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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY.

PART V.

JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1923.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part V.

No. 1.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 1.)

(No. 371.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July* 1, 1923.

MY telegram No. 368.

Parker telegraphed 29th June that he will leave Angora on 4th July at latest.

He states that Turkish Government, realising that if company's claims were submitted to neutral arbitration company would certainly win, insisted: (1) on reserving to itself choice of final referee; (2) on limiting maximum sum to be received by company to amount of net paper money receipts during Turkish administration (which was both [? faulty] and dishonest); (3) that arbitration be deferred to an indefinite date.

He requests views of His Majesty's Government.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 107.)

[E 6822/35/44] No. 2.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 375.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, June* 26, 1923.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 363 of the 19th instant, to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the joint note which, after some hesitation on the part of the Italian Acting High Commissioner, I induced my colleagues to address to the Turkish representative here in regard to the violation by the Turks of the Mudania Convention, as established by the guns captured on board the steamship "Umid."

2. After a week's silence, Adnan Bey came to see me yesterday to protest against this seizure. His representations were of the most half-hearted nature, and consisted of what amounted practically to an appeal to my goodwill in arranging for the return of these guns on the ground that they had not been imported into Eastern Thrace, but, having been hidden there by Djafer Tayar on the disbandment of his forces, had recently been discovered there. I pointed out to Adnan Bey that his story was on the face of it most improbable. Djafer Tayar had given the British authorities a written declaration to the effect that all the guns in his possession had been handed over. Moreover, the captured guns were in excellent condition, and when seized were being accompanied by the entire equipment of regular batteries, including horses and artillerymen. The latter could scarcely have been concealed with the guns. Adnan Bey admitted that the evidence on the face of it looked rather black from the Turkish point of view. He said that he had himself expressed surprise to Refet Pasha that the guns should have been accompanied by artillerymen, but that Refet had explained that among the

gndarmerie who were being demobilised there were a number of former artillerymen, and that he had thought it suitable to send them with the guns.

3. As Adnan's representations were merely verbal, I made no mention of the fact that some of the guns bore marks showing conclusively that they had been in the Tophané depot as late as last July. I told him that I saw no prospect of the guns being returned until after peace, but I asked him to furnish me with a full and detailed explanation showing when and where and how they had been discovered. Adnan replied that he had telegraphed to Angora for the necessary details. When I observed that this could more easily be obtained from Refet Pasha, Adnan entered upon a lame explanation about Refet being merely a guest in Constantinople and in no way under his orders.

4. Our conversation was in fact farcical. Adnan fully realised that I did not believe him, and he made no serious attempt to convince me.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Allied High Commissioners to Adnan Bey.

IL a été porté à la connaissance des Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie par le Général commandant en chef les forces alliées en Turquie que le 17 du mois courant le vapeur turc "Umid" a été arrêté au large de Silivri ayant à bord, à part des hommes de troupe et des chevaux, un nombre de canons de montagne et de pièces de campagne.

Il a été établi que ces canons ont été chargés à bord de l'"Umid" dans le port de Silivri même.

Les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés ne peuvent que constater que la présence de ces canons en Thrace orientale constitue une preuve définitive de la violation par les Turcs de la Convention de Moudania et est en contradiction flagrante avec les assurances répétées à maintes reprises par les autorités turques que les conditions de cette convention ont été loyalement observées par elles.

Les Hauts-Commissaires alliés se sont empressés de notifier ce fait à leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

JESSÉ CURÉLY.
NEVILE HENDERSON.
MAÏSSA.

Constantinople, le 21 juin 1923.

[E 6823/52/44]

No. 3.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 376.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 27*, 1923.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 361 of the 24th instant relative to the future of the Œcumenical Patriarchate, I have the honour to enclose herein a copy of the note addressed by the Patriarchate to the Allied High Commissioners on the 21st instant, informing them of the refusal of the Mixed Council to accept the resignation of Mgr. Meletios until such time as the future relations of the Patriarchate with the Turkish Government, as well as the method of election of the new Patriarch, are clearly defined.

2. A letter in similar terms has been addressed to the United States, Jugo-slav and Roumanian representatives here, and I understand that the whole position has been explained at length to M. Veniselos, who has been requested, if possible, to take action at Lausanne to give effect to the Patriarchate's decision, even though it be in direct contradiction to the advice offered by that statesman to the Patriarch and to the assurance given by him to the Turkish delegation that Mgr. Meletios would definitely resign on the conclusion of peace.

3. I do not think that M. Veniselos will be able to assist, or that, even if he were willing, he would succeed. Mgr. Meletios, as your Lordship is aware from Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 1118 of the 10th December, 1921, was elected to the Patriarchal see on the 8th December, 1921, under conditions of grave irregularity, and his whole record has been such as to render his name anathema to the Turks in general and to the Angora Government in particular. It is most improbable, therefore, that the Turkish Government will agree to enter upon any such discussions until the promise of the resignation of Mgr. Meletios has been definitely fulfilled. The Turks will maintain that questions affecting the Patriarchate are matters of purely internal politics, and that, as such, no foreign intervention can be tolerated.

4. Although from this point of view the decision taken by the Patriarchate must in present circumstances be considered as unfortunate, it is difficult not to sympathise with the decision which has been taken. The person of the Patriarch is regarded as the only bulwark of the Orthodox Church against the attacks with which the institution is menaced. The apprehensions expressed in the accompanying note as to the determination of the present rulers of Turkey to degrade the Patriarchate are certainly not exaggerated. There is, in fact, good reason to believe that the Turkish authorities were more or less directly responsible for the recent Patriarchal troubles which culminated in the announcement that a representative of the Anatolian or Turkish Orthodox Church would be established in Constantinople.

5. For various reasons as stated in the note from the Patriarchate, the regulations governing the election of the Œcumenical Patriarch are out of date. The resignation of Mgr. Meletios himself would, I fear, not suffice to disarm Turkish resentment against the institution as a whole. Neither would the appointment of any *locum tenens*—unless he were a puppet of the Turks—be recognised by them. The next step would probably be a demand for the reorganisation or even dissolution of the Holy Synod and the Lay Council on the ground that it is improperly constituted. It is, moreover, a fact that the election of some members of both of these bodies was irregularly conducted at the time of the appointment of Mgr. Meletios. In the present circumstances, the appointment under Turkish control of new members of these bodies would be merely farcical. Any amendment in their composition or in the regulations governing a new election would merely be contrived to suit the Turks' plan of converting the Patriarchate into a Turkish Orthodox institution.

6. The maintenance therefore of a Patriarchate in Constantinople, with its quasi-political status definitely abolished and entirely subservient to a Moslem Government, can scarcely, from a religious point of view, be regarded as otherwise than undesirable. Falling into increasing disrepute, it would cease to have influence either at home or abroad, and would merely become contemptible as a result of the inevitable intrigue and corruption to which it would be exposed.

7. Nor do I think that much would be gained even if—which I much doubt—the Turkish authorities expressed their willingness to discuss the regulations affecting the future of the Patriarchate before the resignation of Mgr. Meletios. The Turks would either impose conditions which would be altogether unacceptable or, at most, record a paper agreement, which, after it had served to secure the resignation of the present Patriarch, would be so manipulated as to serve the Turkish purpose.

8. For the above reasons, I incline to the opinion that the interests of the Orthodox Church would best be served if Mgr. Meletios did not yet resign, and if he and the entre Patriarchate were removed from Constantinople before the evacuation of the Allied forces. If it remains there would seem to be no guarantee against the grave risk, to which reference is made in the letter to your Lordship of the 12th instant from the Archbishop of Canterbury, of seeing Papa Eftim or some other creature of the Turks seated on the Patriarchal throne, the Patriarchate itself made into a public laughing-stock, its traditions destroyed and its records and treasures in the hands of a tool of the Moslems.

9. The suggestion that Mount Athos should, as neutral ground, become the new seat of the Patriarch was at one time regarded with favour, I believe, by Mgr. Meletios himself. Only outside Turkey would the Patriarch be free, in the present temper of the Turks, to exercise his true functions as head of the whole Orthodox Church; nor need the loss of all the sacred and historical associations of Constantinople be regarded as final. The Papacy itself has had its periods of absence from Rome. The principal objection to the adoption of such a course is naturally the repugnance of the Patriarch to desert his flock. But, on the other hand, though a certain amount of initial disquiet would inevitably ensue, I doubt whether such a transfer would be altogether injurious to the Greek population of Turkey, many of whose troubles may indirectly be

attributed to Patriarchal activities. It is even possible that it may result in the Turkish authorities showing rather increased tolerance towards the Greek population. Moreover, it is to be trusted that in the course of time circumstances will so change as to render possible the return of the Patriarchate to Constantinople under conditions once more favourable to itself and the whole Christian world.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Œcumenical Patriarch to Allied High Commissioners.

LE Patriarcat œcuménique a l'honneur d'avertir MM. les représentants des Hauts-Commissaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie à Constantinople, et, par leur intermédiaire, leurs Gouvernements respectifs, qu'il traverse actuellement une période des plus critiques : il se sent menacé dans son existence même, et, pour échapper au danger d'une destruction, il invoque de nouveau la sollicitude des grandes Puissances alliées qui, à plusieurs reprises, lui ont donné des témoignages de leur précieux intérêt.

L'attaque du 1er juin contre le Patriarcat par une troupe de gens sans aveu, qui, sous la protection de leur police, ont cherché à dissoudre les corps constitués du Patriarcat et qui ont molesté la personne du Patriarche lui-même pour lui arracher sa démission ; les actes semblables qui se déroulent actuellement dans une des principales paroisses de Constantinople—celle de Galata—où ces mêmes gens, toujours sous la protection de la police, empêchent le fonctionnement des institutions religieuses et proclament leur intention d'installer dans la principale église de Galata un Patriarcat turco-orthodoxe, démontrent clairement l'intention des dirigeants turcs d'avilir et de dissoudre le Patriarcat en organisant contre lui des mouvements populaciers, protégés contre l'indignation de la population orthodoxe par la force armée publique.

Il ne peut pas y avoir de doute que l'évacuation de Constantinople par les troupes alliées donnera le signal de la réalisation complète de ce programme.

En considération de ce qui précède et devant la probabilité de la dispersion des membres des deux corps constitués du Patriarcat, soit par la force, soit sous divers prétextes, il ne reste comme unique sauvegarde de l'Église orthodoxe contre les attaques et les empiétements dont elle est et sera la victime que le Patriarche, qui ne peut être dépouillé canoniquement et légalement de sa dignité par la seule violence.

Convaincue de cette vérité, l'assemblée des deux corps constitués du Patriarcat œcuménique, en discutant la question de la démission éventuelle du Patriarche actuel après la signature de la paix, conformément à une déclaration faite à Lausanne, a conclu à l'unanimité des voix qu'elle ne pourra accepter cette démission tant que la situation légale du Patriarcat vis-à-vis du Gouvernement turc n'aura pas été définie et qu'un règlement fixant le mode d'élection du nouveau Patriarche n'aura pas été établi. Elle reconnaît, d'ailleurs, la nécessité de cette démission pour des raisons de convenance politique, sa Sainteté étant la première à se rallier à ce point de view.

Il est à noter que l'ancien règlement pour l'élection patriarcale n'est plus en vigueur, puisque la loi organique sur le Patriarcat qui l'englobait est considérée comme caduque par le Gouvernement turc et que les modifications d'ordre territorial et d'administration religieuse survenues dans ces dernières années rendraient impossible l'application de ce règlement.

L'élaboration d'un nouveau règlement ne peut avoir de valeur canonique que si celui-ci est confirmé par un Patriarche en fonctions.

Le Patriarcat œcuménique, s'autorisant de la bienveillance que les grandes Puissances alliées lui ont témoignée au moment où fut discutée à Lausanne la question de son maintien à Constantinople, espère qu'elles voudront bien lui venir en aide dans les circonstances difficiles qu'il traverse actuellement, en exerçant leur influence pour que la constitution et la forme actuelles du Patriarcat soient reconnues comme légales par le Gouvernement turc et pour que des garanties de sécurité et d'ordre lui soient assurées afin qu'il puisse exercer librement ses attributions religieuses qui comprennent naturellement l'élection patriarcale.

Constantinople, le 21 *juin* 1923.

[E 6824/199/44] No. 4.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 377.)

Constantinople, June 27, 1923.

My Lord,

THE chief electoral feature of the past week in Constantinople has been the conclusion of the "secondary" elections in all sections of the town. Your Lordship is already aware from my previous despatches of the manner in which these elections have been conducted. Needless to state, only the secondary electors whose names appeared on the lists furnished by the Kemalist organisation were actually nominated. The grotesque nature of the entire proceedings is shown by the fact that, two days before the ballot boxes were opened for the counting of votes, the municipal officer in charge of the elections despatched a telegram to Angora informing Mustafa Kemal of the unanimous vote accorded by the population of Constantinople to the candidates of his party, a telegram, moreover, which was suitably acknowledged before the counting of the votes commenced.

2. It is interesting to note that the authorities made special efforts to ensure that as much display as possible should be made on the occasion of the collection of the ballot boxes in the Pera area, and for this purpose a special grant, alleged to be more than £ T. 10,000, was made by the municipality. Hundreds of denizens of the Turkish quarters were conveyed to Pera in cabs and motor cars adorned with the red flag and the crescent in order to impress the casual observer with the appearance of spontaneous enthusiasm. The Turkish press of the following morning did full justice to the occasion and was at pains to demonstrate that such a result had at last revenged the loyal population of Pera for the indignities and oppression from which they had suffered at the hands of foreigners during the preceding four years.

3. Altogether, some 1500 "electors" have been chosen and these will proceed on the 28th June to elect the fifteen Deputies for the Constantinople area. A list of candidates has been issued, fifteen in number, including such prominent Kemalists as Reouf Bey, Fevzi, Kiazim Kara Bekir and Rafet Pashas, Fethi Bey, Minister of Interior, Adnan Bey and Mukhtar, Ambassador at Moscow. Perhaps the most significant feature of the list, however, is the inclusion of Ismail Djambolat Bey, one of the most active members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who has never been at pains to conceal either his Unionist leanings or his animosity towards Mustafa Kemal himself.

4. It had been anticipated that no Opposition candidates would take the field. On the 25th instant, however, it was announced that three independent candidates would offer themselves for election, but, as one of these was, until a few days ago, president of the Defence of Rights Committee here, it remains to be seen whether these are actually Opposition candidates, or whether, as seems probable, they are in reality Kemalist candidates put up to demonstrate the alleged freedom of the elections. On the other hand, particular importance attaches to an announcement made yesterday that 300 electors had petitioned the authorities in favour of the candidature of Nureddin Pasha, whose opposition to Mustafa Kemal was dealt with in my despatch No. 366 of the 20th instant. It is also stated that the absence of a Jewish candidate from the Kemalist list has caused dissatisfaction in Jewish circles. It had been hoped to secure the nomination of the ex-Grand Rabbi, Haim Naoum Effendi, who has just returned to Constantinople, but his candidature here or at Smyrna was not approved by Angora.

5. Considerable progress has now been made with the elections in Western Anatolia and altogether ninety Deputies have been elected. The results recently announced include those for Smyrna, who, as usual, are Kemalist candidates, Mustafa Kemal himself being at their head. It may be noted, however, with reference to the Unionist activities at Smyrna which have already been reported, that, although over 800 electors should have participated in the final choice of the nine Deputies, only 315 appear to have done so, the remainder being reported unavoidably absent through illness and other reasons. In view of what is already known regarding Kemalist electoral methods, these figures, if correct, would indicate that local feeling at Smyrna, about which I hope to have more detailed information at an early date, has become to a large extent anti-Kemalist.

6. As regards the remainder of Anatolia, reliable information is still lacking. Apart from the election on the 25th instant of two Deputies for Erzindjan, no information has reached me regarding electoral activities in the eastern provinces, though it has been announced that Mosul will be represented in the new assembly by three Deputies. In Angora, however, whither some thirty of the most reliable Kemalist

policemen from Constantinople have recently been transferred, it is stated that on the issue of the Kemalist list of forty-two "second" electors an Opposition list was also published, while it is reported that in two quarters of Eskishehr none of the second electors chosen appeared on the Kemalist list. The press reports add that enquiries are being made regarding the causes of these two incomprehensible incidents.

7. In so far as Constantinople is concerned, perhaps the most significant feature of the last week has been the reception accorded to the proclamation addressed to the population by Mustafa Kemal in acknowledgement of the conferment upon him of the freedom of the city. This colourless pronouncement, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation herein, is of itself not without interest, principally for what it leaves unsaid, particularly in regard to the future status of Constantinople, and also for the complete absence of that fire and vigour which have invariably characterised such declarations in the past.

8. Its reception by the press represents, I think, fairly the waning popularity of Mustafa Kemal, at least among the civilian population in Constantinople. Only three of the Turkish papers gave it real prominence, one ignored it altogether, while only one went so far as to comment favourably upon it. On the other hand, the campaign of criticism is steadily gaining ground and is no longer solely confined to the "Tanin." The hitherto loyalist "Wakt" inserted on the 21st instant a partly censored letter from Edhem, the notorious Circassian leader, accusing the Turkish army of treason, praising the Committee of Union and Progress, and defining national sovereignty as despotism; while on the 25th instant the violent Nationalist journal "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," in common with the "Tanin," published a proclamation by Lutfi Fikri Bey, the leader of the Turkish Bar, in which after a general criticism of the Administration, particularly in connection with the elections, he quoted the Bulgarian elections, which had resulted in such an overwhelming majority for Stambolisky and which had merely precipitated the recent *coup d'État* in that country, as an example from which it would be well for the Turks to take warning.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Manifesto of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the People of Constantinople.

(Translation.)

I CONSIDER myself fortunate to-day in having received from the noble population of Constantinople a new token of their confidence and sympathy. The general municipal council, the presidents and members of which are elected by the people of Constantinople, basing itself on its mandatory rights, has conferred upon me honorary citizenship in accordance with the decision taken at its meeting on the 28th February, 1923. I have received with great respect and emotion from the hands of the special commission the council's mazbata, this mark of sympathy and love, whose contents are a masterpiece of art and accord with the pure and noble sentiments of Turkish and Mussulman Constantinople. On this occasion I again recall, in all its fullness, beautiful Constantinople and the virtue of its noble population.

Throughout our national struggle Constantinople has been the high and holy altar of our national and patriotic love, and from henceforth no event and no power can turn our hearts from this sacred altar. To-day the heart of every Turk, and of every Moslem, is the inviolable abode of love and affection for Constantinople. In that beautiful city are gathered together the fruits of our national efforts throughout the centuries. There are found all the monuments and institutions, every one of which is an eternal and eloquent sign of our national capabilities.

At times there have lived in that beautiful city Sovereigns and Governments who have dominated the national destinies, and whose behaviour towards the nation has not always been faithful and patriotic. This is a historical truth which cannot be denied. The noble and enlightened people of Constantinople, being eye-witnesses of these misfortunes, were the first to become convinced of the necessity of uprooting the evils of despotism, which had brought a chain of calamities on our fatherland. I have never doubted this.

When, by its decision of the 1st November, 1922, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which, from the 23rd April, 1920, had taken into its hands the destiny of the nation, had again explicitly proclaimed that dominion and sovereignty unconditionally belonged to the nation, what enthusiasm its acceptance and approval evoked from the heart of patriotic Constantinople! Although not yet completely liberated from foreign interference and oppression, nothing prevented the people of Constantinople from manifesting enthusiastically the noble sentiments hidden, up till that day, in their hearts, and on that occasion from showing their lively interest in the national sovereignty and independence.

We have now witnessed the appearance of a new and sublime sign of the patriotism of Constantinople. We have seen with the utmost gratitude that, on the decision taken for the re-election of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in order to strengthen our sovereignty and our national independence, the enlightened and patriotic population of Constantinople, which to-day is fully aware of the truth, has formed an united national *bloc* against friends and enemies, and is on the point of arriving at a happy result. I consider it a great honour and dignity that such a people should have conferred on myself the honorary citizenship as a proof of its sincere love.

I can never forget the separation or despair which I felt when I left Constantinople four years ago to take strength from the capacities which I had for long seen in the noble spirit of our nation, and to prepare the foundations of our national struggle. But this separation had as its object the deliverance of Constantinople, which, like other parts of the fatherland, was groaning in pain and slavery. Thanks be to God that the determination and resolution of our great nation succeeded! Our national aspirations have been, are, and will be, manifested and realised.

The day is not far off when Constantinople, which already breathes an air of greater liberty than before, will be completely delivered. By this deliverance not only will Constantinople be rescued from occupation and slavery, but perhaps henceforth, in an united Turkey, it will enjoy new life and happiness in returning to the motherland and nation. It was not an honourable position for Constantinople to be the seat of the ambition and magnificence of despotic Sultans. It is only when Constantinople has become an enlightened and precious city of a great Turkey, free and mistress of her destinies, that through her most natural resources and virtues she will be raised to her most real high position. We know that in order to obtain these glorious results Constantinople, like all our nation and country, suffered much. But it is also undeniable that calamities and sufferings have been for us sources of resolution and strength. We can be certain that, thanks to the efforts of the nation, which has taken hold of its independence and sovereignty, all these sufferings, damages and devastations will shortly be made good.

On this occasion, in the expectation that Constantinople, of which I am proud to be an honorary citizen, will enter, free and joyful, into a well-earned era of happiness, I beg you to transmit to the whole population, great and small, the expression of my warmest and most sincere affection.

E 6801/1/44] No. 5.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July 2.*)

(No. 216. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Lausanne, June 29, 1923.*

MR. GREW, the American observer, has on two occasions spoken to me about the principle which the Allied delegates propose to endeavour to get the Turks to accept validating and maintaining concessions, the formalities in connection with which had not been completed on the 29th October, 1914. This is the second principle set out in the draft protocol which was forwarded in my despatch No. 214 of the 28th June to your Lordship. Mr. Grew has on both occasions emphasised the fact that, in objecting to the principle in question, his Government disclaim that they have any particular concessionary company in view. They consider that a treaty stipulation should not confirm the validity of concessions or contracts which are not in themselves completely valid. In spite of the above-mentioned disclaimer on the part of the United States Government, there is no doubt whatever in my mind that the Americans have in mind the concession for the Samsun–Sivas Railway in the case of the French and the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession in the case of the British.

2. I left Mr. Grew under no misapprehension on both occasions on which he spoke to me that it was the duty of the British delegation to protect the interests of British

concessionary companies, and that this delegation would do their utmost to ensure such protection as was possible for those companies. I may mention that between the first and second conversations which I had with Mr. Grew on the subject the Allied experts had introduced certain modifications into the draft of section 2 of the protocol in question in order to make that section more palatable to the Americans. These modifications consist in the introduction of the words "d'un commun accord" between the words "s'ils ont" and "reçu un commencement d'application," whilst the words "comportant un avantage pour la Turquie" were added at the end of the paragraph. The draft protocol as so modified was communicated to the American and Turkish delegations, and I enquired what Mr. Grew thought of the modifications. He again repeated that they were not of a nature to alter the objections of his Government to the particular principle formulated in that section, but that he had telegraphed the modifications to his Government. Mr. Grew also said that he thought that the principles laid down in the protocol would not be of easy application, from which I derived the impression that he was not very favourably disposed to the protocol as a whole.

3. On the occasion of his second visit he read me the instructions of his Government, which are summarised in Sir Auckland Geddes's telegram No. 276 of the 20th June. He also informed me that he had been instructed to speak to Ismet Pasha on the subject, and there is no doubt whatever that the opposition which the Turks may certainly be counted on to offer to the acceptance of the second principle will be strengthened by American support, whether direct or indirect.

4. Speaking generally, the attitude of the American delegation during the second phase of this conference has been disappointing. I believe that Mr. Grew has once or twice intervened in private interviews with Ismet Pasha to get the latter to be reasonable about the Græco-Turkish reparations question and the coupons question, but he missed a great chance of helping the Allies on the occasion on which the latter delivered an onslaught on the Turks in committee with reference to their refusal to allow the return of the numerous Armenians who had left Turkey under the impulse of fear. The American delegation remained completely silent on that occasion, possibly because Mr. Grew is deaf and did not hear what was going on, but also possibly because the American observers appear to be incapable of making verbal declarations on the spur of the moment and confine themselves to the reading of written declarations, which are as often as not couched in very involved language.

5. Mr. Grew recently informed me privately that his Government are being very much attacked by various associations and societies for entering into negotiations with a country whose attitude towards its Christian subjects is so callous, not to say brutal. He suggested that at the final meeting of my committee I might once more allude to the attitude of the Turkish Government in refusing to allow the return to Turkey of the very numerous Armenians who are Turkish subjects. This would give him an opportunity of making a declaration on the subject, which would presumably salve the conscience of the American Government and their delegation.

6. The British and American delegations are on excellent terms with each other, and the composition of the latter is a great improvement on that of the American delegation during the first phase of the conference. We have happily been spared the presence of men of the stamp of Admiral Bristol and Mr. Gillespie.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

No. 6.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 2, 1923.*

I GATHER from Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams that his Italian colleague is in general agreement with him. In these circumstances it appears only necessary that your Excellency should, when communicating to the Italian Government the substance of my telegram No. 281 to Lord Crewe, merely add that I assume that the Italian Government share these views and will inform the French Government accordingly.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 282; Lausanne, No. 103; and Constantinople, No. 209.)

No. 7.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 2, 1923.*

THE position which has now been reached in the negotiations at Lausanne is shown in Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams Nos. 232, 233, 234, which your Excellency has received by bag. The moment appears, therefore, to have come when a final decision must be taken by the Allies as to the demands which it is necessary to put forward to the Turks on the questions of (1) the debt coupons, (2) concessions.

On the attitude which it is decided to take up on these points will depend also the decision as to evacuation. The alternative French proposals to meet the situation are as follows:—

(*a.*) Signature of a treaty containing French formula on the coupons question, and agreed Allied text covering the concessions question and protocol providing for evacuation in accordance with Turkish desires; or,

(*b.*) Failing Turkish acceptance of this, signature of a treaty omitting provisions covering the coupons and concessions question, and maintenance of Allied occupation until the bondholders and concessionnaires shall have reached satisfactory agreement with the Turkish Government.

The first of these alternatives represents what His Majesty's Government, for their part agree would be an ideal solution. The second is open to the objection that the Allies will be committed to a continuance of the occupation of Constantinople and neighbourhood with the inconveniences and risks which would be inevitably connected therewith.

His Majesty's Government appreciate the force of the views strongly held by Sir H. Rumbold as set forth in his telegrams Nos. 232 and 233 that the French terms will certainly be rejected, and having regard to the effect which the indefinite continuation of the occupation would entail on public opinion in all countries, they feel impelled to invite the careful examination by the French Government of the alternative scheme submitted by Sir H. Rumbold in his telegram No. 232, under the headings numbered 1, 2 and 3. Your Excellency should, when discussing the matter with M. Poincaré, enquire whether, notwithstanding the consideration urged by Sir H. Rumbold, the French Government propose to adhere to their own proposals, and if so, whether they have weighed all the consequences which may arise, and whether, in particular, they would be prepared to send reinforcements which, in the opinion of the delegates at Lausanne, may become a necessity.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 195; Constantinople, No. 208; and Lausanne, No. 102.)

No. 8.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, July 2, 1923.*

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 111 (Lausanne telegram No. 239).

Situation here remains as described in my telegram No. 241, except that press is more open in scoffing at way "great powers of the earth" present themselves as beggars before Greece terrified by the idea of a separate peace. It is argued here, as I have already pointed out, that Turks would be so glad to get out of the way of the only army capable of taking the offensive against them that they would readily give Greece good terms to achieve this end.

I venture to doubt whether Greek Government would dare to assume responsibility for demobilisation without signing at least a preliminary peace, and it appears to me that we ourselves should incur grave responsibility in recommending them to do so. Experience of last year here shows that, once demobilised, it will be impossible to get men to return to the colours.

Whilst it is true that our action served Greece last autumn, it seems to me difficult to contend that it has brought her any advantage during the last three or four months. On the contrary, as far as my information goes, we have, for the third

time within two years, stood between Greece and Constantinople, and thus prevented her from striking a blow at Turkey, and perhaps settling whole question in a manner satisfactory to herself as well as to us, without any cost to ourselves.

At present, whether we acknowledge it or not, we are using the menace of Greek army to secure our ends at Lausanne, and of course presence of that army on Maritza must strengthen our position at Constantinople. Demobilisation must perforce weaken efficiency of that menace. According to press, Greek Prime Minister stated yesterday that "if coercive measures against Turkey are realised, Greece will not participate."

If, after all that has passed—our failure to save Greece from collapse after she had placed herself in our [? omitted: hands]; our failure to help solve refugee problem; our preventing Greek occupation of Constantinople and recovery of Eastern Thrace—we are now to come as suppliants to a Government with which we have severed relations, and, whilst offering them nothing in return, beg them not to make a separate peace, our position in this part of the world will be truly humiliating. If we *must* beg Greek Government not to make separate peace, would it not be somewhat less humiliating and cheaper in long run for us to offer to reopen abandoned credits and enable Greeks to keep army in field and maintain solid front with us?

(Sent to Constantinople, No. 135.)

No. 9.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 3.)

(No. 374.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July* 2, 1923.

MY telegram No. 364.

Adnan's reply to joint note (enclosed in my despatch No. 345) states that guns were "found" in Thrace and removed thence out of respect for Mudania Convention. In order to effect their removal soldiers and draught horses had to be sent.

This halting explanation is followed by a mild protest against search of steamship "Umid" and request for return of guns.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 199.)

No. 10.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 3.)

(No. 242.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 2, 1923.

(R.) SIGNOR MONTAGNA this morning informed General Pellé and myself that he had received instructions from Italian Government that Italian delegation should not take any further part in drawing up draft agreement for distribution amongst Allied nationals who have reparation claims against Turkey of the 5,000,000*l.* in gold and proceeds of 846,000*l.* Turkish Treasury bills. Italian Government consider that questions dealt with in this draft agreement should be discussed between Governments, and not by delegations here, and state that they are about to communicate with His Majesty's Government and French Government through Italian Ambassadors in London and Paris. We received this announcement with considerable dismay, as it appears to us essential that arrangements granting some measure of compensation to reparation claimants should be made simultaneously with treaty negotiations, and should not be deferred to some indefinite future date. Also, as a matter of practical convenience, it seems essential to take advantage of presence of Allied experts here to reach agreement on any points of difference that may arise between Governments in regard to this question, especially as Roumania, Serbia and Japan are interested as well as inviting Powers. Italian delegation state that their Government have given no reasons for their decision, but it seems probable that they object to draft agreement—

1. In view of their refusal to abandon pretension that His Majesty's Government should contribute 5,000,000*l.* to Turkish reparation fund; and

2. Because they fear claims of concessionary companies (none of which are Italian) will swamp fund to the prejudice of claims by individuals. (End of R.)

(Part 2.)

To meet first point we might agree that article 1 of convention should refer to (1) sum of 5,000,000*l.* in gold, and (2) any other sum which may be available so as to enable 5,000,000*l.* in gold to be distributed without waiting until Italian Government has abandoned its pretensions in regard to payment of a further 5,000,000*l.* sterling by His Majesty's Government. We should of course withhold Turkish Treasury bills until this pretension had been given up. As regards second point, it seems essential to settle at once whether and to what extent concessionary companies are to share in fund, and agreement can be reached here between Allied experts acting on instructions of their Governments more easily than by diplomatic correspondence. In this connection, see my telegram No. 199. General Pellé is telegraphing in a similar sense to his Government.

Copies of draft agreement drawn up on 6th June and of article 6 as redrafted on 28th June have been sent to Mr. Oliphant semi-officially. Copies of draft with further minor changes will be sent by bag to-morrow.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 5.)

No. 11.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 3.)

(No. 244.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 2, 1923.

FOLLOWING is summary of note addressed this afternoon by Ismet to delegates of inviting Powers, through secretary-general. Text was given by Turks to press immediately after despatch:—

"Inviting Powers, when proposing settlement of Greek reparation question on 26th May, assured Turkey that she would enjoy same facilities regarding financial questions concerning her. Immediately after settlement of reparation question I proposed that essential outstanding questions—notably the judicial declaration, evacuation, and coupons—should be disposed of successively and without break, like reparation question, which had been settled before any of the others.

"This procedure was accepted and followed at first. Agreement was thus reached regarding judicial declaration.

"Evacuation and coupon questions have not, however, been settled. Allied delegations, on their part, have not continued to study them until solution should be found. Inviting Powers have, throughout, deferred decision on these questions, which are the principal obstacle to peace.

"Turkish delegation has exerted every effort in this direction. It took as basis formula prepared by jurists and proposed with the approval of Allied plenipotentiaries. It went into precise [? groups omitted] elaborated by the same jurists, and assented finally to reasonable formula resulting from combination of the two proposals made in collaboration with an Allied financial expert. About two weeks have since elapsed.

"At the meeting of 23rd June evacuation and coupons were not discussed, although they appeared on agenda circulated beforehand. In reply to repeated verbal representations made by me since then, I have always been told that they would be proceeded with within one or two days.

"I am still without any reply, although four days have elapsed since my latest representation.

"I have not ceased to add that I was ready to settle successively in one sitting questions of evacuation, coupons and concessions.

"Turkish delegation, which has throughout exerted itself to avoid delay in conclusion of peace, requests conference to proceed with discussion of essential questions enumerated above successively at single meeting, more particularly question of coupons, which constitutes principal obstacle to conclusion of peace."

No. 12.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 3.)

(No. 245.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 2, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Turkish note is a tissue of misrepresentations, seriousness of which is aggravated by its premature publication. Ismet came to see me just after I had received it. I protested vehemently against his action. I said that I had spared no effort to accelerate the settlement of outstanding questions, and that it was intolerable that we should be accused of dilatoriness on the ground that we had not accepted, lying down, Turkish view of how they should be settled. Angora Government showed clearly that they had no idea of compromise. He himself had transformed jurists' formula into something totally unacceptable. Even at earlier stage I had warned him that in discussing it I had got beyond instructions of His Majesty's Government and could not pledge them to it. It was not until a few days ago that he had told me that he could discuss concessions question at all. As for evacuation, I had always told him, and I now repeated, that, while ready to discuss this at same sitting as the other two questions, it must come last in order. I said that his action in publishing note without previous reference to Allied delegates was incorrect and would compel me to reply at once showing up its inaccuracies. My observations to him were of the most forcible description.

Ismet attempted to justify his action, but his replies to my observations were of the lamest description. He made grievance of fact that we are holding meetings of Second and Third Committees to-morrow to dispose of as many as possible of the outstanding subsidiary questions. Only foundation for this grievance is that there has been accidental delay in giving notice of these meetings.

I will confer with my colleagues first thing to-morrow regarding reply to Turkish note.

No. 13.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 639.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 3, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 281 of 2nd July.

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I went to see the President of the Council this afternoon, and told him of the propositions made by His Majesty's Government, and founded on Sir Horace Rumbold's telegrams Nos. 232, 233, 234. M. Poincaré had two difficulties in saying offhand whether the French Government could concur or not, the first being that the interests of the bondholders had been all through looked after by M. de Lasteyrie, and he must consult him before replying; and, secondly, he had, almost at that moment, received a telegram on the subject which the Minister of Finance had not yet seen. This gave some details of a proposed agreement between the Turkish Government and the Council of Bondholders, which might perhaps take the place of any provision in the treaty regarding their interests. I did not think the proposal sounded very promising, and I asked M. Poincaré's opinion of it, to which he replied that it was, at any rate, a beginning in the direction in which we had all along wished to move, that of direct dealings between Angora and the bondholders. He asked me to send him a note of the terms in which His Majesty's Government wished Turkey to be addressed, and he would send me the gist of the telegram just mentioned.

M. Poincaré said that the French Government found themselves in a rather peculiar position, owing to the Angora Conventions. These, he was quite aware, had been carried out in a not very correct manner, and he was in no way responsible for them, but the fact of their existence did make it necessary to *ménager* the Turk more than otherwise would have been the case.

No. 14.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 3, 1923.)

(No. 640.) [By Telephone.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris.*

YOUR telegram No. 281 of 2nd July and my telegram No. 639.

Reply received from French Government this evening.

They ask that urgent instructions be sent to Sir H. Rumbold to agree with his French and Italian colleagues on the final proposals to be made on outstanding questions. Note states that the three points of the suggestion in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 232 are in accord with instructions sent through French Ambassador in London on 29th June, on which his Excellency was at once to approach your Lordship. His Excellency was instructed, however, as regards the debt, to add to alternative (*b*) of point 1 a provision whereby evacuation would only take place within six weeks after ratification by Turkish Parliament if in the interval an agreement was reached with bondholders. This would safeguard interests of the bondholders, while giving the Turks time to reach an agreement with them. The alternative would thus be (*a*) either the text in the draft of 4th February maintaining the Decree of Muharrem, with which should be embodied the Paris formula, or (*b*) no declaration at all, it being understood (1) that this would be interpreted by the Allies as leaving the Muharrem Decree in full validity, as well as the annexed decree and loan contracts, and (2) evacuation would only take place six weeks after Turkish ratification if an agreement had been reached with bondholders in the interval.

It would follow that point 3 in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 232 (evacuation) would require modification.

Text of telegram from General Pellé, referred to in my telegram No. 639, is enclosed in French Government's note. Summary is given in my immediately following telegram.

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

No. 15.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 3, 1923.)

(No. 641.) [By Telephone.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris.*

MY telegram No. 640.

Following is summary of telegram from General Pellé to French Government :—

Zeki Bey suggested to M. des Closières that the Allies should abandon any demand from the Turkish delegation for a declaration regarding the debt. Instead, an exchange of letters should take place between the Turkish Government and the Council of the Debt outside the conference. The Turkish Government would inform the council that it confirmed it in its powers, restored to it all administration of the debt and the loan securities and had decided to enter into negotiations with the bondholders. The council would take act of the declaration and answer that to meet the needs of the Government it would undertake to hand over 50 per cent. of the revenues of the debt until an agreement had been reached with the bondholders.

Zekiai stated that the idea was purely personal and had not been mentioned to other members of his delegation.

M. des Closières declined to discuss it, as it was too late now to discuss such solution, and said that the Allied Governments would without delay make known their last proposals.

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

No. 16.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 211.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 3, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 371 of 1st July.

You should reply that His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot take the responsibility of expressing any views on the Turkish offer.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 104.)

No. 17.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne).

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 3, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 235 and 239 of 29th and 30th June: Separate Græco-Turkish negotiations.

Your reply to M. Veniselos should be to the effect that we greatly appreciate his past and present action in this matter, that we fully understand his position and that of his Government, and that in the circumstances we can only leave the decision and the responsibility to them.

It would, however, be most useful if you could defer this reply to the last possible moment. I am not prepared to advise M. Veniselos in the sense of your telegram No. 239, but you might perhaps speak to him in that sense confidentially and personally on your own initiative.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 113.)

No. 18.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne).

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 3, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 240 of 30th June.

The French Ambassador has given a quite incorrect account of what passed.

He produced a formula about the coupons which I did not even read, but begged leave to examine. He asked me on the strength of this to agree to a Franco-Anglo-Italian ultimatum.

I said that I was certainly in favour of grouping the three outstanding questions and procuring a united front. But I was in communication with you and was still hopeful that an ultimatum might be avoided, and until I heard from Lausanne I could enter into no undertaking.

No. 19.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 246.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 3, 1923.

MY Allied colleagues and I decided yesterday morning to hold a meeting to-day to clear off certain subsidiary outstanding points in the Second and Third Committees. In conversation with my French colleague yesterday, Ismet hinted that he would be unable to agree to any of these points, while no progress was being made with the three major questions of coupons, concessions and evacuation. Judging, however, by the nervously accommodating attitude of Ismet and the rest of his delegation at the meeting this morning, he must have been shaken out of these intentions by the vigorous onslaught which I delivered on him yesterday (see my

telegram No. 245 of 2nd July) and an equally powerful attack by my French colleague, whom he saw after leaving me. Following is record of to-day's proceedings:—

Second Committee: Articles 45, 48, 49 *and* 52.

Outstanding question here was that of providing in them for Greek responsibility for share of debt in area in Western Thrace ceded to Bulgaria by Turkey in 1915 and now ceded to Greece (see reports of experts of 12th June—my despatch No. 161 of 14th June).

This question was taken together with that of article 58 (Græco-Turk reparations) (see above-mentioned report of 12th June), which was still outstanding owing to Turkish attitude regarding payments for Greek requisition notes. M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha explained that they had discussed both of these questions and were waiting for certain instructions from their Governments on one or two small points. They hoped to reach complete agreement in a few days, and would then inform the secretary-general, thus rendering any further meeting of the committee on these two questions unnecessary.

Article 65.

Ismet Pasha accepted the draft text agreed upon by the experts in their report of 29th June (see my despatch No. 217 of 30th June), but he explained that he had been in communication with M. Veniselos regarding similar property in Greece, and that they hoped to agree, within the next few days, on a clause relative to such property which could be added to that concerning Civil List property in the detached territories in Asia. It was arranged that if they reached such an agreement they should communicate it to secretary-general, without necessitating another meeting of the committee. My colleagues and I thanked Turkish delegation for communicating to us Iradés of 1908 and 1909 and lists of the Civil List properties referred to in these Iradés. Copies of these lists will be sent home after translation. They comprise a list of "ancient Imperial properties" retained by the Sultan in 1909. This makes no mention of any property in Irak or Palestine, thus greatly strengthening our belief that all Civil List property in these countries will be acquired gratuitously by the Irak and Palestine Governments under article 65.

Article 70 (*Bill of Indemnity for Financial Acts of Constantinople Government, Debt Council, &c., since the Armistice*).

Ismet explained that, while the question of the gold sequestrated in 1919 and the advances to the Ottoman Bank and Debt Council secured on this gold had been settled (see Constantinople telegram No. 194 of 29th June to me—copy enclosed in my despatch No. 226 of 3rd July), he was awaiting instructions from his Government before being able to accept draft of letter from Turkish Government to Debt Council set out in experts' report of 29th June (see my despatch No. 217). In reality Ismet is believed to be merely withholding acceptance until the debt question is settled. General Pellé read—and Ismet accepted—an Allied declaration to explain that we regarded article 152 as covering reimbursement by Debt Council since the armistice of certain taxes collected on spirituous liquors. I also read a declaration, which Riza Nour formally accepted, making it quite clear that quarantine dues are covered by the expression "sanitary tariff" in article 130 (see my despatch No. 219 of 30th June.

Third Committee: Article 72.

I read the declaration regarding Turkish property in Egypt and Turco-Egyptian economic questions attached to the note of the secretariat dated 27th June (see my despatch No. 215 of 29th June), and this was accepted by the Turkish delegation.

The modification of the article suggested in the economic experts' report of 29th June (see my despatch No. 218 of 30th June) was agreed to, and it was also agreed to add the same words at the end of the first sentence of the second paragraph of the article.

Article 72 *bis* (*Restitution of Property*).

The modification contained in the economic experts' report of 29th June (see my despatch No. 218) was accepted, and the declaration also set out in that report was made by the Turkish delegation and accepted by the Allied delegations.

Article 109 (*Mixed Arbitral Tribunal*).

The additional paragraph proposed in the Drafting Committee's report of 25th June was accepted (see my despatch No. 199 of 26th June). This provides that after three years the Mixed Tribunal may, on the demand of either party, be transferred outside the country where it has had its seat. Thus Turkish fears regarding the thin end of a new Capitulations wedge are removed.

Article 115.

It was agreed to suppress the first paragraph of this article, which was reserved at the last meeting for further consideration, so that the whole article has now been suppressed.

Article 117.

This article will now be suppressed, as the French and Italians have agreed upon covering the contents of the article elsewhere in the treaty. The provisions with regard to trade between Turkey and Libya, and including a provision that most-favoured-nation treatment shall be granted by Italy to Turkish goods entering Libya, will now appear after article 16 in the Commercial Convention.

Trade between Morocco and Turkey is to be the subject of a separate arrangement later between France and Turkey. This is provided for by a modification in article 27.

Commercial Convention: Article 11.

The declaration with regard to the use of the Turkish language contained in the economic experts' report of 29th June (see my despatch No. 218), was read and accepted by the Turks.

Article 17.

The Turkish delegation stated that they were now negotiating a commercial treaty with Poland, and that they would negotiate commercial treaties with Portugal, Belgium and Czechoslovakia in accordance, as far as possible, with the same principles as those contained in the convention with the other Allied Powers, thus agreeing to a compromise similar to that adopted in the case of the adherence clause in the Convention d'Établissement. This article will accordingly be suppressed.

Article 18.

The question of the duration of the Commercial Convention was referred to particularly in connection with Greece, and Ismet stated that there would be a meeting within the next day or two between the Greek and Turkish representatives, when this matter would be discussed between them, and the result communicated in writing to the secretary-general. The question of duration, so far as regards the other Powers, had already been agreed in accordance with the recommendations in the economic experts' report of the 26th May (see my despatch No. 106 of 29th May).

M. Veniselos explained to a member of my delegation after the meeting that he had talked yesterday to Ismet Pasha about the last paragraph of article 157 (mutual restitution of ships captured since the armistice) as invited to do by Ismet Pasha at the last meeting of my committee (see my telegram No. 223 of 26th June). To their apparently mutual surprise, M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha have discovered that this exchange will work out much in favour of the Greeks, and Ismet Pasha has asked M. Veniselos to get him out of a hole with his Government by consenting to abandon Turkish restitution of Greek ships. Apparently M. Veniselos has telegraphed to his Government asking them to agree, if various other points such as the duration of the Commercial Convention are settled in Greece's favour. We may therefore expect that all outstanding points between Greece and Turkey will be settled soon, probably without necessitating any further meetings of the three committees.

Apart from debt, concessions, evacuation and questions on articles 58, 45, &c., and 65, which M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha hoped to settle between them, only points technically outstanding are final draft of last paragraph of article 157 (Græco-Turkish restitution of ships), final text of protocol and declaration under

article 159, articles 46 *bis* and 56 (which depend on the debt settlement), article 70 (reserved this morning), article regarding cabotage in Commercial Convention (settled in principle, but Allies still undecided regarding choice of lines to benefit by two years' continuance of pre-war service), and declaration to be made by Turks regarding Allied lighterage service in Turkish ports.

No. 20.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 247.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 3, 1923.

ROUMANIAN and Serbian delegates called to-day together to say they were uneasy at present state of conference and disturbed by reports of an intention to present Turks with a *mise en demeure*. They pointed out that their countries would be immediately affected by renewal of hostilities with Turkey. They therefore hoped Allies would not take any action which would either lead to a rupture of conference or to *mise en demeure*, which might bring about a rupture. They did not wish to criticise any action Allies thought fit to take in defence of financial and economic interests of their subjects, but they considered a rupture of conference for sake of bondholders difficult to justify. They said that they were going to speak to French and Italian delegates in the same way

Serbian delegate, who had seen Ismet yesterday, stated that latter had informed him that a rupture would this time mean resumption of hostilities. Nothing would induce Turks to pay interest on debt in gold. If rupture occurred Turks would openly proclaim throughout Asia that Allies had not hesitated to bring about renewal of hostilities for the sake of bondholders. Ismet asked Serbian delegate whether Serbs would [group undecypherable] back Greek army in the event of resumption of hostilities. Serbian delegate returned a non-committal reply. Ismet added that he had noticed in press a suggestion that Allied occupation of Turkish territory might be prolonged until Turks had reached an arrangement with bondholders. He said that any prolongation of occupation would mean war, and that Turks would never sign peace unless they were assured beforehand that their territory was to be evacuated.

Allowing for a certain amount of bluff on Ismet's part, I have little doubt that Turks would view prolongation of occupation in manner stated by Ismet. If French have recourse to their second alternative with regard to debt and concession questions, their action will in effect amount to creation of another Ruhr question at Constantinople, and I am convinced that this policy will land Allies in serious difficulties. Sense of conference is entirely opposed to proposed French solution of debt question, and they are isolated on this subject.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 21.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 642.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 3, 1923.

I QUESTIONED President of the Council as to reinforcements at Constantinople in certain eventualities. M. Poincaré stated that last thing anyone wished was to send further reinforcements, and he assumed I should agree with that view.

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

No. 22.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 375.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 4, 1923.

I HAVE received telegram *en clair* from Mr. Parker stating that he has concluded "very satisfactory agreement" on behalf of Aidin Railway.

He is due here to-morrow or day after, when I will confirm.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 201.)

No. 23.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 377.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July* 4, 1923.

TELEGRAM No. 281 to Paris.

General Officer Commanding-in-chief has shown me copy of his telegram to War Office No. 41/54 to-day, drawing attention to difficulties of situation here if evacuation is suspended until such time as coupon and concession questions be settled. I entirely share General Harington's view that if occupation is to continue in such circumstances its legal position should be clearly defined.

My own view is that there are three courses open to us: either (*a*) evacuate Constantinople and Gallipoli as soon as possible; (*b*) to resume effective control here; (*c*) to evacuate Constantinople and to retain hold on Straits.

(*a*) is natural outcome of satisfactory treaty, (*b*) that of rupture, and (*c*) that of treaty in which outstanding questions remain to be settled.

(*b*) would mean resumption of police control and other measures which would probably be resisted to an extent likely to lead to serious incidents. It is not the course to adopt unless Powers are prepared for all possible contingencies. Prestige of Allied troops could only be upheld if real force were applied.

If a treaty with reservations be signed, moral and persuasive effect of maintenance of occupation of Straits seems to me almost equally powerful as would be effect from occupation of Constantinople, and, being far less irritating and easy to manage, more likely to produce in the end an amicable solution.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 203.)

No. 24.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 378.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 4, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 207.

Arrangements are being made for Patriarch to leave for Mount Athos on 8th July on British destroyer.

Holy Synod has approved his departure, and Turkish authorities have granted him necessary visas.

No. 25.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 249.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 4, 1923.

PARIS telegrams Nos. 639 and 640.

French Government apparently wish to represent themselves as going a long way to meet us by accepting point 1 in my telegram No. 232, and agreeing to confront Turks with two alternatives regarding debt, viz., (*a*) acceptance of Paris formula, or (*b*) abandonment of declaration of bondholders subject to reservation on our part of our right to protect interests of latter in so far as they are Allied subjects. They

attach, however, to (*b*) conditions which, as I explained in my telegram No. 233, would inevitably make this alternative as unwelcome to Turks as (*a*). Turks are growing daily more sensitive and suspicious regarding evacuation question. If we should now tell them that we can only abandon declaration to bondholders on conditions—

1. That evacuation will in any case be deferred until six weeks after ratification by Angora, in the hope that they will thus have time to reach agreement with bondholders; and

2. That failing such agreement within that period, evacuation will be still further postponed,

effect on them will be the same as that of ultimatum, and they will refuse to sign treaty. In this connection see my telegram No. 247.

I have spoken to General Pellé in the above sense, and told him that effect on his Government's policy would be to create another Ruhr question. My Italian colleague, who was present at interview, supported my views throughout, and is so reporting to his Government.

French are thus still seeking to involve us in policy which means rupture of conference, but they refuse to face the consequences of such rupture. These consequences are—

1. Indefinite postponement of peace.

2. Probable necessity of tightening our hold on Constantinople, where we cannot with dignity or safety remain for any length of time on present basis.

3. Possible resumption by Turks of hostilities in one or more of three directions, viz., Constantinople and Chanak, Syria or Irak.

Even the first of these consequences is fraught with danger, having regard to the general state of unrest in the Balkans and Near East. Second means that we must assume large measure of responsibility for administration of Constantinople and some measure of responsibility for Eastern Thrace, unless we ask Greece to take it over. Third means war, the ultimate extension of which cannot be foreseen.

M. Poincaré dismisses possibility of Turkish resistance so lightly or appreciates its consequences so imperfectly that when asked whether he will in certain eventualities send reinforcements to Constantinople he says that this is the last thing anyone wishes. This amounts to saying that if above consequences ensue he expects British to bear almost the entire brunt of the danger at Constantinople and Chanak. Bulk of Allied forces in that area are ours; we alone, thanks to the French attitude in the past, have any forces at all on the Asiatic side of the Straits. In these circumstances I cannot see how French can ask us to pull chestnuts out of the fire for bondholders, majority of whom are French citizens and who would themselves gain nothing unless and until we had inflicted fresh and crushing defeat on Turkey. I cannot see either, though this is a question for you rather than for me, how we could justify to British public opinion rupture of conference, involving so much uncertainty and danger. In my considered opinion the one chance of avoiding rupture is to follow course recommended in my telegram No. 232.

It is quite true that another question which, as outcome of proceedings at Angora, is as much a British as a French question is still outstanding, but in my opinion there is little doubt that Ismet, even on his present instructions from Angora, is in a position to, and anxious to, settle it on lines more or less satisfactory to us. Question in itself is not, therefore, so difficult of solution as that of debt, and, in so far as it can be made to appear more a British than a French interest, is for that very reason more likely to be settled by Ismet.

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.)

No. 26.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 250.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 4, 1923.

MY telegram No. 247.

M. Diamandy told a member of my staff confidentially that he had invited Greek delegation to join him and M. Yovanovitch in making these representations to British, French and Italian delegations. He had pointed out advantage of such action from point of view of Greece's anxiety to join in Little *Entente*.

M. Veniselos, whom M. Diamandy had seen in presence of M. Alexandris, had been very anxious to accept invitation, but M. Alexandris said that he could not agree. M. Diamandy presumed this was due to latter's anxiety to keep a complete free hand for Greece in case latter is forced to open separate negotiations with Turkey.

[E 6984/3579/44] No. 27.

Memorandum respecting recent Negotiations with Turkey regarding Concessions.

THE commercial and economic interests of Allied nationals in Turkey consist not only of those held by them directly as foreigners trading in Turkish territory, but also of those held by them indirectly as shareholders in commercial undertakings which have received concessions in Turkey from the Turkish Government, and which are in many cases registered as Turkish companies in accordance with Turkish law. A list of such concessionary companies, the capital of which is entirely or preponderantly British, is attached (Annex (A)).

2. The special interests of Allied concession-holders and of Turkish concessionary companies in which Allied interests are preponderant, were safeguarded by articles 94 and 80, and to a less important extent by articles 95 and 70, of the draft treaty which was presented to the Turks at Lausanne on the 31st January last.

3. These articles provided for the full recognition by the Turkish Government of all concessions granted to such companies and concession-holders before the outbreak of war, and of all arrangements made with them by the Constantinople Government after the 30th October, 1918: for the prolongation of pre-war concessions by a period equal to the duration of hostilities; for the readaptation, by agreement or arbitration, of certain concessions to new economic conditions; for the payment by the Turkish Government to the companies of compensation for war damage, either in the form of new economic advantages or by the payment of a sum to be assessed by agreement or arbitration; and for the general maintenance of the companies' rights and privileges, wherever such rights and privileges might be affected by other articles of the treaty or by the consequences of the war. These clauses formed an important part of the economic section of the draft treaty.

4. The Turks refused to accept them. It was in fact largely owing to their rejection of the economic clauses as a whole that negotiations at Lausanne broke down on the 4th February. The Turkish contention in regard to these particular clauses has always been that, although the companies may rely on receiving equitable treatment and on obtaining the ratification of their pre-war concessions, since they are for the most part Turkish companies and since the granting of concessions is a matter of Turkish law, the settlement of outstanding questions between the companies and concession-holders and the Turkish Government is an internal Turkish question, which cannot form the subject of treaty provisions. Moreover, the Angora Government has strongly objected on principle to ratifying anything done by the Constantinople Government after March 1920.

5. On the 8th March last the French Ambassador communicated to Lord Curzon a somewhat startling proposal from M. Poincaré which was apparently intended to offer a solution of this problem on entirely new lines (see Annex (B)). It was that arrangements should be made for the opening of direct private negotiations between the concessionary companies and concession-holders and the Turks, with a view to the conclusion of separate arrangements on the various points at issue. It was not clear how far it was intended that these negotiations should extend, or how far it was proposed that they should be combined with renewed official negotiations, but M. Poincaré proposed that, if they failed, a renewed attempt should be made to obtain the agreement of the Turks to the original treaty provisions, while, if they succeeded, a mere formal note should be taken of the arrangements reached.

6. After consultation with Sir H. Rumbold in Constantinople and with the other Government Departments concerned, a reply was returned to the French Ambassador on the 16th March to the effect that His Majesty's Government considered that the uncertainty and delay which the suggested procedure would involve would be prejudicial to the chances of peace, but that they might nevertheless be prepared to consider the proposal if the scope of the negotiations were to be strictly limited to the regularisation of arrangements come to between the companies and the Constantinople Government since the armistice. It was explained that His Majesty's Government would for their part prefer that a renewed attempt to reach agreement with the Turkish Government

should in the first instance be made by the Allied Governments direct. They proposed, however, that the whole question should be rediscussed at the inter-Allied meeting of experts which was about to be held in London to decide on the next step to be taken in the negotiations with Turkey.

7. On the 21st March M. Bompard, the French representative at the inter-Allied meeting, reopened the question. He explained that the French plan was that the Allies should propose to the Turks for insertion in the treaty a set of two or three articles briefly stipulating the broad principles of what should be done concerning the concessions held in Turkey by Allied subjects and by companies in which Allied subjects held a preponderating interest. The French suggestion, however, was that the proposal to insert these articles should be accompanied by an intimation that, if the Turks themselves would rapidly come to separate agreements with the concessionaires on the lines of these proposed clauses, leaving the details to be settled subsequently, the Allies would not insist on the inclusion of the clauses themselves in the treaty, since all the Allies desired to obtain would have been secured already by the separate agreements. Should this procedure be agreed to, the French Government suggested that representatives of the concessionary companies should proceed at once to Turkey and endeavour to obtain the signature of such agreements, while the Turks should be given to understand that, unless those agreements were satisfactorily concluded, the Allies would feel compelled to insist on the insertion of the general articles in the treaty of peace. M. Bompard added that the French Government had already discussed this proposal with the French concessionaires who had expressed their willingness to act as suggested.

8. In view of this new explanation, His Majesty's Government consented to reconsider their whole attitude towards the French proposals. The Italians at first raised objections, owing to the fear that private negotiations might end in the concessionary companies, in which few or no Italian interests are represented, receiving advantages from the Turks which Italians might otherwise have acquired, but, it having been found possible to reassure them on this point, they also expressed their willingness to agree to the French scheme.

9. Meanwhile it appeared that the concessionary companies in which French interests preponderated—such as the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the Tobacco Régie —were actually on the point of embarking on private negotiations with the Angora Government without waiting for any inter-Allied decision, and M. Bompard, in discussing the possibility of such separate French negotiations, went so far as to state, on the 26th March, that the French Government could not prevent their people from negotiating, since, if they did so, they would take on themselves the responsibility of obtaining from the Turks at least as good terms for the pre-war concessionaires as the latter considered that they could get for themselves.

10. This made it clear that if the British concessionary companies now held back, their interests might be seriously affected, and on the 27th March it was finally decided, at an inter-Allied meeting, that the Allied concessionary companies should be formally invited to open direct negotiations with Angora as suggested by the French Government.

11. A copy of the letter, dated the same day, communicating this decision to the chief British concessionary companies concerned, in which the exact nature and object of the proposed negotiations was clearly explained, is attached (Annex (C)).

12. At the same time a passage was inserted in the joint reply, which was returned by the Allied Governments on the 2nd April, to the Turkish counter-proposals of the 9th March as follows:—

> "The purpose of some of these clauses is to establish by a common agreement the regulations assuring, in Turkey, to the nationals of the Allied Powers and to companies in which their capital is involved security for the rights which they have already acquired and for such of their interests as have suffered through the events which have occurred since 1914, as well as the readaptation of their contracts to the new economic conditions resulting from those events. In order to expedite the solution of this important question, the Governments of the Allied Powers have invited those of their nationals who are interested in this question themselves to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Government with a view to reach a practical settlement with that Government on the basis of the provisions which have been inserted in the draft treaty of peace. If these negotiations are successful, once the Governments of the Allied Powers have recorded the conclusion of the arrangements reached, the provisions at present

concerned with this subject in the draft treaty will have lost their justification, and it would seem that the conclusion of peace should be greatly facilitated thereby. It would only be in the event of no agreement being reached in regard to the suggested arrangement within a reasonable time that the Governments of the Allied Powers would have to insist on the insertion in the treaty itself of detailed provisions approximating to those appearing in the draft of the 31st January last in order to safeguard the vital interests of their nationals."

13. On the 28th March a meeting was held at the Foreign Office between representatives of the various British concessionary companies concerned (see Annex (A)) and representatives of the Foreign Office and Board of Trade to arrange details, and it was decided that the companies should each send representatives to Turkey at the earliest moment.

14. On the 8th April the Turkish reply to the Allied note of the 28th March regarding the resumption of negotiations was handed to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople. The following is a summary of the passage in it dealing with the question of concessions :—

"Nevertheless, Turkey, duly appreciating the wish expressed by the Allied Powers for a favourable settlement of pending economic questions, does not object to discuss questions which can properly form subject of international negotiation. She has invited holders of concessions formerly granted by Turkey to enter into direct negotiations as the Allies themselves proposed."

15. This was the first that had been heard of any invitation issued by the Turkish Government to the concessionary companies, and was at first understood, not only as an implicit acceptance of the principle of private negotiation, but also as an obscure allusion to some prior arrangement of which nothing was hitherto known. But the Turkish object in using this formula appears merely to have been to retain the initiative in their own hands. No invitation, in fact, appears to have been issued ; but before the Allies could arrange for their High Commissioners at Constantinople to make any joint *démarche* regarding the proposed private negotiations between the concessionary companies and the Turkish Government, the latter published, on the 17th April, an official notice, which was no doubt the "invitation" referred to in their note, to the effect that "the Turkish Government had decided to examine and settle, on application by the companies' representatives, pending questions with all companies working in places within the national boundaries of present Turkey under concessions granted by the Ottoman Empire before the general war."

16. Meanwhile, the attitude of the French Government in insisting that there should be no official intervention in the impending negotiations, the desire of certain companies to negotiate on entirely independent lines, and the issue of the Turkish notice referred to above before any official *démarche* had been made by the Allies, rendered any united semi-official negotiations impossible ; and, beyond urging the companies to comply with the terms of the Turkish notice and giving them such unofficial assistance as was practicable, His Majesty's Government could only at this stage leave matters entirely in the hands of the companies and their representatives. It was decided after some discussion that these representatives should proceed to Angora itself, an arrangement which had at least the advantage of enabling them to get into direct touch with the really responsible Turkish authorities. Nevertheless, it was not until the 6th May that the Turkish Government announced that it was ready to receive the negotiators, and negotiations did not actually begin until the end of the month.

17. Owing to these delays, for which the Allied Governments were not responsible, it gradually became clear that the official negotiations at Lausanne would proceed faster than the private negotiations at Angora, and it became necessary to consider the question of an alternative course of action on which to fall back in case of indefinite delay at Angora or of complete deadlock.

18. After consultation with Sir H. Rumbold and Mr. Henderson, it was decided that it would be necessary to take up the question at Lausanne without awaiting the issue of the negotiations at Angora, and to endeavour to obtain the acceptance by the Turks of certain general principles, to be embodied either in the treaty itself or in a separate declaration, binding Turkey to give satisfaction to the companies in negotiations to be completed subsequently.

19. On the 4th June the Allied delegates at Lausanne raised the whole question of the concession negotiations at a private meeting with Ismet Pasha. They presented him

with a draft statement of principles, intended to serve not as atext but as a basis for discussion (see Annex (D)). A very long and unsatisfactory discussion followed, in which Ismet Pasha raised strong objection to the Allied proposals, which, he said, merely repeated those already rejected, but agreed to refer the question to his Government. He proved unbending on the question of indemnification for war losses, repeating that the companies were either Turkish, and therefore not entitled to indemnification, or Allied, in which case the Allies' waiver of their reparation claims applied to them. He showed clearly that he intended to give the Allies no satisfaction, even in regard to the general principles, until the questions of the interest on the debt and the evacuation of Constantinople had been settled. A further discussion with Ismet Pasha took place on the 12th June, but with no better result.

20. It had by now become clear from this and other indications that the companies would be unable to obtain any cash indemnities for war damage from the Turks, as originally provided for in article 80 of the draft treaty of the 31st January, and that if they were to obtain any compensation at all they could only do so by being allowed to share in the Allied reparation pool.

21. Meanwhile, in spite of Turkish communiqués and assurances, the negotiations between the British concessionaires and the Turkish Government at Angora were proving farfrom successful, and by the end of June had in fact been broken off by five of the principal British companies concerned, in the following order : Borax Consolidated, Eastern Construction Committee, National Bank of Turkey, Ottoman Gas Company of Smyrna and, finally, the Smyrna–Aidin Railway.* One company only – the Constantinople Telephone Company—had succeeded in obtaining fairly favourable terms. The French companies appear to have been no more successful.

22. It thus became essential, if the interests of the companies were to receive any protection at all, that some general treaty provisions should be agreed upon for this purpose at Lausanne, and the position at the end of June had become, for all practical purposes, identical with that existing at the end of January.

23. Ismet Pasha was accordingly informed on the 23rd June that the contingency contemplated in the Allies' note of the 2nd April (see paragraph 12 above) had now arisen, and that it had become necessary to deal with the concessions question at the conference ; and he was presented with a draft protocol and declaration, based on the principles laid down in the statement of the 4th June (see paragraph 19 above) and on the relevant articles of the original treaty (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above), which had been prepared by the experts. Copies of this draft protocol and declaration in their latest form are attached (Annex (E)). After some inconclusive argument Ismet stated that his instructions were only to discuss this subject "after everything else was settled."

24. The present position is that the Turkish delegation have obstinately maintained their refusal to discuss the merits of this protocol and declaration until the questions of evacuation and of the interest on the debt are settled to their satisfaction. To accept this procedure would be to abandon our only remaining lever and to court a failure, and the Allied delegates are therefore insisting on a satisfactory settlement of the concessions and debt questions as a preliminary condition to any discussion on evacuation.

25. As will be seen from the note of the principal companies concerned, given in Annex (A), the British interests involved are very considerable. In certain cases, notably in that of the Smyrna–Aidin Railway, widespread hardship would be caused among the small shareholders by failure to protect the companies' rights. It ought perhaps also to be remembered that the British financial groups interested in these companies and undertakings possess considerable political influence at home.

26. Failure to obtain from the Turks any formal recognition of their legal obligations towards these companies would, after all that has passed, be practically equivalent to an admission on our part of the right of the Turkish Government to repudiate its contracts with the concessionary companies. Apart from the direct losses involved to British subjects and to British trade, the precedent created, even by a merely tacit admission of this kind, would be exceedingly dangerous, and might involve far-reaching consequences in similar cases in other countries. It is therefore an important matter of principle that we should endeavour to obtain the agreement of the Turks to formal treaty provisions of the nature suggested.

Foreign Office, July 4, 1923.

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* Since this was written, negotiations between the Smyrna–Aidin Railway and the Turkish Government have been resumed.

ANNEX (A).

NOTE of principal concessionary companies in Turkey in which British interests preponderate or are seriously involved.

1. *The Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey.*

A Turkish company formed in 1856 under Turkish law.

The capital is understood to be almost entirely in British hands. The amounts actually issued are as follows :—

	£
Ordinary shares	1,294,360
40 per cent. 1st debenture stock	2,264,105
5 „ 2nd „ „	1,629,567

2. *The National Bank of Turkey.*

A Turkish company formed in 1909 under Turkish law (although it makes returns to His Majesty's Commissioners of Inland Revenue).

The capital is almost entirely in British hands. The authorised capital consists of 100,000 shares of 10*l.* each (2*l.* 10*s.* paid). The British Trade Corporation hold 96,810 shares, thus having a nominal interest in the company of 242,025*l.*

3. *The Constantinople Telephone Company.*

A Turkish company formed in 1911 under Turkish law.

The issued, paid and outstanding capital is as follows :—

	£
Ordinary shares	250,000
6 per cent. "obligation" bonds	200,000
6 „ "service" bonds	95,260

4. *The Constantinople Quay Company.*

A Turkish company.

The capital consists of 47,750 shares of 500 fr. each—*i.e.*, 23,875,000 fr.

Rather less than half these shares are held by the Bank of England acting for a British group. Nearly all the rest are in French hands.

5. *Smyrna Mining Concessions.*

This is a private syndicate of British merchants from Smyrna holding direct concessions from the Turkish Government, regarding which no detailed information is available.

6. *Ottoman Gas Company (Limited) (Smyrna).*

A British company which provided gas to the town of Smyrna. Issued capital, 75,000*l.*

The following companies and syndicates do not operate primarily in Turkey, but hold important concessions from, or contracts with, the Turkish Government :—

(1.) *Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth and Co. and Vickers (Limited).*—These two great firms have combined to form a private syndicate known as the *Eastern Construction Committee* which claims to hold important concessions from the Turkish Government for the construction of naval docks at Constantinople. It is, however, impossible to say how large a proportion of the total capital of the two firms is involved in this particular undertaking.

(2.) *Eastern Telegraph Company.*—This British company, with an authorised and issued capital amounting to 9,000,000*l.*, holds important contracts with the Turkish Government in respect of terminal stations, cable landing rights, &c.

(3.) *Borax Consolidated (Limited).*—A British company, with an authorised capital of about 5,000,000*l.* It holds borax properties all over the world, and it is impossible to obtain any accurate information regarding the proportion of its funds which may be invested in Turkey.

There are also numerous British concerns, such as the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company, a considerable portion of whose funds are no doubt indirectly invested in Turkey ; but it is difficult to say to what extent the prosperity of such undertakings would be affected by the repudiation by the Turkish Government of pre-war contracts

Lastly, a large number of minor private companies, such as the Keshan Collieries (Limited), Abbotts' Emery Mines, &c., hold concessions from the Turkish Government. They are for the most part understood to be registered as Turkish companies, but, although the capital involved is British, the shares are for the most part held by local merchants and the sums affected are understood to be comparatively small.

ANNEX (B).

[**E 2569/1/44**]

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 847.) *Foreign Office, March 8, 1923.*

My Lord,

THE French Ambassador came to see me this afternoon with a proposal from M. Poincaré which he hoped that His Majesty's Government would be in a position to accept. It was that the Allied Powers should allow the Angora Government to enter into private negotiations with the various European concessionnaires at Constantinople and in Turkey with a view to concluding separate arrangements with them rather than incorporate a general settlement in the contemplated treaty. When I asked who the concessionnaires were, to what extent they were French, British or Italian, what was their standing, what their numbers and what the interest that they represented, the Ambassador, to whom the subject was evidently new, could not inform me. All that he could say was that the bulk of these people or societies - he was speaking, of course, in the main if not entirely of the French—had at different stages since the war concluded such arrangements with the Constantinople Government, and these were the agreements which he hoped that the Angora Government would now ratify. The object of the French Government in making the proposal was to humour the Turks, who would be more likely to arrive at a suitable settlement if they were allowed to negotiate in this way than if they were asked to accept an international treaty that provided the same safeguards. If the negotiations failed, M. Poincaré's proposal then was that the guarantees already provided in the draft treaty should stand. If, on the other hand, they succeeded before a new treaty was signed, we should take act of these arrangements in a special official agreement or document signed by Turkey and the Powers, in which the latter would claim the right to interfere in the future in the interests of the concessionnaires to see that the stipulations of the various agreements were faithfully carried out. This would be necessary in order to secure the right of the Powers to intervene on behalf of their nationals, which might otherwise be disputed by the Turkish Government in the future. The Ambassador asked whether I would accept this proposal in principle. This I declined to do because, as I said, the subject was new to me ; I did not recall it ever having been brought to my notice at Lausanne ; I had no idea who or what the British concessionnaires might be ; I could form no opinion whether this method of treating their case would be either feasible or just ; and I was considerably disturbed at the prospect of negotiations for a renewed treaty being indefinitely postponed while these domestic pourparlers between the Angora Government and the concessonnaires at Constantinople were going on. Surely the right thing to do was to get to business again without delay, whether at Lausanne or elsewhere, and the prospect of waiting while a squabble of indefinite duration took place between the Turkish Government and these persons filled me with no small alarm. I asked permission, therefore, to reserve my opinion and to make enquiries before I could give any definite reply to the Ambassador. I conclude from M. Poincaré putting forward the proposal that it is one which will be favourable to French interests, whatever it may be elsewhere, and that it is more than likely it may be intended to cover some arrangement or offer that his representatives have already made. I further mentioned the case of the Italians who would have to be considered, since any action to be taken could only be international.

I went on to indicate to the Ambassador the right method, as I thought, of dealing with the Turkish proposal to reopen the negotiations, but said that we must wait till the official letter or proposal from the Angora Government should arrive I had myself a fairly clear idea of the manner in which we should proceed, and in

all probability I should address the French Government on the subject. In the meantime I called the attention of his Excellency to the fact that, whereas M. Poincaré had made it quite clear to us here that along with ourselves he regarded the Montagna formula and the proposals put forward by M. Bompard at the last moment concerning the economic section as having lapsed owing to their failure to secure the signature to the treaty, which they had been put forward to effect, nevertheless, no intimation of the French point of view had been conveyed to the French High Commissioner at Constantinople or to Adnan Bey, and a persistent effort was now being made there to represent the French as being willing to offer concessions to the Turks, against which the British alone were standing out. This was an absolute misrepresentation of the situation, which would soon be found out, but meanwhile it seemed to me unfortunate that the French Government had kept their High Commissioner and the Turks in the dark as to what were their real views and intentions.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

ANNEX (C).

COPY of letter addressed to the secretaries of the following companies:—

1. Smyrna–Aidin Railway.
2. Ottoman Gas Company of Smyrna.
3. Eastern Construction Company.
4. Constantinople Telegraph Company.
5. Eastern Telegraph Company.
6. National Bank of Turkey.
7. Constantinople Quays Company.
8. Borax Consolidated (Limited).

[E 3244/1/44]

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 27, 1923.*

I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to invite you to send a representative to a meeting in the Ambassadors' waiting-room at the Foreign Office at 11 A.M. to-morrow, the 28th March, to discuss the following matter.

2. As you are aware, in articles 80 and 94 of the draft Treaty of Peace presented to the Turks at Lausanne, provision is made for the maintenance of pre-war concessions in Turkey held by nominally Ottoman companies, of which the capital and control is actually Allied. Provision is also made under certain conditions for the possible prolongation, revision and readaptation to the changed economic situation of these concessions, and for compensation of the concessionnaires for damages suffered in virtue of the war.

3. The Turkish delegates at Lausanne professed the intention, in the interests of attracting foreign capital to Turkey, not only to maintain these concessions but also to treat the concessionnaires fairly as regards the modification of their concessions and compensation, but they resolutely refused to provide for these matters in the treaty itself on the plea that the companies were Ottoman, and that the Turkish Government must be left free to deal directly with its private concerns. This was one of the grounds on which the Turkish Government refused to sign at Lausanne. In their counter-proposals the Turkish Government has simply proposed to separate all the economic clauses from the treaty, and deal with them by separate negotiation later. The Allied experts, who have met in London to consider their proposals, have unanimously agreed to refuse this procedure, but the French Government have proposed that, in order to surmount one of the practical difficulties to the negotiation of the peace, and to give the Turkish Government a chance of living up to its professions at Lausanne, the Turkish Government should be invited at once to enter on negotiations with representatives of the private concessionary companies concerned with a view to endeavour to agree with them upon the general principles upon which each of them should have their concessions maintained, revised or readapted, and should receive compensation in cash or in kind. These negotiations should begin as soon as possible, probably in Turkey, and should proceed concurrently with the resumed negotiations for

a general peace with Turkey. The Turkish Government would at the same time be warned that, should the Allies find, when the general negotiations are drawing to a close, that their concessionnaires are not being satisfactorily treated in their private negotiations with the Turkish Government, they will be forced to reinsert in the treaty something like the present articles dealing with concessions. On the other hand, should the private negotiations succeed before the conclusion of the main negotiations, an article would merely be inserted in the treaty taking note of the results of the former.

4. The British Government consider this procedure desirable, but are anxious in the first instance to learn the views of the companies concerned. They wish if possible to obtain the general decision of the companies to-morrow so as to concert a communication to the Turkish Government with the French and Italian representatives before they leave London. They regret that it has not been possible to give the companies longer warning, but the proposal has only been explained by the French delegates at this meeting, and a discussion between the Governments was necessary before the companies could be consulted.

5. It is understood that, as a matter of fact, the French companies concerned have already formed a group and appointed representatives who are prepared to start from Paris as soon as the other Allied companies are ready, and as soon as the invitation has been sent to, and accepted by, the Turkish Government.

6. Similar letters are being addressed to the Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin, the Ottoman Gas Company, the Constantinople Telephone Company, the Eastern Telegraph Company, the National Bank of Turkey, the Borax Consolidated (Limited), and Mr. Cecil Lubbok of the Constantinople Quay Company.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

ANNEX (D).

Draft Statement of Principles handed to Ismet Pasha at Lausanne on June 4, 1923.

LES concessions accordées avant le 29 octobre 1914, dont des ressortissants alliés ou des entreprises fonctionnant à l'aide de capitaux appartenant à des ressortissants alliés sont bénéficiaires, seront confirmées. Seront également confirmées les concessions pour la régularisation desquelles certaines formalités n'auraient pas été remplies avant la guerre, mais qui ont reçu un commencement d'exécution ou ont formé le sujet d'un accord entre le Gouvernement turc et un Gouvernement allié.

2. Les accords entrevenus avec le Gouvernement ottoman depuis le 30 octobre 1918 relatifs aux concessions visées à l'alinéa 1 demeureront en vigueur, sous réserve de leur soumission, à la demande du Gouvernement turc, à l'examen des experts dans le délai de trois mois à compter de la mise en vigueur du traité. Dans ce cas, l'accord sera confirmé ou modifié selon les recommandations des experts.

3. Les provisions des contrats de concession seront :

(*a.*) Mises en conformité des conditions économiques actuelles ;
(*b.*) Revisées comme réparation des préjudices subis par suite de la guerre. La revision à titre de réparation pourra comprendre l'augmentation des prix exigibles aux termes de la concession, la modification des droits payables au Gouvernement turc conformément aux dispositions de la concession et la prolongation de la durée de la concession.

4. Au cas où cette revision ne suffirait pas à assurer la réparation des préjudices subis, les concessionnaires auront droit à un versement en espèces en ce qui concerne toute somme qui ne serait pas couverte par la revision.

5. Faute d'entente entre le Gouvernement turc et un concessionnaire en ce qui concerne les questions visées ci-haut, le différend sera réglé par deux experts, dont chaque partie nommera un, ou, si les experts n'arrivent pas à un accord, par un tiers expert qu'ils désigneront.

Annex (E).

Projet deProtocole.

L'EMPIRE britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'État serbe-croate-slovène et la Turquie, animés du même désir de maintenir et de régler leurs rapports et ceux de leurs nationaux conformément aux principes d'équité et de respect des engagements réciproques, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Section I.

1. Les contrats de concessions, ainsi que les accords subséquents y relatifs, intervenus avant le 29 octobre 1914 entre le Gouvernement ottoman ou toute autorité locale d'une part, et les ressortissants alliés (y compris les sociétés) d'autre part, sont maintenus s'ils sont en application ou ont reçu un commencement d'application.

2. Les contrats et accords au sujet desquels, au 29 octobre 1914, toutes les formalités n'étaient pas encore accomplies, seront, néanmoins, considérés comme valables et maintenus s'ils ont d'un commun accord reçu un commencement d'application ou s'ils ont fait l'objet d'arrangements entre le Gouvernement ottoman et un Gouvernement allié comportant un avantage pour la Turquie.

3. Les sommes revenant après règlement des comptes aux bénéficiaires desdits contrats et accords à raison de l'utilisation par l'État de leurs propriétés ou de leurs services, seront payées conformément aux contrats ou accords existants ou, à défaut de contrats ou accords, conformément à la procédure d'expertise prévue par le présent protocole.

4. Les contrats de concession n'ayant pas reçu avant le 29 octobre 1914 un commencement d'application sont également maintenus.

5. Les clauses des contrats et accords subséquents visés aux alinéas précédents seront, d'un commun accord et en ce qui concerne les deux parties, mises en conformité des conditions économiques nouvelles.

6. Faute d'entente dans le délai d'un an à compter de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix en date de ce jour, les parties adopteront les dispositions qui seront considérées, tant en ce qui concerne le règlement des comptes que la réadaptation des concessions, comme convenables et équitables par deux experts qu'il leur appartiendra de désigner et qui s'en référeront, en cas de désaccord entre eux, à un tiers expert désigné par le Gouvernement turc sur une liste de trois personnes dressée par le chef du Département fédéral des Travaux publics suisse.

7. Au cas où la réadaptation de contrats de concession n'ayant pas reçu avant le 29 octobre 1914 un commencement d'application entraînerait pour l'État un supplement de charge ne répondant plus, de l'avis des experts prévus à l'alinéa précédent, aux services que la concession devait rendre au pays, ces contrats pourront être résiliés à la demande de l'une ou l'autre des parties. En cas de résiliation, le concessionnaire aura droit, s'il y a lieu, à telle indemnité que lesdits experts jugeront équitable.

8. Les accords intervenus entre le 30 octobre 1918 et le 1er novembre 1922 entre le Gouvernement ottoman et les bénéficiaires des contrats et concessions visés à l'alinéa 1, ainsi que les transferts des contrats de concessions effectués pendant cette période, demeureront en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient reçu l'approbation du Gouvernement turc. Au cas où cette approbation ne serait pas accordée, il sera alloué, s'il y a lieu, aux concessionnaires pour le préjudice effectivement subi, une indemnité à fixer par les experts désignés dans les conditions indiquées à l'alinéa 6. Cette disposition ne porte pas atteinte, en ce qui concerne les contrats antérieurs au 29 octobre 1914, au droit à réadaptation prévu par le présent protocole.

Section II.

9. Dans tous les territoires détachés de la Turquie, soit à la suite des guerres balkaniques, soit en vertu du Traité de Paix en date de ce jour, l'Etat successeur est pleinement subrogé dans les droits et charges de la Turquie vis-à-vis des ressortissants alliés et des sociétés dans lesquelles les capitaux alliés sont prépondérants, bénéficiaires de contrats de concession passés avant le 29 octobre 1914 avec le Gouvernement ottoman ou toute autorité locale ottomane. Cette subrogation aura effet à dater de la mise en vigueur du traité par lequel le transfert du territoire a été stipulé.

10. Les stipulations de la première section du présent protocole à l'exception de l'alinéa 8 seront appliquées aux contrats visés à l'alinéa 9.

11. Toute société constituée conformément à la loi ottomane et fonctionnant dans des territoires détachés de la Turquie, soit à la suite des guerres balkaniques, soit en vertu du présent traité, et où des intérêts alliés sont prépondérants aura, pendant cinq ans à dater de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix en date de ce jour, la faculté de transférer ses biens, droits et intérêts à toute autre société constituée en conformité de la loi soit de l'État exerçant l'autorité sur le territoire en question, soit de l'un des États alliés dont les ressortissants contrôlent ladite société. La société à qui les biens, droits et intérêts auront été transférés jouira des mêmes droits et privilèges dont jouissait la société précédente, y compris ceux que lui confèrent les dispositions du présent protocole.

12. Les dispositions de l'alinéa 11 ne s'appliquent pas aux sociétés concessionnaires de services publics dont une partie de l'exploitation demeurerait en territoire turc.

13. Les sociétés auxquelles seront transférés, en vertu de l'alinéa 11, des biens, droits et intérêts de sociétés ottomanes, ne seront soumises sur les territoires détachés de la Turquie à aucune taxe spéciale du fait de ce transfert, s'il n'y est fait obstacle par des conventions internationales en vigueur. Il en sera de même sur le territoire de celle des Puissances contractantes dont ces sociétés prendraient la nationalité, à moins que cette Puissance n'y fasse opposition en vertu de sa législation propre.

Projet de Déclaration de la Délégation turque.

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à appliquer les stipulations de la première section du protocole en date de ce jour concernant les concessions aux sociétés ottomanes dans lesquelles les capitaux des ressortissants des autres Puissances contractantes audit protocole sont prépondérants.

Il est entendu que le bénéfice de ces stipulations ne pourra être demandé par les sociétés où les capitaux étrangers seraient devenus prépondérants postérieurement au 29 octobre 1914.

Note on Annex (E).

This formula, consisting of a protocol and declaration, is intended to replace articles 94 and 80 of the draft treaty presented to the Turks on the 31st January, 1923.

One of the principal objections of the Turks to those articles was that they considered that many of the companies and syndicates affected, being technically Turkish, could not properly form the subject of treaty provisions. This difficulty has been overcome by making the protocol applicable only to Allied companies and Allied subjects, and by providing for the extension of the principles laid down therein to Turkish companies by a separate unilateral declaration to be made by the Turkish delegation.

The Turks had further objected to ratifying any of the acts of the Constantinople Government during the armistice period. A formula has been found in article 8 of the protocol, which, while safeguarding the main interests of the companies in this respect, avoids any appearance of making the Angora Government responsible for the acts of its predecessor.

The claim for compensation to the concessionary companies for war damage, contained in the original article 80, has been abandoned, as has also that for the prolongation of concessions beyond their normal date of expiry for a period corresponding to the period of hostilities.

Apart from this, the main provisions of the original articles have been maintained, especially as regards the confirmation of all pre-war rights and concessions, including those not fully ratified whose execution had been begun and those whose execution had not been begun, but which had been ratified. Provision is also made for suitable arbitration in cases where no agreement is reached within a year regarding the readaptation of concessions to new conditions, and for the payment of adequate compensation where concessions are terminated or not ratified in the special cases provided for in the protocol.

Foreign Office, July 4, 1923.

[E 6948/1/44] No. 28.

Ismet Pasha to Allied Delegates. —(*Communicated by British Delegation, Lausanne (No. 224); Received at Foreign Office, July 5.*)

MM. les Présidents, *Lausanne, le 2 juillet* 1923.

LES Puissances invitantes, en proposant, le 26 mai 1923, de régler la question de réparations grecques, avaient assuré la Turquie qu'elle bénéficierait des mêmes facilités dans les questions financières qui la concernaient. Aussitôt après le règlement de la question des réparations, j'avais proposé aux Puissances invitantes que les questions essentielles restées en suspens, notamment la déclaration sur le régime judiciaire, les questions d'évacuation et des coupons, soient résolues successivement et sans intervalle à l'exemple de la question des réparations, qui était réglée avant toutes les autres.

Ce mode de procéder a été agréé et suivi dans le commencement. De la sorte, un accord fut établi sur la déclaration relative au régime judiciaire.

Toutefois, on n'est pas arrivé à une solution dans les questions d'évacuation et des coupons. Les délégations alliées n'ont pas, d'autre part, continué à les étudier jusqu'à ce qu'on arrive à une solution. Les Puissances invitantes ont toujours différé de prendre une décision sur ces questions, qui entravent principalement la conclusion de la paix.

La délégation turque a démontré à ce sujet le maximum d'efforts qui lui était possible et a mis en œuvre tous les moyens en son pouvoir. Elle a pris en considération comme une base la formule qui avait été préparée par les conseillers légistes et proposée avec approbation par les plénipotentiaires alliés. Elle est entrée également sur le terrain des précisions élaborées par ces mêmes légistes et a finalement adhéré à une formule raisonnable qui a résulté de la combinaison de ces deux propositions faites en collaboration avec un expert financier des Puissances alliées. Environ deux semaines se sont passées depuis cette date.

A la réunion qui eut lieu le 23 juin 1923, les questions des coupons et d'évacuation n'ont pas été discutées, bien qu'elles figuraient sur l'ordre du jour communiqué précédemment. Aux démarches verbales réitérées que depuis lors j'ai entreprises à cet effet auprès des plénipotentiaires alliés, j'ai toujours reçu la réponse qu'il serait procédé dans un ou deux jours à leur règlement.

Je n'ai pas encore reçu aucun renseignement ni une réponse, alors qu'il s'est écoulé quatre jours depuis le jeudi dont date ma dernière démarche.

Je n'ai pas cessé d'ajouter que j'étais prêt à résoudre dans la même séance successivement les questions d'évacuation, des coupons et des concessions.

La délégation turque, qui a toujours déployé ses plus grands efforts pour éviter tout retard dans la conclusion de la paix, a l'honneur de demander à la conférence de vouloir bien procéder dans une même séance successivement à l'étude des questions essentielles ci-dessus visées qui sont demeurées en suspens et surtout au règlement de la question des coupons, laquelle constitue le principal obstacle à la conclusion de la paix.

M. ISMET.

[E 6951/1/44] No. 29.

Allied Delegates to Ismet Pasha.—(*Communicated by British Delegation, Lausanne (No. 227); Received at Foreign Office, July 5.*)

M. le Président, *Lausanne, le 3 juillet* 1923.

NOUS avons l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note que votre Excellence nous a adressée le 2 de ce mois. Nous remarquons tout d'abord, avec regret, que cette note a été livrée à la publicité avant que nous ayons pu nous-mêmes en prendre connaissance. Cette publication prématurée nous paraît d'autant moins propre à faciliter les travaux de la conférence que ce document fait mention d'une réunion privée tenue le 23 juin, dont le but était de préparer la solution des questions encore en suspens.

Votre Excellence relève que, lors du règlement de la question des réparations turco-grecques, elle avait insisté auprès des Puissances invitantes pour que les autres questions pendantes, notamment les questions financières, reçussent une prompte solution et que la Turquie bénéficiât dans ces questions des mêmes facilités qu'elle-même estimait avoir accordées à la Grèce. Les Alliés ont toujours tenu compte de l'état financier de la Turquie. Il suffit de citer l'acceptation par leurs délégués d'un règlement de la

question des réparations qui n'impose aucune charge au budget de la Turquie, et leur décision de libérer la Turquie de toutes les dettes qui lui incombent du chef des créances très considérables que l'Allemagne possédait contre elle. Si, dans ces circonstances très considérables que l'Allemagne possédait contre elle. Si, dans ces circonstances comme en maintes autres, nous avons fait preuve des dispositions les plus bienveillantes, nous n'avons, cependant, pris aucun engagement quant à la manière dont seraient résolues les principales questions demeurées en suspens.

Votre Excellence a également exprimé le désir de voir intervenir rapidement le règlement de ces questions. Nous tenons à lui faire observer que nos efforts ont constamment tendu à ce but, et que, s'ils n'ont pu aboutir, c'est que les instructions de la délégation turque étaient de nature à rendre impossible une solution.

En ce qui concerne les concessions, la délégation turque a maintenu, même après la réunion du 23 juin, que cette question n'était pas de la compétence de la conférence. Il y a quelques jours seulement votre Excellence s'est déclarée prête à la discuter.

Les Puissances invitantes ont déclaré dès le début de la discussion de la question des coupons qu'il était impossible pour elles, dans le Traité de Paix ou dans les négociations qui s'y rattachent, d'imposer aux porteurs des emprunts ottomans (y compris les porteurs neutres) le paiement des coupons dans des conditions autres que celles prévues par les contrats d'emprunt. Les délégués de ces Puissances se sont épuisés en efforts pour trouver à cette question une solution qui, sans déroger à ce principe fondamental, tiendrait compte de la situation financière de la Turquie. Nous n'avons fait obstacle à l'étude d'aucune suggestion inspirée du désir de trouver une telle solution. Mais la délégation turque a insisté pour apporter à ces suggestions des changements dont le but avoué était d'obliger les porteurs à accepter une décision unilatérale du Gouvernement turc. Nous avons chargé un de nos experts de faire savoir à la délégation turque que toute proposition de cette nature était inacceptable. C'est au cours de cette conversation que fut proposée à notre expert la formule à laquelle, dans sa lettre du 2 juillet, votre Excellence fait allusion. Mais cette formule, due à l'initiative de votre Excellence, ne saurait être représentée comme résultant d'une collaboration avec un expert allié.

La troisième question visée par votre Excellence est celle de l'évacuation. Nous avons, à plusieurs reprises, fait connaître nos dispositions favorables à ce sujet, subordonnées à une solution satisfaisante des deux autres questions. Nous avons déclaré, en conséquence, que nous ne pourrions aborder l'examen des modalités de l'évacuation avant que les autres questions eussent été résolues.

Dans ces conditions, nous sommes disposés à procéder, comme le souhaite votre Excellence, au règlement, dans une même séance, des questions essentielles ci-dessus visées. La date de cette séance sera fixée aussitôt que nous serons en possession de toutes les instructions que, dans les circonstances présentes, nous avons demandées à nos Gouvernements.

Veuillez agréer, &c. ;
PELLÉ.
HORACE RUMBOLD.
J. C. MONTAGNA.

[E 6946/1/44] No. 30.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July 5.*)

(No. 1588.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré respecting the proposal for direct negotiations with bondholders at Angora.

Paris, July 3, 1923.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

M. Poincaré to the Marquess of Crewe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 3 juillet* 1923.

J'AI l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint à votre Excellence le texte du télégramme du Général Pellé, dont je viens de lui donner lecture.

Je serais très heureux que le Gouvernement britannique voulût bien donner d'urgence pour instruction à Sir Horace Rumbold de se mettre d'accord avec le Général Pellé et M. Montagna sur les propositions finales à faire à la délégation turque touchant les questions restées en suspens.

Les propositions contenues dans la lettre de ce jour que votre Excellence vient de me remettre concordent avec les instructions que j'ai adressées à M. de Saint-Aulaire dès le 29 juin, en le priant d'effectuer immédiatement une démarche auprès du Foreign Office. Cependant, je l'ai prié, en ce qui concerne la question de la monnaie de paiement, de compléter la seconde partie de l'alternative de la façon suivante : l'évacuation n'aurait lieu, dans un délai de six semaines après la ratification par le Parlement turc, que si l'accord avec les porteurs était intervenu dans l'intervalle. L'addition de cette condition me paraît de nature à sauvegarder les droits des porteurs, tout en laissant aux Turcs le temps nécessaire pour s'entendre avec eux. L'alternative se présenterait donc ainsi :

Ou bien le texte inséré dans le projet de traité du 4 février maintenant en vigueur le décret de Mouharrem, auquel serait incorporée l'addition rapportée sous le paragraphe (*a*) de la lettre de votre Excellence ;

Ou bien absence de toute déclaration, étant entendu (1) que cette absence serait interprétée par les Alliés comme laissant leur pleine valeur au décret de Mouharrem, aux décrets-annexes et aux contrats d'emprunts, et que (2) l'évacuation n'aurait lieu, dans un délai de six semaines après la ratification par le Parlement turc, que si l'accord avec les porteurs était intervenu dans l'intervalle.

Il va de soi que le paragraphe 3 de la lettre de votre Excellence, relatif à l'évacuation, devrait être modifié en conséquence.

Veuillez, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

General Pellé to M. Poincaré.

(Télégraphique.) *Lausanne, le 2 juillet* 1923.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD n'a pas encore reçu d'instructions du Cabinet de Londres.

La délégation turque est énervée par cette attente prolongée de la solution finale. Elle fait tous ses efforts pour percer les résolutions des Alliés et, suivant une ancienne habitude, feint de considérer comme acquises les solutions qui lui donneraient toute satisfaction.

Aujourd'hui Zekiai Bey est venu présenter à M. des Closières, comme une idée toute personnelle, dont il n'aurait encore parlé à aucun membre de sa délégation, une nouvelle solution au sujet de la monnaie de paiement, qu'on peut résumer comme suit : Les Alliés renonceraient à exiger de la délégation turque aucune déclaration au sujet de la dette. Mais il y aurait, en dehors de la conférence, un échange de lettres entre le Gouvernement turc et le Conseil de la Dette. Le Gouvernement annoncerait au conseil qu'il le confirme dans ses pouvoirs, qu'il remet entre ses mains toute l'administration de la dette et les gages des emprunts, et qu'il a décidé d'entrer en pourparlers avec les porteurs. Le conseil prendrait acte de ces déclarations et répondrait que pour tenir compte des besoins du Gouvernement turc il s'engage à lui remettre 50 pour cent des revenus de la dette jusqu'à ce que l'accord soit réalisé avec les porteurs.

M. des Closières a décliné toute discussion en disant qu'il était trop tard maintenant pour discuter ici des solutions de ce genre, que les Gouvernements alliés étaient saisis et qu'ils feraient connaître incessamment leurs dernières propositions. Il est néanmoins intéressant de constater que "l'idée" de Zekiaï Bey marquerait de la part de la délégation turque un effort sensible pour se rapprocher de nos vues.

D'autre part, Ismet Pasha a adressé aux délégués des Puissances invitantes une lettre, dont j'adresse ci-joint copie à votre Excellence, et qu'il a communiquée à la presse avant même qu'elle nous soit parvenue. Cette lettre présente de façon tendancieuse ou même inexacte les événements de ces derniers jours ; j'examinerai demain avec mes collègues comment il conviendra d'y répondre.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

Ismet Pasha to Allied Delegates.

Lausanne, le 2 juillet 1923.

MM. les Présidents,

LES Puissances invitantes, en proposant, le 26 mai 1923, de régler la question de réparations grecques, avaient assuré la Turquie qu'elle bénéficierait des mêmes facilités dans les questions financières qui la concernaient. Aussitôt après le règlement de la question des réparations, j'avais proposé aux Puissances invitantes que les questions essentielles restées en suspens, notamment la déclaration sur le régime judiciaire, les questions d'évacuation et des coupons, soient résolues successivement et sans intervalle, à l'exemple de la question des réparations, qui était réglée avant toutes les autres.

Ce mode de procéder a été agréé et suivi dans le commencement. De la sorte, un accord fut établi sur la déclaration relative au régime judiciaire.

Toutefois, on n'est pas arrivé à une solution dans les questions d'évacuation et des coupons. Les délégations alliées n'ont pas, d'autre part, continué à les étudier jusqu'à ce qu'on arrive à une solution. Les Puissances invitantes ont toujours différé de prendre une décision sur ces questions, qui entravent principalement la conclusion de la paix.

La délégation turque a démontré à ce sujet le maximum d'efforts qui lui était possible et a mis en œuvre tous les moyens en son pouvoir. Elle a pris en considération comme une base la formule qui avait été préparée par les conseillers légistes et proposée avec approbation par les plénipotentiaires alliés. Elle est entrée également sur le terrain des précisions élaborées par ces mêmes légistes, et a finalement adhéré à une formule raisonnable qui a résulté de la combinaison de ces deux propositions faites en collaboration avec un expert financier des Puissances alliées. Environ deux semaines se sont passées depuis cette date.

A la réunion qui eut lieu le 23 juin 1923, les questions des coupons et d'évacuation n'ont pas été discutées, bien qu'elles figuraient sur l'ordre du jour communiqué précédemment. Aux démarches verbales réitérées que depuis lors j'ai entreprises à cet effet auprès des plénipotentiaires alliés, j'ai toujours reçu la réponse qu'il serait procédé dans un ou deux jours à leur règlement.

Je n'ai pas encore reçu aucun renseignement ni une réponse alors qu'il s'est écoulé quatre jours depuis le jeudi, dont date ma dernière démarche.

Je n'ai pas cessé d'ajouter que j'étais prêt à résoudre dans la même séance successivement les questions d'évacuation, des coupons et des concessions.

La délégation turque, qui a toujours déployé ses plus grands efforts pour éviter tout retard dans la conclusion de la paix, a l'honneur de demander à la conférence de vouloir bien procéder dans une même séance successivement à l'étude des questions essentielles ci-dessus visées qui sont demeurées en suspens et surtout au règlement de la question des coupons, laquelle constitue le principal obstacle à la conclusion de la paix.

M. ISMET.

No. 31.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 251.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 5, 1923.

MY telegram No. 249.

Ismet replied yesterday to Allied note enclosed in my despatch No. 227. I am sending copy of his further note in my despatch No. 232. It is defensive and comparatively mild in tone, but concludes with expression of hope that Allied delegates will speedily receive instructions necessary to enable pending questions to be settled. Turks are, in fact, thoroughly impatient, and though primary responsibility is theirs, there is some ground for their complaint that delay in arrival of our final instructions has held up conference since 23rd June. My French colleague has impressed very strongly on his Government danger of keeping Turks waiting indefinitely in present temper of Angora. This doubtless accounts for rapidity with which French Government answered British note of 3rd July.

I earnestly hope that His Majesty's Government and French Government will, if possible, reach speedy agreement and send us identic instructions not later than end of this week.

You will see by my immediately following telegram that I have also to keep M. Veniselos in play, and have induced him to hold his hand until Sunday.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 32.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 252.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 5, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 105.

M. Veniselos called this morning, and I felt I could no longer defer replying to enquiry which I had reported to you in my telegram No. 235. I spoke to him in the sense of your instructions to me and then went on to speak to him in the sense of my telegram No. 239, as authorised by you, making it perfectly clear that I was speaking to him on my own initiative.

M. Veniselos replied that he understood and appreciated considerations which I had submitted to him. He stated that he had been thinking what could be done supposing there was rupture of conference. He was deeply concerned to secure immediate return of remaining Greek prisoners of war in Turkish hands, as well as of 80,000 males of Greek origin who had been kept back by the Turks. It was urgent that these males should rejoin their families at earliest possible moment, and he was also anxious to give immediate effect to agreement for exchange of populations in order that the said males and their families should, by 1st October next, be settled on the lands to be vacated by Turks under Exchange of Populations Agreement. If this could not be effected by 1st October another agricultural year would be lost and Greece involved in further huge expenditure on account of refugees. He added that there was danger, if immediate steps were not taken, that a considerable number of Greek prisoners would die in Asia Minor.

He therefore contemplated following procedure. If there were rupture of conference he would propose to Turks to draw up a protocol providing for immediate handing over to Greece of remaining Greek prisoners of war and the 80,000 above-mentioned males, as well as immediate application of Exchange of Populations Agreement. If Turks required to be reassured against employment against them of these males, he would be prepared to settle them temporarily in islands under supervision of Red Cross or neutral representatives. In return for Turkish readiness to accept such a protocol he would undertake to demobilise Greek army, but he would not make peace with Turkey, and Græco-Turkish relations would continue to be governed by armistice of Mudania until such time as Great Powers made peace with Turkey. He would ask latter to give an assurance that when they made peace with Turkey they would see to it that Greece should be able to make peace simultaneously on conditions not less favourable than those possible at present moment. He thought of approaching Ismet on foregoing lines.

I took it upon myself to tell M. Veniselos that Allied delegates confidently expected to receive by Sunday next agreed and final instructions from their Governments with regard to questions still outstanding. This would permit of an immediate meeting with Turks. In these circumstances I suggested that M. Veniselos might hold his hand until Sunday next, and he agreed to do so.

(Repeated to Athens.)

No. 33.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 379.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, July* 5, 1923.

MY telegram No. 374.

I am replying, if possible, by identic note, in the sense of observations furnished me by General Harington and to the effect that Turkish explanation cannot be accepted in view of facts already reported, including proof of guns having been

smuggled out of Allied depot as lately as last June. Allies have long been aware through intelligence service of manner in which Turks have been violating article 13 of Mudania Convention, and guns seized only form small amount of excess military equipment recently retransported from Thrace to Anatolia. Several soldiers on steamship "Umid" admitted being artillerymen disguised as gendarmerie. It is inconceivable that guns could have remained hidden, even if Tayar's declaration were false, during the four years of Allied and Greek occupation of Eastern Thrace. Nor, in spite of my request, have Turks supplied any details as to locality, date and conditions of discovery of guns.

It is possible that above details might be useful for communication to British press in connection with this affair.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 205.)

No. 34.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*).

(No. 284.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 639 to 642 of 3rd July: Lausanne.

Please make a communication to the French Government in the following sense:—

His Majesty's Government greatly regret that they find a further exchange of views with the French Government necessary before they can send Sir H. Rumbold further instructions.

The latest French proposal still contains elements which Sir H. Rumbold and, as His Majesty's Government believe, his Italian colleague consider certain of refusal by the Turks, and therefore likely to produce a rupture, since they confront the Turks with a choice between integral acceptance of the French formula or a postponement of evacuation. General Pellé will doubtless have communicated to French Government the serious warning of the Serbian and Roumanian delegates at Lausanne, together with Ismet's statements that the Turks will not pay interest in gold, that a rupture would mean renewal of hostilities, and that they would not sign peace failing assurance of evacuation. This all bears upon the French proposals, and the French Government may desire to reconsider their decisions and their instructions to General Pellé.

His Majesty's Government take note of M. Poincaré's statements that he must *ménager* the Turks (your telegram No. 639), and that the last thing he desires is to despatch reinforcements to Constantinople (your telegram No. 642). They appear to His Majesty's Government to be inconsistent with a policy of insistence on a solution of the debt question, which it is generally agreed is calculated to lead to a rupture with the Turks.

His Majesty's Government can only explain this inconsistency by the assumption that M. Poincaré believes that a definite settlement between the Turks and the bondholders will follow from Zeki's personal and quite unauthorised proposal, that such settlement will be reached in the interval between signature at Lausanne and ratification at Angora, so as to permit of the beginning of evacuation on the latter, and that the Turks, in spite of Ismet's statement referred to above, will be prepared to sign a treaty without any definite agreement as to the date of evacuation.

His Majesty's Government would be only too glad to be able to share this belief. But they apprehend, on the contrary, that the French proposals, which require Turkish acceptance of either the French debt formula or a postponement of evacuation, are far more likely to lead to a rupture, and they can therefore only ask the French Government to reconsider the possibility of omission of any declaration on the subject of the debt from the treaty, full reservation of the bondholders' rights in a letter to Ismet, but no corresponding postponement of evacuation.

Should the French Government, as they hope, see their way to instructing General Pellé in this sense, it seems desirable that he be at the same time instructed to submit this solution to the Turks simultaneously and in conjunction with the protocol and declaration governing the concessions. It is essential to avoid a further deadlock arising on this second question, which is of almost greater importance to

Allied interests, since the debt contract would remain valid in equity, while the rights of Allied concessionnaires require to be guaranteed by definite stipulations in the treaty. The two questions must therefore be treated together and their solution secured simultaneously in consideration of Turkish satisfaction on evacuation.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 202; Lausanne, No. 107; and Constantinople, No. 216.)

No. 35.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 203.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1923.

LAUSANNE telegram No. 242, repeated to you, of 3rd July.

Please urge Italian Government to authorise their representatives at Lausanne to continue to co-operate with their Allied colleagues in negotiation of draft agreement on distribution of Turkish reparation fund. You should lay stress on necessity of early settlement and practical convenience afforded by presence of experts at Lausanne.

Pending receipt of Italian note to be addressed to ourselves and French Government it is unnecessary for you to refer to probable reasons of Italian instructions.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 103.)

No. 36.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, July* 5, 1923.

MY telegram No. 257.

President of the Council is reported in press to have stated that Greece would certainly not demobilise before signature of at least a preliminary peace.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Lausanne.)

No. 37.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Rome, July* 6, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 204.

President of the Council informed me to-day that he has already approached French Government in the sense desired.

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.)

No. 38.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 130A.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, July* 6, 1923.

YOUR telegram 203.

I made representation to President of the Council, and he seemed ready to agree, but was less prepared to do so after hearing from departmental expert reasons for Italian attitude as given in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 242.

His Excellency promised, however, to look into matter and if possible to meet my request.

No. 39.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 654.) [By Telephone.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris.*

YOUR telegram No. 284.

Following is the central portion of note from French Government just received quoting instructions sent to General Pellé to-day.

Following is in French :—

" Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a prescrit par télégramme au Général Pellé de se résigner à accepter qu'aucune déclaration relative à la question de la dette ne soit insérée au traité, à la condition qu'il soit notifié expressément à la délégation turque que si les Alliés renoncent à demander une déclaration au Gouvernement turc, ils n'en considèrent pas moins que le Décret de Mouharrem et les décrets annexes restent valables dans toutes leurs parties.

" Cette notification prendra la forme d'une note ou d'une lettre annexée au traité; elle devra être insérée dans la note faisant connaître aux Turcs les conditions définitives des Alliés en ce qui concerne la dette.

" Il est bien entendu que dans cette note, qui sera remise à Ismet Pacha, seront comprises toutes les questions encore en suspens et notamment celle des concessions."

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

No. 40.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 204.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, July* 6, 1923.

MY telegram No. 284 to Paris, repeated to you, No. 202 of 5th July : Lausanne.

Please inform Italian Government of substance of above and urge them to bring such pressure as they can on French Government to adopt Sir H. Rumbold's proposals, in which we understand M. Montagna entirely concurs, for settlement of debt question.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 285; Lausanne, No. 110; and Constantinople, No. 218.)

No. 41.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 655.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 7, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 284.

In pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, I made an appointment to see M. Poincaré this morning and handed him a confidential *aide-mémoire*, containing the substance of the above telegram. M. Poincaré said that the distinction drawn by His Majesty's Government between the claims of the concessionnaires and those of the bondholders seemed to him a just one. Unless the former were looked after in the actual treaty their interests might lapse entirely, while the bondholders possessed an inherent and continuing right to the support of their Government. On the other hand, the concessionnaires, speaking generally, were big men, and the French bondholders were many of them small men, so that in a democratic country it would not do to seem to ignore their interests. Once more he could not give me an immediate answer, as he must consult M. de Lasteyrie on this particular point. I pressed M. Poincaré very strongly to consider with the Minister of Finance if the bondholders would not be safeguarded, so far as was possible in the circumstances, by the proposed declaration outside the treaty. I added that the matter was exceedingly urgent, as I had heard that a further meeting was to be held at Lausanne to-morrow, and that M. Veniselos had said that, unless something

could be settled before Sunday, he could no longer refrain from making separate terms with Turkey. The President of the Council said that this was not the statesmanlike and sensible M. Veniselos of whom they had had experience during the Peace Conference, but the other M. Veniselos, who became excited and made use of threats. As to the danger of a Turkish attack, he ought to say that his information from Lausanne on the Roumanian and Serbian attitude did not tally with that which your Lordship had received. It was quite true that the French Government did not wish to send reinforcements to Constantinople, but there were 20,000 troops in Syria, who would be available against Turkey in case of need. I repeated the earnest hope that instructions might be sent to Lausanne in the sense of your Lordship's proposals, and I begged that I might receive an answer at the earliest possible moment.

The substance of the French Government's reply, which I am happy to think is generally satisfactory, has been transmitted to your Lordship by telephone this evening.

No. 42.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 7.)

(No. 254.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Lausanne, July* 7, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 284 to Paris.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris informed me yesterday by telephone of substance of note which he had just received from French Government. General Pellé confirmed this information a little later. As French have now come into line with our proposals, except on two minor points, I am assuming that I can proceed without awaiting further instructions.

One of the minor points just mentioned is that French Government apparently contemplate immediate despatch of a note to the Turks. Second point is that French wish Allied declaration reserving right to protect rights of bondholders to be annexed to treaty, which would, in my opinion, make it much more difficult for Turks to swallow it.

As regards first point, General Pellé agrees that we can hold private meeting with Ismet before deciding whether note is necessary or not. As regards second, we have agreed that question whether declaration should be annexed to treaty by being inserted in final act need not be raised for the moment.

In these circumstances we have arranged to hold private meeting with Ismet this afternoon in order to discuss questions of debt and concessions and evacuation. We shall take them in that order, making it clear, however, that we are discussing them as a single whole. I will report result of meeting this evening.

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.)

No. 43.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 8.)

(No. 255.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 7, 1923.

MY telegram No. 254.

Meeting took place this afternoon, and lasted from 3·30 P.M. to 9·15 P.M. Full report goes by bag to-night, but following is summary of results:—

Debt.—Ismet insisted that either suppression of all mention of confirmation of Decree of Muharrem and payment of coupons, whether by article in treaty or made in committee or otherwise by Turks or Allies, should be complete, or if Allies insisted on an Allied unilateral declaration regarding their point of view, Turkish delegation could not be prevented from making counter-declaration of their point of view. If they passed over Allied declaration in silence it might be interpreted as acceptance. Matter was left there.

Concessions.—We asked Ismet for agreement in principle on each paragraph of concessions protocol and declaration. He refused to accept paragraph 2, regarding judicially incomplete pre-war concessions, although General Pellé and I made it clear that only Allied interests which article was intended to protect were Vickers-Armstrong, Turkish Petroleum Company, French 1914 loan and railway agreement. It was finally agreed that experts should examine paragraph again on basis that Allies might suppress provision if before conclusion of peace Turks could offer a satisfactory settlement with companies or other satisfactory guarantees for protection of their interests—at any rate, in case of the first and third. Turkish Petroleum Company is less important, as its treatment will almost certainly not be regulated by provisions of protocol regarding concessions in territory remaining Turkish.

Ismet also made difficulties on various other points, including declaration attached to protocol in so far as second paragraph (Bagdad and Anatolian Railways) is concerned.

Apart from above-mentioned points and two or three others, Ismet accepted concessions protocol and declaration in principle subject to examination to-morrow by experts, who will also then make another effort to reach agreement on outstanding points of disagreement.

Evacuation.—Ismet criticised nearly every paragraph of protocol, even saying that six weeks was too long, and asking for further assurances regarding return of arms, including those taken on "Umid." He also objected to modification, proposed by us in protocol, of date from which delay of nine months for Irak frontier negotiation is to run.

I refused to accept any change of substance on any single point, but agreed that experts should discuss with Turks to-morrow small changes of form.

Experts are to meet to-morrow morning to discuss both concessions and evacuation protocols, and meeting with Ismet will be resumed at 3 o'clock to-morrow afternoon.

I regret to report that Turkish attitude on all points was most unsatisfactory, but General Pellé and I attacked Ismet very violently, and there is a possibility that reaction in our favour may have set in on Turkish side by to-morrow afternoon.

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.)

[E 7032/21/44] No. 44.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 381.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July* 3, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the Ministry of National Economy at Angora is stated to be preparing a law whereby all administrations, commercial establishments, companies and shops functioning in conformity with the laws of the Grand National Assembly, will be obliged in future to close on Fridays. In the meantime measures of persuasion and intimidation are already being taken in Constantinople to give this law anticipatory effect. All Turkish establishments already conform to it, and most Armenian and Greek shops (at any rate in the Turkish quarters of the town) are finding it expedient to follow suit.

2. A number of foreign and Allied institutions have also been approached on the subject, and in a notice published recently in the press the various Chambers of Commerce were invited to draw the attention of their companies and establishments to the imminent introduction of this law. I understand that some British firms have acquiesced so far as to close on Friday afternoon.

3. If it were possible to restrict the Friday closing law to a half-holiday and to substitute it for that on Saturday, I would regard this measure as being actually in the interest of British firms here having relations with Turkish administrations. It is most unlikely, however, that the Turks, who, in their present frame of mind, seek to make Turkey impossible for any but Turks, will be prepared to agree to their day of rest being limited to a half-holiday. I have little doubt, therefore, that the law, as soon as it is promulgated and the treaty has been signed, will come into full force in Constantinople and throughout the country.

4. Two whole holidays in the week cannot fail either to increase the cost of living or to lead to a reduction of wages. Whether it will be possible in these circumstances

for Christian shops to remain closed both on Fridays and Sundays is another matter. If not, inasmuch as it will be impossible to protest against this law, the Turks will either achieve their object in hampering the non-Moslem competitor, or the Christian establishment will be obliged to forgo its Sunday day of rest.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 7083/52/44] No. 45.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. —(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 382.) *Constantinople, July* 3, 1923.

My Lord,

ON the 27th ultimo, after I had addressed by bag to your Lordship my despatch No. 376, I received a visit from M. Pallis, the delegate of the Greek Red Cross in Constantinople, who came to inform me, on behalf of the Œcumenical Patriarch, that the latter had decided to request the Mixed Council, which is at present sitting, to allow him to retire forthwith to Mount Athos on the grounds of ill-health. M. Pallis, who explained that departure did not necessarily mean resignation, added that Mgr. Meletios was most grateful for all the support and assistance which he had received in the past from His Majesty's Government and your Lordship, and begged that, as a final proof of this goodwill, a British warship might be placed at his disposal in order to spare him the humiliation of having to apply to the Turkish authorities for permission to leave. M. Pallis asked whether, if this request was granted, it would be possible to make arrangements for the Patriarch to leave on the following day, as he proposed to announce his intention to the Mixed Council that same afternoon and did not wish the news of his departure to be made known before he actually left.

2. I told M. Pallis that as I could not regard Mgr. Meletios's life as being in immediate danger, I could not take upon myself the responsibility of making the necessary arrangements without first seeking the sanction of His Majesty's Government. I undertook, however, to telegraph at once to your Lordship and to suggest that the Patriarch's request be granted.

3. As stated in my telegram No. 366 of the 27th ultimo, it is obviously the intention of the Patriarch, in leaving Constantinople and in handing over all his powers to the Holy Synod, to bring the issue between the Turks and the Œcumenical Patriarchate to a head while the Allied forces of occupation are still here, and before the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference. His departure, which the Holy Synod can, if it chooses, subsequently convert into resignation, gives the Patriarchate the opportunity, which so long as Mgr. Meletios remained here would be denied it, of opening negotiations with the Turks. This course is in accordance with the spirit, at any rate, of M. Veniselos's expressed desire for the Patriarch's resignation, while at the same time it does not leave the Patriarchate without the opportunity of declining to proceed with the election of a new Patriarch in the event of the Holy Synod meeting, as it anticipates in its negotiations with the Turks, with intolerable interference with its proceedings as a spiritual organisation.

4. Mgr. Meletios's resignation, as well as the future status of the Patriarchate, would thus depend on the outcome of the negotiations which the latter will presumably initiate, after the Patriarch's departure, with the Turkish authorities. In this connection I venture to refer your Lordship to the written statement, read by Riza Nour Bey to one of the sub-commissions at Lausanne on the 16th December, which defines the future status of the Patriarchate (see p. 322 of the records of proceedings of that conference, "Turkey No. 1 (1923)"). It is therein laid down that as the relations of the Turkish Government with the educational, philanthropic and benevolent institutions previously dependent on the Patriarchate will in future be conducted directly with those institutions themselves, "so the clergy and its hierarchical chief will only have to deal with purely religious matters, and the Government will no longer have occasion to intervene either in these affairs or in any decisions which may be taken by the clergy in question."

5. If the Turkish authorities are prepared to abide by the letter of this definition, there should be no great difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory arrangement. The election of the spiritual chief of the Patriarchate, being a purely religious matter, should

afford the Turks no ground for interference in any form. I do not myself see that it even necessitates the prior submission, in accordance with traditional procedure, of the list of candidates as mentioned in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram to the Foreign Office No. 237 from Lausanne. It was in view of this new spiritual character of the Patriarchate that I anticipated, in my telegram No. 366, the early disappearance altogether of the lay members of the Mixed Council. Their presence might afford a pretext for Turkish objections, on the ground of the maintenance of a form of temporal régime in the Patriarchate, whereas there would seem to me to be no justification for interference with a Holy Synod, legally constituted according to purely canonical law.

6. I have already had an indication that this anticipation may prove correct. M. Pallis informed me on the afternoon of the 27th ultimo that the Mixed Council had announced that its decision on the Patriarch's request for permission to leave Constantinople could not be given for two or three days. He telephoned to me yesterday to state that the council, as at present constituted, does not regard itself as competent to pronounce, but has referred the Patriarch's proposal to the Holy Synod sitting alone.

7. In the meantime the news of the intended departure of the Patriarch has become public property, and I now learn from Adnan Bey that he has even applied, as a Turkish subject, for permission to leave, which has been granted him. Mgr. Meletios has nevertheless not yet acquainted me with the date selected for his departure, though I caused him to be informed, on receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 207 and after having obtained the concurrence of Admiral Brock, that a British warship would be held in readiness to convey him to Mount Athos. As a matter of fact, now that he has himself applied to the Turkish authorities for a passport and received a visa, there would seem no special reason to afford him the hospitality of a British warship. The offer having already been made, it cannot, however, now well be withdrawn, and in certain respects, though less so than if the Turks were not a party to his departure, I still see a certain advantage in maintaining the offer.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 7087/199/44] No. 46.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 387.) *Constantinople, July* 4, 1923.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 377 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, as had been anticipated, the fifteen Kemalist candidates were on the 28th June elected Deputies for Constantinople. Thanks to the measures taken by the authorities, no extraordinary incident occurred, and all but a small minority of the electors recorded their votes, Reouf Bey being, however, the only candidate to receive the unanimous vote of the 1,232 electors who took part. At the bottom of the list of successful candidates, some 70 votes behind the leader, was Ismail Djambolat Bey, and at the top of the unsuccessful candidates came Nureddin Pasha with 100 votes, closely followed by Ali Ihsan Pasha and Lutfi Fikri Bey, all these three Oppositionists having submitted their candidatures on the eve of the final elections.

2. It appears that the nomination of Nureddin Pasha, to which I referred in my despatch under reference, created considerable excitement in Kemalist circles, and immediate but unsuccessful efforts were made to suppress it. It has even been reported that Mustafa Kemal ordered the immediate return to Angora of the commander of the western army, an order, however, with which, if given, the latter has so far shown no sign of complying. It is similarly stated that the Turkish police recently seized letters of a compromising nature written by Nureddin Pasha, and that, as a result, the general has been relieved of his command. Both these reports, however, so far lack confirmation.

3. As regards the final elections themselves, the only feature of any interest was the list posted up in the election hall of the candidates for whom the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress were recommended to vote. In addition to Nureddin and Ali Ihsan Pashas, Lutfi Fikri and Ismail Djambolat Beys, this list contained the names of such prominent Kemalists as Reouf Bey, Fevzi, Kiazim Kara Bekir and Refet Pashas, and Fethi and Adnan Beys, a fact which may, I think, be taken as an

indication of the leaders who are likely to take the helm when in due course, after the conclusion of peace, the committee once again becomes a real power in the Turkish State.

4. The anticipation in my despatch No. 333 of the 6th ultimo, that the old National Assembly would not meet again, has been justified by the fact that on the 30th ultimo, when the sittings should have been resumed, a quorum could not be formed. A further postponement till the 2nd August was therefore decided upon, by which time it is expected that the new Deputies will be present in sufficient numbers to constitute a quorum. As over 120 Deputies have already been elected, there is every reason to suppose that, in the absence of untoward events, this expectation will be realised.

5. Estimates of the number of Deputies to be elected vary considerably, but in any case it is not expected that they will exceed 300; 290 is the number quoted to me by Adnan Bey. But it has been confidently asserted in the press that Mosul will elect Deputies to the new Assembly, while the population of the Yemen has also petitioned to be represented. It has since been announced, however, probably in pursuance of the present declared policy of the Angora Government against interference in matters affecting the detached territories, that a reply will only be returned to this latter petition after it has been considered by the new Assembly.

6. Apart from the eastern vilayets and the Trebizond area, it is only at Angora and Adana that difficulties are apparently being encountered. In the case of the former the difficulties seem to be chiefly due to the refusal of the population to accept, at the dictation of the Government, the candidature of former Deputies who, it is alleged, have done nothing for the country. At Adana, on the other hand, the troubles are of a more serious nature, and have up to the present given rise to the arrest of over thirty persons, who were attempting to carry out propaganda on behalf of the Opposition.

7. Meanwhile, the population of Trebizond have definitely intimated their refusal to follow blindly the orders of the Angora authorities. In accordance with the prevailing custom, the latter forwarded to Trebizond a list of Kemalist candidates whose election was required. This list was, however, completely ignored by the local Defence of Rights Organisation, which submitted to Angora for approval a list of candidates which it had decided to propose for election. No reply has, it is understood, yet been returned by Angora to this communication, but I have received information to the effect that Said Pasha, who replaced Kiazim Kara Bekir on the eastern front, has been sent to Trebizond and Erzeroum with a division in order to terrorise these localities, supervise the elections in such a manner that only Kemalist Deputies will be elected, and arrest notables who have been playing leading rôles in the Opposition movement there.

8. As regards the eastern vilayets, the only definite information received is from Kars, where it is stated that the elections have had to be suspended owing to the activities of the Opposition. At no other place have the elections apparently yet commenced, but earlier general impressions are borne out by a report that at Diarbekr the population has protested against the candidature of Feizi Bey, Minister of Public Works, who is himself of Kurdish origin. In view, however, of the fact that he has been nominated by Angora and will have at his command all the forces for opposition which has been so successful elsewhere, there is no reason to doubt that the election of Feizi Bey will be secured and that in the space of a few weeks the Angora Government will meet an assembly composed, for a time at least, exclusively of its nominal partisans.

(Copy to Lausanne, No. 152.)

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 47.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 256.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 7, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

The private meeting this afternoon between the Allied delegates and the Turkish delegates, each assisted by experts, lasted nearly six hours, with two intervals for separate consultation among Turks and Allies respectively. The attitude of the

Turks was exasperating to the last degree. They were equally shameless in their demands and ungenerous in their lack of appreciation of any concessions offered by the Allies. They tried the patience of my French colleague and myself to an extent unparalleled during the present phase of the conference. Nevertheless, I think they were severely shaken, and although their attitude this afternoon was unsatisfactory and disheartening, I am not entirely without hope that we may see the reaction in a better attitude when we resume the conversation again to-morrow afternoon.

I opened the meeting with an explanation of its object, in the course of which I made it clear that the three questions to be discussed, namely, the debt, concessions and evacuation, must be considered as a single whole. I emphasised the spirit of conciliation shown by the Allies, and expressed the hope that this might be our last private meeting, to be followed by final sittings of the three committees at which the work of the conference could be completed. After my French and Italian colleagues had spoken in the same general sense, and Ismet Pasha had made a reply asserting the Turkish delegation's eagerness for peace, General Pellé propounded the two alternative solutions for the debt question, namely, (*a*) the acceptance by the Turks of the Paris formula for a declaration to the bondholders, or (*b*) the abandonment of any attempt at a formula in the treaty settlement, subject to a declaration by the Allied delegates affirming their view that Decree of Muharrem, loan contracts, &c., retained their validity, and that the Allied Governments, while hoping for a direct settlement betwen the Turkish Government and the bondholders, reserved their right to protect the interests of their subjects.

My colleagues and I had agreed that it would be desirable to put the Turks in possession of the Allied case regarding all three questions before asking for a reply on any one of them. M. Montagna therefore went on to explain our views regarding the question of concessions, with which it had become necessary to deal in the conference owing to the failure, in a large number of cases, of the negotiations at Angora. The protocol and the declaration drawn up by the experts were, he said, already in the possession of the Turks. These texts represented the final views of the Allies.

I then outlined the proposals of the Allied delegations regarding the evacuation of Constantinople and Chanak. We had reduced these to the form of a protocol, copy of which I am sending home to-night. My Italian colleague had concurred in this draft, and General Pellé had expressed general concurrence in it subject to any views which might be expressed by his Government on questions of detail. This made it necessary for me to tell the Turks that, although we had prepared a text, it might be subject to slight modifications of form. I said I understood that Ismet Pasha and M. Veniselos had reached an agreement regarding the arrangements for the handing over of the Kara-Agatch area. This left the question of arrangements for Imbros and Tenedos, regarding the handing over of which the Allied delegations would be prepared to make suggestions. Finally, we would propose an addition to article 160 of the treaty, providing for the re-establishment of peace between Greece and Turkey, and the bringing into force of the Græco-Turk frontier clauses, as soon as Greece and Turkey had both ratified the treaty.

Ismet Pasha asked to be given copies of the Paris formula regarding the debt and of the draft protocol regarding evacuation. We gave him these, after renewing as regards the evacuation protocol our reservation that modifications of form might be necessary. He then asked for an adjournment of one hour to confer with his colleagues. When we reassembled, he said that although all questions at issue in the conference had been discussed, the proposals now made contained much that was new. He would, however, state his view regarding the general principles involved. Dealing first with the debt question, he dismissed outright the Paris formula as unacceptable. The Turkish delegation could, he said, accept the alternative proposal for the abandonment of any mention of the debt question in the treaty settlement, but he took strong exception to the proposal of the Allies to make a unilateral declaration of their own affirming their own point of view. He proposed that the abandonment of the declaration to the bondholders should be unaccompanied by anything in the nature of commentary or interpretation. The question would thus remain entirely one between the Turkish Government and the bondholders, with whom he hoped an understanding would be reached.

Turning to concessions, Ismet Pasha said that according to his information nearly all the companies represented at Angora had reached agreements with the Turkish Government. If there were any who had not done so their affairs could be settled here in Lausanne. He referred, however, only to companies whose concessions

were regularly in force before the war, to the exclusion of companies whose concessions had not been completed at that time. In the case of companies whose concessions were fully completed before the war he would accept (1) confirmation of existing contracts; (2) re-adaptation; (3) settlement of accounts; and (4) arbitration on the settlement of accounts if no agreement were reached otherwise. He said that this would meet the case of all companies which had not already reached agreements. Subject to discussion of minor details, he had no objection to the second section of the protocol which dealt with concessions in detached countries. Nothing settled in Lausanne must affect the position of companies whose negotiations at Angora had already resulted in agreements. He would propose to limit the effect of paragraph 8 of the protocol relative to transfers effected under the Constantinople Government to territory under the effective authority of that Government, to the exclusion of territory occupied by the Greeks.

Ismet Pasha then turned to evacuation and criticised our draft protocol in seven distinct respects as follows:—

1. The period of six weeks was unnecessarily long.

2. In any case the operation should be divided into stages, a period being fixed for the evacuation of each successive area, beginning with Constantinople, which might be evacuated in one week.

3. He observed that the provisions regarding evacuation had been entirely divorced from the treaty. He must therefore ask for a provision that if the evacuation protocol were not carried out the Turkish ratification of the treaty would be null and void.

4. The draft protocol made no mention of the restoration of material removed from Turkish stores or from on board ship, *e.g.*, in the recent case of the "Umid."

5. The restoration of ships of war should include all warships interned by the Allies.

6. He had not been able to study in detail the effect of the proposal to bring into force immediately certain articles of the treaty and the annexed conventions. What struck him at first sight, however, was the absence of reciprocity. What, he asked, would happen in the event of an indefinite postponement of ratification by the Allied Powers?

7. He objected to the clause providing for the nine months' negotiations regarding the Irak frontier to run from the beginning of evacuation, on the ground that this was at variance with what had been already agreed in the relevant article of the treaty. That article had, he said, been adopted at a time when the general conditions of evacuation were already known.

General Pellé stated that he did not consider Ismet Pasha's answer regarding the debt question satisfactory or one which could form a basis for peace. Having offered him his free choice between two alternatives, the Allies could not take exception to his rejection of the first. The conditions which Ismet Pasha attached to his acceptance of the second alternative were, however, inadmissible. We were not asking Turkey to enter into any new engagement or to confirm any old one. We were offering her a considerable concession and showing confidence in her, but our Governments considered that there must be no room for misunderstanding, as there would be unless we made it clear that the abandonment of a declaration to the bondholders did not imply any renunciation of the views which we had so frequently sustained. The declaration which the Allied delegations proposed to make would merely define their point of view. It would not necessarily call for any answer from the Turks. The offer which had been made represented the last word of the French Government.

I expressed disappointment at Ismet's statement, and said that the Turks could not object to the Allies making a declaration on the lines indicated in their offer. As for myself, I had definite instructions to make this declaration.

A long discussion ensued. Ismet Pasha persisted for a long time in his contention that, unless the Allies were prepared to deal in the treaty settlement with the question of the currency in which interest was to be paid, they should desist from any intervention whatsoever between the Turkish Government and the bondholders. General Pellé, supported by myself and M. Montagna, repeated that the declaration which we wished to make was merely an affirmation of an existing juridical position and of rights which the Allied Governments might have to exercise at some future time. The Turks were not even being asked to *prendre acte* of it. In the end Ismet weakened to the extent of saying that if the Allies made a declaration, the Turkish delegation would also have to make a counter-declaration embodying

their point of view, in order that both statements might stand on record. Personally, I should have liked to acquiesce in this view, but we were debarred from doing so by the fact that the instructions of the French Government still require that the Allied reservation of rights should take the form of a declaration annexed to the treaty. We therefore passed, after a short separate discussion between my colleagues and myself, to the question of concessions.

After some preliminary discussion, we went through the first portion of the concessions protocol paragraph by paragraph. Ismet Pasha suggested that paragraph 1 should be confined to named companies, viz., those who had sent representatives to Angora and had failed to reach an agreement. My colleagues and I refused to entertain this suggestion.

As I had anticipated, Ismet took the strongest exception to the second paragraph relative to non-completed pre-war concessions. He refused absolutely to accept the general principle embodied in the paragraph. We explained that it was meant to cover three specific cases, viz., the concessions definitely promised to the French in 1914, the Vickers-Armstrong concession (though I explained that in my view this really came under paragraph 1 and could only be affected by paragraph 2, owing to the attitude taken up by the Turks during the negotiations at Angora), and the Turkish Petroleum Company. We said that we should be prepared to drop the paragraph if Ismet Pasha would give us positive satisfaction regarding these three cases. He professed ignorance of them, and thereby drove General Pellé and myself to angry remonstrances.

After a good deal of further discussion, in the course of which Ismet maintained that the declaration attached to the protocol should be limited to Turkish companies in which Allied interests had been preponderant in 1914, thus excluding the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways. It was agreed that the experts should discuss the various questions which had been raised to-morrow.

It was now very late, and I rapidly ran through Ismet's seven objections to the draft evacuation protocol. I had no trouble in demolishing them, and I took particular pleasure in showing the Turks up over the incident of the "Umid." Ismet Pasha suggested that the evacuation protocol also should be discussed among experts. I said that I was not prepared to discuss the fundamental principles of the very generous offer which we were making, but I had no objection to allowing the draft protocol to be examined by experts in order that any necessary explanations should be given to the Turks and modifications of detail introduced.

It was agreed that the two committees of experts to discuss the concessions protocol and the evacuation protocol should meet to-morrow morning and that the conversation between the delegates should be resumed to-morrow afternoon. I foresee another very difficult interview, and can only hope that a night's reflection will make the Turks somewhat more reasonable than they were to-day. We agreed, pending the resumption of the conversation, that as little as possible should be disclosed to the press. General Pellé said roundly that the offers which he on his side had made were of such a nature that if they were revealed prematurely he would have to withdraw them.

No. 48.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 8, 1923.

IN discussion of the text of protocol of evacuation by experts this morning, Turks enquired whether withdrawal of Allied naval forces was included in a phrase in protocol which speaks of delay of six weeks within which operations of evacuation are to be carried out. Allied experts point out (*a*) never since armistice had naval units been regarded as part of forces of occupation; (*b*) Turks themselves, in their counter-proposals of 8th March, had only asked for withdrawal of Allied forces "from Turkish territory"; (*c*) nothing could prevent Allies having free run of Straits until convention entered into force since Turks, by their own action in August 1914, had destroyed pre-war Straits régime; (*d*) Ismet and his colleagues had had an hour to study text of protocol yesterday, and had raised number of detailed criticisms, but had never raised this question.

Clearly, therefore, protocol did not and could not cover question of Allied naval forces, who would have free run of Straits until Straits Convention enters into force.

Turkish expert insisted that presence of large Allied naval forces in Turkish territorial waters was certainly regarded by Turks as part of Allied occupation. While he said enough to make it clear that Angora will certainly insist on Ismet pressing this point, he hinted that Turks would be content with some reduction and not complete withdrawal until entry into force of Straits Convention. Ismet appears really to have made an oversight yesterday in not raising point, incredible though it may seem.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 49.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 258.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 8, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I feel that, as in practice we mean to make a big concession regarding evacuation on ratification by Turkey, the force of the concession will in fact be considerably diminished if we keep present naval forces in Turkish territorial waters, and I do not suppose Admiralty are particularly anxious to maintain large units in those waters.

I doubt whether, once land forces are evacuated, much real advantage would accrue to our interests at Constantinople from the presence of several naval units there in the interval between ratification by Turkey and actual entry into force of treaty and Straits Convention. I would therefore suggest, for your consideration and that of the Admiralty, the fixation of maximum number of British light cruisers, *e.g.*, two, with appropriate number of destroyers and auxiliary vessels. In fixing this number, account must be taken of probability that French and Italians, whose representatives are being asked to obtain urgent instructions from their Governments on the point to-day, will almost certainly wish each to have the right to maintain number equal to ours, and Americans will certainly continue to keep some naval forces at Constantinople. Either by separate declaration or insertion in protocol, Allies might then agree to withdrawal of their naval units over and above the number fixed for each.

I shall be very grateful if your instructions can be telegraphed to me if possible by the afternoon of 9th July, as it is essential, if final negotiations here are to be successful, that we should now keep them going at a rapid rate, and there is a possibility of concluding them to-morrow.

No. 50.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 259.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 8, 1923.

MY telegrams Nos. 255 and 256.

Allied and Turkish delegates with their experts met at 5·45 this evening.

Discussion was continued on coupons and evacuation. Ismet stated that he accepted the second alternative, but reserved to himself the right to make counter-declaration reserving generally his attitude if Allies made a unilateral declaration regarding their attitude. I took the opportunity of saying that every delegate was free to make what declaration he wished in committee meetings. General Pellé reserved his final attitude pending further instructions from his Government (see my telegram No. 261).

Evacuation.—Agreement was reached on text except on question of naval evacuation (see my telegram No. 257) and date of commencement of the nine months within which Irak frontier negotiations between His Majesty's Government and Turkish Government are to be concluded. I said that I personally would accept the end of Allied evacuation as the commencement, and Ismet also accepted this subject to reference to his Government.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 51.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 260.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 8, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Meeting rose at 8 o'clock, as economic experts only reached agreement on a text of concessions protocol and declaration at 7·30 after working all the morning and afternoon. Turks, who were thoroughly cowed by the shaking they received yesterday, showed themselves much more accommodating and reasonable, as I had ventured to hope. In order to make the most of this better atmosphere at once and to try to clinch matters, we are meeting again at 11 P.M. to-night to discuss experts' work on concessions.

Further details of this afternoon's meeting and a report on to-night's will be telegraphed to-morrow.

We are still refraining from any announcement to press.

No. 52.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 261.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 8, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Before meeting this afternoon General Pellé told my Italian colleague and myself that his Government had instructed him that Allied declaration regarding coupons need not be attached to treaty. He added that, in conversation on the telephone this afternoon, M. Peretti had suggested personally that, in order to avoid counter-declaration by Turks if Allied declaration were made in a committee and put into *procès-verbal*, Allies might say nothing until after conclusion of peace, and then through their High Commissioners make proposed declaration to Turkish Government.

Both Signor Montagna and I strongly dislike this proposal, as it would look as though we had feared formally to state our view when renouncing Turkish declaration or article in treaty, and had then tried to cover our position after conclusion of peace. It will certainly also weaken Allied position to make a concession renouncing Turkish declaration if we do not in committee, and before conclusion of peace, reserve our rights and attitude. We both think it would be much better to make strong declaration in committee and let Turks reply as they like. Neither declaration nor counter-declaration will insist on juridical position of bondholders. We have let General Pellé know this, and I informed him we could not go back on a procedure thereby endorsed by our respective Governments regarding making a declaration before conference separates. I telegraph at once in case M. Poincaré to-morrow endorses M. Peretti's suggestion and telegraphs to London and Rome for support.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 53.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 263.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 9, 1923.

MY telegram No. 259.

Discussion was resumed at 11 P.M., and continued for two and a half hours. We went through new draft concessions protocol which experts had prepared. Ismet agreed to discuss it, but reserved right to raise later points which might have escaped him owing to shortness of time which he had had to consider it.

Main difference between this draft and earlier one is that article 2, relative to inchoate pre-war concessions, is replaced by clauses expressly referring to each of the three cases which we had intended to cover, viz., Vickers-Armstrong, Turkish Petroleum Company and French Railway Concession of 1914. In first and third

cases basis of proposed settlement is that pre-war concessions are maintained in principle, but may, at option of Turkish Government, be replaced by new concessions of equal value. In case of failure to agree on conditions of such new concessions companies will have the right to submit them to arbitration. If either party is not satisfied, Turkish Government will compensate companies for cancellation of previous concessions. Companies will have preferential right for ten years to any concession for docks or Black Sea railways respectively on same terms as those offered to other applicants.

It is proposed to meet case of Turkish Petroleum Company by simple affirmation of validity and maintenance of pre-war concession.

In case of other concessions principle of arbitration is to extend to re-adaptation as well as settlement of accounts.

Declaration attached to protocol had been shortened so as to cover only companies in which Allied capital was preponderant in 1914, but French are pressing for supplementary letter to meet the case of Anatolia and Bagdad Railways.

Ismet accepted these proposals in principle except as regards last-mentioned letter, but he raised several points of detail on these and other clauses, with the result that several articles had to be referred back to experts for reconsideration of points which, if his assurances of his desire to give satisfaction are sincere, are mainly questions of drafting. Experts are working on these articles to-day, and I hope to send home to-morrow by bag revised text of protocol in the form in which it will probably be finally agreed. At end of discussion, Ismet said he could only accept final text *ad referendum*, but he hoped that this would not entail any serious delay, as he had already telegraphed substance of what was proposed. He was reminded in this connection of fact that all three questions discussed at this and earlier meetings were being dealt with as single whole, and that Allied offers all hung together.

I then briefly reviewed position of conference resulting from our prolonged conversations, and outlined procedure whereby further discussions amongst experts should be finished as far as possible to-day and ground prepared for final official meetings of committees. I said the only question on which I myself still stood in need of instructions was that of naval forces inside Straits. Ismet, on his side, had said he would need instructions on three points, viz., article 70, period for Irak frontier negotiations and concessions protocol. I urged him to obtain instructions which he required without further delay. Debt question was not mentioned, but if, as I hope may be the case, French Government agree that Turks must be allowed to record reply to declaration which Allied delegates propose to make in committee, this question should present no further difficulty, though article 46 *bis*, relative to readjustment of *gages*, still remains to be disposed of by experts.

It is too soon to say peace is assured, but I no longer have any serious anxiety about it. At close of meeting we issued communiqué *re* proposed [? group omitted] in my immediately following telegram. It was agreed that while delegations must still be prudent in giving additional information to press, much greater latitude might now be used in this respect.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 54.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 264.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 9, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is translation of communiqué issued at the end of the meeting:—

"Semi-official meetings which have taken place since Saturday have enabled an agreement to be reached in principle between delegations of inviting Powers and Turkish delegation on the three questions which remained under discussion: currency for payment of coupons of Ottoman Debt, concessions and evacuation.

"Experts have been requested to reduce to final form drafts prepared on these subjects, and these drafts will then be submitted to competent committees of conference."

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 55.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 265.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 9, 1923.

MY telegram No. 263.

Americans may still intrigue against Turkish Petroleum Company settlement, exact terms of which are amongst matters referred back to experts. We have, however, met their ostensible objection to clause regarding inchoate pre-war concessions by avoiding inclusion of any general principle in protocol. If they show their hand by objecting to manner in which particular case of Turkish Petroleum Company is being dealt with, we can say we had satisfied ourselves that no rival American interest is involved. We have, I hope, got well to windward of them.

Fuller report of yesterday's proceedings, with necessary texts, will follow by bag to-morrow.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 56.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

[Telephoned to Paris for transmission.]

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 9, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 257 and 258 of 8th July: Withdrawal of naval forces.

I entirely concur in arguments by which you asserted Allied right to free run of Straits pending entry into force of Straits Convention, and I cannot consent to derogate from this principle by fixing number or tonnage of ships that may have access to Straits or Sea of Marmora.

Admiralty require maintenance of whole force until evacuation is complete; thereafter, they have no immediate interest in keeping any force there. But they insist that it be stipulated that when once total force has been withdrawn, rights of access as allowed by Straits Convention be reserved pending coming into force of that instrument.

It is clear that naval forces have been acting as auxiliary to military forces of occupation, and that they will be very considerably reduced on withdrawal of latter. If the Turks insist, you may insert a provision of this indefinite nature in the protocol or give a similar assurance in a letter to Ismet, but in either case, or in the event of any other mention of reduction of naval forces, the principle of our right of free access must be expressly asserted, and it cannot be jeopardised by fixation of a maximum.

No. 57.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 10.)

(No. 267.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 9, 1923.

MY despatch No. 169, your telegram No. 180.

My Allied colleagues and I invited the two Jugoslav representatives to see us this afternoon regarding their Government's signature of treaty. In spite of all our arguments, they maintained attitude, which they had adopted before our meeting in June, trying to meet demolition by our jurists of their case regarding validity to-day of financial stipulation of Treaty of London by opposing contrary opinion of a jurist whom they had consulted. They will either only sign treaty with a reserve, which we explained is juridically impossible, or they demand all reference to Serbia in article dealing with repartition of debt should be omitted. This would involve the reopening of the whole question of method of distributing debt.

When asked what is to become of their share (some 5 per cent.) of pre-war debt division if they will not sign, they suggested it should be divided amongst other participants. When asked how they are going to put an end to state of war with

Turkey, they reply that they suppose they will have to make a separate peace, but will take no action on negotiations until our own treaty is ratified by Turkey, so as not to embarrass us. They hope, I think, that undesirability of rift in Allied ranks, caused by one member of the Little *Entente* refusing to sign, may still force us to admit their signature with a reserve.

At the end of the meeting my Allied colleagues and I agreed to report deadlock by telegraph to our Governments. Hitherto French, who are mainly interested, have sought to bring pressure on Belgrade. You may still think it worth while to instruct Sir A. Young to urge Jugoslav Government to be reasonable.

I should explain that written reply referred to in last paragraph of my despatch under reference, a copy of which was sent to Belgrade, was never drafted, as we decided to let French continue representations orally.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

No. 58.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 12.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 268.) *Lausanne, July* 9, 1923.
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegrams Nos. 259 and 263.

The following is the full report of yesterday's proceedings which I promised to send by King's Messenger :—

The experts sat for three hours in the morning to go through the draft protocol concerning evacuation and to discuss the more or less connected questions of Imbros and Tenedos and the re-establishment of peace between Turkey and Greece. The Turkish expert was told that the Allied delegates were not prepared to alter the draft evacuation protocol in any material particular, but had allowed the meeting to be held in order that any necessary explanations should be given, and minor modifications introduced if required. The Turkish expert was in the main reasonable and conciliatory, and he did not revert to some of the objections made by Ismet Pasha the evening before. I am sending home by King's Messenger (see my despatch No. 245 of 10th July) a report prepared for the delegates showing the results arrived at at the meeting.

The principal point made by the Turkish expert—and this was one which had not occurred to Ismet Pasha on the 7th July—was that the draft protocol did not provide for naval evacuation. I have reported separately on this important point in my telegram No. 257 of 8th July.

The next really important point raised by the Turkish expert was that relative to the date to be indicated in paragraph 4. The upshot of the discussion is given adequately in the report of the meeting. Nothing else in the report calls for special mention in this portion of the record of yesterday's proceedings.

The Allied delegates had intended to resume their discussion with Ismet Pasha early in the afternoon. Owing to the prolonged nature of the discussion between the economic experts, to which I will revert later, the meeting of the delegates was postponed to a later hour. It began with a somewhat unpleasant incident. It will be remembered that, at the close of the private meeting on 7th July, the delegates mutually pledged themselves to give no information to the press regarding what had passed. The only delegate who had demurred to this was Ismet Pasha, who, however, at once withdrew his objection, and agreed to the pledge. It was therefore a painful surprise to find that two Swiss papers yesterday morning published an account of the proceedings, which, though inaccurate in certain particulars, was obviously based on first-hand information. This was all the more unfortunate as the published account reproduced a somewhat strong expression which I had used regarding the attitude of the Turkish delegation. There is reason to suppose that the French were in some way responsible for this grave indiscretion, especially as similar information was published yesterday morning in the Paris newspaper, the "Information," which has a correspondent here. My colleagues and I, who held a short meeting before resuming our discussions with Ismet Pasha, agreed that this must be mentioned at our meeting with him. I therefore opened the proceedings by expressing regret that so serious an indiscretion should have been committed. My French and Italian colleagues expressed similar regret, all of us saying that

we could not understand how the information had been given to the press. I went out of my way to make it clear that we regarded the Turkish delegation as entirely free from suspicion, as I had been told that Ismet Pasha, when shown the newspaper report, had most correctly said that, having given his word to make no statement, he would neither confirm nor deny anything which had been published. Ismet Pasha proceeded to read a previously prepared statement, in which, after expressing astonishment at the violation of the pledge by which all the delegates had bound themselves, he went on to say that I had used an expression which had escaped him at the time owing to his infirmity, but which he would not have allowed to pass had he heard it. I said in reply that, while renewing my expression of regret that any indiscretion had occurred, I must object strongly to any criticism of language to which the Turkish delegation had driven me, and which had been used at a private meeting. I repudiated indignantly the insinuation that I had taken advantage of Ismet Pasha's infirmity. He responded with a sullen maintenance of his protest, and the incident closed.

We then passed to the question of the interest on the debt. General Pellé summarised the proceedings of the previous day, making it clear that the Allies, while abandoning their demand for a Turkish declaration to the bondholders, would make a statement of their own, to which the Turks might reply. After some little discussion, Ismet Pasha asked whether it was clear that the Turks would be free to make a counter-declaration. My French colleague having told me before the meeting that the French Government had agreed that the Allied statement should be made at a meeting of his committee in a form drawn up in Paris, to which I had no objection, I thought it was clear, especially after what he had said in his preliminary summary, that the Turks could not be prevented from making a counter-declaration in the same way. I told Ismet Pasha that this was my view of the matter, but to my astonishment General Pellé said that he must reserve his formal answer, which he hoped to be able to give on the following day. I can only suppose that he wished to protect himself in case M. Poincaré should adopt the entirely new suggestion made by M. Peretti, and reported in my telegram No. 261 of 9th July.

It was then agreed that article 46 *bis*, which had been in abeyance pending a settlement of the main question of the interest on the debt, should be referred to the financial experts. As regards article 70, which is the only other outstanding article in the financial clauses, Ismet Pasha said that he still awaited instructions from Angora regarding the Allied proposal that this article should be suppressed subject to the Turkish delegation writing a letter which the experts had drafted (see my despatch No. 217 of 30th June). I urged Ismet Pasha to obtain his instructions from Angora as soon as possible.

We now passed to the evacuation protocol and went through the report of the meeting of the experts in the morning. Ismet Pasha was most insistent that the naval forces of the Allies should also be evacuated. I repeated the arguments used by my representative in the morning, and insisted that the Turks were making an entirely new demand, which was not even covered by their own counter-proposals as formulated in their note of 8th March. I said that I had already consulted my Government as to whether a reduction of naval forces, as suggested by the Turkish expert in the morning, could be contemplated, but I pointed out that, in the whole of the correspondence which has led up to the acceptance of the Turkish proposal regarding evacuation, the Allied Governments had had in mind the evacuation of land forces, as asked for by the Turks themselves.

We then took the three points raised by the Turks on the 4th paragraph of the protocol. As regards the "Umid," I confirmed what my representative had said in the morning. Ismet Pasha seemed inclined to press for a declaration in committee that the guns, &c., seized in the "Umid" would be returned, but I think he was relieved when I enabled him to abandon his request by saying I was on the point of telegraphing to Constantinople to say that I had already given an assurance in regard to these guns, &c. I undertook to mention in the same telegram the arms or portions thereof removed from certain Turkish stores in Constantinople about the end of last year, and now, I believe, at Kilia.

The Allied delegates agreed to insert after the words "bâtiments de guerre" the words "y compris le 'Yavouz Sultan Selim.'"

Ismet Pasha abandoned his request for any modification as regards the date indicated in paragraph 4 other than the substitution for the word "encore" of the words "à la date de la signature du présent protocole" on my telling him that in

the telegram which I was about to send to Constantinople I would say that I had promised that none of the objects covered by the paragraph should be removed from Turkish territory between now and the signature of the treaty, provided it was signed at the end of the present phase of the conference. I fulfilled the promises mentioned in this and the preceding paragraph, to which my French and Italian colleagues made themselves parties, by my telegram No. 82 of 9th July to Constantinople, repeated to you under No. 262.

We were unable to dispose of the point raised in paragraph 6 regarding the Commercial Convention, as the economic experts had not yet had time to go into it. As regards the second portion of paragraph 7, I said that I was prepared to adopt the suggestion made by my representative in the morning that the period of nine months for negotiations regarding the Irak frontier should run from the end of the evacuation. Ismet Pasha said that he too would accept this, subject to the approval of his Government.

Ismet Pasha demurred strongly to any special arrangement being made as regards the application of the provisions of article 14 relative to the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. He said that that article imposed an obligation on Turkey which she could be trusted to carry out after the Greeks had evacuated the two islands. He suggested the following formula :—

"Le retrait des troupes et autorités helléniques des îles d'Imbros et Ténédos sera effectué dès que le présent traité sera ratifié par les Gouvernements turc et grec. Dès ce retrait, les dispositions prévues à l'article 14 du traité de Paix seront appliquées par le Gouvernement turc."

I reserved this question for further consideration before the final meetings of committees.

He agreed to the addition proposed to be made to article 160, providing for the re-establishment of a state of peace between Greece and Turkey and the bringing into force of the articles relative to the Græco-Turkish frontier as soon as the treaty should have been ratified by the two Powers.

By this time the economic experts, who had sat practically the whole day, had produced a new draft of the protocol regarding concessions, a copy of which I am sending home in my despatch No. 246 of 10th July. This had not been copied, and it was close on dinner-time. I had learned that the Turkish economic experts had shown the same relative spirit of conciliatoriness as the Turkish delegates themselves had displayed at our meeting. Anxious to take advantage of this spirit, which might be described almost as one of subdued resignation tempered only by intransigence on a few points, I proposed that we should meet again in the evening, in order to clinch matters. Ismet Pasha rather demurred to this, and my French colleague was lukewarm. I nevertheless carried my point with the support of M. Montagna. We agreed to give the Turks a couple of hours to consider the draft produced by the experts, and it was arranged that we should meet again at 11 P.M. When we reassembled M. Montagna, as president of the Third Committee, went through the new draft protocol article by article :—

Article 1 was agreed to.

On *article* 2, which is now to take the form of separate special provisions for the Vickers-Armstrong concession, the Turkish Petroleum Company and the French railway concessions of 1914, Ismet Pasha raised several points of detail. As regards Vickers-Armstrong and the French railway concessions, the most substantial of these was that the paragraph ensuring to the concessionnaires for ten years a preferential right in regard to any future concession for the same purpose as their present concessions was so worded as to take effect notwithstanding that the companies might have in the meantime obtained alternative concessions or indemnities. It was agreed that this point must be met, and, as there were several others of less consequence, the whole article was referred back to the experts for revision. As regards the Turkish Petroleum Company, Ismet Pasha assured me that he wished to give satisfaction, but that it must be in a form which could be reconciled with Turkish legislation. With this object he desired to use the words "droits acquis" instead of the word "concession." I objected to this, as it might be said afterwards that *only* acquired rights were upheld, and that the rights claimed by the Turkish Petroleum Company were not in fact "acquis." After a vain attempt to find a new formula at the meeting, it was agreed that the experts should make a fresh attempt to arrive at one to-day.

Articles 3 *and* 4 were agreed to.

Article 5.—Ismet Pasha wished it to be made clear that the general provision regarding readaptation would not apply to the concessions specially dealt with in article 2. It was agreed that the question was only one of drafting, and should be left to the experts to settle. Subject to this and to a reservation regarding the letter asked for by us to cover the case of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways, &c., he agreed to the principle of article 5. This marked an important advance, inasmuch as, up to 7th July, Ismet Pasha had objected to the principle of arbitration being applied to anything except settlement of accounts.

Article 6.—Ismet Pasha wished it to be made clear that this article should not defeat the rights of the Government in cases where concessions might lapse or be annulled in the ordinary course of Turkish law, or under the terms of the concessions themselves. We agreed that this was reasonable and that the experts should redraft the article so as to meet the point.

Article 7.—Ismet Pasha wished to limit the operation of this to agreements with the Constantinople Government regarding concessions and to transfers of concessions in territory under the effective authority of the Constantinople Government, *i.e.*, Constantinople and the immediate neighbourhood, to the exclusion of territory which had been occupied by the Greeks. As it was not very clear what he was really driving at, and as there was believed to be at least one case in Smyrna in which the French are interested, it was agreed to refer the article back to the experts.

Ismet Pasha reminded us that it had been agreed that arrangements already arrived at between certain concessionary companies and the Turkish Government as a result of the recent negotiations at Angora were not to be affected by the protocol. He wished this to be made clear in the protocol itself. To this we agreed.

Ismet Pasha also said that he would have to submit the whole protocol to his Government for approval. The Allied delegates expressed apprehension lest this should cause delay. Ismet said he hoped this would not be the case, as he had already telegraphed the main lines. General Pellé took the opportunity of reminding him that the three questions which we had been discussing at our meetings of 7th and 8th July were being settled as a whole, and that any offers which the Allies had made regarding the other questions were conditional on all three questions being settled.

Ismet Pasha accepted *en bloc* section 2 of the protocol. He also accepted the draft declaration attached to it, which, indeed, had been given the form for which he himself had asked. He reserved his consent to the Allied proposal that the Turkish delegation should write us a letter covering the cases of the Oriental Railway, the Anatolian Railway, the Mersina–Adana Railway, the Bagdad Railway and the port of Haidar Pasha.

Before closing the meeting, I reviewed the position of the conference in the manner indicated in the penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 263 of 9th July. It was agreed that the necessary further meetings of the economic and financial experts to dispose of the concessions protocol and the small number of outstanding financial clauses should be held to-day, that the jurists should busy themselves with such drafting amendments as are necessary in the various texts, and that the ground should be fully prepared with the least possible delay for a series of meetings of the three committees to be held on the earliest possible day in order to record the final agreements on all points remaining to be settled finally in the conference before the treaty can be printed for signature.

These proceedings closed at 1·30 A.M. this morning. We had been working at high pressure since an early hour on Saturday afternoon, and most of the delegates were reduced to a state of extreme physical exhaustion. This was all the greater as our labours were conducted in an atmosphere of stifling heat. It so happened that the two days also coincided with an annual regatta and fair, which were held under the windows of the building in which we meet. To some it appeared that the Near Eastern Peace Conference had assumed the position of one of the gloomier side-shows to the fair. From our own point of view it was extremely trying to have to carry on conversations so laborious and important to the accompaniment in our immediate neighbourhood of merry-go-rounds, dancing, shooting practice and the clash of varied music.

The economic experts have resumed their labours. I hope to be able to send to-morrow evening in the same bag as this telegram a revised version of the concessions protocol, taking account of our discussion last night.

No. 59.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 10.)

(No. 269.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 9, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 112.

I fear I did not make it sufficiently clear that suggestion regarding delimitation applied only to ships sojourning in Turkish territorial waters. What I would wish to arrange with Turks is (1) unlimited right of passage pending coming into force of Straits Convention, and (2) right of sojourn in Turkish waters between end of evacuation and coming into force of convention for maximum number of ships of each of the three Powers. Turks will resist both, and their resistance to (2) may be more strenuous than I anticipated when I drafted my telegrams Nos. 257 and 258, for at the meeting with Ismet late yesterday afternoon he was much more insistent on complete naval evacuation of Turkish waters than his expert had been in the morning.

I gathered from telegram under reply that Admiralty, while insisting on unlimited right of passage, are comparatively indifferent to maintenance (once land evacuation is complete) of right to remain in Turkish waters, which of course we shall not possess under Straits Convention. I would therefore suggest I should be authorised to press strongly for (1) above, using argument which I have already invoked, but to use discretion as regards (2). If so authorised, I would as regards (2) try hard for the right to maintain in Turkish waters during transitional period maximum which I mentioned in my earlier telegrams, but would reduce this maximum if necessary, subject to getting complete satisfaction as regards (1).

I need hardly point out that argument based on destruction by Turks in 1914 of old régime of Straits is very strong as regards right of passage but very weak as regards right of sojourn.

My French colleague has been authorised to undertake to reduce ships in Turkish waters to maximum suggested by me. Italian strength is already below that maximum. If it were necessary to reduce maximum still further on lines indicated above, I should of course act in agreement with them. Please telephone reply through Paris Embassy.

Matter is most urgent, as I believe this to be the only serious question now standing in way of peace.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 60.

Sir H. Rumbold (*No.* 86) *to Mr. Henderson.*—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received July* 10.)

(No. 270.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 9, 1923.

DELEGATIONS here have received telegram from Greek consul-general at Constantinople that nineteen Ottoman Greeks from Beicos were yesterday condemned by court-martial at Constantinople, seventeen to death and two to penal servitude for life, for having aided Greek army during the war. Reuter from Constantinople to London of yesterday, appearing in press here to-day, confirms this, and says that execution of death sentence is to take place at Ismid. M. Veniselos is absent in Paris until to-morrow night, but M. Caclamanos has written to Ismet to-night urging him, in view of probability of early signature of peace and amnesty, to intervene at once.

Greek delegation are much upset. Please telegraph facts. If they are as stated I feel sure you will take any action you consider possible.

(Repeated to Athens and Rome.)

No. 61.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 10.)

(No. 383.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, July* 10, 1923.

ŒCUMENICAL Patriarch left this afternoon on Khedivial steamship "Famaka" for Mytilene, whence he will be conveyed by Greek destroyer to Athos.

No. 62.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 261 of 8th July: Debt coupons declaration.

I approve your attitude as regards French proposals.

No. 63.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 256 of 7th reports a statement by Ismet that nothing settled at Lausanne must affect the position of companies whose negotiations at Angora had already resulted in agreements.

It is highly undesirable that such companies should be excluded from the benefits of the treaty guarantees.

No. 64.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 259 of 9th July: Date of commencement of Irak frontier negotiations.

I accept your proposal that date should be end of Allied evacuation.

No. 65.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

[Telephoned to Paris for transmission.]

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 10, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 269 of 10th July: Withdrawal of naval forces.

I have consulted Admiralty, and we are content to leave question of number of vessels sojourning in Turkish waters to your judgment.

You may therefore use your discretion as regards (2), provided that as regards (1) you secure formal recognition of unlimited right of passage pending coming into force of the convention.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 222, in "R.")

[E 7158/7158/44] No. 66.

Sir O. Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 89.)
My Lord, *Vatican Mission, Rome, July 7*, 1923.

AS I was leaving Cardinal Gasparri's room this morning after paying the customary Saturday visit, his Eminence suddenly remembered to ask a question which had evidently been on his mind for some time, but which had been driven into the background by the all-absorbing topic of the Papal note.

He is very anxious to learn, and hopes your Lordship will be good enough to inform him as I was unfortunately not in a position to do so, whether His Majesty's Government have now been able to come to an agreement with the French Government with regard to the claim maintained by the latter that their representative should be accorded a privileged position and liturgical honours at Roman Catholic services in Constantinople. His Eminence, who was informed of the diplomatic incident which occurred last year on the occasion of the Requiem Mass for the Pope Benedict XV, involving the non-attendance of the British and Italian High Commissioners, appeared ready if desired to prevent the repetition of such an incident by the simple means of cancelling the next official service. In the ordinary course of events there would be another in the near future when the new Apostolic delegate assumes his functions at Constantinople.

I should be grateful if your Lordship would enable me to inform the Cardinal if there has been any further development arising from the discussions which have taken place on this question since it first divided British and French opinion after the Conference of San Remo.

I have, &c.
ODO RUSSELL.

No. 67.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 384.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, July* 10, 1923.

GENERAL HARINGTON has drawn attention of War Office to importance of defining status and rights of Allied forces of occupation during the six weeks' period after ratification of peace by Angora, and to the danger of incidents if Turks are allowed to send troops to Constantinople or to organise demonstrations.

That status will be precisely what it has been up to the present, but I trust it will be possible clearly to define this at Lausanne before signature. I spoke to Adnan on the subject to-day. He seemed personally ready to admit above view, but his opinion carries no weight. He added that special orders were to be issued in Constantinople with a view to avoiding incidents.

At the same time, attitude of Turks during the past few weeks has been increasingly aggressive, and more calculated to provoke than to avoid incidents. I therefore trust it will be possible to obtain definite undertaking from Ismet on the subject.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 212.)

No. 68.

Mr. Henderson (*No* 213) *to Sir H. Rumbold* (*Lausanne*).—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received July* 11.)

(No. 385.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 10, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 86.

My attention had already been drawn to condemnation of Beicos Ottoman Greeks, and I made serious unofficial appeal to Adnan on the subject this afternoon. Adnan told me only seven had been condemned to death out of some fifty who had been arrested. He denied sentences had been delivered on political grounds, and said

that condemned men had been found guilty of murders, brigandage and rape. I told him, while I had no desire to intervene, even unofficially, on behalf of criminals, press, including Turkish, had reported charge was assistance to Greek army during its occupation of Beicos in 1920, and I laid stress on unfortunate impression which would be caused on the eve of peace by such executions.

Adnan promised to discuss question with Turkish commandant, and I hope representations may have some effect.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 80.)

No. 69.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 386.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 10, 1923.

HAVING been informed by General Harington that six Ottoman-Greeks, who had been employed by British Labour Battalion at Chanak, had been arrested on their return thence to Constantinople, and were to be removed to Angora solely on the ground of their having been in British service, I made protest on the subject to-day to Adnan.

Adnan said that while information as to return to Angora was incorrect, all Turkish subjects, including Albanians, Ottoman-Greeks and Armenians, who had served in British army would be expelled from Turkey, that this was in accordance with the law of Grand National Assembly, and that he could therefore do nothing as they were regarded to have forfeited claim to Turkish nationality through service in British forces.

I understand from General Harington that large numbers of Ottoman subjects of all categories who have been or are still attached to British forces in various capacities will be affected.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 214.)

No. 70.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 272.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 11, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 115.

You will have seen from record of private meetings with Ismet that we have already agreed that agreements already reached between Turkish Government and companies at Angora should not be affected by concessions protocol. We had considered question very carefully, and had reached conclusion that it would be neither practicable *vis-à-vis* Turks nor in true interests of companies concerned to ask that latter should be free to reopen negotiations on basis of protocol. To do so would have been contrary to the spirit, though perhaps not the letter, of Allied note of 27th March, and it is most unlikely that any company which after concluding agreement went back thereon in order to negotiate on basis of protocol would do better than it has done already, having regard to odium which it would incur with Turks by doing so.

I trust you will agree with view on which we have acted after considering above arguments, in which Board of Trade representative fully concurs.

No. 71.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 11, 1923.

WAR OFFICE apprehend that Turks, failing to realise that evacuation only begins on ratification by Angora and then will last some six weeks, may cause incidents in Constantinople involving Allied military authorities. They suggest

Ismet should be induced to issue a proclamation to inhabitants stating the situation and enjoining tranquillity.

You may urge this course of action on Ismet unless you see any objections.

Can you learn from Ismet when Angora is likely to ratify?

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 223.)

No. 72.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne).

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 11, 1923.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 266 of 9th July: Greek Minorities Treaty.

1. M. Veniselos's request, reported in your despatch No. 229, seems reasonable, and you should assent to it.

2. As regards question of guarantee, our main anxiety is not to jeopardise the fate of the Minorities Treaty. We have conflicting reports as to the value attached by the Greek Government to the clause in the preamble. Please, therefore, in the first instance sound M. Veniselos in conjunction with your French colleague, and ascertain what are his views. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

3. Personally, I see no objection to surrendering the rights and no advantage in retaining them. But if M. Veniselos agrees with the French and we do not jeopardise the treaty, I am willing to concur in French view.

No. 73.

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 672.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 11, 1923.

DISCUSSING the Lausanne peace to-day, "Pertinax" complains that five years after the victory of 1918 France is threatened with complete elimination in the Levant. England has successfully protected her interests as regards concessionnaires. Why has France suffered so complete a reverse? It is because since last September France has always refused to use force. It would have been better to put off the conference. The English, and even the Greeks, are realising the fruits of their firmness, while France has been flouted. Sooner or later, with Syria on their hands, France will have to show force, but no one will dispute with M. Bompard the privilege of signing the treaty.

This morning's "Information financière" observes that it is supposed that Turkey will soon have to have recourse to foreign capital, and that this will be the occasion when it may be possible to secure from her what it was impossible to get by means of the Lausanne negotiations. I mention this as it seems to suggest the possibility of the French trying to use Turkish financial needs as a means of pressure to get better terms.

One or two papers also express considerable dissatisfaction with the results at Lausanne from the French point of view.

No. 74.

Mr. Kennard to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received July 12.)

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, July* 11, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 7.

Official reply not yet received, but Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me privately that Italian delegate was instructed by telegraph on evening of 8th July to take part in negotiation of draft agreement on condition that signature of peace is not delayed for conclusion of that agreement.

No. 75.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 273.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 11, 1923.

MY telegram No. 268.

Things are going more slowly than I expected.

My colleagues and I agreed this morning, after reviewing points still to be settled before final meetings of committees can be held, that further private meeting with Ismet must be held this afternoon.

Before this meeting Ismet came to see me privately and seemed conciliatory. He expressed doubt whether meetings of committees could take place to-morrow, as he needed instructions from Angora on various points. He said he was now in a position to agree to my latest proposal regarding Irak frontier negotiations. I showed him formula prepared for meeting of delegates regarding reduction of ships in Turkish waters after evacuation subject to unlimited right of passage. He promised to consider it, and spoke principally of difficulties over concessions protocol. His object apparently was to divide me from French over their 1914 concessions and to frighten me with bogey of American opposition. I gave him no encouragement.

At meeting of delegates Turks were evidently playing for delay. Ismet was much more uncompromising about departure of ships than my conversation with him had led me to expect. I am telegraphing separately about this. It was necessary to refer once more to economic expert point on paragraph 6 of evacuation protocol about Commercial Convention. Even as regards Irak frontier negotiations he was less precise than in private conversation just before. He admitted that Mudania Convention would remain in force during evacuation period subject to arrangements of detail being made between military authorities on the spot. Allied delegates dropped with expression of regret question of any special arrangements applied to article 14 regarding Imbros and Tenedos. Ismet promised to consider question of allowing Belgium to adhere to concessions protocol.

These were principal matters dealt with in long and inconclusive discussion. We left remainder of outstanding points over for consideration at further private meeting to-morrow morning. These include concessions protocol, on which economic experts again worked to-day. I will report more fully to-morrow evening on proceedings to-day and to-morrow.

At present it is difficult to see whether Turks are moving back, playing for time in hope that Anglo-French relations may deteriorate owing to Ruhr question, or merely testing Allied position, in order to see what they can screw out of us before finally coming to terms.

No. 76.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 274.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 11, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I produced at private meeting of delegates this afternoon formula providing for maintenance of maximum number of Allied warships sojourning in Turkish waters inside Straits as laid down by correspondence ending with your telegram No. 117, between the end of evacuation and coming into force of Straits Convention, subject to unlimited right of passage during the same period. As my French colleague is still awaiting final instructions from Paris, I had to explain that this was merely provisional British proposal based on categorical instructions from His Majesty's Government.

Ismet said he would report my proposal to his Government, but went on to express uncompromising views of his own. He said that he could accept no evacuation proposal which did not include complete withdrawal of Allied warships from Turkish waters, that Turks had always understood evacuation in this sense, and that, as regards right of passage, only proper course was to bring into force article 2 of Straits Convention as soon as Turkey had ratified treaty. I combated all these con-

tentions strongly, using same arguments as in previous discussions, and emphasised generosity with which we had tried to give Turkey great measure of satisfaction without sacrificing our own principles.

Discussion was quite inconclusive. Ismet may have been simply trying to see how strongly we held our position, but this is just the sort of point on which Turks may prove obstinate to point of refusing to sign unless they secure departure of all Allied warships from Turkish waters. I have no intention of giving way easily, but I should be glad to learn for my guidance whether in the last resort His Majesty's Government would agree to leave no ships at all stationed in those waters provided I can secure unlimited right of passage. I doubt whether French will take strong line, and only desire of my Italian colleague is to stand aside from this question, leaving French and us to agree amongst ourselves and then get what we can from Turks.

No. 77.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 275.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 11, 1923.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 12, 8·30 A.M.)

Lausanne, July 11, 1923.
(*July* 12, 3·20 A.M.)

(No. 275.)

MY telegram No. 273.

French circles here have got the impression that Turks are delaying matters in the hope that statement which Prime Minister is expected to make to-morrow may produce serious disagreement between Great Britain and France, which would react on solidarity of Allied front here.

No. 78.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 276.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 12, 1923.

AMERICAN observer came last night to speak about formula which has been in discussion between Turks and ourselves to cover case of Turkish Petroleum Company. This formula is given in my immediately following telegram.

Mr. Grew dwelt on importance which his Government attached to this matter, and said that they would not be able to acquiesce in validation of an agreement which had not at the time fulfilled all the legal requirements. He said that if we maintained our position he would be reluctantly compelled to make a protest in committee. He reminded me that intervention of American army on the western front had enabled Allies to defeat Turkey, and that demand made by us to Turks to validate Turkish Petroleum Company's rights amounted to unfair use of our victory. He asked me what was my attitude in this matter, and suggested that I should drop case of company.

I did not discuss with him question whether American intervention in the war had in reality enabled us to defeat Turks. I reminded Mr. Grew that on two occasions on which he had objected on behalf of his Government to article 2 of concessions protocol he had expressly stated that neither his Government nor he himself had any particular Allied company in view. The Americans had now obtained satisfaction, in that article 2 had been dropped, but I told him frankly that I was convinced at the time he had made two above-mentioned *démarches* his Government had certainly had in view Perier Loan Concession and Turkish Petroleum Company. He demurred to this statement.

I then defined my attitude, which was that as long as I was in charge of this delegation I should continue, in discussions with Turks, to defend British interests to utmost of my ability, and that I entirely declined to drop case of Turkish Petroleum Company. If he were obliged to make protest in committee we would stand the racket. I then enquired in what manner he proposed that this case should be settled if it were dropped now.

Mr. Grew replied that, as this case had formed subject of correspondence between his and my Governments during last three years, it seemed an eminently suitable subject for arbitration. I told him that I would report his *démarche* to you, whereupon he asked whether I would not delay a settlement of this question so as to enable you to consider matter and, if necessary, give me fresh instructions. I said that I meant to hurry on conclusion of treaty as much as I could. He then pointed out there might not be time for me to receive fresh instructions. I observed that this assumed that I should receive fresh instructions, and I had no reason to anticipate that this would be the case. If Mr. Grew makes protests I shall reply.

No. 79.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 277.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 12, 1923.

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram :—

" Les droits acquis par la Compagnie pétrole de Turquie, en vertu des arrange-
" ments intervenus en 1914, ainsi que les obligations découlant pour ladite société
" anonyme de ces arrangements, sont valables et maintenus."

No. 80.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 387.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 12, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 118 to Lausanne.

It is generally announced that new Grand National Assembly will meet on or about 2nd August. Adnan confirmed this, and expressed the opinion that the treaty, if signed by 20th July, would be ratified by 10th August.

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 215.)

No. 81.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Howe (Belgrade).

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 12, 1923.

LAUSANNE telegram No. 267 of 9th July, repeated to you: Signature of treaty by Jugoslav Government.

Please bring such pressure as you can on Government to which you are accredited to abandon their obstructionist attitude and to consent to sign treaty.

You should impress on them that there can be no question of their signature with reservations or of omission of reference to Serbia from article dealing with division of debt.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 123.)

No. 82.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 278.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne.*

MY telegram No. 273.

Private meeting with Ismet was resumed to-day. We discussed outstanding questions for nearly four hours in the morning and for about two hours in the afternoon. As regards minor questions, Turks were in better mood, and though they were inconceivably tiresome and meticulous over some of these questions, they

allowed us slowly to extract satisfaction from them, with the result that we were able to settle following points:—

Article 46 *bis* to be replaced by agreed declaration which Ismet will read in committee.

Article 70 to be replaced by letter which Turkish Government will address to Debt Council.

Article 78. Turks dropped demand for repartition of pre-war claims amongst succession States.

Navigation, including cabotage and port services. Existing state of affairs to be maintained until 31st December, we on our side agreeing, in return for declaration to this effect, to drop mention of Commercial Convention in evacuation protocol.

Right of cabotage to be maintained in favour of certain named British, French and Italian lines after 1st January, 1924, on the understanding that Turkish Government will consider question of negotiating with them agreements for continuation of cabotage, but that if negotiations are not successful by 30th June, 1924, provisional right of cabotage in present conditions will terminate two years after that date.

Belgium to concede [*sic*: ? accede to] concessions protocol.

Duration of Commercial Convention to be of same period, *i.e.*, three years for Greece, Roumania and Jugoslavia.

This left nothing to be settled except the form of concessions protocol and question of naval evacuation, regarding which General Pellé stated at outset of this morning's meeting that he had received instructions and was at one with me. We discussed article 2 (*a*) and (*c*) of former (*i.e.*, special arrangement for Messrs. Vickers, Armstrong and French railway concession of 1914) in morning, with no result except to reduce my French colleague and myself to the verge of desperation. I nevertheless hoped that by the afternoon Turks might be more conciliatory about these clauses and naval evacuation. In order to promote this I authorised Mr. Ryan to see Reza Nour in the interval, and represent to him how little now separated us, but how serious situation would become if Turks persisted in uncompromising attitude on questions on which we had gone far more than half-way to meet them. Mr. Ryan found Reza Nour and Ismet, who specially asked to see him, apparently very anxious for final settlement, but still disinclined to yield regarding either naval evacuation or right of preference in regard to future concessions which we are trying to secure for Messrs. Vickers, Armstrong and French 1914 concessionnaires. Ismet also produced entirely new formula about Turkish Petroleum Company, based on principle that question of what rights were acquired in 1914 should be decided by arbitration.

When delegates reassembled, we cleared off such minor questions enumerated above as had been left over from morning and once more tackled article 2 (*a*) and (*c*) of concessions protocol. Ismet declared that he would not yield on question of right of preference. We had already met his arguments in the morning, and, finding that his attitude was unchanged, General Pellé and I reminded him for the tenth time that it had been agreed to settle questions of debt, concessions and evacuation as a whole. His present attitude, we said, left us no option but to inform our Governments that he had gone back on agreement on these questions reached on 8th July. There was no utility in continuing present discussion.

Ismet replied in uncompromising language. There were, he said, four questions still unsettled: (1) naval evacuation; (2) and (3) rights of preference claimed on behalf of Messrs. Vickers, Armstrong and French railway concessionnaires; (4) Turkish Petroleum Company. As regards (1), he reaffirmed his demand for withdrawal of all men-of-war from Turkish waters and application of article 2 of Straits Convention to passing ships. As regards (2) and (3), he said we had accepted principle of compensation and were now asking for something new, viz., right of preference. As regards (4), he said he had offered new formula.

We had [*sic*] made only such replies as were necessary to define our position before breaking off. We refused to consider his demands regarding (1). We pointed out, as regards (2) and (3), we had throughout taken validity of concessions in question as our starting-point, though we had agreed to seek practical working solution of which right of preference formed part. As regards (4), I said that his new formula, obviously due, as I told him outright, to American inspiration, was unacceptable and was inconsistent with his promise of 8th July to give us satisfaction.

Meeting then broke up. Ismet's attitude made this refusal on our part to continue discussion absolutely necessary.

I have no doubt that he will now run round trying to patch matter up, and I hope that he may realise by to-morrow that he has gone too far. If not, we shall have to reconsider our whole position, and *mise en demeure* may be necessary, but Turks are uncomfortable, and I do not despair of saving situation.

Proceedings to-day were so protracted that I fear that I cannot send full report by bag, as I had intended, but present telegram gives everything that is essential.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 87.)

No. 83.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 279.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 13, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 118 and Constantinople telegram No. 384, my telegram No. 275.

You will have seen by my telegram No. 273 that question of maintenance of Mudania Convention until the end of evacuation period was raised with Ismet at private meeting of delegates on 11th July, and that he admitted that it should remain in force during that period subject to arrangements of detail between military authorities on the spot. What he meant by this was that case might arise at different stages of departure of Allied troops from particular area, whereon entry of Turkish troops into such area would be a matter of military arrangement, though evacuation as a whole might not have been completed. This seems reasonable, especially as wording of article 3 (2) of convention in terms provides only for respect of areas occupied by Allied forces until "decision of Peace Conference."

I also mentioned danger of incidents during evacuation period and necessity for restraining population by means of proclamation by Ismet or other high authority. He promised that all necessary measures would be taken.

I shall ask Ismet to confirm these assurances at final meeting of my committee if, as I hope, we find a way out of our present difficulties.

Mr. Ryan asked Riza Nour yesterday when Angora might be expected to ratify treaty. He replied the Grand National Assembly would meet on 2nd August and that ratification might be expected about 15th August. This agrees generally with Constantinople telegram No. 387 to you. Riza Nour asked similar question about our ratification; Mr. Ryan said that, owing to prolongation of proceedings, ratification could hardly be expected before reopening of Parliament at the end of the autumn.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 84.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 280.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 13, 1923.

This reached me in middle of private meeting of delegates on 11th July. I at once addressed vehement protest to Ismet, and said that, apart from anything else, action of Turks and Adnan's statement were entirely contrary to spirit of amnesty declaration. Turkish delegates were much embarrassed, and tried to make out that Adnan could not have stated correctly terms of law. We told them that Adnan was not imbecile and must have known what he was talking about. Ismet promised to enquire into the matter at once.

I feel that if six men are not released General Harington would be justified in taking very strong line, as he did in "Umid" case, but nature of reprisal would of course have to be considered locally.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 85.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 281.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 13, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 213.

Greek delegation informed us on 10th July that Ismet had sent secretary of his delegation to inform M. Caclamanos that, while he did not wish to reply to latter's note in writing, and while he knew nothing of case, he had himself telegraphed urgently to Angora that they should not carry out execution. Riza Nour confirmed this in private meeting on 11th July.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.)

No. 86.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1923.
(No. 124.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1923, 7·20 P.M.

MR. HENDERSON'S telegram No. 214 to you.

You should do your utmost to exact through Ismet an undertaking that this monstrous regulation will be revoked or nullified either by an addition to the evacuation protocol or in any other way that may be possible.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 226.)

No. 87.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 282.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 13, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 119.

General Pellé and I saw M. Veniselos this afternoon. We enquired of him his views regarding suppression, from preamble of Greek Minorities Treaty, of two paragraphs relating to guarantees for France and Great Britain. M. Veniselos was insistent that the continuation of these guarantees was both unnecessary and undesirable. He himself wished constitutional monarchy to continue in Greece, and believed it would, but if Greek people in future thought differently, he still believed that form of Government in Greece was now one for them to decide. My French colleague did not press matter, but merely said he would report M. Veniselos's views to his Government. I assume, therefore, that French Government will not now insist upon any modification in preamble, and that protocol can be signed here with insertion of phrase providing for suppression of second paragraph of article 7 of Minorities Treaty.

No. 88.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 283.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 13, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

M. Veniselos then asked to be allowed to discuss question of facilities to be given to Greece for payment of her share of pre-war Ottoman Debt should future negotiations between Turkish Government and bondholders modify Turkey's existing contracts in favour of Turkey (see third paragraph of my telegram No. 226). He said that, before signing treaty, he would have to inform inviting Powers either by a declaration in committee or by a note that he was only going to sign treaty on express

understanding that Greece would never consent to pay bondholders on terms more unfavourable to her than those to be eventually accorded by bondholders to Turkey.

General Pellé replied, as he had in committee, that this was still a matter between bondholders and Greece and was not for Peace Conference to deal with. M. Veniselos countered this by saying that, while that might be the case as regards Turkey and bondholders, it was not so as regards Greece and bondholders, because Greece was bound by no charge or contract towards them or Powers except as a result of treaty of peace about to be signed. Greece's financial situation was just as bad as Turkey's, and Greece was an ally while Turkey was an enemy. He would therefore take no pledge towards bondholders, such as financial clauses of treaty, when he signed them would force him to do, unless it was clearly understood beforehand that Greece's treatment was to be no worse than Turkey's. Apparently he expects us either to pass his declaration and letter under silence or else accept them. If we do this, however, we shall in a certain sense be violating principle which we are upholding as between Turkey and bondholders, because we shall be prejudicing any future arrangement which they may make with Greece. On the other hand, it is obvious that we shall have great difficulty in getting M. Veniselos to accept present debt clauses of treaty unless we can find some form of declaration which we could permit him to make in committee without a counter-declaration on our part.

M. Veniselos, as usual when pressing a demand, was very excited in manner and made a rather violent disquisition on Allied treatment of Greece in the past. He mentioned once or twice in the course of conversation, without at all emphasising it that Greece has also possible alternative of making separate peace with [group omitted: ? Turkey]. He did not, however, revert to question of protocol (see my telegram No. 252).

We strongly contested M. Veniselos's arguments, but could not move him from his main proposal, on which we said we must have [? further] time to reflect.

No. 89.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 284.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 14, 1923.

(D.) MY telegram No. 278.

No movement of any kind having been made by Turks, I considered this afternoon with my Allied colleagues some form of summary procedure whereby Turks can be brought to a final private meeting and to a definite decision on the few outstanding issues to-morrow or Monday. Since none of these issues in themselves separately or collectively provides strong grounds for rupture by the Allies, care will be taken, should this meeting take place and fail, to leave final decisions to the three Governments.

You will have noted that Ismet made complete withdrawal of occupying naval forces and as regards right of passage application of article 2, Straits Convention, one of the few outstanding points of difference between Turkey and the Allies on which Tuesday's meeting broke off. In proposing application of article 2, Ismet was, of course, intending to provide anticipatory application of provisions of convention relating to passage under peace conditions, although for the juridical reason that we remain at war until entry into force of Peace Treaty, his object could not be achieved in the way which he suggested. As a result of Ismet's stand, situation here regarding application of evacuation protocol to Allied naval position in the Straits waters has therefore changed somewhat since despatch of my telegram No. 274, and Turkish resistance on point may now prove severe.

If, however, we bring Turks to a final meeting, it will be essential for us to be in a position to know beforehand the ultimate limit of concessions to which we may be driven to go, in its course, in our final effort definitely to clinch matters. I have been therefore carefully examining the outstanding points, and am firmly satisfied that sufficiently satisfactory solutions can probably be obtained as regards those arising on concessions protocol. (End of D.)

As regards naval evacuation, I am aware that Admiralty are comparatively indifferent as to maintenance of vessels in Turkish waters, and I can still reduce in bargaining maximum number of vessels which we proposed to reserve the right

to send to sojourn in Straits waters. I am also advised that if protocol merely provided for complete withdrawal of naval units in connection with operations of land evacuation nothing in the law could prevent our sending vessels in to sojourn in Turkish waters if a grave emergency affecting the safety of British lives in Constantinople arose before treaty entered into force. Possibly Turks would accept a declaration by Allies attached to protocol or made by agreement with them in committee expressly safeguarding point.

More serious difficulty arises over *unlimited* right of passage. Clearly an excellent juridical case exists for our insistence on this demand, but in view of risk of a break in negotiations mainly on this point, it seems necessary to consider whether its recognition by Turkey is absolutely essential to His Majesty's Government. As explained above, Turks are ready to accept right of passage as limited in numbers by Straits Convention. Treaty and therefore Straits Convention can probably be brought into force within three months after the end of our evacuation.

There seems no serious risk of any political issue arising during these three months which would require passage of unlimited Allied or British forces into the Black Sea, and, as far as I am aware Admiralty would be very reluctant to send any large force at all, as long as both shores of the Straits were in Turkish hands. In the circumstance, it is very difficult to justify refusal by Allies during this short interim period of some limited right of passage equivalent in substance to that accepted by them already in Straits Convention, and to be applied as soon as that convention enters into force.

Neither the French nor Italian support is anything but lukewarm on the point.

If possible, of course, I will wait for His Majesty's Government's observations on this telegram and in particular on lowest limit with which Admiralty would be content if principle of limitation of right of passage is accepted. If, however, in the course of the next two days, I find that in order finally to clinch matters and secure peace I must accept a limited right of passage until entry into force of peace treaty, I feel certain that you will support me in taking that responsibility, even if I have by then received no answer from you.

No. 90.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 390.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 15, 1923.

SIR H. RUMBOLD'S telegram No. 280.

Case does not appear to me to be one for local action, which would recoil on men's families, but rather for definite stipulation in some form in treaty.

Some of the men in question, who were released on bail yesterday, stated that they were to be deported forthwith, on the ground, or rather pretext, that they had left and returned to Constantinople without Turkish visa. They were of course sent down to and brought back from Chanak on British ship.

In this connection, date of 20th November last specified in armistice declaration, which I quoted in written protest which I addressed to Adnan Bey on the subject, should certainly be altered to "date of completion of evacuation."

(Sent to Lausanne, No. 217.)

[E 7346/52/44]

No. 91.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 404.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July* 10, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, as reported in my telegram No. 383, the Œcumenical Patriarch left Constantinople this afternoon on board the Khedivial steamship "Famaka" for Mitylene, whence he will proceed by a destroyer, which is being placed at his disposal by the Greek Government, to Mount Athos.

2. As your Lordship is aware, steps had originally been taken to convey Mgr. Meletios to his destination in a British destroyer, and all arrangements had in

fact been completed for his departure by this means on the 8th instant. Late on the 6th instant, however, the Patriarch sent his dragoman to the High Commission to deliver the note, of which a copy is enclosed herein, and to state verbally that, as his presence was required a few days longer for ecclesiastical reasons, he was obliged to postpone his departure. On receipt of this communication I immediately caused a message to be sent to the Patriarch expressing my regret that the carefully considered arrangements already made should be thus upset, and adding that, as all British warships in Turkish waters had to participate in firing practices during the present week, I feared that Admiral Brock would find it difficult to keep a destroyer at his disposal. I therefore hoped that his Holiness would reconsider his decision and adhere to the original plan.

3. This, however, he found himself unable to do, but, in informing me to this effect, he added that, as his papers were in order and as the Turkish authorities were fully aware of his impending departure, he would proceed by ordinary ship. At the same time he expressed his gratitude for the arrangements made on his behalf and his regret that he should have been obliged to cancel them. The press of the following day stated that the Patriarch would leave on the 12th instant.

4. Yesterday morning I learnt from the Turkish press that my Italian colleague had sent his dragoman to the Phanar to pay an official visit of courtesy to the Patriarch, while in the course of the day my French colleague informed me of his intention of following this example. For my part, I saw no reason to depart in any way, even at this late stage, from the course hitherto followed of having none but unofficial relations with Mgr. Meletios. Nor did I think that visits to the Patriarchate by representatives of the High Commissioners were likely, in present circumstances, to help the Patriarchate in its relations with the Turkish Government. I therefore intimated to M. Jessé Curély that I proposed to confine my courtesies to sending my acting chief dragoman to see the Patriarch once on board ship at the time of his departure. I understand, however, that the French Acting High Commissioner adhered to his original intention.

5. The difference of procedure was immaterial as I was notified a few hours later of the decision of the Patriarch to leave the following afternoon. His Holiness begged that if possible a British launch might convey him and his suite, consisting of the grand vicar of the Patriarchate, a bishop and a servant, from the Patriarchate to the ship. I arranged with General Harington to meet the Patriarch's wishes in this respect, and, in reply to a further request, gave permission for the baggage of the party to be put on board through the British base in order to avoid possible interference from the Turkish customs authorities.

6. Nevertheless, owing to the failure of the Patriarchate staff to carry out the careful instructions given to it by Mr. Helm, the Patriarch's baggage, consisting of some fifteen cases, was this morning despatched by the wrong route and without being in charge of a responsible official, with the result that, instead of being brought to the British base, as had been arranged, it was delivered to the Turkish customs authorities, who announced their intention of making an examination of the contents. Although I had been assured that the baggage included nothing but the Patriarch's personal effects, I was anxious, if possible, to prevent such an examination, though averse to removing the cases from the custom-house by force. I therefore pointed out to Adnan Bey by telephone the unfortunate effect which would be caused abroad if the Turkish authorities made difficulties at such a juncture, and requested him to issue instructions for the baggage to be passed through the customs without examination. To my satisfaction, and somewhat to my surprise, he immediately undertook to do this, and the packages were subsequently embarked without further difficulty.

7. The fact that Mgr. Meletios's departure from the Patriarchate was effected without incident may in part have been due to the presence of the British guard on board the launch provided by General Harington, and partly to its having taken place two days sooner than was expected; but probably the decisive factor was the announcement published two days ago by the Turkish authorities that any demonstrations, whether pro- or anti-Meletios, on the occasion of his leaving Constantinople would be severely punished. Incidentally, Adnan Bey, whom I saw later in the day, informed me that orders had been specially issued that morning to the Turkish police to prevent incidents of any kind whatsoever.

8. During his short journey by launch from the Phanar to the steamship "Famaka" the Patriarch was accompanied by an officer representing General Harington, two British police officers and six men. As an additional precautionary measure, a further launch provided by the British captain of the port followed at a

short distance. Rowing-boats containing a number of Turkish policemen were in evidence close to the gangway, but these took no more than a passive interest in the proceedings.

9. I had instructed the acting chief dragoman to receive Mgr. Meletios on his arrival on board the "Famaka" and to express to him my good wishes for his journey. The Patriarch, who engaged Mr. Helm in conversation for some twenty minutes, expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would in the future, as in the past, extend their support when possible to the institution of the Patriarchate. Mr. Helm, in reply, reminded his Holiness of your Lordship's efforts during the first phase of the Lausanne Conference with a view to securing the maintenance of the Patriarchate in Constantinople, and said that, as one of the branches of the Christian Church, the union of which his Holiness during his tenure of office had striven to further, the Greek Orthodox Church could always be assured of the earnest sympathy of the British Government and nation.

10. In reply to a question regarding his own future, the Patriarch stated that he was leaving Turkey for good. He had not resigned, but had delegated full powers to the Holy Synod. He displayed no signs of rancour towards the Turks, but, on the other hand, expressed his great regret that circumstances had rendered it impossible for him to remain. He expressed himself as completely satisfied with the conditions under which the maintenance of the Patriarchate had been accepted, and would have been prepared loyally to abide by them. Moreover, with his experience in Cyprus and America, he considered that he would probably have been better able to fulfil these conditions than would a prelate of less wide experience and hampered by the training and traditions of the past.

11. Mgr. Meletios, whose courageous conduct and dignity during the past eight months of extreme difficulty and danger have won universal admiration and respect, requested Mr. Helm to convey to His Majesty's Government his warm gratitude for the assistance accorded to him and to the Greeks of Constantinople during the armistice period, and his earnest hope that that benevolent attitude would be maintained during the anxious times which are still ahead of the Orthodox Church in Turkey.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Mgr. Meletios to Mr. Henderson.

Patriarcat œcuménique, Constantinople,
le 6 juillet 1923.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que je compte m'absenter de Constantinople en congé de trois mois pour des raisons de santé.

Pendant mon absence, ce sera le Saint-Synode qui gérera les affaires du Patriarcat, investi de tous les pouvoirs et de toute l'autorité du Patriarche.

A cette occasion, je crois de mon devoir de vous exprimer, M. le Haut-Commissaire, avec mes sentiments de profonde reconnaissance, mes plus vifs remerciements pour la haute protection dont la personne du Patriarche œcuménique ainsi que l'institution du Patriarcat ont été l'objet de la part du Haut-Commissariat de Sa Majesté britannique notamment en ces dernières circonstances si difficiles.

J'espère que l'intérêt bienveillant, témoigné de tous temps par les autorités britanniques à l'égard du Patriarcat œcuménique, et la haute protection dont celui-ci a eu des preuves manifestes, continueront, même dans une plus large mesure à lui être acquis pendant mon absence, étant données les circonstances toutes particulières qui pourraient en résulter pour l'institution du Patriarcat avec ses dépendances, les membres des corps constitués et le personnel.

Dans cette ferme conviction je prie, &c.

MELETIOS,
Patriarche œcuménique.

[**E 7347/199/44**] No. 92.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 405.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, July* 11, 1923.

DURING the past week the Turkish electoral campaign has proceeded without any incident of particular importance. The choice of Deputies has been expedited even in the eastern provinces, and the total number now elected has almost reached 200, the latest results including those for Konia, Yozgad, Kars and Sivas.

2. At the same time, it has been announced that all elected Deputies have been requested to proceed to Angora without delay. It is thus apparent that, if in the meantime the Treaty of Peace is signed at Lausanne, every effort will be made to secure a quorum when the Assembly meets in the early days of August or possibly even sooner. The election of a president and other officials will doubtless occupy the first sitting, after which the discussion of the treaty will doubtless be immediately proceeded with and the formality of ratification will in all probability be completed not later than the 15th August.

3. It is interesting to record that at least one Deputy in the new Assembly will not be a recognised member of the Defence of Rights party. This is a certain Emin Bey, who has been elected at Eski Shehir. His name appeared in the list originally furnished by Angora, but before the final elections took place the Kemalist approval of his candidature was withdrawn. This did not, however, prevent his election, on being informed of which Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to the municipality of Eski Shehir, stating that Emin Bey had been excluded from the Defence of Rights party.

4. In other areas, and more particularly in the Pontus region, minor difficulties appear to have been encountered. At Kerassund the proportion of electors who participated was so small that fresh elections have been ordered. At Trebizond considerable delay, estimated by the press at not less than one month, is anticipated. Samsoun also seems to have emerged as a centre of opposition, since it has been reported that the central organisation at Angora has given orders for the immediate dissolution of the Defence of Rights Committee there. The publication of this information coincided with an announcement that fifty Communists had been arrested at Samsoun and that further arrests were in prospect.

5. The reasons for the continued postponement of the final elections at Angora are difficult to understand. Although a further batch of reliable Constantinople policemen is being despatched there, I do not believe that the repressive measures utilised elsewhere could not be equally successfully employed by Mustafa Kemal in his own capital. Be that as it may, it is now announced that Mustafa Kemal will himself head the list of approved candidates at Angora, and that, in the event of his election, which cannot be doubted, a law will be introduced in the new Assembly empowering him to execute the double duty of Deputy for Smyrna as well as for the capital.

6. It is also not without interest to record that, for the first time in Turkish history, women have received votes in the final elections. At Smyrna, the wives of Mustafa Kemal and Adnan Bey each received 1 vote, while, at Konia, Latife Hanoum received no less than 39 votes, a fact which is doubtless causing much heartburning among Turks of the old school. At the same time, women's political committees have been formed in some of the larger centres, and more particularly in Constantinople.

7. I have no definite information regarding the position of Nureddin Pasha, the commander of the western army. It is reported, however, that anti-Kemalist intrigues continue at his headquarters, where he still remains, and that a certain Emin Pasha, Inspector-General of Artillery, has been nominated as his successor. Emin Pasha is reported to have proceeded to Smyrna, where he will have an interview with Keuprulu Kiazim Pasha, the Minister of War, before taking up his appointment.

8. As regards the negotiations between Mustafa Kemal and the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, to which I referred in my despatch No. 348 of the 13th ultimo, I am now informed that these have definitely broken down owing to the refusal of the Unionist leaders to hand over the party funds. The three Unionists have accordingly returned to Smyrna, where they are now believed to be in contact with the leaders of the National Defence and other Opposition groups. Future developments in this connection may be of interest.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 7314/6316/44]

No. 93.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 252.) *Lausanne, July* 14, 1923.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter and enclosure from the head of the French delegation relative to judgments pronounced by the Turkish courts against Allied subjects. I have discussed this communication with my French and Italian colleagues. We agreed that it would be impracticable to attempt to insert in the peace treaty a clause providing for either of the alternatives suggested in the telegram from the Acting High Commissioner in Constantinople. In our opinion, therefore, the only advice which can be given to the Allied subjects affected is that they should have recourse to the remedies provided by Turkish law. My French colleague undertook to telegraph these views to M. Jessé-Curély on behalf of himself and his colleagues.

I have, &c.
(For Sir H. Rumbold),
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 93.

General Pellé to Sir H. Rumbold.

Lausanne, le 9 juillet 1923.

Mon cher Collègue,

J'AI l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-joint à toutes fins utiles copie d'un télégramme qui m'a été adressé le 7 juillet de Constantinople par notre Chargé d'Affaires. Vous remarquerez que M. Jessé-Curély parle aussi au nom de ses collègues alliés.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
PELLÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 93.

French Chargé d'Affaires, Constantinople, to French Delegate, Lausanne.

Constantinople, le 7 juillet 1923.

(Télégraphique.)

LES tribunaux turcs rendent des jugements contre un certain nombre de ressortissants alliés. Nous parvenons, quand nous sommes avertis à temps, à arrêter l'exécution de ces jugements. Mais notre intervention risquerait d'être en définitive nuisible aux intéressés, si le futur traité ne devait pas contenir une clause expresse assurant soit une possibilité de revision par le Tribunal arbitral mixte, soit la prorogation des délais d'opposition, appel ou cassation. Pouvons-nous donner aux ressortissants alliés l'assurance d'une telle clause ? Dans le cas contraire, il vaudrait mieux les engager dans leur intérêt à recourir aux moyens de procédure prévus par la loi turque.

Je vous télégraphie d'accord avec mes collègues alliés et en leur nom.

No. 94.

Mr. Howe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 92.) *Belgrade, July* 15, 1923.

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 58.

Minister for Foreign Affairs obstinately maintains attitude adopted by Serbian delegates at Lausanne, arguing that article 6 of Treaty of London is still in force, and stating he cannot accept opinion of Allied jurists. For this reason, and in order not to embarrass negotiations, they had taken no part in discussions on economic and financial clauses of Treaty of Lausanne, and it would be manifestly unfair to ask them to sign treaty parts of which they had not negotiated. They could therefore only sign with reservations already mentioned.

I made it quite clear that there could be no question of such a signature, and he replied that in that case they would not sign. He added that once treaty had been signed (Turkish share of debt being thus disposed of) he would willingly agree to discuss at conference of other interested parties disputed questions. This tends to show that Serbs are boggling over amount of debt for which they are to be held responsible. Feebleness of Minister for Foreign Affairs' argument only confirms weakness of their case, but considerable pressure will be needed to bring them round.

French Minister, who has also been pressing this Government, has just received instructions to make joint *démarche* with me to Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, while Italian Minister has been instructed to support our representations. I presume I shall receive instructions similar to my French colleague.

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

No. 95.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 286.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 15, 1923.

MY telegram No. 284.

My French and Italian colleagues and I are sending a note to Ismet this evening recapitulating position as it stood the night of 8th July, when agreement in principle on three principal outstanding questions was reached, and developments which led to interruption in private conversations on 12th July. We declare ourselves ready, however, to instruct our experts and jurists to meet their Turkish colleagues on the morning of 16th July to examine once again outstanding points. We suggest that we should afterwards meet Ismet in order to make a final effort to reach agreement to be submitted next day to committees of conference. In conclusion, note emphasises that meeting will be purposeless unless we are sure in advance that Ismet can take definite decisions on outstanding points.

Note is not being published. Text follows by bag.

No. 96.

Sir H. Rumbold (*No.* 8) *to Mr. Kennard* (*Rome*).—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received July* 16.)

(No. 287.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 16, 1923.

YOUR telegram unnumbered of 11th July and my telegram No. 7.

Italian delegation state that they sent text of draft agreement on which French and we are provisionally agreed, several days ago to Rome with request for instructions as to points which Italian Government wish to raise upon it and that it would be useless for them to discuss text until they received reply from Rome.

Can you expedite despatch of their instructions?

No. 97.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 288.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 16, 1923.

BELGRADE telegram No. 92.

I assume British Chargé d'Affaires will be instructed to join his French and Italian colleagues.

Serbian representatives have, of course, attended every meeting of Financial and Economic Committees, and taken active part where it suited them, *e.g.*, as regards duration of Commercial Convention. It is not accurate, therefore, to say that they had taken no part in these discussions

Absence of Serbian representatives from some meetings of financial and economic experts was, of course, entirely voluntary, and it is ridiculous to adduce it as an argument in favour of their case.

So far as this conference is concerned, only pressure which can be used is Allied intention to refuse to allow them to sign any act or convention of this conference if they will not sign treaty. They would probably like to sign Commercial Convention on the grounds of economic interests, and Straits Convention on grounds of prestige.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

No. 98.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne).

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 274 of 12th July: Naval evacuation.

Provided that you secure formal acceptance of unlimited right of access, you are authorised to abandon provision for sojourn of warships in Turkish waters.

But this concession should only be made in last resort and as part of an absolutely final settlement covering concessions and any other points that Ismet may raise afresh.

It would be well that Ismet should realise full significance of unlimited right of passage, which we have every intention of exercising.

No. 99.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H Rumbold (Lausanne).

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 283 of 14th July.

If M. Veniselos can be induced to confine his statement to the position *de facto*, and to say that the financial position of Greece renders negotiations with the bondholders necessary, this would not go beyond the Paris formula and would seem to be admissible.

If he insists on adding, still *de facto*, that Greece intends to ask for any facilities which may be granted by the bondholders to Turkey, this might be held to prejudice the bondholders, but would clearly be better for them than the signature of a separate peace containing no provisions about distribution of the debt, and I should therefore feel justified in authorising you to pass his declaration in silence.

If, however, M. Veniselos insists on making a declaration as regards the *de jure* position, to the effect that in law Greece is only responsible for her share of the debt with any reductions or facilities obtained by Turkey after negotiations with the bondholders, we should clearly, by passing such a declaration in silence, be open to the criticism that we have purported to deprive the bondholders of their rights under private contracts. I presume that the French will decline to agree to such a declaration, and will prefer that Greece should sign a separate treaty, and I do not think we could reasonably oppose this view.

If, however, the French should in the last resort agree to a declaration in the sense proposed by M. Veniselos affecting the *de jure* position, I should be prepared to authorise you to fall into line with them, since their interests are so much larger than ours. But I should in that event regard it as essential that the principle applied in the case of Greece should extend also to Irak and Palestine, since we could not justify a refusal to extent a concession, granted to Greece, to the other succession States, for whom we are primarily responsible.

No. 100.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne).

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 276 and 277 of 12th July: Americans and Turkish Petroleum Company.

As you anticipate, I have no fresh instructions to send you, and I entirely approve your language to Mr. Grew.

(Repeated to Washington, No. 230.)

[E 7158/7158/44] No. 101.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir O. Russell (Vatican Mission).

(No. 163.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1923

IN reply to your despatch No. 89 of the 7th instant relative to the claim of France to be regarded as the special and privileged protector of Catholics in the Near East, I request that you will inform the Cardinal Secretary of State, in reply to his enquiry, that, while there has been no change in the situation during the past year, and while His Majesty's Government are not proposing to take any further action in this matter for the present, His Majesty's Government fully maintain, and will continue to insist on, their contention that the French claim in this matter has no justification.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 102.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 289.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 17, 1923.

MY telegram No. 286.

Ismet replied by two notes yesterday morning, the first agreeing to proposed meetings, the second setting out his own case of events from 8th July to 12th July. Copies of both notes follow by bag. Meeting of Allied and Turkish experts took place in the morning and afternoon on four outstanding points, namely:—

1. Retention of phrase in sections (*a*) and (*c*) of article 2 of Concessions Protocol regarding maintenance of 1914 Régie Concession and Armstrong-Vickers Convention.
2. Paragraphs in sections (*a*) and (*c*) of same article regarding ten years' right of preference.
3. Section (*b*) regarding Turkish Petroleum Company.
4. Naval evacuation.

No progress was made except as regards 2, where French and British experts had agreed to drop right of preference in favour of right for ten years to compete on equal terms with all other applicants. French themselves favoured this after consultation with a representative of Régie. Turkish experts accepted.

Before private meeting between Allied delegates and Ismet at 5 o'clock latter asked to see Mr. Ryan. After three-quarters of an hour's conversation and strong pressure, Mr. Ryan extracted agreement from Ismet on point 4 above, comprising (*a*) complete liberty of passage until entry into force of treaty, (*b*) right of each of the three Allies to station one cruiser and two destroyers, with suitable coaling and provisioning auxiliaries, in Straits water up to entry into force of Straits Convention or 31st December, 1923, whichever comes earliest, both (*a*) and (*b*) to be provided

for by unilateral declaration on the part of Turkey to be attached to evacuation protocol.

This agreement was formally accepted by Ismet after opening of meeting at 5 P.M. Latter then displayed complete intransigence on other three points, refusing to sanction even his own experts' agreement on 2, on the ground that it would prevent Turkey reserving concessions to Turkish capital. After private conversations and adjournment from 9 to 11 P.M., Ismet finally agreed to a slight redrafting of sections (*a*) and (*c*) to meet point 1 and Allied proposal on point 2, modified to run for five years, and to meet Ismet's point regarding Turkish capital, and to be embodied in letters to two companies. Long wrangle ensued on Turkish Petroleum Company. I had with me numerous formulæ, but Ismet, tired and obstinate, and obviously frightened by his latest instructions from Angora not to infringe Chester Concession in any way, refused them all in turn, despite apparent encouragement of rest of his delegation that he should yield. I had foreseen that this situation might arise, and I had decided, after full consultation with my experts, to drop all mention of company from protocol and make a strong reservation of His Majesty's Government's position and company's in committee this afternoon rather than to fail to reach agreement on this one outstanding and almost entirely British question, with prospect of accentuating thereby a somewhat undesirable controversy. At 2 A.M. I therefore fell back on this solution, and meeting ended.

Final session of three committees this afternoon will sanction agreements arrived at, and finish off one or two other outstanding points, and it is hoped to sign treaty on 24th July.

Full report of yesterday's meeting follows by bag.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 103.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne).

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 390 of 15th July: Expatriation of Ottomans who have served with British forces, repeated to you, No. 217.

If not too late, you should endeavour to alter date of amnesty declaration to "date of completion of evacuation," and also to arrange for entry into force of declaration on ratification of the treaty by Angora, *i.e.*, by inclusion in anticipatory enactment of evacuation protocol.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 228.)

No. 104.

Mr. Kennard to Sir H. Rumbold.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received July 18.)

(No. [?139].)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, July* 16, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 8.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs are expecting M. Nogara shortly in Rome, and hope to be able to send definite instructions to Italian delegate after discussion with him.

They are, however, agreed that question should be discussed and settled at Lausanne, but point out that, while there are only a few important British claims, there are large numbers of Italian claims which, while unimportant in themselves, require careful consideration.

(Repeated to Foreign Office.)

No. 105.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 17, 1923.

AT final meetings of three committees held this afternoon agreements on all outstanding questions were officiallly recorded. It only remains to collate texts and prepare treaty and other instruments for signature, which has been fixed for 24th July.

Fuller report will follow.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.)

No. 106.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 292.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 17, 1923.

MY telegram No. 289.

Meetings of economic experts and experts dealing with Evacuation Protocol which took place at 10 o'clock yesterday morning ended in no modification of position, except that Turkish experts agreed to an Allied proposal that the last paragraphs of sections (*a*) and (*c*) of article 2 of the Concessions Protocol should be modified to substitute rights of equal competition for rights of preference in the case of Vickers–Armstrong and the Régie générale. It was clear that on other points neither side was prepared to show their hand until the delegates' meeting in the afternoon.

This took place at 5 o'clock. About 4 o'clock Mr. Ryan, who was asked by Ismet Pasha to go and see him, had succeeded in extracting with great skill an agreement from Ismet Pasha upon the principles upon which naval evacuation was to be settled. These were given in my above-mentioned telegram. In addition Ismet asked that declaration be made by Turkey, who also expressed hope that ratifications by the different Parliaments should take place as soon as possible with a view to the early entry into force of the treaty.

Meeting of Allied and Turkish delegates opened by my briefly recapitulating the question of naval evacuation and explaining the agreement which Mr. Ryan and Ismet Pasha had provisionally accepted. As usual, emphasising Turkey's sacrifices and the further proof which he was thus giving of her conciliatory spirit, Ismet formally accepted this settlement, but my French colleague, while emphasising further concessions offered on this point by the Allies, reserved his final agreement until outstanding points, issues on Concessions Protocol, should be satisfactorily solved. It was agreed that principles should be embodied to-day by the jurists in a draft declaration for submission to the First Committee this afternoon. In the Evacuation Protocol itself only reference to naval evacuation will be a statement that the withdrawal of military forces comprises Allied naval units.

Discussion then passed to the three outstanding points on the Concessions Protocol. General Pellé explained that he was quite unable to understand why Ismet Pasha should require the suppression of the first paragraph of section (*c*) of article 2 and the similar phrase regarding maintenance in the first paragraph of section (*a*) of the same article. Both paragraphs clearly showed that the Allies did not demand the application of the old concessions, but required this statement regarding maintenance in order to emphasise the basis on which compensation in cash or in kind was to be determined. In particular, General Pellé explained how section (*c*) had been carefully drawn up to leave intact the question of the Chester Concession, and that he had actually shown the draft to Mr. Grew, who raised no objection to it.

As regards Ismet's objections to the last paragraphs of sections (*a*) and (*c*) relating to rights of preference, General Pellé emphasised the further great concession which the Allied experts had offered the Turkish experts that morning, namely, to change the preference rights into one of equal competition with all applicants.

Ismet showed clearly that, as regards maintenance, he was frightened by the

attitude of the Angora Government and the Angora Assembly, who would see in the phrase relating to maintenance an attempt by the Allies to challenge their right to give the Chester Concession, and the possibility of future claims for indemnification by Chester and the American Government. He apparently did not fully understand what was being proposed as regards the rights of competition, but gradually took refuge in the one objection that Turkey, even under the article as now drafted, might be prevented from reserving either of these concessions to Turkish, as opposed to foreign, capitalists.

General Pellé pointed out most emphatically that, whatever the Angora Government might have done in 1923, certain rights were created in 1914 in favour of the Régie générale. An iradé had been issued; a legal concession had been given, and for months past Ismet had been aware of the French point of view on this issue and had never challenged their case. General Pellé also pointed out that Hamid Bey, when semi-official representative of the Angora Government at Constantinople, had informed General Pellé that his Government regarded the 1914 concession as valid. Finally, the minutes of Sunday's meeting were quoted to show that Ismet had accepted the phrase in question, asking only for the suppression of the word "juridiquement," which had been accorded.

I strongly supported General Pellé, and tried to explain to Ismet that no Turkish right was being infringed by the phrase regarding equal competition. Ismet was also challenged to say whether any Turk was really likely to be found with the necessary capital to take up these concessions, and whether the Angora Assembly could really be regarded as such strict guardians of the economic rights of Turks after they had handed over practically a complete monopoly for all new railway construction and mineral exploitation to an American capitalist whose financial standing was doubtful. Ismet Pasha only took refuge in the usual phrase regarding sovereign rights and independence, but he did drop one rather significant phrase regarding his apprehension as to putting anything regarding special rights for these companies into an international Act.

As regards the Chester Concession, Ismet excused his Assembly for their action by saying that they could not wait for Allied competition to make itself felt. They were out of contact with the rest of the world, and they had therefore been forced to give the concession to the first suitable entrepreneur who came forward.

I took this opportunity of pointing out that, so far as contact with the Turkish Government officially was concerned, the United States Government had for some time after the armistice maintained relations through the Swedish Legation at Constantinople, while taking care to despatch commercial experts and concession-hunters to Angora.

The discussion then passed to the question of the Turkish Petroleum Company. I began by reading passages from Ismet's note of 16th July (see my despatch No. 255 of 16th July) to the presidents of the delegations of the inviting Powers, in which he more than once lays down that, as regards the Turkish Petroleum Company, the basis of negotiation was the recognition of the acquired rights of the company. I also read the passage from the *procès-verbal* of the final meeting on the night of the 8th July, on which agreement in principle was reached. This passage clearly shows that Ismet himself proposed a formula recognising the maintenance of "droits acquis," that he stated that he was anxious to give us satisfaction, and that he had no *arrière-pensée*.

I asked Ismet what was now his attitude regarding the company in the light of this explanation. He agreed that the position was generally as I had stated it. He stated quite frankly that he had not fully realised on Thursday the extent to which the maintenance of "droits acquis" might lead to legal difficulties in connection with the Chester Concession. For this reason, he had proposed on Thursday last (see my telegram No. 278 of 13th July) the formula providing for arbitration.

In reply, it was pointed out that this question was one between the British and Turkish Governments, and that we were not concerned here with rights given at a later date to an American concessionnaire or with the American Government's attitude regarding these rights.

Ismet retorted that the Chester Concession had been given to a Turkish company, not to an American company, and, from the point of view of law, differences upon it would be settled in the Turkish courts. He was afraid of the dispute on this point of "droits acquis" being settled against the Turkish Government, if they agreed to any words modifying the present position, and of his Government having to pay a large indemnity. He again pressed for arbitration.

At this point I thought it well to suggest that the Allied delegates should have discussion among themselves, and the Turkish delegates retired. In the course of the ensuing discussion the French, after some demur, agreed that Ismet's first point regarding the maintenance of rights in paragraph 1 of sections (*a*) and (*c*) could really be met by a redraft which, while suppressing the simple affirmation that the 1914 concessions were maintained, made it clear that concessions had been granted in that year, and that it was now a question of putting the proprietors back into possession of their rights. The French also agreed that it would be possible to accept the incorporation of the paragraph in sections (*a*) and (*c*) relating to open competition in a letter from Ismet to the companies. I explained that I was prepared to go a good deal farther than I had done on the Turkish Petroleum Company. I suggested that Mr. Ryan, who had been in touch with the Turkish experts on all these questions recently, should first go to the Turkish delegates in the next room and sound them on the new proposals on which we were agreed, including the new formula regarding the Turkish Petroleum Company, since it seemed essential that we should run no risk of meeting with another failure on the outstanding points. The Allied delegates waited for an hour while Mr. Ryan endeavoured to persuade Ismet Pasha to accept the new suggestions and formulas. At 9 o'clock Ismet had come round on the first point, but it was impossible to move him on the other two. The whole meeting was therefore adjourned until 11 P.M. in the hope that Riza Nour and Munir Bey, who understood more clearly the proposals made to them and who were obviously anxious to bring matters to a conclusion, would be able in the meantime to influence Ismet, who appeared exhausted and diffident of taking any final responsibility.

When the meeting resumed I explained that I had just received a telegram from my Government, who insisted upon an immediate and satisfactory solution on the concessions question, and I added that I was astounded at Ismet's apparent refusal to accept the proposals which Mr. Ryan had made to him on behalf of the Allied delegates. General Pellé expressed himself equally strongly, and said that it was quite useless for the Allies to be conciliatory and make concessions, as Ismet only went back step by step on what he had agreed upon on Sunday. Signor Montagna, who had for the last two days been singularly silent, now also returned to the charge with an earnest appeal for a display of conciliation and good will on Ismet's part.

Ismet began by saying that the points before us were most vital to Turkey and no concession was possible. He dwelt particularly on the prejudice to Turkey's rights of the proposal regarding ten years' open competition for the Régie générale. Both my French colleagues and I strongly dissented from this and emphasised the bad faith which the Turkish Government were showing as regards the Régie's concession. Eventually, after further discussion, Ismet accepted the Allied proposal after the period had been reduced to five years and a phrase had been introduced to enable a concession to be given to an undertaking working with Turkish capital alone without inviting any foreign competition. It was agreed that Ismet should write a letter in this sense to the Régie générale and Vickers–Armstrong, and should send copies of the letter to the French and British delegations. He will sign them on behalf of the Turkish Minister of Public Works.

Ismet then proceeded to accept the Allied suggestions for the redrafting of the first paragraphs of (*a*) and (*c*) to surmount the difficulty regarding the maintenance of the pre-war concessions.

A long controversy ensued on the Turkish Petroleum Company. I tried Ismet with a weak formula, which merely provided that the situation in regard to the company's pre-war arrangement should be maintained and that Turkey should declare that it had not been modified by the war. Later I suggested adding to this a sentence providing for further negotiations between the British and Turkish Governments on any questions which might arise from that situation. Ismet was adamant on the point. From his rather involved explanations, and from what we know from other confidential sources of Angora's attitude, it is fairly clear that his difficulty was as follows: The grant of the railway and mineral rights in the Mosul area to the Chester Company reserves the "droits acquis" by other parties. If Ismet were in any way to appear to confirm directly or indirectly at the conference or in the treaty rights held by the Turkish Petroleum Company before the war, he feared that he would lay himself open to a charge by Chester that the Turkish Government had deliberately created "droits acquis" to conflict with part of the concession which they had granted to Chester a few months before and to deprive him of the greatest attraction in the concession, namely, the oil rights. For this reason he refused to answer my direct question whether or not in the Turkish Government's opinion the

company's rights were affected by the war. He also rejected a further formula which I proposed, as follows :—

"Les droits qui existaient au profit de la Turkish Petroleum Company en "1914 existent aujourd'hui, nonobstant la guerre qui a éclaté depuis cette "date."

Ismet maintained that the question was a juridical one, that he could not intervene politically, and that it was for some impartial tribunal to decide whether or not the Turkish Petroleum Company had acquired rights in 1914.

We made it quite clear, of course, throughout that it was only in so far as the concessions of company concerned might fall within the new Turkey that any question between us and the Turkish Government on those rights would arise.

Finally, it became quite evident that Ismet would not commit himself. Though General Pellé did his best to support me, he was obviously not very interested, and Signor Montagna was significantly silent. I therefore felt it useless as well as undesirable to adjourn the discussion and the conclusion of the final settlement over a question so controversial and one on which I would have received little or no support from my Allied colleagues. I also felt that your Lordship would not have wished me to threaten to break or to have adjourned the discussions on account of this one question, with all the risks of further points being reopened or other points being raised. I therefore declared that I would content myself with making a strong declaration in the committee next day explaining His Majesty's Government's attitude regarding this company and their rights and holding the Turkish Government responsible for any damage to them.

After drafting alterations in two other parts of the Concessions Protocol prepared by the experts had been read and agreed, the meeting closed at 2 A.M. in an atmosphere of relief, but without any display of exhilaration on either side as to the results. While we did not obtain all that I had desired on the Concessions Protocol, we secured more than I had expected on the question of evacuation, and the main thing is to have at last brought Ismet to take a final and definite decision.

No. 107.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 293.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 17, 1923.

MY telegram No. 291.

The ground had been carefully prepared for the final meetings of the three committees this afternoon, and while contentious questions were raised they were not of such a kind as to effect the text of the treaty and the other instruments. The following is a summary record of the proceedings under each head :—

First Committee.

Evacuation Protocol.—We adopted the text of the protocol and the attached declaration, enclosed in my despatch No. 261 of to-day's date. A clause had been added to the protocol at the last moment providing that the Mudania Convention should remain in force until the end of the evacuation, subject to arrangements of detail between the respective military authorities on the spot. The attached declaration records the settlement regarding the right of passage and the retention of a limited number of ships in Constantinople as reported in my telegram No. 289 of to-day's date.

Kara-Agatch Protocol.—The text of this has been sent home in my despatch No. 262 of 17th July. It embodies the arrangement made between M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha, with the addition of the Turkish formula regarding Imbros and Tenedos, which is a little better than nothing at all. It was adopted subject to an observation by M. Veniselos that he would like to add a few words, the nature of which he did not indicate, to the clause about Imbros and Tenedos. He said he would like to discuss this addition with Ismet Pasha, with whom he hoped to come to an agreement without difficulty.

Accession of Belgium and Portugal.—We adopted the texts enclosed in my despatch No. 260 of 17th July.

Article 160 *of the Draft Treaty of January* 31.—We formally adopted an addition to this article providing for the re-establishment of peace between Greece and Turkey and the bringing into force of the clauses relative to the Græco-Turkish frontier as soon as both Powers had ratified the treaty.

Amnesty Declaration.—The text of this was definitely adopted some time ago, and there is no question of altering it. I took the opportunity to-day, however, of reading a prepared statement, once more urging upon the Turks the importance of observing this declaration both in the letter and in the spirit, and urging the Allied view that it would become operative as from the date of signature. I laid stress on the recent case of the arrest in Constantinople of certain Greeks who had served in a British labour battalion, and on the whole attitude of the Turks towards the return of Armenians. General Pellé supported me strongly, and made special reference to the case of persons normally resident in Cilicia, who, under the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, had been promised an amnesty. The Italian, Japanese and American representatives followed. Mr. Grew read a prepared statement, echoing what I had said, in milder and more flowery language. Ismet Pasha, though he must have been aware that the question of the expatriated Armenians would be raised, was obviously not prepared for this combined attack. After some consultation with his supporters, he delivered himself of a reply in which he stated that Turkey fully desired that the amnesty should be applied sincerely and with rapidity. Turkey, he said, would vie with other States in the generosity with which she applied this measure. He claimed that, as regards subjects who had borne arms against their country, Turkey had shown greater tolerance than any other State. He, nevertheless, defended the unwillingness of the Turkish Government to allow the return of dangerous Armenian elements and represented the question of the large masses of refugees now outside Turkey as being an economic problem rather than one having any connection with the amnesty.

I asked Ismet Pasha to state more precisely whether the Turkish Government would regard the amnesty declaration as coming into force on the date of signature. I pointed out that the obligations imposed by it were reciprocal; that it was the intention of the Allied Governments to satisfy these obligations as soon as they had signed the declaration; and that, even if legislative action or a decision of the Grand National Assembly were necessary, it nevertheless rested with the Turkish Government to suspend proceedings, which would eventually be barred by the declaration if they wished to do so. I pointed out that the declaration should take precedence of all legislation.

Ismet Pasha briefly replied that Turkey would act, on her side, in the sense which I had indicated.

M. Veniselos said that, though the right of the Constantinople Greeks to return to their homes was assured by the Exchange of Populations Convention, he was nevertheless preoccupied by what he had heard me say, on the authority of the Angora representative in Constantinople, regarding the law applicable to persons who had rendered assistance to enemy armies. He would, however, speak direct to Ismet Pasha on this subject. He added rather pointedly that he hoped that on this, as on other occasions, he would have no difficulty in reaching an agreement with Ismet Pasha in direct conversation. Ismet Pasha concurred in this hope.

I reminded Ismet Pasha that the Turkish delegation was to address to the British, French and Italian delegations a letter embodying the understanding arrived at some weeks ago about schools and other establishments. Ismet promised that the letters would be forthcoming.

It was agreed to issue an invitation to the Russian Government to send representatives to Lausanne or, alternatively, to Constantinople, within a period of three weeks, to sign the Straits Convention.

Having thus disposed of the work of my committee, I read a closing statement, in which, after expressing thanks to the Swiss authorities, the experts (among whom I specially named M. Fromageot and Munir Bey) and the secretariat-general, I advanced some general considerations regarding the dependence of nations on each other, the moral element in the greatness of those Powers who are called great, and the value to a country like Turkey of the example of a country like Switzerland, where people of different races, language and religion form, in spite of these distinctions, a solid block animated by a mutual spirit of tolerance and a common spirit of solidarity.

Second Committee.

The letter to the Council of the Public Debt replacing article 70 of the draft treaty of 31st January was agreed to. Ismet Pasha read the agreed statement, subject to which it had been agreed to drop article 46 *bis*.

We then came to the first paragraph of article 56 regarding the maintenance of the Decree of Muharrem, &c. General Pellé announced the decision of the inviting Powers to drop this paragraph and dispense with any declaration to the bondholders. He read, on behalf of the Allied delegations, the statement which had been drawn up in Paris regarding the sanctity of the obligations imposed on Turkey by her agreements with the bondholders. Ismet Pasha read a counter-declaration in which, after reaffirming the inability of Turkey to pay interest in gold or in pounds sterling, he said that the declaration of the Allied delegates was not binding in Turkey. General Pellé pressed him for a definition of what was meant by the latter part of this statement. Did it mean that Turkey repudiated her obligations? Or did it mean that Turkey would treat with her creditors for an alleviation of her burdens by agreement with them? After some little discussion, in which Ismet indicated that Turkey contemplated negotiations with the bondholders, but strictly on the basis of her incapacity to pay in pounds sterling or gold, General Pellé said he understood Ismet Pasha's statements as in no wise invalidating the juridical value of the contracts between Turkey and the bondholders. Ismet Pasha said that he had sufficiently indicated the attitude of his Government, and that he had nothing to add. General Pellé, to the relief of everyone, accepted this as sufficient.

M. Veniselos then made a statement to the effect that Greece would consider herself entitled to the benefit of any alleviation of financial liabilities in respect of the debt which might be agreed upon between the bondholders and the Turkish Government. General Pellé made a carefully worded and conciliatory reply, and it was unnecessary for me to intervene. Copies of these statements will be forwarded in due course.

General Pellé then wound up the work of his committee with a statement similar to that which I had already made. He emphasised the bonds which had united France and Turkey in the past, and said that France was more interested than any other country in the re-establishment of peaceful relations with Turkey.

Third Committee.

The Turkish delegation withdrew their reservation regarding article 78 of the draft treaty of 31st January, the object of which reservation was to provide for the distribution among the succession States of pre-war claims.

The Allied delegations agreed to drop the paragraphs in article 9 of the Commercial Convention claiming the maintenance of the right of cabotage for a period of years. M. Montagna mentioned that, so far as the immediate future was concerned, the question of cabotage was disposed of by the declaration attached to the Evacuation Protocol. It had been agreed that no mention should be made of the special arrangement continuing this right in favour of certain British, French and Italian lines for two and a half years after 1st January next, and M. Montagna merely hinted in a passing manner at this arrangement.

Note was taken of the agreement between M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha regarding the duration of the Commercial Convention, the effect of which is to place Greece on the same footing as Roumania and Serbia, and to fix duration of the convention at two and a half years with a further period of six months as from denunciation by the parties, *i.e.*, a minimum of three years in all three cases.

We next took the Concessions Protocol, a copy of the final version of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 259 of 17th July. The protocol as a whole was adopted. I then read a statement explaining the circumstances in which all mention of the Turkish Petroleum Company had been omitted from article 2. I reproached Ismet Pasha with having failed to fulfil his promise to agree upon a formula upholding the acquired rights of the company. I stated categorically that His Majesty's Government regarded all the obligations undertaken by the Ottoman Government in 1914 as binding on the Turkish Government in any territory which might remain to Turkey as the result of the Peace Treaty. They did not, I said, recognise any rights, whether within or without such territory, which might be alleged to have been granted by the Turkish Government to any third party and which would conflict the rights of the Turkish Petroleum Company. I affirmed the strong intention of His Majesty's Government to hold the Turkish Government responsible for any failure to fulfil the obligations contracted in 1914.

This elicited a statement from Ismet Pasha to the effect that the question was a juridical one, which he was not prepared to prejudice in any way, and which, in his view, should be settled by arbitration, as he had already proposed. Mr. Grew, following immediately on Ismet Pasha, made a statement in guarded terms, the substance of which was that he assumed that any settlement regarding Vickers-Armstrong and the French railway concessionnaires would not affect the interests of American citizens. As regards the Turkish Petroleum Company, the views of his Government were as stated in the correspondence between them and His Majesty's Government.

I replied briefly to both statements. I reminded Ismet Pasha that if, from the point of view of the Turkish Government, there were a conflict between two private interests owing to two conflicting acts of the Turkish Government, that Government could not escape its responsibility towards the prior claimant, namely, the Turkish Petroleum Company, by proposing arbitration. My Government, I said, had an undoubted right to protect its own subjects, and they intended to exercise this right in case of need. As regards Mr. Grew's declaration, the view of the British Government had been stated in the correspondence to which he himself had referred. All I need add was that I had difficulty in understanding by what right a third Power could claim to intervene in a question concerning rights accorded by the Ottoman Government, which was the predecessor of the present Turkish Government, to a British company.

This ended the matter.

The Japanese delegate made a speech in which, while saying that Japan had at present no concessionary interests in Turkey and was, for that reason, not a party to the protocol, she stood for the principle of the "open door." Ismet Pasha, who regards this principle with great suspicion, stated briefly that Turkey was in these matters a sovereign and independent State.

General Pellé raised the question of the prolongation of two years of the contract between the Turkish Government and the Imperial Ottoman Bank. He got very little change out of Ismet Pasha, who began by saying that this was outside the competence of the conference, and ended by promising that he would telegraph recommending the matter to the favourable consideration of his Government, with whom, as a matter of fact, the bank was already in direct negotiation.

I then made a statement regarding the position of agents of British companies in Turkey who, under the present Turkish law, might be held responsible for all the operations of their principals in Turkey owing to the mere fact that the companies had not registered under the Turkish law. I pointed out that this law had been promulgated at the end of 1914; that no attempt had been made to enforce it after the armistice until the Angora Government assumed control; that even then its enforcement had been delayed by arrangement between the High Commissioners in Constantinople and the Angora Government; and that it was wholly inadmissible in these circumstances that the agents should be visited with responsibility. I reserved the right of His Majesty's Government to protect its subjects by all means customary between Governments if any attempt were made so to hold the agents of the companies responsible. Ismet Pasha maintained that this was entirely a question of domestic legislation and said that there could be no ground for intervention on such an issue in Turkish internal affairs. General Pellé and M. Montagna supported my statement in a somewhat belated and lukewarm fashion, but the latter usefully pointed out at the end of the discussion that diplomatic intervention in such a case was always possible.

Ismet Pasha made a final speech, in which he emphasised fact that Peace Treaty which was about to be signed was result of an agreement with Turkey, reached through discussions to which inviting Powers had had the wisdom to admit Turkey on a footing of equality. He also dwelt on sincere intentions of Turkey to apply all provisions of settlement.

Referring to a passing allusion in my speech to past relations between Great Britain and Turkey, Ismet specially thanked British delegation, recalling old friendship between Great Britain and Turkey, which had been so strong in the past, and he hoped and believed would be strong in future. Ismet then referred to Turkey's special relations with France in history, and said that Turkey would continue to entertain friendly sentiments towards that country. Relations between Turkey and Italy had always been most amicable. He expressed special gratitude to Switzerland and to Lausanne, as well as to all experts and jurists who had assisted in successful conclusion of common task. Turkish delegation would always

remember with feelings of honour and respect collaboration of all delegations present at this conference.

The meeting terminated with a series of formal speeches by the heads of the different delegations, most of which can justifiably be described as "flapdoodle." The only notable features of this display of oratory were, firstly, that the Roumanian and Serbian delegates professed ignorance of the fact that these were the last real sittings of the conference, and that M. Stanciof leaped in with a statement to the effect that he was most grateful to the president of the Political Commission for the opportunity which had been given to the Bulgarian delegation to state their views and aspirations. This somewhat discomfited M. Montagna, who had intended to close the discussion, and had already delivered an eloquent, if somewhat lengthy, speech. Both M. Diamandy and M. Yovanovitch said that they would have statements to make at the closing session of the conference. So far as the Serbian delegate was concerned, this created some amusement, as it is more than doubtful whether he will be admitted officially to that session, in view of the avowed intention of his Government not to allow him to sign the treaty.

No. 108.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 295.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 18, 1923.

MY telegram No. 282.

French delegation have apparently received a telegram this morning from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs showing that French Government have not yet accepted text of proposed protocol with regard to ratifications of Western Thrace and Greek Minorities Treaties. It seems that they have not yet abandoned their desire to suppress second and third paragraphs in the preamble. It is quite clear that M. Veniselos will not agree to make any change in preamble, even if strong pressure were put upon him by France and Great Britain, and your telegram No. 119 shows clearly that His Majesty's Government do not wish to exercise such pressure. Moreover, Italian delegation appears to be as unwilling as M. Veniselos to make any modification in preamble. It would be most unfortunate if, owing to attitude of French Government, protocol cannot be signed with other documents on 24th July. We are all anxious to put Western Thrace and Greek Minorities Treaties into execution as soon as possible, and we have more than once told Turks that protection afforded by Minorities Treaty to Moslems in Greece would be put into execution with rest of peace settlement.

Unless, therefore, you see objection, I shall be grateful if representations could be made to Paris on this point.

(Confidential.)

French delegation here appears to be in entire agreement with our views.

(Repeated to Paris.)

No. 109.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Howe (*Belgrade*).

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 92 of 15th July: Serbian signature of the treaty, and Lausanne telegram No. 288, repeated to you.

You should join your French and Italian colleagues in exerting further pressure on Government to which you are accredited.

Clearly they cannot be allowed by signature of the treaty to obtain the advantages which it confers on them, while evading by a reservation the obligations which it imposes

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 130.)

No. 110.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 289 of 17th July.

I am most uneasy at learning that you jettisoned case of Turkish Petroleum Company, whose claim I repeatedly emphasised in discussion when at Lausanne regarding Mosul.

Apart from fact that secret information which you will have received last evening shows that Ismet might have yielded, it appears to me that mere unilateral reservation, however strongly couched by you, cannot but prejudice materially our position in forthcoming negotiations about Mosul, and will also weaken most seriously company's claims to rights under 1914 concession.

Unless you are convinced that my apprehensions are not fully justified, you should insist on putting back the Turkish Petroleum Company into the protocol.

I object very strongly to additional validity given to Chester Concession by our surrender.

[E 7469/1/44]

No. 111.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 264.)
My Lord, *Lausanne, July* 17, 1923.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 175 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the invitation to sign the Straits Convention, which was telegraphed to-day by the secretary-general of this conference.

The draft invitation which was enclosed in my despatch under reference was slightly modified with a view to denying, so far as possible, any opportunity to the Soviet Government to embark on a polemic.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Secretary-General, Lausanne Conference, to M. Chicherin.

(Télégraphique.) *Lausanne, le 17 juillet* 1923.

LES négociations poursuivies en vue du rétablissement de la paix en Orient ayant abouti à un résultat favorable, le Traité de Paix entre les Puissances alliées et la Turquie sera signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923. En même temps sera signée la Convention sur le Régime des Détroits, dont le texte a été examiné, avec la participation de la délégation russe, par la Commission des Questions territoriales et militaires de la conférence dans sa séance du 1er février.

Les Puissances représentées à la Conférence de Lausanne ont, à maintes reprises, affirmé leur volonté d'admettre la Russie à participer aux décisions adoptées concernant le régime des Détroits. J'ai, en conséquence, l'honneur de vous prier de me faire savoir si la Russie est prête à accepter telle quelle la convention dont le texte a été arrêté par la conférence le 1er février 1923 et si elle est disposée à envoyer des plénipotentiaires à Lausanne pour signer cet acte le 24 juillet. Dans l'affirmative, je vous serais obligé de me faire connaître télégraphiquement les noms et titres de ces plénipotentiaires.

Au cas où, en raison de la brièveté du délai ou pour toute autre cause, vos représentants ne pourraient pas se trouver à Lausanne à ladite date, la conférence a décidé que la signature leur resterait ouverte à Constantinople jusqu'au 14 août 1923.

En l'absence d'un réponse précise qui devrait me parvenir au plus tard dans la journée du 20 juillet, la conférence considérera que la Russie persiste dans l'attitude que ses représentants ont adoptée le 1er février.

Soucieuse de réserver les droits de la Russie, la conférence a prévu que, dans ce cas, la Russie pourrait ultérieurement adhérer à la convention conformément à l'article 19 de cet acte, cette adhésion devant lui conférer notamment le droit d'être représentée à la commission visée à l'article 12.

No. 112.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 689.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 18, 1923.

M. HERBETTE surpasses himself this evening in the "Temps" in his comments on the Lausanne Conference. He observes that Turkey has gained a great diplomatic victory and has escaped the dangerous consequences which her enemies, the English and the Greeks, might have drawn from the Mudania armistice. Turkey has again become a purely national State and has replaced the centre of her power in a spot inaccessible to the enemy from overseas. France has not reaped all that was sown in the Angora Agreement. Whenever French interests have suffered, it has almost always been due to one of the two following causes: Either a French plenipotentiary gave excessive support to his English calleague, against the Turks, as during the first Lausanne Conference, or else England has neglected to support France, as in the recent affair of the Ottoman Debt. The United States have worthily upheld their rights: the pretensions of the Turkish Petroleum Company, which were so shadowy that His Majesty's Government did not wish to submit them to arbitration, have not been sanctioned by the conference. Russia is invited to sign the Straits Convention, and in this connection it is said that England, during the recent difference she had with Russia, advised the latter not to enter into conversations with France. It is added that Russia, fearing lest England should suddenly place an embargo on all Russian capital and goods in London, has had to resign herself to promise what your Lordship demanded of her. M. Herbette is good enough to admit that all this may be a legend, and declares that he adheres to the idea that the national interests of France and Russia are nowhere in opposition and that he would rejoice if the legend were denied. England is far and away the greatest loser at Lausanne, and Asiatic Turkey escapes British domination. All plans for domination will fail in the same way, those which consist in separating the peoples of the Continent as well as those which consist in setting the Greeks against the Turks. "Those plans have caused too much blood to flow in Asia; let us act in such a manner "that they will not cause any more to flow in Europe."

No. 113.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 19, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 131.

Your Lordship's telegram has caused me deep concern, but does not alter my conviction that only alternative to course which I took would have been rupture of conference.

Ismet's telegram to which you refer crossed one from Angora instructing him to break rather than yield and to make public reasons for doing so. His attitude since 12th July has shown that he would have carried out these instructions. I cannot but think in that case Allies and considerable section of world opinion would have accused His Majesty's Government of destroying certainty of peace for the sake of British oil interests. We should have incurred odium of having done this after we had ourselves forced French Government to treat debt question in manner precisely similar to that in which I myself finally treated that of Turkish Petroleum Company.

I did not consider when I decided on my line of action, nor does it now seem to me possible, that failure to obtain affirmation by Turkey of company's rights could in any way prejudice our negotiations regarding frontier. So far as I was influenced

at all by consideration connected with latter question, I took view that the more strongly I insisted on such affirmation, the more Turks would have believed His Majesty's Government to be apprehensive lest settlement of frontier question should be unfavourable to them. In any case, past experience has shown that in any negotiations [groups omitted]d by political and military considerations.

For the rest I can only hope that fuller explanations contained in my telegram No. 292 and account of my final action given in my telegram No. 293 will satisfy you, firstly, that, as stated above, course which I took was the only one open to me if rupture was to be avoided; secondly, that I have left question of Turkish Petroleum Company intact as between Turkish Government and His Majesty's Government; and thirdly, that my action has in no way enhanced validity of Chester concession.

As regards first consideration, I felt nothing could be farther from your wishes than that rupture should take place on an exclusively British question, which however important, is of secondary importance, and which, if we retain Mosul, will, as question between us and Turkey, lose much even of that secondary importance and which relates to oil.

I had in mind your only published statement on latter subject during first phase of conference (see Blue Book, pp. 360 and 361) when you emphatically stated that oil considerations had nothing to do with our attitude regarding Mosul. Moreover, strongly as I felt regarding action of American delegation, I did not think your Lordship would wish rupture to occur in circumstances which would have committed His Majesty's Government to open and unpleasant dispute with United States Government.

As regards second and third considerations, I have not only affirmed in strongest manner determination of His Majesty's Government to uphold validity of Petroleum Company's concession, but I have denied that any rights alleged to have been given to Chester can override it, or that United States Government are entitled to intervene in question regarding rights conferred by Turkish Government on British company. I have made it very difficult for Turks to invoke hereafter what is perhaps most substantial argument they could use, namely, that agreement of 1914 was one between Governments and, as such, abrogated by outbreak of war. Ismet repeatedly said that rights claimed by company were of private nature, and their value was what it was before the war, but that he was not prepared to determine now what their value was.

I do not feel that company's claims are in any way weakened or those of Chester strengthened by what has occurred Claims of Petroleum Company remain in exactly the same legal position as before conference. What has happened is that we have failed to secure something which would have put them in a better position and which Turks were determined not to give from fear of exposing themselves to large claim to compensation by Chester, which they anticipated, probably with reason, would have the support of United States Government.

Before resigning myself to this failure, I sought for ten days by pressure and persuasion to make Turkish representative yield, but every day up to the end his attitude had been hardening owing to receipt of increasingly stringent instructions from Angora; he would agree to no formula which did not provide for arbitration, which I refused, as I was advised that result of any arbitration might tie our hands to an unfortunate extent in dealing with company claims of rights in the hoped-for event of their falling mainly in Irak.

I propose to await your Lordship's instructions before taking any action. I deeply regret that after three months' arduous negotiations, in the course of which you have more than once been good enough to express appreciation of my proceedings, I should have failed to obtain your approval on the last remaining question which stood in the way of peace. You will doubtless take into account what is much more important than any personal consideration, namely, how grave a matter it would be to reopen question after the final meeting of the committee has been held. I could only do so by announcing that His Majesty's Government had practically disavowed my action; even that would not prevent Ismet from accusing both His Majesty's Government and myself of bad faith, and I cannot insist too strongly that it will not have the effect of securing more favourable settlement. If His Majesty's Government feels no other course is open to them, they must be prepared to face dangers which I had occasion to indicate when I urged the importance of dissuading French Government from, on their side, precipitating rupture.

No. 114.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 298.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 19, 1923.

MY telegram No. 297, paragraph 6.

This refers not only to verbal statements by Ismet at private meetings, but also to the two passages in his note of 16th July (see my despatch No. 255). Passages referred to are as follows: "Principles which we had laid down on the morning of "8th July were the following: to recognise acquired rights of Turkish Petroleum," and "we have admitted principle of safeguarding interests of Turkish Petroleum "Company, based on acquired rights, subject to finding a suitable formula."

I quoted these statements textually in my declaration in committee.

No. 115.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 299.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 19, 1923.

ROME telegram unnumbered of 17th July.

Nogara returned to-day to Lausanne after short visit to Milan.

Italian experts have, however, discussed text with French and British experts. They raised innumerable points, referring everything to Rome and saying that they were awaiting instructions. It is clear that they are trying to leave question unsettled here.

From discussions, however, it is evident that Italians are mainly anxious to secure exclusion of concessionary companies, of course for sole reason that they have none. Unfortunately French expert tells us confidentially that his Government's instructions are now to meet Italians by agreeing to such exclusion.

So far he has only shown his hand to Italians by offering to exclude concessionary companies in territories detached from Turkey. In itself this proposal is quite unjustifiable, but of course mainly hits French.

In order to make a final attempt to force Italians to a settlement my experts finally agreed to put forward [? final] proposal that convention should include a provision that payments to concessionary companies should in no case exceed 1,500,000*l*., on strict understanding that this offer would be withdrawn if convention was not signed here. French expert supported this, but stated that he considered maximum of 1,000,000*l*. amply sufficient.

We dislike proposal as to the fixing of any arbitrary sanction, but in consultation Italians argued that they wished to secure that the claims of individuals are not entirely swamped by those of concessionnaires, and it seems better to make some sacrifice of form to secure signature here. Otherwise Italians will continue practice which they occasionally pursue in other matters of keeping this question open for bargaining purposes, and our claims will suffer.

Could you telegraph urgently if Treasury agree, and if, in last resort, we could safely accept 1,000,000*l*. as the maximum?

(Repeated to Rome.)

No. 116.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 20, 1923.

MY despatch No. 264.

Chicherin has replied at length on behalf of the Soviet Governments recapitulating their objections to Straits Convention and manner in which it was drafted. To show, however, their peaceful intentions, and without withdrawing objections to convention or "to the so-called League of Nations," they have decided to make attempt to collaborate with the "*Entente* Powers." In view of the

impossibility of sending Soviet representative to Switzerland owing to conduct of that country in connection with the murder of Vorovsky, in whose person the rights of the three Soviet States were violated by the conference, they are sending their representative at Rome, M. Jordansky, to Constantinople to sign the Straits Convention there before 14th August.

In one passage note states that, Turks having agreed to Allied proposals, no responsibility attaches to the Soviet Republic for violation of rights and interests of Turkish people, for observance of which those republics strive and will go on striving.

Copy of Russian reply follows by bag.

No. 117.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Phipps (*Paris*).

(No. 289.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1923.

LAUSANNE telegram No. 295 of 18th July: Greek Minorities Treaty.

French Ambassador recently approached me with a view to suppression of clauses in the preamble to the Greek Minorities Treaty which renounce the rights of guarantee. Personally, I saw no objection to surrendering these rights and no great practical advantage in retaining them, but my chief anxiety was not to jeopardise the fate of the Minorities Treaty. Accordingly, I instructed Sir H. Rumbold to sound M. Veniselos after consultation with his French colleague. M. Veniselos was insistent that the continuation of the guarantees was both unnecessary and undesirable. Since then the Italian Government have declared through their Embassy that their acceptance, and presumably their ultimate ratification, of the Greek Treaty was dependent on the maintenance of the preamble in the form agreed upon at Sèvres.

On the other hand, it looks as if the French Government may refuse to accept the Minorities Treaty and the Western Thrace Treaty unless the clauses in the preamble providing for the abrogation of the French and British rights of guarantee are suppressed.

Please approach French Government without delay and urge them to waive their objection to the retention of these clauses, which, if insisted on, may endanger the whole treaty.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 133, in "R.")

No. 118.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

(No. 134.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 297 and 298.

I accept your explanation, and agree that matter must be left as it stands.

No. 119.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 20, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 385 of 10th July: Condemnation by Turks of Ottoman Christians at Constantinople.

Press report that numerous Armenians have also been condemned in connection with alleged incendiary plots.

Can you confirm?

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 136.)

No. 120.

Mr. Howe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, July* 20, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 60.

My French colleague made his *démarche* yesterday, and my Italian colleague and I followed suit this morning. Minister for Foreign Affairs maintained the same point of view as that reported in my telegram No. 92, although we emphasised the bad impression which Serbia's refusal to take over share of debt would have in Allied countries.

(Repeated to Sir H. Rumbold.)

No. 121.

Mr. Howe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, July* 20, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I see no prospect of this Government signing treaty at the present moment, but I am inclined to think, and French Minister is convinced, that Serbia will eventually end by signing, although, perhaps, not for some months. French Minister has accordingly suggested to his Government that Jugoslavia be allowed a period of grace within which to sign, this period to be prolonged if necessary.

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

No. 122.

Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Moscow, July* 20, 1923.

SOVIET Government have officially communicated copy of long reply addressed to Massigli at Lausanne agreeing to sign Straits Convention. Jordansky, newly appointed Soviet representative to Italy, will sign on their behalf at Constantinople before 14th August.

No. 123.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 395.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, July* 21, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 230.

About twenty Armenians were arrested a week ago (see my despatch No. 416), but trial has not commenced.

It is quite likely that charge is not without foundation, and I do not regard the case as one for intervention.

(Repeated to Lausanne, No. 221.)

No. 124.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 23.)

(No. 301.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 21, 1923.

MY telegram No. 300 of 20th July.

Your Lordship will recollect that before the opening of the conference you discussed with M. Poincaré the question whether, in the event of Russia signing the Straits Convention, it would be possible or desirable to make a declaration or take some other similar action with the object of placing it on record that the acceptance of the Russian signature was not to be regarded as involving any further recognition of the present Russian Government. So far as I am aware, no definite decision was reached.

Inasmuch as the Russians propose to sign at Constantinople, there is no need for the question to be taken up here, but I venture to bring it to your Lordship's attention in case it may be considered desirable for the question to be discussed between the Governments concerned before the Russian signature takes place, which will probably be some time between 1st and 14th August.

No. 125.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 302.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lausanne, July* 21, 1923.

BELGRADE telegram No. 95 to Foreign Office.

Special protocol, to be executed by parties on day of signature, will enable Jugoslavia to sign at any time up to coming into force of treaty.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

No. 126.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 695.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, July* 21, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 289.

I saw M. Poincaré to-day, and strongly urged him to waive his objections to retention of clauses in preamble. He observed that Allies had already surrendered on too many points, but he promised to examine the question in the light of your observations. My impression is that he will agree to your suggestion.

(Repeated to Lausanne.)

[**E 7592/7120/44**] No. 127.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 23.)

(No. 416.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July* 16, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report that the local press of the 14th instant gave much prominence to the arrest of a Græco-Armenian gang of incendiaries in Constantinople. This organisation, the members of which are variously estimated at from twenty to fifty in number, is stated to have been in existence for the last two years.

2. The incident has served as a fresh pretext for a vigorous press attack on the Christian elements of the city, while a certain piquancy has been added to it by the fact that the leader of the gang, a certain Bedros Zeki Effendi, is the joint

president of the Turco-Armenian Rapprochement Committee, the formation of which was reported in my despatch No. 33 of the 16th January last.

3. Doubtless in the hope of further embittering the relations between the Turkish and Christian elements, certain organs of the press have stated that the primary object of the organisation was the destruction of the Moslem quarters of the city. This view has not, however, been borne out by the enquiries which have already been conducted. These tend to show that the chief and probably the only aim of the incendiaries was to raise money by arranging beforehand with the owners of heavily insured properties for the destruction of the latter by fire, subject, of course, to the payment to the gang of a considerable share of the proceeds of the insurance policies. This has already been admitted by Bedros Zeki in the course of an enquiry, which has likewise established the participation of the gang in a number of recent fires, in most of which the damage was limited, thanks to the assistance of the British military fire brigade.

4. The incident is nevertheless unfortunate at the present time, as it comes as a blow to those who are honestly striving to bring about a real improvement in the relations between the Turkish Government and its Christian subjects.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 7603/52/44]

No. 128.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 427.)
Constantinople, July 17, 1923.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 404 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that following the departure of Mgr. Meletios and the delegation by him of full powers to the Holy Synod, the Œcumenical Patriarchate has lost no time in coming to a decision regarding its future line of action. Mgr. Nicolas, Archbishop of Caesarea, has been elected president of the Synod, and I enclose herein a copy of his letter of the 11th instant notifying me to this effect.

2. From the point of view of the future relations of the Patriarchate with the Turkish Government, I doubt whether the choice of the Synod, as well as the appointment as Vicar-General of Joachim, Bishop of Goritza, and a strong partisan of Meletios, can be regarded as felicitous. Mgr. Nicolas was, as your Lordship is aware, *locum tenens* of the Patriarchate during the interregnum between the death of Mgr. Dorotheos and the election of Mgr. Meletios as Patriarch. He was, therefore, closely associated with the Allied authorities in Constantinople during the mid-Armistice period, nor is his position *vis-à-vis* the Turkish authorities likely to be improved by the fact of his having taken a leading part in securing the election of Mgr. Meletios in December 1921.

3. The Holy Synod and the Mixed Council are nevertheless anxious to placate the Turkish authorities so as to enable the formalities for the election of a new Patriarch to proceed. In an interview to the press, Mgr. Nicolas has stated that the Greeks, who have lived with the Turks for more than 400 years, cannot forget the favours received from the Turkish Government. In the past their attitude had been ill-advised, but now the spirit of friendship will be preached in the churches, as the Greeks of to-day desire nothing better than to live on friendly terms with the Turks.

4. Meantime the Patriarchate has announced that the future relations of the Church with the Government will be based on the following principles:—

(*a.*) The Œcumenical Patriarchate abandons its political and administrative character and remains a purely religious institution of a pan-orthodox nature.
(*b.*) Marriage and cognate questions fall within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
(*c.*) Communal education and charitable institutions will be administered by delegates elected by the people according to the regulations concerning minorities The present Mixed Council of the Patriarchate will cease to exist as soon as the communal authorities have been constituted.
(*d.*) The election of the Patriarch will take place according to canonical law.

(*e.*) The relations of the Patriarchate with the Government will, as stated by Riza Nour Bey at the Conference at Lausanne, be similar to those existing between Church and State in England, France and the United States of America.
(*f.*) The Patriarchate accepts the declaration of Riza Nour Bey that the Government, while abolishing these privileges of the clergy which are inconsistent with the new democratic régime, will not intervene in clerical decisions nor in matters of hierarchical organisation.

5. The departure of the Patriarch has stimulated the discussion of the question of the Patriarchate. In the local press, with one exception, the tone of the articles which have so far appeared has been markedly subdued, while several Turkish newspapers have gone so far as to express approval of the attitude taken up by the present Patriarchal authorities. The exception referred to was the rabidly xenophobe "Tewhid-i-Efkiar," which accused the new Vicar-General of being more violently anti-Turk than Mgr. Meletios himself, and bitterly attacked the whole Greek population of Turkey.

6. The Turkish Government has so far refrained from giving any indication of its future line of action. The Secretary of the Mixed Council of the Patriarchate was received by the Vali, Haidar Bey, on the 15th instant, while I understand that a deputation from the Holy Synod is to be received this afternoon. On the other hand, the Turkish press to-day announces that the Government will probably nominate a *locum tenens* without previous discussion with the Patriarchal authorities. This *locum tenens* will, it is stated, hail from Asia Minor, and, if so, it is not improbable that he will be found in the person of the notorious Papa Eftim, the head of the "Turkish Orthodox Church" of Anatolia.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Œcumenical Patriarchate to Mr. Henderson.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,
Constantinople, le 11 juillet 1923.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que sa Sainteté le Patriarche œcuménique Mgr. Mélétios, qui a quitté hier Constantinople en congé régulier pour se rendre au mont-Athos, a transmis au Saint-Synode les pouvoirs de l'autorité patriarcale pour tout le temps de son absence.

Le Saint-Synode, dans la séance qu'il a tenue immédiatement après le départ de sa Sainteté, m'a désigné pour présider à ses travaux et m'a confié la gérance provisoire des affaires du Patriarcat.

Je saisis, &c.
(Pour le Saint-Synode),
Le Président,
NICOLAS,
Archevêque de Césarée.

No. 129.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 303.)
(Telegraphic.)
[By Bag.]
Lausanne, July 21, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 129.

I realised, when protesting against the arrest of the six Greeks from Chanak, that there was some danger of the Turks taking advantage of the date fixed in article 1 of the Amnesty Declaration being 20th November, 1922, but I felt that it was too late to suggest an alteration, as this date has figured in it since the text was adopted in the first stage of the conference.

We had ourselves, moreover, insisted on this date in the case of Turkish subjects arrested or condemned by our authorities.

At the meeting of my committee on 17th July, however, I made a fresh protest against action being taken by the Turks against Turkish subjects who had served the British army in non-combatant capacities, and I will, before leaving Lausanne, endeavour to obtain from Ismet Pasha a promise that Turkish subjects so employed by the British military authorities, since 20th November last, will not be molested on that account. I will take the line that this is not a case really requiring amnesty at all, as the conditions of the occupation were determined some time before that date by the Mudania Convention, and it was natural that the occupying forces should employ local labour.

As regards the second point raised in your telegram under reference, I stated in committee, on 17th July, the view of the Allies that the Amnesty Declaration would come into force as from the date of signature, and extracted a statement from Ismet that the Turkish Government would act in accordance with this principle.

The case of the inhabitants of Imbros and Tenedos, which was dealt with in your despatch No. 180 of 13th July, presents special features, and M. Veniselos has induced Ismet Pasha to agree to an addition to the protocol relative to the evacuation of Kara-Agatch and those two islands, providing that in the case of these three places no action shall be taken against the inhabitants in respect of any offences up to date.

No. 130.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 23.)

(No. 305.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 23, 1923.

MY telegram No. 303.

Mr. Ryan discussed on 21st July with member of Turkish delegation who has been in charge of Evacuation Protocol question of Turkish subjects employed by British army since 20th November, 1922. Turkish delegate admitted that it would be unreasonable to prosecute such persons, but, as I anticipated, suggested that matter might be dealt with on basis of reciprocity. Mr. Ryan of course pointed out that no real question of reciprocity arose, as acts subsequent to 20th November, which we on our side had insisted on excluding from amnesty, were criminal acts, whereas non-combatant service rendered to troops, whose position had been defined by Convention of Mudania when conclusion of peace was in sight, had not any criminal character. In view of delicacy of matter, however, he said I should be satisfied if Ismet gave me verbal assurance that he shared my view of principle that Turkish subjects in question ought not to be molested and would promise to discuss details with General Harington on his passage through Constantinople.

Ismet has this morning sent me verbal message in this sense. I think it establishes sufficient basis to enable General Harington to settle matter satisfactorily when discussing details of evacuation, and I cannot get more in view of strong line which we ourselves took regarding offences by Turks against Allied forces subsequent to 20th November.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 131.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (*Lausanne*).

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 23, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 299 of 20th July: Reparations.

Treasury consider that we should accept maximum of 1 million for payments to concessionary companies.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 207.)

No. 132.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 308.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Lausanne, July* 24, 1923.

PEACE Treaty and seventeen other instruments, including final act, were signed this afternoon at plenary session, which began at 3 P.M.

Swiss President presided. Jugoslav Government having maintained their attitude, their delegate did not sign anything. American observer was present, but refrained from signing final act, although he had been invited to do so.

French withdrew yesterday their proposal to suppress clause in preamble of Greek Minorities Treaty providing for abolition of guarantee of Greek Constitution. Instruments signed to-day consequently include protocol providing for ratification simultaneously with Peace Treaty of both Greek Minorities Treaty and Western Thrace Treaty, subject only to suppression of article 7, second paragraph, and article 15 of former and adjustment of latter necessitated by retrocession of Karagatch to Turkey.

I leave Lausanne to-night by Simplon Express, and shall arrive in London to-morrow afternoon, accompanied by Ryan, Payne, Malkin and Cotesworth.

(Repeated to Constantinople, Athens and Sofia.)

No. 133.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 25.)

(No. 703.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 24, 1923.

M. ANDRÉ TARDIEU, in to-day's "Echo national," writes a leading article headed "England, Mistress of the Straits." M. Tardieu quotes a letter received from "one of the most distinguished members of the French community at Constan-"tinople," declaring that French influence in Turkey has entirely passed over to the British, who, in fact, have become the protectors of Christians in the East. Only they intervene vigorously whenever an Armenian or a Greek is molested by the Turks; only they are not annoyed or insulted by the Turks. The British would remain at Chanak, and would possess all the gates of the Mediterranean.

M. Tardieu again draws attention to the French policy of scuttle at Chanak, and declares that England has now a new Gibraltar in the Straits. He declines to believe that England will, in a few weeks, consent to abandon that position. French turcophilism had given England prestige in the East and had made her mistress of the Straits.

[E 7722/1/44] No. 134.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 26.)

(No. 275. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Lausanne, July* 24, 1923.

IT may be useful if I place on record in as succinct a form as possible my impression of the course of the conference which has just concluded, and of the various factors which contributed to shape the course of our proceedings. I do not pretend that this review sheds any new light on the course of our proceedings or that the considerations mentioned will not have already occurred to your Lordship.

It will be remembered that French policy was largely responsible for the suspension of the proceedings of the first phase of the conference. M. Poincaré still seemed to be under the influence of M. Franklin-Bouillon and to be ready to give way at every turn, without foreseeing the inevitable effect on the future financial and economic interests of France in Turkey. The Italians, who had no particularly vital interests at stake, were also quite ready to conclude peace almost at any price. This was sufficiently demonstrated by their unfortunate eleventh-hour intervention in connection with the declaration providing for judicial safeguards for foreigners.

During the period which elapsed between the close of the first phase and the opening of the second phase of the conference, the Turks prepared a counter-draft of a treaty. Assuming that they had nothing to fear from France and still less from Italy, they also took action which effectively roused the French Government and even the Italian Government. By giving railway and other concessions of a comprehensive character to an American citizen, they directly violated the concessions obtained in 1914 by the Périer group in consideration of which the Turkish Government of the day had received a loan of 500,000,000 fr., and thus at once antagonised the French High Commission at Constantinople and the French Government. Not content with this, the Turkish General Staff moved troops down to the Syrian frontier with the obvious intention of intimidating the French authorities in Syria. In their counter-draft of the treaty, the Turks inserted a claim for the surrender by Italy of Castellorizo.

The French therefore entered the conference smarting under the sense of injustice produced by the grant of the Chester concession, and indignant at the measures of intimidation which the Turkish Government were practising. The Italians were from the first mainly preoccupied by the question of Castellorizo and of how to get the Turks to drop their demand for an island which the Italian Government were determined not to give up.

On the reassembling of the conference, the work was divided amongst three committees entitled the Political, Financial and Economic Committees respectively. It was fairly evident from the start that the political questions raised by the Turkish counter-draft would not give much trouble and that the struggle would centre mainly on financial and economic questions. But the question of judicial safeguards for foreigners, which fell within the competence of the Political Committee, gave trouble from the outset, the Turks holding that the so-called Montagna formula had settled this matter, whilst the British delegation maintained that it was not bound by the action taken by the French and Italian delegates after the final meeting with the Turks on the 4th February. The French and Italian delegations took refuge in the argument that they had recovered their liberty of action in view of the suspension on the 4th February of the proceedings of the conference. Ismet Pasha declared that he would not consent even to consider any further draft declaration regarding judicial safeguards, and for the moment there was a deadlock over this question.

The first three or four weeks of the conference were devoted to clearing the ground and to taking new or modified articles in committee. It was soon evident that we should have difficulty with article 57 dealing with reparation to be demanded by the Allies from Turkey. The determination of His Majesty's Government not to pay into a common reparation pool 5,000,000*l.* on account of the Turkish battleships building in England, and taken over by them before Turkey entered the war, created an awkward situation with the French and Italian delegations. The unwillingness of the latter to content themselves with the 5 millions gold actually in the hands of the British and French Governments made it for the moment impossible to deal with the reparation section of the treaty, and thereby aroused the suspicions of the Turks, who thought that the Allies meant to reopen a question which they considered as already settled.

The situation of the conference at the end of the first four or five weeks was therefore as follows: there was a deadlock over the question of judicial safeguards for foreigners. It was not possible to take the reparation articles owing to the attitude of the French and Italian delegations, nor was the time ripe for taking the question of the confirmation of the Decree of Muharrem and the loan contracts, whilst the proposal made by the French Government, which had been accepted by the Allied Governments, that representatives of the concessionary companies should proceed to Angora and deal direct with the Turkish Government, prevented the conference from taking up the question of concessions until a reasonable time had elapsed for the said companies to come to an agreement with the Angora Government.

It was at this stage that M. Veniselos intervened. In the interval between the Mudania armistice and the opening of the second phase of the conference the Greek army had been reorganised with remarkable rapidity and efficiency, and was concentrated within easy distance of the Maritza River. Its leaders were confident that it could sweep the Turks out of Eastern Thrace without any difficulty and advance to the Chatalja lines. The Revolutionary Government in Greece shared that confidence. But the Greek army was getting impatient, and its leaders wished to strike while the iron was hot. As the question of Turco-Greek reparation was about to come up in the conference, and as the Greeks were determined not to pay reparation to Turkey, M. Alexandris was despatched to Lausanne to acquaint M. Veniselos with the views of

the Revolutionary Government in this matter and to urge a prompt settlement on the basis of a mutual waiver of reparation claims as between Greece and Turkey. The Greek statesmen became very insistent that this question should be tackled and settled without any further delay.

The Allied delegates were placed in a very difficult position, and the British delegation realised that it would be first of all necessary for the French and Italian Governments to authorise their delegates to drop any demand for reparation from the Turks in excess of the 5,000,000*l.* gold. This matter was referred to the Allied Governments for immediate decision, and meanwhile the Allied delegates used every endeavour to prevent M. Veniselos and M. Alexandris from precipitating matters. The assent of the French and Italian Governments to waiving any demand for reparations beyond the 5,000,000*l.* and £T. 846,000 Turkish Treasury bills was obtained in the nick of time, and at a private meeting of the delegates of the inviting Powers with Ismet Pasha on the 26th May, at which the Serb, Roumanian and Greek delegates, as well as the American observer, were present, an agreement was reached in which Turkey renounced all claim to reparation from Greece, but received Kara-Agatch in return for this renunciation.

The above was the only occasion during the conference on which the threat of force was used, a threat there was no doubt the Greek Government would, if necessary, have put into execution. It has been suggested that advantage should have been taken by the Allies of an impatient Greek army to have tried to settle the important questions of the debt and concessions, but for the reasons given above it was not possible to follow this procedure. Several weeks were to elapse before the French Government could be brought round to the solution of the debt question, which was eventually proposed by the British delegation, whilst negotiations at Angora between the concessionary companies and the Angora Government only began on or about the 23rd May.

Having settled the Greco-Turkish reparation question, Ismet Pasha naïvely imagined that he was going to settle the remaining big outstanding questions at the rate of one a day. Throughout all this time I had repeatedly informed him that we refused to consider the question of judicial safeguards for foreigners as settled by the so-called Montagna formula and that we insisted upon discussing this whole question anew. He was eventually obliged to accept our point of view, and some arduous private sittings between the heads of the delegations of the inviting Powers and Ismet Pasha were devoted to discussing various draft declarations on the subject. It became evident that the Turks would rather break the conference than agree to give to any extra-judicial authority like the legal counsellors a deciding voice in regard to contemplated arrests of foreigners, as they considered such a procedure incompatible with their sovereignty. A formula was eventually found providing for the notification of arrests of foreigners immediately after the said arrests had been effected, and extending to the whole of Turkey the competence of the judicial advisers whom the Turks undertook to engage for five years.

In the meanwhile practically all the political questions had been settled, and the Turks had agreed to drop their demand for Castellorizo and Ada Kaleh. A great deal of work had also been completed on the other sections of the treaty. There remained the important questions of the debt, concessions and evacuation, though the last-mentioned question was really not a question for the Allies, but a lever for use in getting the Turks to adopt a satisfactory solution of the other two questions, inasmuch as the Turks had come to attach hardly less importance to securing an early evacuation than to the evacuation itself. Throughout the conference Ismet Pasha had pressed the Allies to acquaint him with their intentions with regard to the evacuation of Turkish territory, but had always been told that this question came logically last in order of settlement.

Great efforts were now made to find a form of declaration covering the debt question which could be accepted by the French and Turkish delegations. The latter made no concealment of their intention not to pay the coupons on the debt in gold or sterling, but to pay in francs. The Allied delegations maintained that it was impossible from a juridical point of view to accept anything in the treaty which would impair the rights of the bondholders under private contracts with the Turkish Government. As neither side would give way a deadlock was reached, from which it became imperative to seek an issue. Meanwhile the Turks declared that they would not even discuss the concessions question until they had received satisfaction with regard both to the debt and evacuation questions. The Allies replied that all three questions must be considered together.

By this time several of the British and French concessionary companies had completely failed to come to any agreement with the Turkish Government, and the state of things foreshadowed in the note of the Allied Powers had now come to pass. It became necessary to consider the insertion in a protocol to be attached to the treaty of certain principles for application in the case of companies which had failed to come to an agreement with the Turkish Government. After a great deal of pressure the French Government agreed to the solution which I had suggested for dealing with the question of the debt, viz., to drop all mention of the Decree of Muharrem and the loan contracts out of the treaty, but to make a statement in committee confirming the validity of that decree and the loan contracts and reserving the liberty to the Allied Governments to protect the interests of the bondholders, their nationals, in any manner they deemed fit, should the negotiations which the Turkish Government intend to conduct with the bondholders after the signature of the treaty not lead to a satisfactory result. As regards the question of evacuation, the French Government proposed that the Allied troops should not leave Turkish soil until the negotiations between the bondholders and the Turkish Government had reached a satisfactory stage. Considerable effort was expended in getting the French Government to drop this condition, and it was not until the 7th July that the Allied delegates were in a position finally to take up these three outstanding questions with the Turks.

After some strenuous sittings, agreement in principle was reached on the night of the 8th-9th July, but when details of the evacuation and of the concessions questions came to be examined by experts, fresh difficulties arose. The Turks insisted that the evacuation must include the naval as well as the military forces. They proceeded to make difficulties in the case of the Régie générale, Armstrong, Whitworth and the Turkish Petroleum Company. These difficulties were in a considerable measure due to the intervention of the American observer, who raised with Ismet Pasha the question of the validity of the Chester concession and proclaimed the principle of the open door. Mr. Grew's activities were directed especially against the Turkish Petroleum Company. This no doubt contributed in the last resort to Ismet Pasha's obstinate attitude on that question. In the end a satisfactory evacuation protocol was drawn up, providing for the right of the three Allied Powers to maintain one cruiser and two destroyers apiece inside the Straits and securing unlimited right of passage until the coming into force of the Straits Convention. In view of the determined opposition of Ismet Pasha it was not possible to obtain a satisfactory formula with regard to the Turkish Petroleum Company, whose case was dealt with in the same manner as the question of the Ottoman Debt. A fairly satisfactory arrangement was come to in regard to the Régie générale and the Armstrong, Whitworth Company.

Towards the end of the conference some trouble arose from three of the smaller Powers. The Serbian delegate intimated that he could not sign the treaty except with a reserve with regard to Serbia's share of the debt. He considered that this question had been settled by the Treaty of London. He was informed that it was not possible for a Power to select from the treaty and sign those portions which benefited it whilst rejecting any portions which entailed an obligation. M. Veniselos claimed that Greece should benefit by any advantages granted by the bondholders to Turkey in regard to a reduction in the interest on the debt. He contended that Greece would only be taking over a share of the Ottoman Debt from the date on which her representatives signed the treaty. He demanded that the Powers should recognise in advance that Greece, who had been an ally, should not be treated less favourably as regards interest on the debt than Turkey, who had fought against the Allies. If this were not understood, he would not be able to sign the treaty. He was informed that the Ottoman Debt contracts were private contracts between the bondholders and the Turkish Government which could not be modified by the conference.

The Albanian delegate intimated that his Government objected to pay their share of the loans raised for railway construction purposes, seeing that there was not a single kilometre of railway in Albania. The Albanian Government would therefore be unable to authorise the signature of the relevant declaration.

The Turks put up an excellent fight throughout the conference and have every reason to be satisfied with the results which they have obtained. They never gave away a point uselessly, and such concessions as were obtained had to be extracted from them with the greatest difficulty. The deafness of the principal Turkish delegate was a source of great inconvenience. But for Ismet Pasha's infirmity, negotiations would not have taken more than half or a third of the time. The Turks pursued the methods of the bazaar until the very last minute. There is reason to believe that Ismet's own

position was much shaken after his acceptance of the solution proposed for the Greco-Turkish reparation question, and that, during the latter half of the conference, he had to refer much more frequently to Angora. At times he gave the impression that he was aware that he was negotiating almost with a rope round his neck.

But it would be hardly fair to the Turks to make them solely responsible for the protracted character of the negotiations. At least three or four weeks were consumed in getting the French Government to recede from the attitude which they had taken up on the reparations, evacuation and debt questions. As time went on, the French delegation became more and more incensed with the Turks, and it was necessary for the British delegation to remind the French that insistence on certain demands might lead to a rupture, which the French Government presumably wished to avoid. General Pellé was a man of very different calibre from M. Bompard, and I gather that on several occasions during the first part of the conference he found himself in conflict with M. Poincaré, with the result that towards the end of the conference he, in his turn, had constantly to refer to Paris for instructions.

The Italian delegation has generally supported this delegation. Signor Montagna was hampered during the first half of the conference by a lively fear of Signor Mussolini until he was able to report that the Turks had withdrawn their demand for Castellorizo. After that he was apparently given a free hand and fell into line with General Pellé and myself, when we were in agreement. Signor Montagna supported me strongly in resisting the French desire to push the debt question to extremes.

The attendance of the American observer has been of no advantage whatever to the conference. His action, indeed, whether involuntary or not, at one moment gravely imperilled the issue of the negotiations and created an awkward situation. Whilst the conference has been in progress, the Americans have been negotiating a treaty of their own with the Turks. They have benefited by the hard work performed by the Allied delegations. Whenever they have intervened to read declarations about Armenians or other matters, their statements have been so anodyne as not to produce the slightest effect on the Turks. The smaller States represented at the second phase of the conference rarely broke silence. On the other hand, M. Veniselos enhanced his reputation. He succeeded, before the end of the conference, in settling directly with the Turks various matters in suspense between Turkey and Greece, and, after the settlement of the Greco-Turkish reparations question, manifested great impatience for a definite settlement with Turkey, even warning the Allied delegates that he would have to sign preliminaries of peace with Turkey if negotiations went on too long.

The Japanese delegate scarcely opened his mouth, though his assistant, Mr. Nagaoka, was most useful on the drafting committee.

None of the Allied Powers will pretend that the treaty which has been concluded is a really satisfactory document from their point of view, but it is perhaps the best which was obtainable, given the circumstances in which the negotiations necessarily had to be conducted. Indeed, it is in many respects less favourable to the Turks than some competent observers of their activities since 1919 had anticipated. Once the question of the Straits and the general liquidation of the old Ottoman Empire had been settled, thanks so largely to your lordship's personal part in the first phase of the conference, there was really no question on which the three Allied Powers would have been ready to have resumed hostilities with Turkey; nor was there any of individual interest for the sake of which any one of the three principal Powers, however strongly they might feel, would have been willing to embark on a new war. The Turks were well aware of the unwillingness of the Allies to renew the war, and took full advantage of this knowledge. As force is the only thing which the Turks respect, and the use of force was never seriously contemplated, the position resembled that of a man going into a fight with one arm strapped to his side. The Turks have realised the principles of their National Pact and cannot complain that the treaty in any way infringes their sovereignty, as to which they constantly expressed great solicitude. Their policy towards the Armenians and Greeks seems to indicate that they wish to apply the maxim Turkey for the Turks, whilst their attitude with regard to the debt shows that they have unorthodox views regarding the sanctity of contracts. Unless I am much mistaken, they will very soon realise that they cannot stand alone, and that they will require European help as well as capital.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.

[E 7815/7158/44] No. 135.

Mr. Dormer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 94.) *Palazzo Borghese, Rome, July* 21, 1923.

My Lord,

ON receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 163 of the 16th instant I informed Cardinal Gasparri this morning of the position with regard to the French claim to the protectorate of Catholics in the East, a question which had again been raised through the proposed appointment of Mgr. Filippi as Apostolic delegate at Constantinople.

His Eminence told me that the French Embassy had originally proposed that the French Ambassador at Constantinople should go to meet Mgr. Filippi on his arrival, accompany him to the cathedral and there receive the liturgical honours at a *Te Deum*. Mgr. Filippi would later call on the French Ambassador and afterwards on the other members of the Diplomatic Corps. The Cardinal had said that this could not be, and that, to avoid difficulties with the British and Italian representatives, there would be no *Te Deum*. The Vatican were told one thing by the French as to what was decided at San Remo, and the reverse by the English and Italians. They themselves had not been present at San Remo, and had not received from the interested parties a copy of the agreement or *procès-verbaux*. They had no intention of taking sides with France against Great Britain in the matter This reply brought forth loud protests from the French Government, first verbally and then in writing. They not only insisted on the *Te Deum*, but had protested vehemently that England, a Protestant nation, had no right to intervene in "religious" questions affecting only France and the Holy See. To this the Cardinal had rejoined that the rendering of these liturgical honours had its political effect.

In the circumstances the Vatican had decided that Mgr. Filippi should go not as Apostolic delegate, but as Apostolic visitor. There could then be no question of a *Te Deum* or of any liturgical honours. After two months or so he might go on to Angora. To this solution the French could not demur.

Once peace was concluded at Lausanne and the treaty signed and ratified the Capitulations would be abolished, and with them the French claim to the protectorate would automatically lapse. In the meanwhile Mgr. Filippi would keep "in his "waistcoat pocket" the letter appointing him Apostolic delegate.

An announcement has already appeared in the "Osservatore Romano" that Mgr. Filippi would go out as Apostolic visitor.

I have, &c.
CECIL DORMER.

[E 8317/199/44] No. 136.

Acting Consul-General Urquhart to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 22.) *Smyrna, July* 21, 1923.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt on the 4th instant of Foreign Office despatch No. 22 covering correspondence on the subject of the return of refugees from Malta to Smyrna, and to submit the following sketch of the situation in Smyrna and its influence on foreigners :—

2. In September 1922 the Turkish people were filled with a spirit of Turkish nationality entirely new to them—a spirit of nationalism of the most primitive type, which expressed itself in insult to the non-Turk and the glorification of the all-Turk. There was a riot of self-assertion and the public mind was full of the most extravagant nonsense about the past and the future of Turkey; foreigners were denounced as the parasites who had impoverished the body politic and economic in the past, who were to be brushed away to permit of a glorious future for Turkey in purely Turkish hands. So public opinion has clamoured for the expulsion of foreign employees, immediately whenever possible, or whenever trained Turks could be found where training was necessary; it demanded also the replacing of foreign by Turkish companies, and the Government of Angora has not disappointed it Constant pressure has been exercised on all concerns whatsoever to compel the employment of Turkish staffs, and preference has been given to Turkish firms wherever possible, while obstacles of every sort have been placed in the way of foreign traders.

3. This attitude has moderated greatly since last September in proportion as the excitement of victory is giving way to consideration of Turkey's internal problems and also in proportion as the need of finding a more permanent means of livelihood than traffic in "abandoned goods" is reasserting itself. The trading Turks and the Turks of the coast realise that Turkey of all nations is not self-sufficing, but the Anatolian proper does not, and it is on the Anatolian proper that the present Government relies and its strength is its xenophobia. The foreigner's position will remain unfavourable until Constantinople and the Turk of the seaboard region regain their position from Angora and the Anatolian peasant, for it is generally admitted that Turkey has not reached political stability and that a fight between those two is certain to come.

4. Already there is discontent; the extreme centralisation of all power in Angora has resulted in administrative chaos. The affairs of local men are often held up for weeks while Angora delays its reply to one simple question or another; telegrams may be sent for weeks without result, since they never reach the harassed Minister to whom they are addressed. Local officials do not dare to act on their own initiative, and business must needs wait. All this centralisation is designed to root out corruption among officials out of Angora, yet corruption is rampant. Salaries paid are ludicrously insufficient, and those officers who are unable to find employment except in Government service are driven to accept money from any possible source.

5. The army has given the best example of degeneration. Officers and men alike have become ragged; the officers have received during the past ten months a certain small percentage of their pay in cash, but part of it has been paid by drafts on the "Commission de Liquidation des Biens abandonnés," which are accepted by that commission in payment of goods in its hands; so they have become dealers in old furniture. The rank and file are receiving nothing, and in consequence they make the streets unsafe at night and rob as opportunity offers. There have been a number of cases of insults to, and attacks on, women, but there has been less violence than might have been expected and the town is perfectly safe in the daytime, for which considerable credit is certainly due to the presence of Allied warships. General conditions may improve with the demobilisation of the army, but the troubles ahead of Turkey seem inevitable. Turks delight in talking of the "New Turkey," but the name is misleading. This is the same old inefficient, idle, corrupt, ignorant and predatory Turkey as before, except that she has shaken off the discipline which the western nations imposed on her and has become noisy and boastful in consequence. Her confusion will presently be the foreigner's opportunity.

6. It is not yet possible to estimate to what extent trade has declined as a result of the interferences and prohibitions of the Angora Government and of the events of last September which destroyed the town and drove out most of the persons who knew best how to conduct the trade of this district. Much depends on the readiness with which foreign capital will be forthcoming after the conclusion of peace, but in any case it is certain that the volume of trade will be considerably lessened for some years.

7. The outlook for foreign communities is, therefore, not at all attractive, and I should not advise the settlement here of any fresh foreigners whatsoever. I submit, however, that the refugees at Malta are in a class by themselves, and that they are specially qualified by long residence in this country and by their knowledge of the Turks to find the means of living here contentedly in circumstances which any other foreigner would find disagreeable. They talk all the various languages in use in this country, and moreover, being Levantines, are so attached to the Levant and so eager to return that settlement of them elsewhere would be very difficult. In view of the imminent signature of peace which guarantees them at least immunity from violence, I submit that there is now no cause why they should not return, due regard being given to their needs until they secure work.

8. It would, however, be most unwise to permit them to return in one group. The main consideration at the outset being housing, only those who can show that they have accommodation of some kind awaiting them should be permitted to leave first, and I suggest that among those who have housing accommodation, preference should be given to the following classes :—

(*a.*) Persons of independent means.
(*b.*) Persons who have employment guaranteed.
(*c.*) Skilled craftsmen, especially those skilled in constructional work, such as carpenters, who are in great demand here.
(*d.*) Domestic servants, also in great demand.

9. As for those persons who do not fall within any of the above classes, the question is simply whether it is better to maintain them at Malta, where there is no prospect of their finding employment, or at Smyrna until they do find employment, unless, indeed, it be found possible to settle them elsewhere. If it is decided to send them back to Smyrna, it is certain that there will be a certain amount of difficulty in re-establishing them, and that relief will be necessary in a number of cases for some time, the more so as the Turks have definitely closed to foreigners at least one class of labour—dockyard labour—which formerly employed a considerable number of Maltese

10. I have visited the Vali of Smyrna to enquire whether, in view of the imminent signature of peace, the attitude of Angora would modify towards the entry of foreigners. He replied that it has not modified so far, and that foreigners are still being prevented from returning, and that, in his opinion, the present attitude would be maintained until the actual ratification of peace. I venture to submit that, if it is decided to take diplomatic action for the return of the refugees at Malta on the strength of signature of peace at Lausanne, it will be important to ensure the return of persons with employment guaranteed, so as to be in time for the busy fruit export season, which begins towards the end of August. I should also point out that there is a risk of the numerous Italian colony of this place replacing British subjects in their employment here if their absence is long delayed after the signature of peace.

I have, &c.
R. W. URQUHART.

[E 7801/199/44] No. 137.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 434.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July 24, 1923.*

IT is generally announced that the new Grand National Assembly will open on the 2nd August. Though this may not prove to be the actual date it is unlikely to be postponed for more than a day or so. The first task of the Assembly will be concerned with formalities, with the re-election of its president and of the various Ministers; its second, the discussion and ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.

2. In view of the importance attached to the early evacuation of Constantinople, I feel fairly confident that Angora will ratify by the middle of August. The new deputies being practically all declared members of the Defence of Rights Party, it is most improbable that there will be any modification, except of an unimportant nature, in the constitution of the new Cabinet. Reouf Bey will certainly be re-elected president of the Council of Ministers and Mustafa Kemal will no less certainly be once more President of the Assembly.

3. At the same time, as I had the honour to mention in my telegram No. 363 of the 24th June last, Kemal's influence has of late greatly declined. His prestige in Turkey reached its zenith at the beginning of last autumn after the recovery of Smyrna and the expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor. Since that date, the deposition of the Sultan and the creation of the People's party, his popularity has steadily diminished.

4. The services which he has rendered to his country are incalculable and universally admitted. In a certain sense he reminds me in this respect of M. Clemenceau, and I should not be surprised to see him now that his country's external dangers are past, suffer a somewhat similar fate. Like M. Clemenceau, being unable to tolerate opposition, he has the habit of making enemies and prefers to surround himself with mediocrities who will be obedient puppets rather than share the power with first-class men who may prove to hold different opinions to himself. But Kemal has other failings which M. Clemenceau had not, and his eclipse may, therefore, occur with greater rapidity. There is no doubt that he drinks heavily. He is said, even by the Turks, to be a liar and not to keep his word, to regard contrary advice as an act of hostility to himself and to play off all men against each other in his personal interest. He is known also to be revengeful and, in a country in which revenge is not difficult to satisfy, and where the example of Ali Shukri Bey is a constant warning, such a characteristic is likely to lead to measures of precaution with a view to forestalling its consequences.

5. I am inclined generally to attribute his waning influence and popularity to the above failings rather than to his actual acts, to personal animosity rather than to purely

political opposition. The Turkish nation is not sufficiently educated to reason for itself, and I doubt whether the abolition of the Sultanate of itself has appreciably added to or detracted from Kemal's position in the country from the popular point of view. Certainly in Constantinople itself, for very comprehensible reasons, there is a considerable movement in favour of the restoration of a Sultan, but I do not think that this is the case in Anatolia and especially Angora, though it is true that the eastern vilayets are believed to be strongly monarchical.

6. But the Sultanate question, with its religious and traditional pitfalls, affords, on the other hand, a convenient rallying-point for the personal adversaries of the Ghazi Pasha. The latter also, in my opinion, made a serious tactical error in identifying himself too openly with internal politics through the constitution under his ægis of the Popular or Defence of Rights party. He would have been better advised to stand aloof, and thereby avoid the odium inseparable from party politics in general and aggravated in particular by the methods employed here to ensure the election of suitable candidates.

7. Though it is difficult at this distance to penetrate the secrets of Angora, I have a distinct impression that already Mustafa Kemal is no longer to the same extent that he was the guiding spirit of the destinies of Turkey. From all accounts he lives at Angora in great seclusion, though surrounded by the outward circumstance of pomp and power. He certainly attends the more important of the Cabinet Councils, and his concurrence in its decisions is recorded as giving them greater weight. It is of course possible that this isolation, surrounded as it is with a special *garde du corps* and adorned, so far as Angora can supply them, with the trappings of a ruler, has been specially conceived in order to prepare the public for the higher position which Kemal may aspire ultimately to achieve. Nevertheless, the control which he used to exercise seems to-day to have passed to a considerable and perhaps irrecoverable extent from his hands to those of Reouf Bey.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 7807/199/44] No. 138.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 441.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, July 25, 1923.*

THE accompanying copy of a despatch, dated the 16th instant, which I have received from the acting consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the general situation in that area, confirms in so far as Smyrna is concerned, the information already reported to your Lordship regarding the waning popularity of the Kemalist régime, its administrative incapacity and its tolerance of abuse and corruption.

2. Nevertheless, it is too early to say that the Kemalist, or rather Nationalist, position is as yet seriously threatened. Really dangerous opposition may only develop when internal problems have to be faced without being obscured by external issues. The Treaty of Lausanne does not settle all the latter, and hitherto the country has so far succeeded in maintaining an unimpared unity of front against its foreign foes.

3. Thanks to a successful military campaign, followed by a no less successful struggle at the conference table, and aided where necessary by methods of pressure and coercion, the party of Mustafa Kemal has now all but obtained a crowning victory in the elections. Of the 280 odd Deputies of the new Assembly, some 240 have already been elected, and of this number only one is not a member of the Defence of Rights party. No more than 102 of the new Deputies elected so far were, however, members of the old Assembly, so that the true faith of the majority in the new Assembly has yet to be put to the real test.

4. After weeks of delay, the elections in Angora have at last taken place with the unanimous election of Mustafa Kemal at the head of the six Defence of Rights Deputies. As Kemal had already been elected for Smyrna, it is now understood that he will resign the latter mandate and not, as was stated in an earlier report, obtain the permission of the Assembly to represent the two constituencies. The reasons for the great delay in terminating the elections at Angora are obscure. It is, however, of

interest that within the last week a third batch of reliable Constantinople Kemalist policemen has been sent for from Angora and was furnished, though not without some difficulty.

5. One of the most important omissions from the list of the present elected Deputies is the name of Ismet Pasha who, it was announced about a month ago, would be one of the candidates of Malatia. No mention, even of the secondary elections there, has yet been made in the press, but there can be no doubt that they will be concluded in time to permit of the appearance of Ismet Pasha in the Assembly when discussions on the Treaty of Lausanne are commenced.

6. In the eastern provinces and in the Trebizond area little further progress has been reported. At Kharput disturbances appear to have occurred owing to the non-acceptance by the population of the official candidates, but a considerable number of gendarmes and troops were introduced and the elections were terminated, among the successful candidates being Djevad Pasha, the commander on the eastern front. At Trebizond, however, even repressive measures have not yet had the desired effect, as it is announced that the elections there will not be concluded before the middle of August.

7. In the meantime an order concerning army commanders has been issued from Angora which may not be without significance. This is to the effect that officers exercising an army command who have been elected Deputies will only be allowed to participate in the debates of the Assembly after they have resigned their command. It is not for the moment clear whether this order will affect all military officers, of whom thirty-eight have already been elected as Deputies, or only those holding high command. It would, however, appear to apply to such leading officers as Djevad and Fahreddin Pashas and possibly also to Kiazim Kara Bekir and Fevzi Pashas. While it is not yet possible to estimate the reasons actuating this move on the part of the Central Administration, it is not impossible that it may be due to the well-known jealousy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and to his desire, if possible, to eliminate the possibility of any of his probable rivals establishing a simultaneous leadership in both the military and political spheres. The same agency may likewise even have been at work in the case of Ismet Pasha, whose labours at Lausanne, now brought to such a successful conclusion, have not even yet received anything approaching the notice and praise which they have undoubtedly merited.

8. With only one-seventh of the new Assembly remaining to be elected, there would now appear no doubt of the necessary quorum when the Assembly meets on the 2nd August. It may, however, be mentioned that two sometimes well-informed Turkish newspapers yesterday stated that further delay will occur, and that the discussion of the Peace Treaty cannot be entered upon much before the end of August. Although this possibility cannot be altogether ruled out, it is contrary both to the generally accepted view and my own conviction. A certain time will necessarily be occupied by the election of the officials in the new Assembly and by the examination of the credentials of the new Deputies. Thereafter, the position of the Council of Ministers will come up for consideration. They, as your Lordship is aware, hold their positions by virtue of the decisions of the Assembly, to which they are individually responsible. They will, therefore, have to submit themselves for re-election, and in the event of any Minister not obtaining the confidence of the Assembly his place will have to be filled. While allowing for every emergency, however, it is only to be anticipated that the large majority will be re-elected without difficulty. One exception is the Minister of Justice, Rifaat Bey, who some time ago joined the second group in the old Assembly, and as a result failed to secure re-election at Cesarea. It is not improbable that his place will be filled by Assaf Bey, recently elected Deputy for Smyrna, and at present an official in the Ministry of which he may become the head.

9. Even allowing for slight hitches in the accomplishment of the above formalities there is no real justification for imagining that the Assembly will not be in a position to commence its more important labours without undue delay. It is therefore permissible to anticipate that, in the absence of unforeseen circumstances, the Treaty of Lausanne will receive the ratification of the Assembly by the 15th August, or at latest by the 20th August.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 138.

Acting Consul-General Urquhart to Mr. Henderson.

(No. 88.)

Sir, *Smyrna, July* 16, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to report on various matters of political and commercial interest :—

(*a.*) There were considerable rejoicings when the report of a week ago was received to the effect that the Lausanne negotiations had ended satisfactorily. Despondency has again set in with the news of fresh difficulties at the conference. Generally speaking, the Turkish population in this town has lost the arrogance which characterised its behaviour at least until February last. There is much doubting as to the future, politically and economically; here and there are fears of revolt against the present rulers.

(*b.*) The governing machinery at Angora shows signs of overloading; the present centralised system requires reference to Angora on the smallest question, and Angora seems unable to cope with the questions pouring in from all sides. Cases pending in the courts are being postponed from week to week over long periods because Angora has not supplied the necessary papers. Again, persons who go to Angora are able to obtain satisfaction there from officials who may have received the original requests several weeks before through the vilayet here, but who are in too great confusion of work to attend readily to any but personal representations and have accordingly left both telegrams and letters from Smyrna unanswered. Locally, conditions are no better; officials are inefficient, narrow-mindedly Nationalistic, ill-paid and corrupt. They are gradually deserting Government service whenever opportunity offers to serve with a European firm.

(*c.*) Pilferage in the customs-house has reached unheard-of dimensions. One example will show the attitute to property. Messrs. Efraim Cohen and Sons have just lost fifteen bags of rice to the value of 25*l.*; no trace of them can be found; but the customs officials said that there would certainly be more rice coming in soon, from which fifteen bags could be abstracted to compensate Mr. Cohen's company.

(*d.*) I am informed that there have been practically no forward sales of fruit abroad this year, although at this time last year 40 per cent. of the entire crop, or more, was already sold. Shippers consider the future too uncertain for them to place themselves under any obligation to supply fruit even two months hence.

(*e.*) The Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (Limited) are taking steps to convert their company into a Turkish concern. They have elected Rahmi Bey to their board of directors, and he at the same time has been nominated as a Government candidate for the Smyrna district and elected. He will therefore sit in the new Assembly as a Government nominee, although he is of the Union and Progress party originally.

(*f.*) The Government and army are leading a hand-to-mouth existence. Pay is months overdue, especially to the army, and a system of payment by drafts on the Liquidation Commission has been begun in the case of army officers. These drafts are presented at the sales of that commission and goods taken in exchange. Smyrna has accordingly an appearance of continuous *déménagement*, and officers have become traffickers in old furniture. They and their soldiers hang about and make the streets dangerous at night. Most of the men are in rags, while the kit of the officers is becoming very shabby indeed.

One Lieutenant Zeki has just been caught by the police removing a part of the fittings of the old British post-office, into which he had broken.

The Government has sold the old iron in the burnt area, and some 500 men have been brought from Constantinople to collect it, not because there is lack of unemployed here, but because local labour asks too much for its service. I am informed that the importees are making trouble because they consider themselves underpaid relatively to other labourers here.

2. A general survey of conditions in Smyrna gives, therefore, an impression of disintegration and decay to anyone who thinks in Western fashion. It may be that this hesitating limp is the normal stride of the Turkish State, but, if so, its pretensions are the more ridiculous. Dislike of foreigners remains the prominent characteristic of Turkish behaviour, and will continue to be so for as long as the Turk of the interior

remains in power with Angora as his capital; the Turk of the seacoast has more knowledge of affairs, and to that knowledge is proportionate his despondency mentioned in the first paragraph.

I have, &c.
R. W. URQUHART.

[E 7808/199/44] No. 139.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 442.) *Constantinople, July* 25, 1923.

My Lord,

THE last three days have witnessed in Constantinople scenes of universal rejoicing which reached their climax on the receipt of the news of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. By a fortunate coincidence the anniversary of the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908 and the first day of Courban Bairam fell on successive days, and the final touch was added yesterday evening by the telegram announcing the definite signature of peace after thirteen years of practically continuous war.

2. These events have naturally evoked great, and, for once, spontaneous enthusiasm on the part of all the elements of the population. Receptions were held by the leading officials, patriotic speeches were delivered, processions paraded the gaily decorated streets, salutes of guns heralded the arrival of peace, and the voice of criticism was temporarily stilled, while the press rose to the occasion by devoting, yesterday, the greater part of its available space to photographs of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his leading associates, and to drawings representing the sun rising over the new Turkey, whose bonds had been broken, thanks to the magnificent efforts and bravery of the Turkish private soldier and people.

3. The coincidence of dates has also furnished the press with an excellent starting-point for patriotic articles. The Treaty of Lausanne is regarded as the crowning sequel of the revolution of 1908. By the latter Turkey released herself from internal slavery and the absolutism of the Palace, and obtained constitutional rights. By the Treaty of Lausanne she definitely frees herself from the foreign yoke and emerges free and entirely independent. The nation congratulates itself on its leaders and on itself, and regards the sacrifice as worth while. No comparison is, however, made between the greatness of the Turkey of 1908 and that of to-day, doubtless because it is realised that if another phase in the evolution of Turkey were to take place at the same cost, Turkey herself would cease to exist.

4. Ever since the early conclusion of peace became a practical certainty the Turkish press had been busily taking stock of the situation, and it is apparent that the difficulties confronting the new Turkey are fully recognised. Indeed, one begins to trace even a certain apprehension lest these difficulties may in the end be insurmountable. The Kemalist organisation proved to be a formidable weapon in war, but its mettle has yet to be tested in the altogether different sphere of peace, when the previous unity of front can no longer be maintained.

5. Once the treaty is ratified and the Allied evacuation completed, the Turkish house will have to be set in order. For this purpose Turkey will, in spite of her present suspicion of foreign assistance and capital, be obliged to seek financial assistance from abroad. This truth is realised even in official circles and is a factor which is bound to influence the treatment of foreign subjects in Turkey after the departure of the Allied forces.

6. The lot of Turkey's own Christian subjects will, however, for a time at least, be most unenviable. In a country so backward and illiterate as Turkey a slowly and painfully acquired mentality cannot be changed abruptly. The present hostility felt regarding the Ottoman Christians cannot be expected to subside at once, and until it does persecutions and even excesses are to be feared. A certain number of the exiled Christians will doubtless in time be allowed to return in any case to Constantinople, but, even then, so long as the existing veto against the employment of Christians in banks, business houses, railways, &c., is maintained they are likely merely to furnish a means of exploitation for unpaid and corrupt officials. Moreover, a serious and immediate problem is the large number of Armenian refugees at present in Constantinople, who for months have been dependent on their co-religionists here. The funds available are now running low, barracks, &c., previously requisitioned for their accommodation will soon

have to be returned to the Government or to their owners, work is unobtainable, and no foreign country is willing to receive these refugees, even if the means of transport were available. Faced with such a situation and with no hope for the future, it would be scarcely surprising if these and other discontented elements who could doubtless be induced to join them were to create disturbances which will only result in redoubled persecution.

7. Early in August the Kemalist Administration will face an Assembly composod exclusively of its own nominees. It is stated that groups are already beginning to take shape. The Defence of Rights, or Kemalist party, will disappear and will in the future be known as the People's party, the programme of which is under consideration. Rumour is also busy with a so-called Republican party, but this may in practice prove to be merely a wing of the first. The real Opposition will, however, be constituted out of the nucleus formed by the remaining members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who may seek to secure additional popularity by declaring themselves in favour of a fresh reform of the Constitution and even ultimately of the re-establishment of the Sultanate. A movement in the latter direction would in all probability enlist its principal support in the eastern vilayets, and especially Constantinople itself, which, with its population of over one million, contains at least one-sixth of the total population of Turkey.

8. The reform of the Constitution is in point of fact already receiving the consideration of the leaders of the People's party, and all the Turkish newspapers are united in declaring that modifications of the fundamental law are essential. In this connection particular significance may be attached to a leading article in the Kemalist paper "Aksham" of the 22nd instant, in which the writer, after discussing the formation of the People's party and alluding to the need of constitutional reform owing to the defects of the present system, expressed the opinion that the life of the Assembly should not in any case be less than four years, and that the system of a single Chamber was not a suitable form of Government for Turkey. The writer also maintained that the present arrangement of individual responsibility of Ministers would be unworkable under peace-time conditions, and urged that the former system of Cabinet responsibility should be re-established.

9. Debates in the Assembly on questions such as these are likely to be violent, nor will other opportunities for the emergence of an Opposition be lacking. A new judicial system has to be evolved, and the final decision on the future capital of Turkey has yet to be taken. As I have already had the honour to inform your Lordship, present indications point to the maintenance of the capital at Angora for some time to come. Supporters of a return to Constantinople will, however, be numerous, particularly when the memories of the Allied occupation have begun to fade, and this also may bring about a clear-cut issue. Moreover, in the event of its being decided to make Angora or another Anatolian town the permanent capital, the future position of Constantinople and Thrace will become a serious problem.

10. Probably, however, the key of the future lies in the field of foreign politics and, above all, in the policy which will be followed by His Majesty's Government in regard to Turkey. The star of Mustafa Kemal may and probably will set, but the traces left by his movement will be lasting. The independent Turkey of to-day appears before the world free from foreign entanglements. Her aims are in many respects not ignoble, and the history of the future may well record this freedom as one of the greatest achievements of the Nationalist movement. But no country, and certainly not a country in Turkey's position, can remain isolated. She stands at a parting of the ways, and must choose between development on Occidental or on Oriental lines. For various reasons and for the moment Great Britain is the only Western Power whose aid Turkey regards as vital for her, and to whom, after the initial brief period of exultatiou in her new freedom, she will be likely first of all to turn. In my despatch No. 85 of the 6th February last I had the honour to explain at length the reasons which led me to hold the view that it is scarcely less in the interests of Great Britain than of Turkey to ensure friendship between the two countries. In a little while Turkey will seek a helping hand, and by not refusing it Great Britain, without much sacrifice, could secure advantages of a tangible and permanent nature in the East.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 140.

Mr. Bentinck (*No.* 139) *to Mr. Henderson* (*Constantinople*).—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received July* 30.)

(No. 275.) *Athens, July* 30, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.

BRITISH consular agent at Mudros telegraphs panic has broken out at Imbros, where inhabitants are demanding immediate embarkation.

Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs confirm this, but are doing their utmost to calm inhabitants and to persuade them to remain in the island, explaining that nothing can happen at any rate until after ratification of treaty. As many of the inhabitants fought in Asia Minor against Turkey, practically entire population of island [?want]s to leave. In spite of their efforts, Greek authorities do not think that it will be possible to persuade inhabitants to remain in island.

Have you any information?

No. 141.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 1.)

(No. 401.) *Constantinople, August* 1, 1923.
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 236.

Ismet's movements depend largely on progress of his negotiations with Americans. It seems probable that he will, however, in any case, leave Lausanne by end of this week, will stop one or two days in Constantinople, and proceed thence to Smyrna, where he will join Mustafa Kemal, whom he will accompany to Angora.

Chief difficulties in way of American negotiations are in respect of claims and nationality. Turks will not admit either claims or return to Turkey of Armenians, &c., who, having once been Turkish subjects, have become American citizens. Policy of Angora appears to be desire to settle with America generally on same terms as Allies, but to refuse to go further. Turks would have been willing to resume negotiations elsewhere, but American representative warned Ismet that this would be regarded as rupture. Latter is consequently doing utmost to bring matters to conclusion before departing from Lausanne. He has, however, been authorised, if necessary, to go away himself, leaving remainder to maintain contact, or even appoint, if practicable, new delegate to continue negotiations at Lausanne.

This is present position in so far as I am cognisant of it. Ismet has put forward formula for settlement of claims, which has been accepted by Angora, but not by Americans, who have telegraphed to Washington as regards proposal to defer negotiations.

In the meantime, it seems unlikely that Grand National Assembly will meet before 12th August or 15th August, since, in opinion of Kemal, majority would be too slight, if proceedings opened on 2nd August, which was date originally fixed.

[E 7948/7734/44]

No. 142.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Kennard (*Rome*), *No.* 969, *and to Mr. Phipps* (*Paris*), *No.* 2532, mutatis mutandis.

Foreign Office, August 2, 1923.

Sir,

NOW that the Treaty of Peace has been signed by the Allies and Turkey and its ratification by the National Assembly at Angora may be expected in the near future, it becomes necessary to consider the status to be accorded to the Allied representatives in Turkey and also the seat of the respective missions in that country. Before taking a definite decision in the matter, His Majesty's Government will be glad to receive the views of the French, Italian and Japanese Governments on the subject, since it is very desirable that a common policy should be adopted by all, and I request accordingly that you will invite the observations of the Government to which you are accredited.

2. While in pre-war days the position of the Ottoman Empire justified the rank of Ambassador being accorded to her representatives in the capitals of the Great Powers,

the diminished area of the present Turkish State appears no longer to merit such consideration, which would hardly be accorded to any other State on a similar footing. On the other hand, the importance of the rôle which the Allied representatives will inevitably play in Turkey may perhaps be thought to outweigh the above-mentioned objections and to justify the retention of embassies at the Turkish capital.

3. His Majesty's Government are, further, desirous to know whether the Italian Government propose to adopt the usual course on the conclusion of peace with a belligerent, namely, that of opening diplomatic relations through the intermediary of a Chargé d'Affaires whose rank can subsequently be raised to whatever scale of official dignity may be decided upon by the Great Powers in unison. It will probably be thought desirable in any case that the diplomatic missions shall remain at Constantinople rather than at Angora, where local conditions will render it practically impossible, at any rate for some time to come, for the Diplomatic Corps to reside with any degree of dignity or comfort. Should this view be shared by the Allied Governments, His Majesty's Government would propose to have a local representative at Angora, who would be subordinated to the mission at Constantinople, with the object merely of facilitating the conduct of daily intercourse with the Turkish Government, who, it is understood, intend, at any rate at present, to retain the seat of Government in Asia.

4. I shall be glad if you will verbally consult the Government to which you are accredited on the above points and invite their observations at their early convenience.

5. A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, and the matter is also being referred to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo by telegraph.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 143.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 238.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1923.

YOUR despatches Nos. 436 and 445 of 24th and 25th July: Looting of British property in Smyrna.

You should protest strongly, pointing out to the Turkish authorities that it is highly improper for them to take, pending the entry into force of the treaty, any action which would prevent the due execution of articles 65 and 66 of the treaty (which have replaced articles 72 and 73 of the draft treaty). Moreover, it is against their own interests to do so, since, under these articles, such property as can be identified must be restored to its owners, and if the Turks in the interval allow such property to be looted or otherwise disposed of they will not be absolved from their obligations to restore it, but may have to compensate persons holding it when identified.

No. 144.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 3.)

No. 279.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August* 2, 1923.

MY telegrams Nos. 276 and 277.

Imbros representative has called to tell me that whole of Christian population of Tenedos, which, including refugees, now numbers from 6,000 to 7,000, has definitely decided to evacuate. Greek Government are being asked to send transports and to arrange destination.

Imbros inhabitants, numbering from 9,000 to 10,000, will probably follow example, in spite of efforts of Greek Government reported in my telegram No. 275.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 145.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1923.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 275 to 277 of 30th July: Inhabitants of Imbros and Tenedos.

Article 5 of document XV of Lausanne settlement (protocol regarding Karagatch and islands) provides for full and complete amnesty to these people for all political or other crimes and offences committed before 24th July.

Article 4 provides for immediate establishment by Turkey of special administration prescribed by treaty as soon as Greeks evacuate.

M. Veniselos is fully aware of situation, and His Majesty's Government regret that they can take no further action.

[E 8007/52/44]

No. 146.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 583.)
My Lord, *Athens, July* 24, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to my despatch No. 524 of the 2nd July, that his Holiness the Patriarch Meletios IV arrived at Mount Athos on the 12th July on the Greek cruiser "Helle," which had taken him on board at Mitylene from the Khedivial liner "Famaka."

2. I gather that the intention now is that his Holiness should reside in comparative retirement at Mount Athos, leaving the two councils of the Patriarchate at Constantinople to administer the Church and appoint, if necessary, a *locum tenens*. His Holiness, I am told, will not for the present resign, for that might introduce anarchy into the Church and give the Kemalists their long-desired opportunity of suppressing the Patriarchate altogether. Or if the Kemalists did not suppress the Patriarchate, they would presumably thrust upon the Church as Patriarch some impossible tool of their own who would bring the Church into complete discredit.

3. It was undoubtedly advisable that his Holiness should leave Constantinople, for if he were still there, when evacuation took place, his position would be untenable. He is, I understand, so hated by the Turks as a symbol of Greek nationalism that he would have run an excellent chance of becoming a neo-martyr. His election as Patriarch in December 1921 was undoubtedly irregular, but irregularities have occurred before and have been condoned, as had been done in this case by all except the Turks and some renegade Greeks.

4. The position of the Greeks in Constantinople after the withdrawal of the Allied forces will be extremely bad, if, as is reported here, the Kemalists are bent on abolishing Christian minorities in their territories. The Patriarch would have had no power to protect his flock, and any attempt on his part to do so might easily have cost him his life and made a second Smyrna of Constantinople. What the fate of the Patriarchate will be no one can foresee. If the two councils succeed in coming to an arrangement with the Turks and the Turks keep their word, then his Holiness would, I understand, resign, and a Patriarch acceptable both to the Church and to the Turks would be elected. It hardly seems likely in any case that his Holiness will return to Constantinople.

5. According to the latest information reaching me, which is still unconfirmed, his Holiness has sent in his resignation and a mixed committee of clerical and lay members has been appointed to consider the situation and negotiate with the Turks accordingly.

6. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

[E 8009/8009/44]

No. 147.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 586.)
My Lord, *Athens, July* 26, 1923.

THE peace of Lausanne, as might have been expected, has called forth no expressions of joy in this country. On the evening of the 24th instant a Council of Ministers was held, after which Colonel Gonatas, the President, informed the press that as a Government they considered the peace, which was to be signed that day, as "very satisfactory," but as a State they did not think that it should be fêted on account of the reverses which had preceded it. He had, he added, ordered the town of Athens to be illuminated so as to announce the event to the people. Thanksgiving services have been held in Athens and Piræus to-day, and prayers offered to the memory of those who fell on the field of honour. Similar services were to be held throughout Greece. That is all.

2. A decree, demobilising the classes 1919 and 1920, to come into force on the 30th July, was signed by the Prime Minister on the 25th July and published to-day. Nothing has as yet been decided about the classes 1921 and 1922, but it is announced that the different units of the army will be transferred from the front to their peace stations. A certain amount of demobilisation has already started in the fleet.

3. Yesterday morning a telegram was received from M. Veniselos announcing the signature of peace. It was addressed to "Messrs. the President of the Council and the "Chief of the Revolution." "This treaty," M. Veniselos said, "concluded after the Asia "Minor disaster, does not, unfortunately, record a triumph for Greece. But the revolu- "tion may be proud in that by reorganising the national army they have given to their "delegation the means of obtaining an honourable peace which permits Greece to return "to the works of peace and devote herself to the work of internal restoration. If by "free elections, shortly to take place, a definite end is put to civil war; if the regular "functioning of the Constitution is re-established, and the problem of the refugees "solved by their permanent settlement, then Greece may look forward with confidence "to a better future." M. Veniselos concluded by thanking "the Royal Government "and the revolution" for having placed in him their entire confidence and thus enabled him to bring his difficult task to a conclusion. M. Veniselos also sent a telegram to the King, who replied thanking him on behalf of the nation for his eminent services and congratulating him on the results.

4. The newspapers have, on the whole, given expression to a good deal of bitterness against the *Entente* Powers for having surrendered so much in their desire for peace. As regards France, to this bitterness is added contempt at the way in which she has acted behind the backs of her "Allies," and has now been bitten by the scorpion whom she has nursed in her bosom. "France," the "Eleftheros Logos" (organ of the revolution) says, "has need of other statesmen and a return to a policy more in conformity "with her great traditions."

5. "Patris," a supporter of the revolution, is particularly bitter, and observes that the spectacle presented at Lausanne is without precedent in European diplomacy. "Never," it says, "has a vanquished State received a greater moral degradation than "that which Turkey has inflicted on the Allies. . . . The peace of Lausanne will bea "written record of the moral decadence of Europe." "The treaty," it says, "is the "funeral of the great dream of the Hellenic nation, but," it adds, "we must not despair. "The country has during the last ten months proved that Hellenism is eternal. One "day the sun of Ionia will shine upon the bayonets of Greeks warriors. The Hellenic "ideal has received a serious wound, but it is not dead" It draws attention to the prime necessity of consolidating friendly relations with the other Balkan peoples.

5. According to the "Eleftheron Vima" (Veniselist), the principal Greek newspaper, Greece is under no obligation to the Allies for their support in the question of reparations, for she asked several times to be allowed to settle this question by means of her own forces. "The Greek people," it says, "received the announcement of peace with "bitterness. . . . At any rate, peace will give tranquillity to the country and permit "the people to busy themselves with settling their internal questions. Greek history," it adds, "must not record a second Lausanne."

6. "Eleftheros Typos" (Veniselist), says, "the humiliating situation of the Allies "becomes despairing owing to the dangers which their attitude has produced." "Hestia" (Veniselist, and which has, during the many years of its existence, been the most

pro-British of all Greek newspapers), calls the peace "a great defeat for the Allies "even than for Greece."

7. "Politeia" (anti-Veniselist, anti-Metaxas, and one of the most moderate of the Greek newspapers) says: "The Conference of Lausanne will remain in history as the "saddest of all conferences. If the announcement of peace produces little enthusiasm "in England, the reflections which it will call forth in the other Allied countries will "perhaps be even more disagreeable. Greece paid very dearly for the prolongation of "the state of suspense after her differences with Turkey had been settled. Nevertheless, "solidarity has been produced among the Balkan States, and this is not destined to "disappear after the conference. On the contrary, the bases have been established of a "closer Balkan collaboration which will consolidate the peace of the East. Greece," it proceeds, "was abandoned on the morrow of the Treaty of Sèvres by those who a few "months previously had touched the human conscience by promises to protect small "peoples. . . . These peoples, however, were mere pawns in the large game of chess "of the Allied Powers in whose interests they were exploited." "Politeia" ends by an appeal for internal peace in order that Greece may prosper. "Embros" (now a moderate independent newspaper, which usually adapts its opinion to the needs of the moment) calls for national unity at all costs.

8. "Kathemerine" (Metaxas) points out that this treaty terminates four wars. "Greece," it says, "has paid dearly for the peace at the end of more than one hundred "battles, and of over twelve years of warfare." "Chronos" (Metaxas) says that it is not Greece alone who has been defeated at Lausanne—it is first and foremost the Allies who have been vanquished.

9. The views expressed by private Greek individuals to people of my acquaintance are all much on the same lines as the above.

10. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

[E 8004/199/44] No. 148.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August 7.*)

(No. 457.) *Constantinople, July 31, 1923.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the meeting of the new Turkish Assembly, originally fixed for the 2nd August, appears now to have been definitely postponed. I gather from statements in the press, as well as information received from other sources, that this postponement will be for not less than ten days to a fortnight, and may be for an even longer period.

2. The reasons for this delay, in view of the long-cherished and frequently expressed desire of the Turks to rid themselves at the earliest possible date of the Allied forces of occupation, are somewhat difficult to estimate, unless it be that the Government feels, despite its unprincipled efforts during the elections, still insecure of its majority. Ismet Pasha himself has, of course, been detained at Lausanne by the present Turco-American negotiations, but, as far as I am aware, this has not influenced the decision to postpone the meeting of the Assembly.

3. It cannot be held that an insufficient number of Deputies have been elected to constitute a quorum, as the elections are now almost completed. In all, over 260 Deputies have now been returned, the results announced during the past week including those from such centres of trouble as Erzeroum and Diarbekr, where Feizi Bey, Minister of Public Works, found ultimately no difficulty in securing election. Ismet Pasha has now likewise been returned at the head of the five Deputies for Malatia. Of the more important centres where the elections have not yet been concluded there remain therefore only Trebizond, Samsoun, and Kerassund.

4. Official circles here are inclined to ascribe the delay in the meeting of the Assembly to the fact that many of the Deputies, having only recently been elected, have been unable to start for Angora in spite of the urgent "whip" stated to have been issued to them ten days ago. As, however, few of the Deputies have, in fact, visited their constituencies during the elections, and as a number of them have been for some time in Constantinople, from which, for Turks, Angora is now only twenty-four hours distant by rail, this excuse carries little conviction. Reports regarding conditions

in Angora go further, in my opinion, to explain the reluctance of the Deputies to proceed thither before they are absolutely compelled to do so.

5. Nevertheless, approximately half of the Deputies are reported to have already arrived at Angora, where the question of their accommodation is again giving rise to great difficulty. Among these, according to information which I have received from a sometimes well-informed source, an opposition is already beginning to take shape. This opposition, which so far consists of some thirty Deputies, will, it is stated, take the name of the "Sultanate party," and will demand the abolition of the law whereby monarchist activities are considered as high treason and punishable accordingly.

6. The rumours in regard to the uncertainty of the situation at Angora have been aggravated by the fact that Mustafa Kemal, Fevzi and Kiazim Karabekir Pashas, accompanied by other Ministers, left suddenly a week ago for Smyrna, that Reouf Bey will in a few days commence a provincial tour extending over a fortnight, and that a fourth batch of fifteen reliable Constantinople policemen has been asked for from Angora. The journey of Mustafa Kemal was even, according to an unconfirmed report from Smyrna, attributed to hostile military demonstrations in Angora. It is now announced, however, that Mustafa Kemal is in need of treatment at the hot baths near Smyrna, and that he will not return to the capital before the 10th August, when it is hoped that he will do so in the company of Ismet Pasha who will proceed to Smyrna after a short stay in Constantinople.

7. Meanwhile there are indications that even the election of the Council of Ministers, which will take place immediately after the opening of the Assembly, will give rise to no little discussion. The defects of the present Constitution and methods of administration are now the subject of general criticism in the Constantinople press, and opinion is definitely hardening in favour of the collective as opposed to the individual responsibility of Ministers to the Assembly.

8. In view of this and other considerations, it is difficult to fix any date by which the treaty is likely to be ratified by the Assembly. Official circles here relegate ratification to the closing days of August, and, if I myself incline to concur in this view, I only do so because I feel that the present Government is still strong enough for the time being to hold the embryo opposition in check, and that the really serious onslaught on the present Government will only develop when the treaty has been ratified, the Allied forces withdrawn and Turkey left to her own resources.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 149.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August 7.*)

(No. 405.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 7, 1923.*

AMERICAN Near East Relief has announced intention of ceasing after 15th August to ration Ottoman Greek refugees in Constantinople and Black Sea ports. Approximate figures are 14,000 and 20,000 respectively.

Greek Government has, I understand, declared that it cannot admit these refugees to Greece until Exchange of Populations Convention comes into force and thereby provides room for them. Nor can Greek Government with its present burden of refugees undertake meantime to feed refugees outside Greek territory.

I am expecting communication from Spanish Legation begging that High Commissioners request Turkish Government, as legally responsible, to assume charge of those refugees. I shall of course invite my colleagues to join me in demand that Turkish Government accept this charge. At the same time, it is unlikely that Turks will do so. Even if they promised to do so, fate of refugees would be unenviable. If it be impossible for Greece to receive even those refugees already in Constantinople, would it be possible to induce Near East Relief to continue present humanitarian task, if necessary, under guarantee from League of Nations, to which appeal might be made for assistance?

(Repeated to Athens, No. 88.)

[E 8081/7734/44] No. 150.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 1864.)
Paris, August 7, 1923.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1855 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a letter from M. de Peretti de la Rocca respecting the status to be accorded to the Allied representatives in Turkey and the seat of the respective missions in that country.

The French Government consider that, in view of the importance of the affairs with which the Allied representatives in Turkey will have to deal, it would be highly desirable that they should have the rank of Ambassadors.

The French Government agree that, for the present at any rate, the foreign diplomatic missions should remain at Constantinople, a subordinate local representative being retained at Angora or wherever the seat of the Turkish Government may be; they agree that diplomatic relations should be opened through the intermediary of a Chargé d'Affaires, who should, however, be replaced by the Ambassador after an interval of a few weeks. The French Government contemplate appointing, when the time comes, their Acting High Commissioner to be Chargé d'Affaires, pending the return of General Pellé.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure in No. 150.

M. de Peretti de la Rocca to Mr. Phipps.

Paris, le 6 août 1923.

Mon cher Ministre,

M. POINCARÉ, à qui j'avais rapporté notre conversation d'avant-hier au sujet de la représentation des grandes Puissances à Constantinople après la mise en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne, me dit qu'il approuve les réponses que je vous ai faites à titre onnel sur les différents points envisagés.

Je m'empresse de vous en faire part.

Croyez, &c.
E. DE PERETTI DE LA ROCCA.

No. 151.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 406.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 7, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 403.

Ismet Pasha, who signed agreement with Americans yesterday, left Lausanne to-day and is due here 10th August. He will stop at Constantinople till 12th August.

I shall see him on 10th August. Is there any question which you would like discussed with him?

No. 152.

Mr. Henderson (*No.* 89) *to Mr. Bentinck* (*Athens*).—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received August* 8.)

(No. 407.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August 8, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 405 to Foreign Office.

I raised question of these Ottoman Greek refugees with Adnan yesterday. He declared very categorically that whatever the moral or other obligations might be, Turkey was materially incapable of undertaking the task of feeding them. Turkish authorities here had no money and the Assembly would never vote credit for this purpose.

I fear that this is a fact which must be faced and which it is useless to try and get round. The best course would therefore be for Greek Government to do its utmost to persuade Near East Relief to continue feeding these refugees for further period of, say, one month, within which the Greek Government might guarantee to arrange for their accommodation in Greece.

No. 153.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Chilton (*Washington*).

(No. 256.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 8, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 76 of 3rd August to Tokyo, repeated to you to-day: Status of diplomatic representatives in Turkey.

Please make similar enquiry *mutatis mutandis* of United States Government, modifying paragraph 3 where reference is made to conclusion of peace.

No. 154.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 242.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 8, 1923.*

YOUR despatch No. 450 of 30th July: Withdrawal of Allied warships from Smyrna.

I agree with your views in paragraph 4.

As soon as your Allied colleagues are similarly instructed, will you therefore inform the Turkish authorities verbally and informally that His Majesty's Government propose to withdraw cruiser at Smyrna when and as other warships are withdrawn from Turkish waters under arrangements made at Lausanne.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 298; and Rome, No. 211.)

No. 155.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (*No.* 299) *and Rome* (*No.* 212).

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August 8, 1923.*

MY telegram No. 242 to Constantinople of 8th August: Withdrawal of Allied warships from Smyrna.

Please inform Government to which you are accredited of instructions sent to Mr. Henderson, and urge them similarly to instruct their representative at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 243.)

No. 156.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 284.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August 8, 1923.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 405.

Ministry of Relief informs me that Greek Government have just arranged to transport 7,500 more refugees from Constantinople to Greece on 15th August on the understanding that remaining refugees, who number about 20,000, shall be allowed to remain where they are for the present and continue to be maintained by Near East Relief.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 148.)

No. 157.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 245.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 405 of 7th August: Refugees.

In view of inability of His Majesty's Government to make any further financial contribution to Near East Relief, it would be impossible for them to make any effective appeal to American Near East Relief or even to suggest to League of Nations desirability of guaranteeing any further expenditure which Near East Relief might be induced to make. Possibly an appeal by yourself to the Near East Relief might be more likely to be effective than appeal by His Majesty's Government.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 130.)

No. 158.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 246.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 406 of 7th August: Ismet Pasha.

If suitable opportunity presents itself, it would be well that you should mention, incidentally and without laying undue emphasis on the matter, our intention of withdrawing cruiser from Smyrna on ratification by Angora. This is on the supposition that the Allies will have agreed (see my telegram No. 242 of 8th August) before you see Ismet.

You should also impress on him the Turkish responsibilities in respect of the refugees in Constantinople and the Black Sea ports. Local matters, of which you and General Harington can alone be the judges, might also be raised.

No. 159.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 409.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 11, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 246.

My Allied colleagues being without instructions, I was unable to refer to Smyrna warship.

(R.) I raised with Ismet the question of Ottoman Greek refugees, and though he would not commit himself he promised to see what could be done with a view to alleviating their lot.

Ismet seemed genuinely anxious that evacuation should take place without incident in order that final impression on both sides might be good. I told him that we all shared this desire, that the last phase if satisfactory might have decisive effect on future relations, and that the Turks would therefore be well advised to refrain from any excessive demands.

He told me that he would submit treaty to Assembly within a few days of his return to Angora, and gave me the impression that the Assembly would ratify by 25th August at the latest. He expressed the hope that the Powers, especially Great Britain, would also ratify as soon as possible, and hinted that Turkey would judge of her own friends by their readiness in this respect.

Ismet enquired particularly after your health. I gave him a friendly message from you and he begged me to thank you and to convey to you expression of his sincere regard. (End of R.)

No. 160.

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 346.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Washington, August* 11, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 256.

Secretary of State, of whom I enquired to-day, said that nomination of representative rests with President, whom he must consult. Meanwhile, he could not express definite opinion, but he thought that there should be no difficulty in common action with Allied Governments on both points. He would be glad to learn confidentially views of His Majesty's Government as to status, and what State or States they had in mind for possible inclusion with Turkish territory under the same diplomatic representative. He saw no objection to the resumption of diplomatic relations by Chargés d'Affaires.

As regards place of residence he presumed that Constantinople would be the ultimate seat of the Turkish Government, but thought that while it was still at Angora, idea of local representative there subordinate to representative at Constantinople would be feasible unless character of questions to be discussed rendered presence of high diplomatic officials at Angora essential.

No. 161.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 412.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, August* 12, 1923.

FOLLOWING is identic telegram from three High Commissioners:—

"Enemy banks at Constantinople were occupied and controlled by Allied "military authorities in January 1919. Later, control passed to High Commissioners. "It has continued in accordance with instructions given by Allied Governments in "October 1919, under which decision regarding eventual liquidation of enemy banks "was deferred until conclusion of treaty with Turkey. Only Brusa and Adrianople "branches were closed.

"We are doubtful whether article 72 of treaty gives Allied Governments power "to proceed to-day to closing down and liquidation of Deutsche Bank and Deutsche "Orient Bank, the only enemy banks remaining at Constantinople, of which we hold "duplicate keys for purposes of control. But in view of importance which applica-"tion of this measure before entry into force of treaty would have from point of view "of Allied banks we feel bound to draw attention to this question and request "instructions."

[**E 8246/343/44**] No. 162.

Mr. Codrington to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 260. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Tangier, August* 2, 1923.

IN accordance with your Lordship's telegram No. 14 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that educated Moors and those others to whom news from the outer world filters through recognise the deposition of the ex-Sultan of Turkey and the appointment as valid, both having been carried out, as they see it, regularly and with the consent of the nation.

2. Instructed Moors, when spoken to of a Caliph, almost invariably enquire what is meant by that term, as in their view there have only been four Caliphs of Islam who were the immediate successors of Mahommed. On the death of the last of these they consider that the Caliphate became extinct, and they in the past have always considered the claims made by the Ottoman dynasty to that title irregular, it having been obtained by conquest, but as no particular concern of theirs so long as those Sultans did not attempt in any way to interfere with Morocco.

3. I understand that the few isolated attempts made in the past by various Sultans of Turkey to bring Morocco more or less into their orbit were invariably repulsed.

4. Prayers are consequently not offered up in any mosques in Morocco on behalf of any Caliph.

5. In the subdued portions of the French zone the name of the Sultan of Morocco is mentioned in the Friday prayers, but this is probably now, since the establishment of the French protectorate, purely perfunctory and a matter of form.

6. In connection with this matter it may be of interest to report to your Lordship the subject of a short conversation held recently by Mr. Irwin with a high Moorish official, which I give in his own words :—

"During our conversation I referred to the recent changes in Turkey, and "asked what their effect was on Mahommedan opinion in this country.

"He replied that, although the Moors were naturally gratified at a Moslem "Power retaining its independence, the action of the Angora Government in "promulgating decrees which, in their opinion, are directly contrary to the "principles of the Islamic faith had caused a great revulsion of feeling amongst "them, and he particularly cited those permitting Mahommedan women to go "unveiled and their admission as members of the Angora Assembly.

"As a result of these measures, which are regarded by pious Moslems as "sapping the very foundations of Islam, he informed me that a schism in Islam is "imminent, and that shortly a union would take place embracing Morocco, "Algeria, Tunis and India, by which their total disagreement with the action "taken at Angora would be made manifest. He added that Afghanistan is "following Angora, and that soon those two nations would find themselves "isolated.

"When our conversation had reached this point we were unfortunately "interrupted, but I propose to take an early opportunity to carry it a step further "and endeavour to find out more about this matter, and I trust that my informant "will be in an equally communicative frame of mind as he was on this occasion."

I have, &c.
WILLIAM CODRINGTON.

[E 8237/7158/44] No. 163.

Mr. Dormer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 101.)
My Lord, *Palazzo Borghese, Rome, August* 4, 1923.

THE Cardinal Secretary of State informed me this morning that M. Jonnart, on the instructions of the French Government, had told him that they considered the French protectorate of Catholics in the East as in no way affected by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Cardinal had replied that, not having seen the treaty, he could not express any opinion; but that if M. Poincaré's statement held good it meant that either the capitulations had not been abolished under the treaty or else that the other Powers had expressly agreed to the French protectorate in one of the clauses. If, however, there was no such clause and the treaty contained a provision under which the capitulations were abolished, it was evident that the French protectorate which rested on the capitulations automatically lapsed; and the French Government under the Law of Nations would have no more right to claim the protectorate of, say, British or Italian subjects in Turkey than they would for instance in Italy. The point was clear and admitted of no argument to the contrary.

To these observations the French Ambassador had replied that he would inform his Government.

I have, &c.
CECIL DORMER.

[E 8229/199/44] No. 164.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 464.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 7, 1923.

I HAD the honour, in my telegram No. 403 of the 3rd August, to inform your Lordship that the meeting of the new National Assembly had been deferred till the 11th instant.

2. Only some sixty Deputies attended the Assembly on the 2nd August, the date originally fixed for the opening, although over 100 of the new Deputies were actually in Angora at the time. Of these sixty, nearly half were old Deputies who had not secured re-election. Ali Fouad Pasha, the Vice-President of the Assembly, acting doubtless under the orders of the Government, thereupon announced the above postponement. There is, however, still some doubt as to whether the Assembly will actually meet on Saturday next. Reouf Bey, President of the Council of Ministers, has gone to Sivas, his old constituency, for a rest, while Ismet Pasha, who leaves Lausanne to-day, is not due to arrive at Angora till the 13th. It is possible, therefore, that the day of opening may yet be postponed for a few days after the 11th.

3. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who returned unexpectedly to Angora from Smyrna on the 2nd instant, has, however, lost no time in getting in touch with the new Deputies. Several meetings with them have already taken place, and great importance is attached by the press to a final one to be held to-morrow, when the programme of the Popular party for the coming session will be definitely decided upon. Apparently the chief point in the programme will be the reform of the Constitution in a manner which will make it more suitable for an established Administration and for peace conditions. Intelligent forecasts of these reforms are so unanimous as to make it appear that their nature has already been agreed upon. The attacks in the Constantinople press on the abuse, corruption and incapacity of the whole administrative machinery have, however, become so bitter and so general that lively and prolonged debates must be expected when the constitutional question is ultimately raised in the Assembly. The realisation of this is doubtless responsible for a proposal now put forward that the discussion of the Treaty of Lausanne should be the first duty of the new Assembly, and that, pending its ratification, the present Ministers should remain in power under their mandate from the old Assembly, the argument being that they are responsible for the treaty and must likewise be responsible for its ratification. In this manner evacuation would be hastened and the Assembly would be left free to expend its energies later over the constitutional issue, with which the question of the future capital of Turkey may well be linked.

4. There are so many unknown quantities in the situation that no forecast may be made with any degree of certainty. One of these is the future of Mustafa Kemal himself. By the decision of the first Assembly, his appointment as generalissimo of the Turkish armies was to cease with the signature of peace, and it is now understood that no measures will be taken to secure its renewal. As Reouf Bey will presumably again be President of the Council of Ministers, the presidency of the Assembly alone remains to Mustafa Kemal. Such a post, unless it carries with it supreme power over the head of the Cabinet Council and a position somewhat analogous to that of the president of a republic, may scarcely satisfy the ambition of the Ghazi Pasha.

6. The attitude of the army is likely to prove the key of the internal situation. There are indications of considerable disaffection among the officers, and the Government has been at pains to minimise their interference in the political field. It now appears that the order, to which I referred in my despatch No. 441 of the 25th ultimo, against officers on the active list being at the same time Deputies is directed more against the junior than the senior grades, as it has been announced that Deputies who are commanders of armies and corps may continue their military duties provided the consent of the Assembly is obtained. This exception may be due at least in part to the reluctance of Mustafa Kemal to drive all the army leaders into opposition, and has probably been all the more readily made because the two leading Opposition generals, Nureddin and Ali Ihsan Pashas, have failed to secure election as Deputies.

7. It is improbable that these and other less-known leaders of the military party will accept defeat without a struggle. At Konia an organisation, known as the Ittihad Zabitan, or officers' union, has been formed with the primary object of protecting the rights of the officers who are dissatisfied with their treatment at the hands of the Government. Nureddin, Ali Ihsan and Mersinali Djemal Pashas and other officers of

high rank who are in opposition to Mustafa Kemal are said to have become members of this union, which is reported to have the support of other influential Opposition elements.

8 After so many years of almost continuous war there must be a considerable military class which sees no prospect of a livelihood except through the establishment of a military dictatorship. I think that there is no doubt that the situation in this respect is causing the Government some anxiety. The "Tanin" of the 1st instant reported, for instance, that the question occupying the Government to the exclusion of all others was the claims made by the reserve and regular officers, and that representatives from the Army Corps and from the vilayets as well as many demobilised officers were arriving daily at Angora to press their claims. If this be true, the situation envisaged in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 366 of the 20th June may now be developing, but it remains to be seen what steps will be taken by Mustafa Kemal with his undoubted talents for readjustment to deal with the opposition of the instrument which he himself created.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 165.

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August* 12, 1923.

YOUR despatch No. 969.

Italian Government are inclined to appoint Ambassador, but will give me their official views later.

It is probable that Montagna will be their representative.

No. 166.

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 15.)

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August* 14, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 213.

Jordanski is to sign Straits Convention on behalf of Russia here this afternoon. Copy which he will sign is original signed by the Allies and Turks at Lausanne and forwarded to Ministry for Foreign Affairs by secretary-general of the conference.

No. 167.

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 15.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August* 15, 1923.

MY telegram No. 153.

Jordanski signed yesterday after producing full power. Copy signed, which I have seen this morning, is original of convention, and Jordanski has signed in place left blank above Ismet's signature. Italian Government are now sending [? copy] to Paris for deposit in accordance with [? its last paragraph]. Secretary-general of conference will notify signatory [? countries] officially.

No. 168.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 15.)

(No. 414.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 15, 1923.

MY telegram No. 408.

In new Cabinet constituted yesterday Fethi replaces Reouf Bey as President of the Council. Only other change is appointment of Seid Bey as Minister of Justice.

[E 8340/7899/44]

No. 169.

Traités signés entre les États-Unis d'Amérique et la Turquie le 6 *Août* 1923, *à Lausanne.*—(*Communicated by United States Embassy, August* 16.)

LES États-Unis d'Amérique et la Turquie animés d'un égal désir de régler les conditions d'établissement de leurs ressortissants sur leur territoire respectif, et de rétablir leurs relations consulaires et commerciales, conformément aux principes du droit des gens et sur la base d'une parfaite réciprocité, ont résolu de conclure, à cet effet, un traité, et ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président des États-Unis d'Amérique :

Joseph C. Grew, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire des États-Unis d'Amérique auprès de la Confédération suisse,

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie :

Ismet Pacha, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, Député d'Andrinople à la même Assemblée,

Le Dr. Riza Nour Bey, Ministre des Affaires sanitaires et de l'Assistance sociale du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, Député de Sinope à la même Assemblée, et

Hassan Bey, ancien Ministre de l'Economie nationale du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, Député de Trébizonde à la même Assemblée ;

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à recevoir sur son territoire les agents diplomatiques de l'autre partie ; il leur sera accordé, à charge de réciprocité, un traitement aussi favorable que celui qui est ou sera accordé aux agents diplomatiques de tout autre pays conformément aux principes du droit des gens.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes déclarent complètement abrogées les Capitulations concernant le régime des étrangers en Turquie tant au point de vue des conditions d'accès et de séjour qu'au point de vue fiscal et judiciaire, ainsi que le système économique et financier résultant des Capitulations.

ARTICLE 3.

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, entière liberté d'accès et d'établissement et pourront, en conséquence, aller, venir et y séjourner, en se conformant aux lois et règlements en vigueur dans le pays.

Ils jouiront, dans les conditions imposées aux ressortissants du pays, de la plus constante protection et sécurité pour leurs biens et leurs personnes conformément au droit commun international.

Ils pourront, conformément aux lois et règlements en vigueur, se livrer, sans entraves à tout genre de profession, d'industrie ou de commerce qui ne sont pas défendus par les lois locales à tous les étrangers.

Ils auront conformément aux dispositions légales en vigueur dans le pays, à l'égal des nationaux, le droit d'acquérir, de posséder et de disposer de toutes sortes

de biens mobiliers. En ce qui concerne l'acquisition, la possession et la disposition des biens immobiliers, les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes jouiront, à charge de réciprocité, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, du traitement accordé généralement aux étrangers par les lois de la situation des dits biens; en conséquence, ils pourront être propriétaire, locataire, et auront le droit de construire des immeubles, s'en servir comme résidence ou pour tout autre but permis par le présent traité; ils pourront également employer des agents de leur choix et faire tout ce qui se rapporte ou est nécessaire à la jouissance de l'un quelconque des droits précités.

En se conformant aux lois et règlements locaux, ils jouiront d'entière liberté de conscience et de culte et auront libre accès aux tribunaux du pays aussi bien pour la poursuite que pour la défense de leurs droits dans tous les degrés de juridiction établis par la loi.

En outre, ils ne seront pas privés de leurs biens sans procédure régulière de la loi ni sans juste indemnité.

ARTICLE 4.

Les sociétés en commandite ou autres sociétés et associations commerciales, industrielles et financières (y compris les sociétés de transport ou d'assurance) constituées conformément aux lois des États-Unis ou de la Turquie, sur leur territoire respectif, et qui ont leur siège central dans le pays où elles sont constituées, seront reconnues par l'autre pays, à condition qu'elles ne poursuivent pas des buts contraires aux lois de ce pays. Elles auront droit à la même protection et à la même sécurité que celles accordées par l'article 3 aux ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes sur le territoire de l'autre partie. En se conformant aux lois applicables en la matière, elles jouiront de la liberté d'accès aux tribunaux, aussi bien pour la poursuite que pour la défense de leurs droits et dans tous les degrés de juridiction établis par la loi.

Les sociétés et associations susmentionnées auront, conformément aux dispositions légales en vigueur dans le pays, le droit d'acquérir, de posséder et de disposer de toute sorte de biens mobiliers. En ce qui concerne l'acquisition, la possession et la disposition de biens immobiliers, ainsi que la faculté de se livrer aux divers genres de commerce et d'industrie, les sociétés et associations susvisées, ressortissantes de l'une des hautes parties contractantes, jouiront, à charge de réciprocité, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, du traitement accordé généralement aux sociétés semblables étrangères par les lois locales. Il est entendu que les sociétés et associations en question pourront effectuer librement leurs opérations sous réserve de l'observation des dispositions d'ordre public.

ARTICLE 5.

Les visites domiciliaires et les perquisitions dans les habitations, entrepôts, usines, magasins et autres immeubles occupés par les ressortissants, sociétés ou associations visés aux articles 3 et 4, de chacune des hautes parties contractantes sur le territoire de l'autre partie, ainsi que l'examen ou inspection des livres, papiers ou comptes dans ces immeubles ou locaux ne pourront être effectués que dans les conditions et formes prescrites par les lois, règlements et ordonnances à l'égard des ressortissants du pays.

ARTICLE 6.

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes ne seront pas soumis, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, au service militaire obligatoire, sur terre ou sur mer, et seront exempts de toute contribution remplaçant le service militaire.

Aucun emprunt forcé ou autre prélèvement exceptionnel sur la fortune ne seront imposés, même en cas de guerre, aux ressortissants de l'une des hautes parties contractantes, établis ou exerçant leur activité sur le territoire de l'autre partie, et à leurs biens, droits, et intérêts situés sur le territoire de cette partie, ainsi qu'aux sociétés, filiales, succursales, ou agences constituées sous la loi de l'une des hautes parties contractantes et établies ou exerçant leur activité sur le territoire de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 7.

En tout ce qui concerne l'imposition et la perception de taxes, impôts et charges de quelque nature que ce soit, et l'exonération de tels taxes, impôts et charges, il sera accordé aux ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes, demeurant ou se trouvant sur le territoire de l'autre partie, le même traitement que les nationaux.

En ce qui concerne l'imposition et la perception de taxes, impôts et charges de toute espèce et relativement à l'exonération de tels taxes, impôts et charges, les sociétés ou associations visées à l'article 4, qui ont leur siège central sur le territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes et qui effectuent leurs opérations sur le territoire de l'autre partie, jouiront, sous condition de réciprocité, du même traitement que toute société ou association semblable étrangère.

Il est, toutefois, entendu que les dispositions de cet article ne peuvent être invoquées pour demander le bénéfice de l'exonération de droits qui est accordée aux établissements fondés par l'État ou concessionnaires d'un service public.

ARTICLE 8.

En matière de statut personnel et de droit de famille (y compris toutes questions concernant le mariage, les régimes matrimoniaux, le divorce, la séparation de corps, la dot, la paternité, la filiation, l'adoption, la capacité des personnes, la majorité, la tutelle, la curatelle et l'interdiction), et en matières mobilières, le droit de succession testamentaire ou *ab intestat*, partages et liquidations, les ressortissants non musulmans des États-Unis d'Amérique en Turquie seront soumis exclusivement à la juridiction des tribunaux nationaux ou autres autorités nationales des États-Unis ou de l'État, territoire ou possession compétent des États-Unis siégeant en dehors de la Turquie.

La présente disposition ne porte pas atteinte aux attributions spéciales des consuls en matière d'état civil d'après le droit international ou les accords particuliers qui pourront intervenir, non plus qu'au droit des tribunaux turcs de requérir et recevoir les preuves relatives aux questions reconnues ci-dessus comme étant de la compétence des tribunaux nationaux ou autres autorités nationales des parties en cause.

Par dérogation à l'alinéa premier, les tribunaux turcs pourront également être compétents dans les questions visées au dit alinéa, si toutes les parties en cause se soumettent par écrit à la juridiction de ces tribunaux, lesquels statueront d'après la loi nationale des parties.

Toutes les questions de compétence judiciaire seront, sous réserve des dispostions précitées, réglées conformément aux principes du droit international.

ARTICLE 9.

Il existera, entre les territoires des hautes parties contractantes, liberté de commerce et de navigation. Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes, à l'égal de ceux de la nation la plus favorisée, pourront librement venir avec leurs navires et cargaisons dans tous les lieux, ports et eaux situés dans les limites territoriales de l'autre partie et qui sont ouverts au commerce et à la navigation étrangers. Aucune disposition du présent Traité ne sera interprétée comme restreignant le droit de l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes d'établir dans les conditions qu'elle jugera utiles, des interdictions ou restrictions de nature sanitaire destinées à protéger la vie humaine, animale ou végétale, ainsi que des règlements pour l'exécution des lois de police et de douane.

Il sera permis aux navires marchands, ou autres navires qui sont propriété privée, battant le pavillon de l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes, de décharger des portions de leur cargaison dans n'importe quel port ouvert au commerce étranger dans le territoire de l'autre haute partie contractante, et de continuer leur voyage avec le restant de leur cargaison à destination de n'importe quel autre port du même territoire, ouvert au commerce étranger, sans payer, dans ce cas, des droits de tonnage ou de port autres ou plus élevés que ceux que paieraient les navires nationaux dans les mêmes circonstances; il leur sera permis, de même, de charger à différents ports au cours du même voyage d'aller, étant entendu, toutefois, que le cabotage dans les eaux des hautes parties contractantes n'est pas visé par les dispositions de cet article ni par toute autre disposition du présent traité, le dit cabotage devant être réglé conformément aux lois de chacune des hautes parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 10.

Les navires et aéronefs de commerce et les navires et aéronefs de guerre des États-Unis d'Amérique jouiront de la complète liberté de navigation et de passage dans les Détroits des Dardanelles, la Mer de Marmara et le Bosphore, à l'égal des

navires et aéronefs similaires de la nation étrangère la plus favorisée en se conformant aux règles relatives à cette navigation et à ce passage, et établies par la Convention des Détroits signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923.

ARTICLE 11.

Il ne sera imposé à l'importation, dans les territoires de l'une des hautes parties contractantes, de quelque article que ce soit d'origine et de provenance, de produit ou de fabrication du territoire de l'autre partie, aucun droit autre ou plus élevé que ceux qui sont ou seront à l'avenir imposés aux mêmes articles de la nation la plus favorisée. De même, aucun droit autre ou plus élevé ne sera imposé, dans le territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes, à l'exportation de quelque article que ce soit à destination du territoire de l'autre partie, que ceux qui sont ou seront à l'avenir imposés à l'exportation des mêmes articles à destination de n'importe quel autre pays étranger. Aucune interdiction, restriction ou condition quelconque ne sera non plus imposée sur l'importation ou l'exportation de quelque article que ce soit d'origine et de provenance, de produit ou de fabrication du territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes à destination ou en provenance du territoire de l'autre partie, sans être également appliquée aux articles similaires de la nation la plus favorisée.

En ce qui concerne le montant et la perception des droits d'importation ou d'exportation de toute espèce, chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à faire bénéficier les navires et marchandises de l'autre partie de toute faveur et facilité qui sont ou seront accordées aux navires et marchandises d'un Etat tiers, et sans prendre en considération si elles sont accordées à l'Etat en question gratuitement ou en retour d'un traitement réciproque compensatoire. Chacune des dites faveurs et facilités qui sera à l'avenir accordée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes aux navires ou marchandises d'un Etat tiers, sera simultanément et sans conditions, demande ou compensation, accordée également aux navires et marchandises de l'autre partie.

Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas au traitement qui est accordé par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique au commerce de Cuba, en vertu des dispositions de la Convention commerciale conclue entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et Cuba le 11 décembre 1902, ou qui sera accordé en vertu de toute autre convention commerciale à conclure à l'avenir, entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et Cuba, ainsi qu'au commerce des Etats-Unis d'Amérique avec l'une quelconque de ses dépendances ou avec la Zone du Canal de Panama, d'après les lois existantes ou futures.

De même, les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas aux avantages et faveurs spéciaux en matière de tarif douanier ou généralement en toute autre matière commerciale, existant ou à établir dans l'avenir entre la Turquie et les pays qui se sont détachés de l'Empire ottoman à la suite de la guerre de 1914 ainsi qu'au trafic frontière avec un Etat limitrophe de la Turquie.

ARTICLE 12.

En ce qui concerne l'imposition et la perception des droits de consommation ou d'accise et les droits d'octroi, ou toute autre taxe perçue par les autorités locales, il sera accordé, sous condition de réciprocité, aux marchandises originaires et en provenance de l'une des hautes parties contractantes sur le territoire de l'autre partie, un traitement aussi favorable que celui qui est ou sera accordé aux marchandises identiques ou similaires de la nation la plus favorisée à cet égard.

ARTICLE 13.

Les marchandises d'origine et de provenance, de produit ou de fabrication du territoire de chacune des hautes parties contractantes recevront, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, en ce qui concerne les droits de transit, les charges d'emmagasinage et autres facilités, et le montant des drawbacks, le même traitement que les marchandises de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 14.

Aucun droit de tonnage, de port, de pilotage, de phares, de quarantaine ou autre droit similaire ou correspondant, de quelque dénomination que ce soit, perçu au nom ou au profit du Gouvernement, des fonctionnaires publics, des individus

privés, des associations ou des établissements de toute espèce, ne sera imposé dans les ports des territoires de l'un des pays sur les navires de l'autre pays, qui ne serait également, sous les mêmes conditions, imposé aux navires nationaux. Une telle égalité de traitement s'appliquera réciproquement aux navires des deux pays, respectivement, de quelque lieu qu'ils puissent arriver, et quelle que soit leur destination.

ARTICLE 15.

Les navires marchands et autres navires qui sont propriété privée, battant le pavillon de l'une des hautes parties contractantes, et portant les papiers requis par ses lois pour prouver leur nationalité, seront, tant dans les eaux territoriales de l'autre partie que sur la haute mer, considérés comme des navires de la partie dont ils battent le pavillon.

ARTICLE 16

Les ressortissants de chacune des hautes parties contractantes jouiront, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, en se conformant aux formalités prévues par la loi locale, de la même protection que les ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne les brevets d'invention, dessins, marques de fabrique, noms déposés, modèles et patrons.

ARTICLE 17.

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes consent à admettre dans tous les ports, villes et localités sur son territoire, les agents consulaires (consuls généraux, consuls, vice-consuls et autres agents consulaires) de l'autre partie, excepté dans les localités où il y aurait inconvénient à les admettre. Cette réserve, toutefois, ne sera pas appliquée à l'une des hautes parties contractantes sans l'être également à toute autre Puissance.

Dans le cas où un agent consulaire ne serait pas ressortissant de la partie qui l'a nommé, l'assentiment de l'autre partie devra être obtenu par voie diplomatique avant cette nomination.

ARTICLE 18.

Les agents consulaires de chacune des hautes parties contractantes jouiront, à titre de réciprocité, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, de tous les droits, privilèges, exonérations et immunités dont jouissent ou jouiront les agents du même rang de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les dits agents consulaires auront droit, dans le pays qui les reçoit, à la haute considération de tous les fonctionnaires avec lesquels ils auront des rapports officiels.

Le Gouvernement de chacune des hautes parties contractantes délivrera gratuitement l'exequatur nécessaire aux agents consulaires de l'autre partie qui présenteront une commission régulière, signée par le Chef d'Etat du pays qui les a nommés et sous le grand sceau de cet Etat; il délivrera de même, à tout agent consulaire subordonné ou intérimaire, dûment nommé par un agent consulaire supérieur avec l'approbation de son Gouvernement, ou par tout autre agent compétent de ce Gouvernement, tels documents qui, conformément aux lois locales, seront nécessaires pour l'exercice de ses fonctions consulaires. A la présentation d'un exequatur ou de tout autre document qui le remplace, lesdits agents consulaires et agents subordonnés ou intérimaires pourront entrer en fonctions et jouir des droits, privilèges et immunités accordés par le présent traité.

Il est entendu que chacune des hautes parties contractantes se réserve la faculté de refuser ou de retirer un exequatur ou tout autre document qui le remplace et ce pour des raisons sérieuses, qu'elle aura seule le droit d'apprécier.

En cas de décès, d'incapacité d'exercer les fonctions, ou en cas d'absence d'un agent consulaire qui n'a pas d'agent subordonné dans son poste, les secrétaires ou chanceliers pourront gérer provisoirement les fonctions consulaires à condition que leur caractère officiel ait été préalablement porté à la connaissance du Gouvernement du pays. Les dits gérants jouiront, pendant leur gestion provisoire, de tous droits, prérogatives et immunités accordés au titulaire. Toutefois, les gérants qui ne sont pas ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés ne jouiront desdits droits, prérogatives et immunités que dans la mesure nécessaire pour l'exercice de leurs fonctions consulaires.

ARTICLE 19.

Les agents consulaires pourront apposer au-dessus de la porte extérieure de leurs bureaux respectifs les armes de leurs pays, avec une inscription appropriée, indiquant le caractère officiel des dits bureaux. Ces agents pourront également hisser le drapeau national sur leurs bureaux, y compris ceux qui sont situés dans les capitales des deux pays. Ils pourront également hisser ce drapeau sur tout bateau employé dans l'exercice des fonctions consulaires.

Les chancelleries, bureaux et archives consulaires seront en tout temps inviolables. Aucune des autorités du pays dans lequel sont situés ces chancelleries et bureaux ne pourra, en aucune circonstance, y pénétrer. Ces autorités ne pourront, non plus, sous aucun prétexte, examiner ou saisir les papiers ou autres objets qui s'y trouvent. Les chancelleries et bureaux consulaires ne sauraient dans aucun cas servir de lieux d'asile. Aucun agent consulaire ne sera tenu de produire des archives officielles devant un tribunal ni de témoigner au sujet de leur contenu.

Si un agent consulaire a d'autres occupations que les fonctions consulaires, les papiers se rapportant à ces occupations seront tenus séparément.

ARTICLE 20.

Les agents consulaires, ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés, ne pourront être arrêtés préventivement, sauf lorsqu'ils auront été inculpés d'avoir commis des infractions qualifiées de crime, et punissables comme tels par la législation locale.

La comparution d'un agent consulaire comme témoin peut être demandée par les autorités judiciaires, l'accusation ou la défense, dans les affaires criminelles. Cette comparution sera requise avec tous les égards possibles dus à la dignité consulaire et aux fonctions de l'office. L'agent consulaire devra accéder à cette demande.

Les agents consulaires seront, dans les mêmes conditions que les ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés, soumis, en matière civile, à la juridiction des tribunaux du pays que les reçoit.

Dans les affaires autres que celles prévues à l'alinéa 2, un agent consulaire, ressortissant du pays qui l'a nommé, et ne se livrant pas à des occupations particulières dans un but lucratif, devra donner volontairement son témoignage au cours d'un procès chaque fois qu'il lui sera possible de le faire sans entraver sérieusement ses fonctions officielles. Néanmoins, il pourra faire sa déposition verbalement ou par écrit dans sa demeure ou son bureau et avec les égards dus à la dignité consulaire.

ARTICLE 21.

Les agents consulaires ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés seront exempts de logements militaires, et de tout service quelconque de caractère militaire, naval, administratif ou de police.

Les agents consulaires et les employés d'un consulat, ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés, et ne se livrant pas à des occupations particulières dans un but lucratif dans le pays où ils exercent leurs fonctions, seront exempts de toutes impositions directes (nationales, d'État, de province ou de municipalité) sur les personnes ou les biens, à l'exception de celles établies sur la possession ou la propriété de biens immobiliers situés sur le territoire du pays où ils exercent leurs fonctions ou sur le revenu provenant de biens de toute espèce situés ou réputés situés dans ce pays. Les agents et employés consulaires, ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés, seront exempts du paiement de taxes sur les appointements, charges ou salaires reçus en rémunération de leurs fonctions consulaires.

Les terrains et immeubles situés sur le territoire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes et appartenant à l'autre partie et employés exclusivement dans un but diplomatique ou consulaire seront exempts d'impositions quelconques (nationales, d'État, de province ou de municipalité), autres que les contributions requises pour des services ou des améliorations publics locaux.

ARTICLE 22.

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes consent à permettre l'entrée en franchise de tous meubles, objets d'installation et fournitures destinés à l'usage officiel des bureaux consulaires de l'autre partie, et de faire bénéficier ceux des agents consulaires qui seraient ressortissants du pays qui les a nommés, ainsi que leurs

familles et ceux des membres de leur suite qui seraient également ses ressortissants, du privilège de l'entrée en franchise pour leurs bagages et tous leurs biens personnels de première installation; toutefois, aucun article dont l'importation est interdite par les lois de l'une ou de l'autre des hautes parties contractantes ne pourra être introduit sur son territoire.

Il est entendu que les agents consulaires se livrant à des occupations particulières dans un but lucratif dans le pays où ils sont nommés, ne bénéficieront pas du dit privilège de franchise.

ARTICLE 23.

Les agents consulaires pourront, dans leurs circonscriptions respectives, s'adresser aux autorités nationales, d'État, de province ou de municipalité, compétentes pour de pareilles démarches, en vue d'assurer les droits qui reviennent en vertu des traités ou autrement aux ressortissants du pays qui a nommé les dits agents. Ils pourront porter plainte en cas de contravention à ces droits.

Si les dites autorités ne font pas droit à leurs demandes le recours à la voie diplomatique peut être justifié.

ARTICLE 24.

Les agents consulaires pourront, conformément aux lois du pays qui les a nommés, recevoir dans leurs circonscriptions respectives, les dépositions volontaires des ressortissants de leur pays ainsi que les dépositions volontaires du capitaine, de l'équipage et des passagers d'un navire de ce pays.

Ils pourront, sans préjudice de la compétence des officiers ministériels locaux, rédiger, attester, certifier et légaliser les contrats auxquels un ressortissant de leur pays est partie et qui seront produits pour un usage quelconque dans un pays autre que celui où les dits agents exercent leurs fonctions.

Les agents consulaires pourront également légaliser les signatures que les ressortissants de leur pays ont apposées aux contrats passés avec les ressortissants d'une tierce Puissance.

Les agents consulaires pourront, de même, rédiger, attester, certifier et légaliser les dispositions testamentaires des ressortissants de leur pays, à condition, toutefois, que les dites dispositions ne se rapportent pas à des immeubles situés sur le territoire du pays où ils exercent leurs fonctions.

En outre, ils pourront rédiger, attester, certifier et légaliser des instruments écrits de toute espèce, ayant pour objet le transfert de biens de toute nature se trouvant sur le territoire du pays qui a nommé ces agents consulaires, ou l'imposition de charges sur ces biens, ainsi que des actes unilatéraux, titres de propriété, dispositions testamentaires et contrats, relatifs à des biens situés ou à des opérations d'affaires en cours sur le territoire du pays qui les a nommés, y compris les actes unilatéraux, titres de propriété, dispositions testamentaires ou accords se rapportant aux biens ou opérations susindiqués et faits exclusivement par les ressortissants du pays dans lequel ces agents exercent leurs fonctions.

Les instruments et documents ainsi faits, et leurs copies ou traductions, lorsqu'elles auront été dûment légalisées par un agent consulaire sous son sceau officiel, feront foi sur les territoires des hautes parties contractantes, comme documents originaux ou copies légalisées, selon le cas, et auront la même valeur et le même effet que s'ils avaient été rédigés et attestés par un notaire ou un autre fonctionnaire public, dûment autorisés, dans le pays qui a nommé l'agent consulaire, à condition, toutefois, que ces documents aient été rédigés et attestés conformément aux lois et règlements du pays où ils sont destinés à être exécutés.

ARTICLE 25.

Au cas où un ressortissant de l'une des hautes parties contractantes décéderait sur le territoire de l'autre partie, sans y avoir d'héritiers connus ou sans avoir désigné d'exécuteurs testamentaires, les autorités locales compétentes préviendront immédiatement de ce décès l'agent consulaire le plus proche du pays dont la personne décédée était un ressortissant, afin que les renseignements nécessaires soient transmis aux intéressés.

En cas de décès d'un ressortissant de l'une des hautes parties contractantes, sans testament, sur le territoire de l'autre partie, l'agent consulaire du pays dont le défunt était ressortissant et dans la circonscription duquel il était domicilié au moment de

son décès, aura, en tant que le permettent les lois du pays et en attendant qu'un administrateur ait été nommé et les lettres d'administration accordées, qualité pour se charger des biens du défunt dans le but de les conserver et de les protéger. Cet agent consulaire pourra être nommé administrateur par le tribunal compétent ou autre autorité compétente, en matière de succession, si les lois locales le permettent.

L'agent consulaire qui accepte de devenir administrateur des biens d'un ressortissant décédé est soumis à la juridiction du tribunal ou autre autorité d'où émane sa nomination pour toutes les mesures nécessaires au même degré qu'un ressortissant du pays dans lequel il administre les biens.

ARTICLE 26.

Les agents consulaires connaîtront seuls les différends relatifs à la discipline interne des navires marchands et autres navires privés battant le pavillon de leur pays et seront seuls compétents pour connaître les incidents qui se produiraient n'importe où entre les officiers et l'équipage en ce qui concerne la discipline à bord, si le navire et les personnes impliquées dans ces incidents sont entrés dans un port de leur circonscription. Ces agents seront également compétents pour connaître les contestations concernant le règlement des salaires de l'équipage et l'exécution des contrats y relatifs, si les lois locales le permettent.

Lorsqu'un acte commis à bord d'un navire marchand ou autre navire privé battant le pavillon du pays qui a nommé l'agent consulaire et se trouvant dans les eaux territoriales du pays où il exerce ses fonctions, est, d'après les lois locales, qualifié de crime et punissable comme tel, l'agent consulaire ne pourra s'occuper de l'affaire qu'autant que les lois locales le lui permettent.

Il est entendu qu'en dehors des cas mentionnés à l'alinéa précédent, les autorités locales ne pourront intervenir que lorsque les désordres survenus à bord seraient de nature à troubler la tranquillité et l'ordre public à terre ou dans le port, ou quand une personne du pays ou ne faisant pas partie de l'équipage s'y trouvera mêlée.

Les agents consulaires pourront, dans les eaux territoriales du pays où ils exercent leurs fonctions, invoquer librement l'aide de la police locale, dans n'importe quelle question relative au maintien de la discipline interne à bord d'un navire battant le pavillon du pays qui les a nommés, et sur leur demande le secours nécessaire leur sera donné.

Les agents consulaires pourront comparaître avec les officiers et équipages des navires battant le pavillon du pays qui les a nommés devant les autorités judiciaires du pays où ils exercent leurs fonctions, afin de leur servir d'interprètes ou d'agents.

ARTICLE 27.

Si un navire de l'une des hautes parties contractantes fait naufrage sur les côtes de l'autre partie, l'agent consulaire du pays dont le navire bat le pavillon et dans la circonscription duquel le naufrage aurait eu lieu, dirigera les opérations de sauvetage. En attendant l'arrivée de cet agent consulaire, qui sera immédiatement prévenu de l'événement, les autorités locales prendront les mesures nécessaires pour la protection des personnes et la conservation des biens naufragés. Elles ne s'immisceront que pour protéger les intérêts des sauveteurs qui n'appartiendraient pas à l'équipage du navire naufragé et pour assurer l'exécution des dispositions à observer pour l'entrée et la sortie des marchandises sauvées. Il est entendu que ces marchandises ne seront soumises à aucun droit de douane, à moins qu'elles ne soient destinées à être livrées à la consommation dans le pays où le naufrage aurait eu lieu.

L'intervention des autorités locales dans ces divers cas ne donnera lieu à aucun frais de quelque nature que ce soit, sauf ceux occasionnés par les opérations de sauvetage et la conservation des marchandises sauvées, ainsi que ceux auxquels seraient soumis, en pareil cas, les navires nationaux.

ARTICLE 28.

Les territoires des hautes parties contractantes faisant l'objet des dispositions du présent traité comprennent toutes les régions de terre, d'eau et d'air sur lesquelles les parties exercent leur autorité souveraine, sauf la Zone du Canal de Panama.

ARTICLE 29.

Il ne sera perçu sur les ressortissants américains ou sur leurs biens au titre des exercices antérieurs à l'exercice 1922–23, aucun impôt, taxe ou surtaxe auxquels, en

vertu du statut dont ils jouissaient au 1er août 1914, les ressortissants américains et leurs biens n'étaient pas assujettis.

Au cas où des sommes auraient été perçues après le 15 mai 1923 au titre d'exercices antérieurs à l'exercice 1922–23, le montant en sera remboursé aux ayants droit dès la mise en vigueur du présent traité.

Aucun recours ne pourra être exercé en ce qui concerne les sommes encaissées antérieurement au 15 mai 1923.

ARTICLE 30.

Dès la mise en vigueur du présent traité, les traités jusqu'à présent conclus entre les États-Unis d'Amérique et l'Empire ottoman cesseront absolument et définitivement d'être effectifs en ce qui concerne les hautes parties contractantes.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour remplacer le Traité d'Extradition de 1874 par le nouveau Traité d'Extradition signé en date de ce jour.

ARTICLE 31.

Le présent traité entrera en vigueur deux mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications. Les articles 1er et 2 de ce traité auront une durée permanente. Les articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 et 8 auront une durée de sept ans. Les articles 9 à 27 auront une durée de cinq ans.

Au cas où aucune des hautes parties contractantes n'aurait avisé l'autre partie six mois avant l'expiration des périodes respectives ci-dessus indiquées de son intention de dénoncer les groupes d'articles auxquels ces périodes s'appliquent, les dits articles resteront en vigueur jusqu'à l'expiration d'une période de six mois à partir du moment où ils auront été dénoncés.

ARTICLE 32.

Le présent traité, rédigé en français, en anglais et en turc, sera ratifié. En cas de divergence le texte français fera foi.

Les ratifications seront échangées à Constantinople aussitôt que possible.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Lausanne, le 6 août 1923.

(L.S.) JOSEPH C. GREW.

(L.S.) ISMET.
(L.S.) DR. RIZA NOUR.
(L.S.) HASSAN.

Traité d'Extradition entre les États-Unis d'Amérique et la Turquie.

Les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et la Turquie, ayant jugé utile, afin d'assurer une meilleure administration de la justice, de se livrer réciproquement, dans certaines circonstances déterminées, les personnes condamnées ou poursuivies pour les crimes et délits indiqués ci-après, ont résolu de conclure un nouveau Traité d'Extradition, et ont nommé, à cet effet, pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique :

Joseph C. Grew, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire des Etats-Unis d'Amérique auprès de la Confédération suisse;

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie :

Ismet Pacha, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, Député d'Andrinople à la même Assemblée,

Le Dr. Riza Nour Bey, Ministre des Affaires sanitaires et de l'Assistance sociale du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, Député de Sinope à la même Assemblée, et

Hassan Bey, ancien Ministre de l'Economie nationale du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, Député de Trébizonde à la même Assemblée;

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique et le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie s'engagent à se livrer réciproquement, sur demande, les personnes qui, étant poursuivies ou condamnées par les autorités judiciaires de l'une des hautes parties contractantes pour un des crimes ou délits énumérés à l'article 2 et commis sur un territoire soumis à la juridiction de cette partie, se réfugieraient ou se trouveraient sur le territoire de l'autre partie.

Néanmoins, l'extradition n'aura lieu que si les preuves de culpabilité sont telles que, d'après les lois du lieu où se trouve le fugitif ou la personne prévenue, elles justifieraient son arrestation et donneraient lieu à des poursuites pénales si le fait y avait été commis.

ARTICLE 2.

L'extradition sera accordée pour les crimes et délits suivants, pourvu qu'ils soient punisables tant d'après la législation du lieu de refuge que d'après celle de l'Etat requérant, savoir :

1. Homicide volontaire, y compris le parricide, l'assassinat, l'empoisonnement et l'infanticide.
2. Incendie.
3. Piraterie; émeute à bord d'un navire, lorsque l'équipage ou une partie de l'équipage ou d'autres personnes se trouvant à bord, se seraient emparés du navire, usant de fraude ou de violence envers le capitaine.
4. L'acte de s'introduire pendant la nuit avec effraction dans une habitation avec intention d'y commettre un crime dont la nature devra être spécifiée dans les documents visés à l'article 6 (crime de burglary).
5. Contrefaçon ou falsification de documents publics ou privés; usage frauduleux de documents contrefaits ou falsifiés.
6. Falsification, contrefaçon ou altération de monnaie, de papier-monnaie, de titres publics et de leurs coupons, de billets de banque, d'obligations ou d'autres titres ou instruments de crédit, leur émission, leur mise en circulation ou leur usage avec intention frauduleuse; contrefaçon ou falsification de sceaux, poinçons, timbres ou marques publics, ainsi que l'usage frauduleux de ces objets contrefaits ou falsifiés.
7. Détournement de fonds publics commis par leurs dépositaires ou par des fonctionnaires publics, lorsque les fonds détournés dépasseront 200 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent turc.
8. Détournement commis par une ou plusieurs personnes employées ou salariées, au détriment de ceux qui les emploient, à condition que ce crime ou ce délit soit punissable d'emprisonnement ou de peine plus forte dans les législations des deux pays et que les fonds détournés dépassent 200 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent turc.
9. Destruction ou obstruction volontaire et illégale de chemins de fer, mettant en danger la vie humaine.
10. Avortement; rapt; viol; enlèvement de mineurs ou d'adultes, étant entendu par ce terme le détournement ou la séquestration d'une personne ou de personnes, dans le but de leur extorquer, à eux ou à leur famille, de l'argent ou dans tout autre but illégal.
11. Vol commis avec violence ou intimidation (robbery); vol commis avec effraction ou escalade dans une maison ou un magasin (housebreaking ou shop-breaking).
12. Vol simple, si l'argent soustrait ou la valeur des objets volés dépasse 25 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent turc.
13. Escroquerie, recel d'argent, de valeurs ou d'autres biens sachant qu'ils ont été détournés, volés ou acquis frauduleusement, lorsque le montant en argent ou la valeur des biens dépassera 200 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent turc.
14. Fraude ou abus de confiance commis par toute personne, notamment par un dépositaire, mandataire, banquier, administrateur de la fortune d'un tiers, ou par le président, un membre ou un fonctionnaire d'une société ou

association, si la perte subie dépasse 200 dollars ou l'équivalent en argent turc.
15. Parjure ou subornation de témoins.
16. Crimes ou délits contre les lois des deux pays relatives à la suppression de l'esclavage et à la traite d'esclaves.
17. Banqueroute frauduleuse.
18. Corruption.
19. Coups et blessures graves dont la peine minimum n'est pas inférieure à un an d'emprisonnement.
20. Tentative d'infractions, énumérées ci-dessus, punie de peine criminelle.
21. Complicité dans l'un quelconque des crimes ou délits mentionnés ci-dessus, si cette complicité est passible d'emprisonnement ou d'une peine plus forte, par les lois des deux hautes parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 3.

L'extradition n'aura pas lieu pour crime ou délit politique ou pour les faits connexes à un semblable crime ou délit.

Ne sera pas réputé crime ou délit politique l'attentat contre la vie d'un Chef d'Etat ou des membres de sa famille.

Aucune personne livrée par l'une des hautes parties contractantes à l'autre partie ne sera poursuivie ou punie pour une infraction commise avant la demande d'extradition, autre que celle pour laquelle l'extradition a été accordée à moins qu'elle n'y consente expressément, par écrit, ce qui sera communiqué à la partie ayant effectué l'extradition, ou qu'ayant eu pendant les 30 jours, depuis son élargissement définitif, la faculté de quitter le territoire de l'Etat requérant, elle n'ait pas usé de cette faculté, ou bien qu'elle y revienne après l'avoir quitté.

ARTICLE 4.

Lorsque la personne dont l'extradition est demandée est poursuivie, qu'elle soit détenue préventivement ou qu'elle soit en liberté provisoire, ou lorsqu'elle a été condamnée pour une autre infraction dans le pays où elle s'est réfugiée, son extradition pourra être différée jusqu'à la clôture de la procédure pénale et sa mise en liberté définitive conformément à la loi.

ARTICLE 5.

Les hautes parties contractantes ne sont pas tenues d'accorder l'extradition de leurs ressortissants respectifs.

ARTICLE 6.

Les demandes d'extradition seront présentées par la voie diplomatique.

Lorsque la personne dont l'extradition est demandée aura été condamnée à raison de l'infraction qui a motivé la demande d'extradition, cette demande devra être accompagnée d'une expédition authentique de l'arrêt prononcé. Si la personne réclamée est seulement prévenue d'une infraction, la demande devra être accompagnée d'une copie dûment certifiée du mandat d'arrêt délivré par le magistrat compétent de la partie requérante, ainsi que des copies dûment légalisées des dépositions ou autres preuves sur la base desquelles le mandat d'arrêt a été délivré. Ces documents devront contenir l'indication précise de l'infraction incriminée, du lieu où elle a été commise et de sa date. Ils devront être accompagnés d'une copie dûment certifiée des dispositions légales applicables aux infractions incriminées ainsi que des éléments nécessaires pour établir l'identité de la personne réclamée.

Les documents susindiqués seront dressés dans la forme prescrite par les lois de la partie requérante et accompagnés d'une traduction, dans la langue de la partie requise ou en français, certifiée conforme.

Il est entendu que la procédure d'extradition sera réglée d'après les dispositions en vigueur, à l'époque de la demande, dans l'Etat requis.

ARTICLE 7.

Lorsque l'arrestation provisoire d'une personne sera requise avant que la demande d'extradition ait été présentée, la demande y afférente sera faite par la voie diplomatique ou adressée directement aux autorités compétentes de la partie requise par le consul compétent de la partie requérante, ou par une autre personne autorisée par cette partie. La procédure à suivre pour l'arrestation sera réglée d'après les dispositions en vigueur dans l'Etat requis.

La détention provisoire devra cesser et la personne arrêtée devra être mise en liberté si, dans le délai de trois mois, à dater de l'arrestation, le jour de l'arrestation non compris, une demande formelle d'extradition, accompagnée des pièces nécessaires, n'est pas présentée de la manière prescrite dans l'article 6.

ARTICLE 8.

L'extradition ne sera pas accordée lorsque d'après la loi de la partie requise ou d'après celle de la partie requérante l'action pénale ou la peine prononcée est prescrite.

ARTICLE 9.

Tous les objets saisis, trouvés en la possession de la personne réclamée lors de son arrestation, doivent être remis à la partie requérante, au moment de l'extradition en même temps que cette personne; cette remise ne s'étendra pas seulement aux objets acquis par l'infraction pour laquelle la personne est poursuivie, mais encore à tous autres objets pouvant servir à établir la preuve de l'infraction. Toutefois, les droits des tiers sur les objets en question devront être dûment respectés.

ARTICLE 10.

Les frais de l'arrestation, de la détention et du transport des individus réclamés seront payés par la partie requérante.

ARTICLE 11.

Le présent traité entrera en vigueur deux mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications et aura une durée de cinq ans.

Si ce traité n'est pas dénoncé par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de la dite période de cinq ans, il restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'il soit dénoncé, cette dénonciation ne devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois.

ARTICLE 12.

Le présent traité, rédigé en français, en anglais et en turc, sera ratifié. En cas de divergence le texte français fera foi.

Les ratifications seront échangées à Constantinople aussitôt que possible.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Lausanne, le 6 août 1923.

(L.S.) JOSEPH C. GREW. (L.S.) ISMET.
(L.S.) DR. RIZA NOUR.
(L.S.) HASSAN.

No. 170.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 16.)

(No. 415.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 15, 1923.

GENERAL HARINGTON has received message from Ismet to the effect that Turkish Government will not molest persons who have been employed by Allied forces in non-combatant capacity since 20th November last, but asking for guarantee for similar treatment for inhabitants of detached territories mentioned in article 2 of amnesty declaration.

There seems no objection to giving required guarantee. Can concurrence of French and Italian Governments be obtained, as early publication of Turkish Government's undertaking is desirable in order to reassure persons concerned?

Adnan Bey came to see me to-day to give me the same message. He added, however, on Ismet's behalf that Turkish Government asked that similar pardon should be extended to Turks condemned for offences committed since 20th November in occupied territories (Constantinople, &c.).

No. 171.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (*No.* 305 (*by bag*)) *and Rome* (*No.* 217 (*R*)).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 17, 1923.

MR. HENDERSON'S telegram No. 415 of 15th August shows the result of General Harington's endeavours to obtain from the Turks a guarantee of non-molestation of Turkish subjects who have worked for Allied armies of occupation.

Please urge Government to which you are accredited to signify at Constantinople their concurrence in reciprocal guarantee in favour of inhabitants of detached territories.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 250.)

No. 172.

Mr. Palairet to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 18.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Tokyo, August* 18, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 76.

Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that—

1. Japanese Government, following precedent established by Great Britain, France and Italy before 1914, have made preparations for accrediting Ambassador to Turkey, but that if principal Allied Governments agree to send Minister they are willing to do likewise.

2. Japanese Government express wish, however, that ultimate status may be agreed upon prior to opening of diplomatic relations, in order that representatives of that status may be sent as soon as treaty comes into force.

3. Before deciding upon appointment of local representative at Angora, Japanese Government desire to make further investigations as to practicability of such a course.

[E 8390/199/44] No. 173.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 469.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 11, 1923.

GENERAL ISMET PASHA arrived yesterday morning in Constantinople. A special train was placed at his disposal from Chataldja, and his arrival at Sirkedji provoked considerable enthusiasm. He received the Allied generals in a body at 2 P.M., and the three Acting High Commissioners individually in the course of the afternoon. A separate interview with General Harington took place this morning.

2. In conversation with me Ismet Pasha laid great stress on his keen desire to see the evacuation programme carried out without hitch or incident in order to leave a good impression on the minds of all the parties concerned. I cordially agreed with his laudable anxiety in this respect and shared his view that a good final impression might have a very appreciable influence on future relations. I pointed out, however, that it was easier for an army of occupation to remain than to depart, and that, consequently, if his Government really desired a satisfactory termination of the long period of occupation they would be well advised to refrain from any excessive and inconsiderate demands in connection therewith.

3. I drew Ismet Pasha's attention to the precarious situation of the various refugees, Ottoman-Greek, Armenian and Russian, in Constantinople. I mentioned to him that I had recently insisted with Adnan Bey on Turkish responsibilities, prior to the inception of the arrangements for the exchange of population, for the proper treatment and upkeep of the Ottoman Greeks concentrated in Constantinople and in the Black Sea ports. I said that Adnan Bey had been inclined to disregard moral and other obligations on the ground that Turkey was materially incapable of providing for these refugees. I remarked that even though it might prove difficult to induce the Grand National Assembly to provide financial assistance, the Turkish Government could still do something to alleviate the lot of these unfortunate persons by enabling them to find work, by leaving them unmolested in the various requisitioned barracks which they at

present occupied, and generally mitigating instead of aggravating their misfortunes. Ismet Pasha asked me for the numbers of the various classes of refugees—which I was able to give him—and, though he said he could not commit himself before his return to Angora, undertook to give the matter his careful consideration.

4. I also referred to the case of the Turkish refugees in Cyprus and the Hedjaz, and said that I understood from Adnan Bey that the return of these individuals to Turkey could not be definitely authorised until the list of the 150 proscribed persons had been published and the Amnesty Declaration had come into force. I urged upon him the desirability of publishing that list as soon as possible, and, in the general interest of an early restoration of tranquillity, of putting into force without delay the provisions of the Amnesty Declaration. Ismet Pasha promised to see what could be done in this respect, and said that, while the Amnesty Declaration could not legally come into force before the treaty, he was contemplating some arrangement whereby effect should be given to it in advance of the legal date of its execution.

5. Ismet Pasha then enquired if I was satisfied with the general condition of affairs in Constantinople. I replied that while a number of regrettable incidents had occurred in the early summer, I had been glad to note an appreciable improvement in the situation during the past few weeks. At the same time there was a spirit of excessive chauvinism abroad in Angora, which would have a deplorable effect if extended to Constantinople. Ismet Pasha asked me for examples. I quoted a letter addressed to a foreign company here by the local office of the Ministry of Public Works demanding the instant dismissal of all its foreign and non-Moslem employees, as well as an attempt on the part of the Lightermen's Corporation to prevent private foreign-owned enterprises from participating in the lighterage work at the port. I pointed out that the treaty expressly stipulated that the latter service could be continued until the 31st December next, while the former demand was not only contrary to the minority clauses of the treaty, but also unwarranted by any Turkish legislation. Both were indications of a general tendency, which, if pursued, would harm Turkey more than anybody else. Turkish nationalism had enabled Turkey to secure the Lausanne treaty in place of the Treaty of Sèvres. Though it must be admitted that it had served its purpose in this respect, it would be a fatal mistake to persist in exaggerated nationalism now that peace had been attained. This consideration had particular force in so far as Constantinople was concerned. Whatever might be the decision of the Turkish Government as to the ultimate status of this city, nothing could deprive her of the advantages which her exceptional position afforded her from a commercial and economic point of view, unless it were the short-sighted policy of the Turks themselves. Vexatious anti-foreign legislation would kill trade in Constantinople and drive it elsewhere to Turkey's loss and to the benefit of her neighbours. One of the future problems with which the Turkish Government would have to deal was labour, but however much one might sympathise with their desire to find employment for their numerous ex-officials and to give momentary satisfaction to the demands of the somewhat unruly labour elements in Constantinople, the only sensible policy was to make things easy for the foreigner so as to encourage and increase the volume of foreign trade and commerce which would automatically augment the prosperity of the town and provide employment for all, Christians and Moslems alike. Ismet Pasha listened attentively but refrained from comment, beyond observing that he fully realised that a policy adopted in a struggle for existence was not suitable for a stage of peaceful development, and that I referred to a danger which I merely anticipated but which he could assure me new Turkey was most anxious to avoid.

6. Ismet Pasha made particular enquiries as to the state of your Lordship's health, whereupon I thought it as well to state that you had requested me to convey a friendly message to him. He begged me to thank you and to assure you once more of the sincere regard which he feels for your Lordship. He added that it had been a matter of real and deep regret for him not to have had an opportunity of seeing you again at Lausanne, as he had been most anxious to have your advice and to discuss certain matters with you personally. I told him that I knew that you regretted the circumstances which had prevented your return to Lausanne.

7. Ismet Pasha told me that he would submit the treaty to the Assembly within a few days of his return to Angora. As he reaches the Anatolian capital on the 13th, this would mean that the discussion of the treaty would begin not later than the 17th. I gained the impression that ratification in Ismet's opinion would take place by August 25th. He showed some earnestness in expressing the hope that the Powers, particularly Great Britain, would similarly ratify as soon as possible. I told him that I anticipated that the treaty would be submitted to Parliament as soon as the autumn

session commenced, and Ismet remarked that Turkey would be inclined to judge as to who were her friends by their readiness to ratify the treaty and show thereby their desire to recommence as soon as possible relations with Turkey under the new order of things.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 8391/4900/44] No. 174.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 470.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 13, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of the Turco-Polish Treaty of Friendship, signed at Lausanne on the 23rd ultimo, as well as of the Commercial Convention and the convention governing the treatment of the nationals of each country in the territory of the other, both of which were signed on the same date.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 174.

Turco-Polish Treaty of Friendship concluded at Lausanne on July 23, 1923.

Turkish representatives: Ismet Pasha, Riza Nour Bey, Hassan Bey.
Polish representatives: M. Jan Modzelewski, Minister at Berne, M. Aleksander Lados, M. Henryk Tennenbaum.

ARTICLE 1er.

IL y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre la sérénissime République polonaise et la Turquie, ainsi qu'entre les citoyens des deux États.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour rétablir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux États conformément aux principes du droit des gens; elles conviennent que les Ministres, Envoyés et agents diplomatiques de chacune d'elles jouiront, à charge de réciprocité dans le territoire de l'autre, des privilèges, honneurs, immunités et exemptions accordés à ceux de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour conclure à la date de ce jour une Convention de Commerce et une Convention d'Établissement.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Berne le plus tôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Lausanne, le 23 juillet 1923.

Enclosure 2 in No. 174.

Commercial Convention between Turkey and Poland concluded at Lausanne on July 23, 1923.

Turkish representatives: Ismet Pasha, Dr. Riza Nour Bey and Hassan Bey.
Polish representatives: M. Modzelewski, Minister at Berne, M. A. Lados, M. H. Tennenbaum.

ARTICLE 1er.

IL y aura entre les territoires des parties contractantes liberté réciproque de commerce et de navigation. En conséquence, les parties contractantes s'engagent à

n'entraver leurs relations commerciales réciproques par aucune prohibition et restriction d'importation, d'exportation, ni de transit.

Toutefois, les parties contractantes se réservent le droit d'établir des prohibitions et restrictions pour les importations et exportations :

1. Pour réserver les ressources indispensables à la vie alimentaire et à sauvegarder l'activité économique de la nation;
2. Pour des raisons de sécurité de l'État;
3. Pour des motifs de police sanitaire, ou en vue de la protection des animaux et des plantes utiles contre les maladies, les insectes et parasites nuisibles et particulièrement dans l'intérêt de la santé publique, conformément aux principes internationaux adoptés à ce sujet;
4. Pour les marchandises faisant l'objet des monopoles d'État;
5. En vue d'application aux marchandises étrangères des prohibitions ou restrictions qui ont été ou seront établies par la législation intérieure en ce qui concerne la production, la vente, le transport ou la consommation, à l'intérieur, des marchandises indigènes similaires;
6. Pour empêcher l'exportation de la monnaie or ou du métal or.

ARTICLE 2.

Les parties contractantes s'engagent à accorder réciproquement le transit sur les voies les plus appropriées au transit international aux personnes, bagages, marchandises et objets de toute sorte, envois, navires, bateaux, voitures et wagons ou autres instruments de transport, en se garantissant, sous ce rapport, le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les marchandises de toute nature, traversant le territoire douanier de l'une des parties contractantes, seront réciproquement exemptes de tout droit de douane, à l'exception des droits de statistique et de surveillance.

Aucune des parties contractantes ne sera pourtant tenue d'assurer le transit des voyageurs, dont l'entrée sur son territoire serait interdite.

Le transit des marchandises pourra être prohibé :

(*a*.) Pour raisons de sûreté publique et de sécurité de l'État;
(*b*.) Pour raisons de santé ou comme précaution contre les maladies des animaux et des végétaux;
(*c*.) Pour les contrefaçons et les marchandises qui, sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes, font l'objet d'un monopole d'État.

ARTICLE 3.

Les négociants, fabricants et autres industriels de l'une des parties contractantes qui prouveront par la présentation d'une carte de légitimation industrielle, délivrée par les autorités compétentes de leur pays, qu'ils y sont autorisés à exercer leur commerce et leur industrie et qu'ils y acquittent les taxes et impôts prévus par les lois, auront le droit, soit personnellement, soit par des voyageurs à leur service, de faire les achats dans le territoire de l'autre partie contractante chez les négociants ou producteurs ou dans les locaux de vente publique. Ils pourront également prendre des commandes même sur les échantillons chez les négociants ou autres personnes qui, dans leur commerce ou leur industrie, utilisent des marchandises correspondant à ces échantillons.

Les voyageurs de commerce des parties contractantes munis d'une carte de légitimation, délivrée par les autorités de leur pays respectif, auront réciproquement le droit d'avoir avec eux des échantillons ou modèles, mais point de marchandises. Cette carte devra être établie conformément au modèle de l'Annexe (A).

Les parties contractantes se donneront réciproquement connaissance des autorités chargées de délivrer les cartes de légitimation, ainsi que des dispositions auxquelles les voyageurs doivent se conformer dans l'exercice de leur commerce.

Il est entendu, toutefois, que les voyageurs de commerce mentionnés ci-dessus n'auront pas le droit de conclure des affaires pour des commerçants ou industriels autres que ceux visés dans leur carte.

A l'exception des marchandises prohibées à l'importation, les objets passibles d'un droit de douane ou toute autre taxe assimilée, qui seront importés comme échantillons ou modèles par les voyageurs de commerce, seront, de part et d'autre, admis en franchise des droits d'entrée ou de sortie à la condition que ces objets soient

réexportés dans le délai réglementaire et que l'identité des objets importés et réexportés soit bien établie, quel que soit le bureau de douane par lequel ils passent à leur sortie.

La réexportation des échantillons ou modèles devra être garantie au bureau de douane d'entrée, soit par un dépôt en espèces, soit par une caution valable.

En ce qui concerne les formalités auxquelles les négociants et les industriels (voyageurs de commerce) sont soumis dans les territoires des parties contractantes, les deux pays se garantissent réciproquement le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 4.

Les ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes se rendant aux foires et marchés à l'effet d'y exercer leur commerce, ne seront pas, sur le territoire de l'autre, traités d'une manière moins favorable que les nationaux, en tant qu'ils peuvent présenter une carte d'identité d'après le modèle annexé (Annexe (B)), délivrée par les autorités du pays dont ils sont ressortissants.

Les parties contractantes se donneront réciproquement connaissance des autorités chargées de délivrer les cartes d'identité prévues à l'alinéa précédent.

Les dispositions ci-dessus ne sont pas applicables aux industriels ambulants non plus qu'au colportage et à la recherche des commandes chez les personnes n'exerçant ni industrie ni commerce, chacune des parties contractantes se réservant à cet égard l'entière liberté de la législation.

ARTICLE 5.

Sous l'obligation de réexpédition et de réimportation dans le délai d'un an et de la preuve d'identité et éventuellement sous réserve de dépôt, de cautionnement ou de consignation des droits de douane, et d'une manière générale à charge d'observer les règlements en vigueur dans la matière, la franchise de tous droits d'entrée et de sortie est stipulée réciproquement :

(1.) Pour les échantillons passibles d'un droit de douane, y compris ceux des voyageurs de commerce;
(2.) Pour les objets destinés aux expositions et aux concours.

ARTICLE 6.

Les navires et bateaux portant le pavillon de l'une des parties contractantes qui entreront sur lest ou chargés dans les eaux et ports dépendant de l'autre partie, ou qui en sortiront, quel que soit le lieu de leur départ ou celui de leur destination, ne seront assujettis, tant à l'entrée qu'à la sortie et au passage, à aucun droit ou taxe, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, perçus au nom et au profit de l'État, des provinces, des communes ou d'un organisme quelconque, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont actuellement ou pourront par la suite être imposés aux bâtiments nationaux. Leurs cargaisons, quelle qu'en soit la provenance, n'acquitteront d'autres ni de plus forts droits d'entrée et ne seront assujetties à d'autres charges que si elles étaient importées sous pavillon national. Leurs passagers et les bagages de ceux-ci seront pareillement traités comme s'ils voyageaient sous pavillon national.

En ce qui concerne le placement des navires, leur chargement et leur déchargement dans les ports, rades, havres et bassins, il ne sera accordé par l'une des parties contractantes aux navires nationaux aucun privilège ni aucune facilité qui ne soient également accordés en pareil cas aux navires de l'autre partie.

Les dispositions qui précèdent ne font pas obstacle à ce que chacune des parties contractantes réserve au seul pavillon national de cabotage, la pêche dans les eaux territoriales, ainsi que le remorquage et autres services de port.

Les navires et bateaux naviguant sous le pavillon de l'une des parties contractantes et porteurs de papiers de bord et documents exigés par les lois du pays de ce pavillon, seront reconnus de plein droit comme ayant la nationalité dudit pays dans les eaux territoriales, eaux intérieures et ports de l'autre partie contractante, sans qu'ils aient à fournir d'autres justifications.

Les certificats de jaugeage délivrés aux bâtiments de chacune des parties contractantes suivant la méthode Moorsom, seront respectivement reconnus sous les modalités qui seront précisées ultérieurement après l'échange des règlements applicables à la matière.

ARTICLE 7.

Tous les produits du sol ou de l'industrie originaires et en provenance du territoire douanier de l'une des parties contractantes qui sont importés sur le territoire

douanier de l'autre et qui sont destinés soit à la consommation, soit à la réexpédition, soit en transit, seront soumis pendant la durée de la présente Convention au traitement accordé à la nation la plus favorisée. Notamment, ils ne pourront, en aucun cas, être soumis à des droits autres ni plus élevés que ceux qui frappent les produits ou les marchandises de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les exportations à destination d'une des parties contractantes ne seront pas grevées par l'autre de droits ou taxes autres ni plus élevés que ceux perçus à l'exportation des mêmes objets dans le pays le plus favorisé à cet égard.

ARTICLE 8.

Chacune des parties contractantes pourra exiger, pour établir le pays d'origine des produits importés, la présentation par l'importateur d'un certificat d'origine constatant que l'article importé est de production et de fabrication nationale dudit pays ou qu'il doit être considéré comme tel, étant donnée la transformation qu'il y a subie.

Les certificats d'origine, établis d'après le modèle que les parties contractantes se communiqueront ultérieurement, seront délivrés soit par le Ministère du Commerce ou de l'Agriculture, soit par la Chambre de Commerce dont relève l'expéditeur, soit par tout autre organe ou groupement que le pays destinataire aura agréé. Le Gouvernement du pays destinataire aura le droit d'exiger la légalisation des certificats d'origine par son représentant diplomatique ou consulaire.

ARTICLE 9.

Les dispositions de l'article 7 ne s'appliquent pas :

1. Aux privilèges accordés ou qui pourraient être accordés ultérieurement par une des parties contractantes dans le trafic frontière avec les pays limitrophes;
2. Aux faveurs spéciales résultant d'une union douanière ou économique;
3. Au régime provisoire douanier entre les parties polonaise et allemande de la Haute-Silésie;
4. Aux avantages et faveurs spéciaux existant ou à établir dans l'avenir, en matière de tarifs douaniers et généralement en toute autre matière commerciale, entre la Turquie et les pays qui se sont détachés de l'Empire ottoman en 1923.

ARTICLE 10.

Aussi longtemps que dureront, sur le territoire des parties contractantes, les mesures restrictives concernant l'exportation des capitaux, chacune d'elles autorisera les sociétés ou firmes de l'autre et les sociétés ou firmes nationales dans lesquelles sont engagés les capitaux de cette autre partie à exporter librement de son pays, sans préjudice des dispositions de l'article 1er, § 6, les sommes qui leur sont nécessaires pour le paiement de leur dividendes, coupons d'obligations ou d'actions, intérêts et remboursements d'emprunts ou autres dettes, ainsi que pour l'achat des marchandises.

ARTICLE 11.

Les parties contractantes se garantissent réciproquement sur leurs territoires, en tout ce qui concerne les diverses formalités administratives ou autres, rendues nécessaires par l'application des dispositions contenues dans la présente convention, le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 12.

Les droits et les taxes intérieures perçus pour le compte de l'État, des provinces, des communes ou d'un organisme quelconque, qui grèvent ou qui grèveront la production, la fabrication des marchandises ou la consommation d'un article sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes, ne pourront pas frapper les produits, marchandises ou articles de l'autre d'une manière plus forte ou plus gênante que les produits, marchandises ou articles indigènes de même espèce.

ARTICLE 13.

Le trafic des marchandises par chemins de fer entre les parties contractantes s'effectuera sous le régime de la Convention internationale sur le Trafic par Chemins

de Fer du 14 octobre 1890, avec toutes les conditions et suppléments introduits d'un commun accord par tous les États faisant partie de cette convention.

Les parties contractantes auront soin, en tant que le change le permettra, d'établir le plus tôt possible des taxes directes, tout au moins pour le trafic des voyageurs et pour celui des marchandises les plus importantes dans les relations les plus usitées.

Les administrations des chemins de fer des parties contractantes devront prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour garantir l'exécution rapide et sûre du trafic des chemins de fer entre les deux pays.

Les wagons, voitures et les autres moyens servant pour le transport des marchandises, utilisés dans la communication entre les parties contractantes et dans le transit, sont soumis aux dispositions de la Convention internationale sur l'utilisation réciproque des wagons (R.I.V.) et à ses prescriptions et conventions supplémentaires; cependant les voitures sont soumises aux prescriptions techniques de la convention sur l'utilisation réciproque des voitures et wagons dans la communication internationale (R.I.C.) et à ses prescriptions et conventions supplémentaires.

Il est entendu que toutes les dispositions prévues à l'alinéa précédent ne seront appliquées au trafic avec un État tiers qu'au cas où un accord concernant la communication directe par chemins de fer aurait été conclu avec cet État.

Les personnes, bagages et marchandises, remis au transport sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et devant être expédiés pour ou à travers le territoire de l'autre à destination du territoire d'une tierce Puissance, ne seront pas traités moins favorablement ni sous le rapport de l'expédition ni sous celui des prix de transport et des impôts publics grevant les envois par chemins de fer, que les personnes, bagages et marchandises du pays, ou d'un autre pays quelconque, transportés dans les mêmes conditions, sur le même parcours et pour la même direction.

ARTICLE 14.

La présente convention entrera en vigueur un mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications et aura la durée d'une année. Si la convention n'est pas dénoncée par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de ladite période d'une année, elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée, cette dénonciation ne devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois.

ARTICLE 15.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à Berne, aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Protocole final.

Au moment de procéder à la signature de la Convention de Commerce entre la Pologne et la Turquie, conclue à la date de ce jour, les plénipotentiaires soussignés ont fait la déclaration suivante :

Ad ARTICLE 1er.

Chacune des parties contractantes s'engage à appliquer les prohibitions sans discrimination d'aucune sorte et, au cas où elle accorderait des dérogations ou licences pour l'importation ou l'exportation des produits prohibés, à ne point favoriser le commerce d'une Puissance quelconque au détriment du commerce de l'autre partie contractante.

Ad ARTICLE 7.

Vu que l'article 7 de ladite Convention de Commerce accorde aux produits du sol et de l'industrie des parties contractantes le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, les parties contractantes constatent que l'établissement, pour cause de dépréciation du change, des surtaxes ou des coefficients des majorations des droits d'entrée, frappant les produits du sol et de l'industrie de l'autre partie et qui ne s'appliqueraient pas à tous les autres pays, seraient contraires à l'esprit de la présente convention.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

ANNEXE (A).

Carte de Légitimation pour Voyageurs de Commerce.

MODÈLE.

Carte de Légitimation
pour
Voyageurs de Commerce

Il est certifié que le porteur de cette carte voyage pour la maison / les maisons

1. ..... à .....
2. ..... à .....
3. ..... à .....

pour l'année 19....., No. de la carte ; Armoirie.

et que cette maison acquitte / ces maisons acquittent les taxes légales.

Signalement du porteur :

Age .....
Taille .....
Cheveux .....
Signes particuliers .....

Valable
en Turquie et en Pologne.

Porteur
(Nom et prénom).

Signature du porteur :

Lieu, le 19 .....

L.S. (Autorité qui délivre la carte).

Signature :

.....

ANNEXE (B).

Carte d'Identité.

Il est certifié que M. ..... porteur de la présente carte, désirant se rendre avec ses marchandises aux foires et marchés en .... (pour les ressortissants polonais) en Turquie

(pour les ressortissants turcs) en Pologne, est domicilié à ..... et qu'il est tenu d'acquitter les taxes et impôts légaux pour l'exercice de son commerce ou industrie.

Le présent certificat est valable pour un délai de ..... mois (lieu, date, signature, sceau de l'autorité qui a établi le certificat).

Enclosure 3 in No. 174.

Convention d'Établissement between Poland and Turkey concluded at Lausanne on July 23, 1923.

Turkish representatives : Ismet Pasha, Dr. Riza Nour Bey, Hassan Bey.
Polish representatives : M. Jan Modzelewski, Minister at Berne, M. A. Lados, M. H. Tennenbaum.

ARTICLE 1er.

LES ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de s'établir et de séjourner sur le territoire de l'autre et pourront, en conséquence, aller, venir et circuler librement, en se conformant aux lois et règlements en vigueur dans le pays.

ARTICLE 2.

Il est entendu que les dispositions de la présente convention, n'ayant pas pour objet la question d'immigration, ne portent pas atteinte au droit de chacune des parties contractantes d'autoriser ou d'interdire librement l'immigration dans son pays.

ARTICLE 3.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, à l'égal des nationaux, le droit d'exercer toute espèce d'industrie et de commerce, et de se vouer à tous métiers et professions quelconques, excepté ceux réservés aux seuls nationaux en vertu des lois et règlements respectifs, et, en Turquie, en vertu d'un long usage (débardeurs, mahonniers, &c.).

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes n'auront à payer pour séjourner et s'établir sur le territoire de l'autre, ainsi que pour l'exercice, sur ce territoire, de tous genres de commerce, industrie, métier ou profession, aucun impôt, taxe ou charge, de quelque nature que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus des nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne seront soumis sur le territoire de l'autre, quant à leur personne, leurs biens, droits et intérêts et quant à l'acquisition, possession et jouissance desdits biens, ainsi qu'à leur transfert par cession, mutation ou héritage, à aucune charge, taxe ou impôt direct ou indirect, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui pourront être imposés aux nationaux.

ARTICLE 4.

Dans le cas, où l'une des parties contractantes, soit à la suite d'une sentence légale, soit d'après les lois ou règlements sur la police des mœurs, sur la police sanitaire ou sur la mendicité, soit pour des motifs de sûreté intérieure ou extérieure de l'État, expulserait par mesures individuelles les ressortissants de l'autre partie contractante, celle-ci s'engage à les recevoir. Le transport, jusqu'à la frontière, des personnes expulsées sera à la charge de la partie qui expulse.

ARTICLE 5.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront, sous condition de réciprocité, sur le territoire de l'autre, le droit d'acquérir, de posséder et d'aliéner toute espèce de biens mobiliers ou immobiliers, à l'exception des biens ruraux, en se conformant aux lois et règlements du pays. Ils pourront en disposer par acte de vente, échange, donation, testament ou autre acte quelconque, ainsi qu'entrer en possession par voie de succession en vertu de la loi ou par suite des dispositions entre vifs ou testamentaires.

Ils ne seront assujettis dans aucun des cas susmentionnés à des charges, taxes ou impôts, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront établis pour les nationaux.

ARTICLE 6.

Les ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes ne seront astreints, sur le territoire de l'autre, à aucun service militaire, soit dans les armées de terre ou de mer, soit dans les gardes ou milices nationales, ni à aucune obligation ou charge remplaçant le service militaire.

Ils seront exempts de tout emprunt forcé. Ils seront également exempts de toute autre prestation pécuniaire levée pour des buts de guerre et qui ne serait pas imposée légalement aux nationaux.

ARTICLE 7.

Les sociétés anonymes ou autres, commerciales et industrielles, qui ont leur siège social sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et qui sont constituées conformément aux lois de cette partie, seront reconnues également comme dûment constituées sur le territoire de l'autre partie, et leur capacité et le droit d'ester en justice seront déterminés par les lois de leur pays d'origine. Elles auront, à condition de réciprocité et en se soumettant aux lois du pays, le droit de s'établir, d'exercer sur le territoire de l'autre partie toute espèce d'industrie et de commerce et d'y acquérir toute sorte de biens mobiliers, ainsi que les biens immeubles nécessaires au fonctionnement de la société, étant entendu, dans ce cas, que l'acquisition n'est pas l'objet même de la société.

Il est entendu que la Pologne aura le droit d'interdire l'établissement des sociétés exerçant certaines branches d'industrie et de commerce qui en vertu de leur caractère d'utilité générale sont ou seront soumises à des restrictions spéciales applicables à tous les pays. Dans ce cas la Turquie aura, en vertu de la condition de réciprocité mentionnée ci-dessus, le droit de ne pas admettre sur son territoire les sociétés polonaises exerçant les mêmes branches d'industrie et de commerce.

Les sociétés anonymes ou autres, commerciales et industrielles, de chacune des parties contractantes ne pourront dans aucun cas être soumises pour l'exercice du commerce et de l'industrie, dans le territoire de l'autre, à des droits, taxes, impôts ou charges, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront exigés des sociétés nationales.

ARTICLE 8.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne pourront sur le territoire de l'autre, être expropriés de leurs biens, ni privés, même temporairement, de la jouissance de leurs biens que pour cause légalement reconnue d'utilité publique et moyennant une juste et préalable indemnité. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable.

ARTICLE 9.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes jouiront sur le territoire de l'autre, en tout ce qui concerne la protection légale et judiciaire de leur personne et de leurs biens, du même traitement que les nationaux.

En conséquence, ils auront libre et facile accès auprès des tribunaux et pourront ester en justice aux mêmes conditions que les nationaux, sous réserve des dispositions relatives à la caution *judicatum solvi* et à l'assistance judiciaire gratuite, qui seront régies par la législation locale jusqu'au règlement de ces questions par une convention spéciale à conclure entre les deux parties.

ARTICLE 10.

En matière de statut personnel, c'est-à-dire pour toutes les questions concernant le mariage, la communauté conjugale, le divorce, la séparation de corps, la dot, la paternité, la filiation, l'adoption, la capacité des personnes, la majorité, la tutelle, la curatelle, l'interdiction; en matières mobilières, le droit de succession testamentaire ou *ab intestat*, partage et liquidations; et, en général, le droit de famille des ressortissants des parties contractantes, seront seuls compétents les tribunaux nationaux ou autres autorités nationales siégeant dans le pays dont relèvent lesdits ressortissants.

La présente disposition ne porte pas atteinte aux attributions spéciales des consuls en matière d'état civil d'après le droit international ou les accords particuliers qui pourront intervenir, non plus qu'au droit des tribunaux des pays respectifs de requérir et recevoir les preuves relatives aux questions reconnues ci-dessus comme étant de la compétence des tribunaux nationaux ou autorités nationales des parties en cause.

ARTICLE 11.

La présente convention entrera en vigueur un mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications et aura la durée d'une année. Si la convention n'est pas dénoncée par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de ladite période d'une année, elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée, cette dénonciation ne devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois.

ARTICLE 12.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à Berne, aussitôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

[**E 8394/7734/44**] No. 175.

Mr Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 473.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 14, 1923.

I NOTE from your Lordship's telegram No. 76 to Tokyo, which has reached me in the telegraph sections, that His Majesty's Government have enquired the views of the Japanese Government in regard to the future status and place of residence of the Allied representatives in Turkey, and have expressed the opinion that, while the importance of the rôle to be played by the foreign representatives may outweigh other considerations, the diminished area of Turkey hardly appears to justify the maintenance of Ambassadors.

2. I had the honour in my despatch No. 82 of the 5th February last to express the hope that His Majesty's Government would not at any rate take the initiative in proposing the reduction of this post to a Legation. Though I would not for a moment recommend the appointment of Ambassadors to reside at Angora and have repeatedly told the Turks so, and though I fully appreciate the apparent anomaly of continuing Ambassadors in a country so attenuated, so impoverished and depopulated as Turkey, I am unequivocally of opinion that the importance of the rôle of the foreign representatives in Turkey does in fact far outweigh the relative unimportance of Turkey herself if estimated solely in terms of her actual size, wealth and population. The area of the Turkish Empire has been diminished and could be still further curtailed, was in fact so curtailed by the Treaty of Sèvres, without detracting from the importance of that rôle. The real issue is the geographical position of Turkey and the political and religious, strategical and commercial significance of Constantinople It is this consideration which, whatever the present intentions of the Angora Government may be and whatever town in Asia Minor they may choose to call their capital, will fatally compel the Government either to return here ultimately or at least to institute a special régime for Constantinople involving the maintenance here of the foreign missions.

3. The question of the capital and the future status of Constantinople must inevitably form the subject of early discussion by the Grand National Assembly, and it will then be possible to form a more decided opinion on the attitude to be adopted by the Powers in respect of their representation in Turkey. In the meantime, I would deplore any proposal for a reduction emanating from His Majesty's Government. In the two interviews I had with Ismet Pasha during his brief stay at Constantinople he laid particular emphasis on the significance which would be attached in Turkey to the early ratification of the treaty by Great Britain. I think that it may be taken as a fact that, whatever sentiments may be held by the majority of Turks, Ismet Pasha is sincerely impressed with the importance of friendship with England. He is, I truly believe, honestly desirous of inducing his countrymen to adopt his views in this respect. He is alive to the difficulties of his task on account of the profound mistrust and hatred felt for Great Britain, whom the Turks regard as principally responsible for the devastation wrought in Asia Minor in consequence of the Greek invasion. He expressed the earnest hope to me that the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the next few months would not be such as to render this task more onerous for him. He was, he said, anxious to restore his people's confidence in England, and for this reason hoped that she would be the first to ratify the treaty. This, he assured me, would do more than I might perhaps imagine to convince the Turks that England for her part was ready to recognise the new order of things in Turkey.

4. I reminded Ismet Pasha of a part of the message which I was instructed by your Lordship to deliver to him when he passed through Constantinople after the first phase of the Lausanne Conference, and in which you expressed your satisfaction at the settlement of the more important questions directly outstanding between Great Britain and Turkey. That message afforded a clear proof that His Majesty's Government would welcome good relations with Turkey in future. It was essential that she should first make a serious effort to set her house in order. If Turkey could by her future acts satisfy His Majesty's Government of her honesty and loyalty in this respect, Great Britain, where the traditions of friendship for Turkey still survived in spite of the enormities committed by the Turks since 1914, would not refuse to lend a hand to help her to overcome the numerous difficult problems which confronted her. I was personally of the opinion that it was to our mutual benefit and in the

interests of peace in the Near East generally to revert to the Anglo-Turkish policy of the middle of the last century. Nevertheless, facts and not merely opinions were necessary to persuade His Majesty's Government that such a view was justified and that such a policy was likely to be fruitful of good results.

5. I have ventured to quote these observations at some length because I feel that they have a certain bearing on the subject of this despatch. The first few months after the signature of the Lausanne Treaty may have a decisive influence on future developments. Turkey is sitting on the fence, and the slightest impulse one way or the other may determine whether the policy of Ismet Pasha is to succeed or fail. The early ratification of the treaty by Great Britain will, in his opinion, undoubtedly tend towards its success. The knowledge that His Majesty's Government are pressing for the reduction of this mission from an Embassy to a Legation, with all the humiliation for Turkey, however salutary, which that implies, cannot fail to handicap his efforts and give an impulse in the contrary direction.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 8398/199/44] No. 176.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 477.) *Constantinople, August* 14, 1923.

My Lord,

THE two outstanding events of the past week in the Turkish political world have been the opening on the 11th instant of the new National Assembly and the retirement, at least temporarily, from the political arena of Reouf Bey, the President of the Council of Ministers.

2. Although the supersession of Reouf by Fethi Bey has not yet been confirmed by the Assembly, it can be taken as definite, and as such affords clear evidence of the uncertainty of the internal situation at Angora. Three weeks ago Reouf Bey appeared to be firmly established and to be acquiring an ever-increasing share of political control. A fortnight ago it was announced that after his labours, which, during the Lausanne Conference were undoubtedly of a most arduous nature, he would take a short rest before the opening of the Assembly. This appeared so natural as to attract little attention, and it was only a few days ago that the unconfirmed rumours of a split between Mustafa Kemal and his principal lieutenant crystallised into a certainty that they had decided to part company. Even now the only reason given for the retirement of Reouf Bey is that of fatigue, which, it is true, may be one of the factors in the situation. But past experience of Mustafa Kemal's methods and character tend to the conviction that this sudden change is due rather to his jealousy at the growing power of a leading Minister and possibly also the latter's dissatisfaction with the Ghazi Pasha's schemes and actions.

3. The retirement of Reouf Bey removes the most powerful of Mustafa Kemal's rivals. On the other hand, the future identification of Reouf Bey with any of the opposition groups would be a serious menace to the Kemalist position. He is generally regarded as the most honest, and consequently trusted more than any of the present Turkish politicians. His name counts for much in this country, and whatever be his future line of action he must be expected to carry with him a large measure of parliamentary support. It is perhaps significant, and the Turkish press has not been slow to emphasise the fact, that immediately after leaving Angora Reouf Bey paid a visit to a former Kemalist Minister, who later went over to the Opposition. For the moment, however, too much importance need not be attached to this fact, as it is possible that, in order to eliminate the chance of his active opposition, Mustafa Kemal may endeavour to induce Reouf to accept the post of Turkish Ambassador at London or Washington. His nomination to the former post has indeed been persistently rumoured ever since the conclusion of peace appeared a practical certainty.

4. The appointment of Fethi Bey as his successor is symptomatic. A leading military member of the Committee of Union and Progress, Fethi Bey was in 1909 charged with the escort to Salonica of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and, after the Balkan Wars, became Minister at Sofia, where he had Mustafa Kemal Pasha as his military attaché. Recalled in 1917, he was offered but declined Cabinet rank, and on Talaat

Pasha's fall at the armistice lost no time in directing a vigorous attack on the policy of which he himself had been a strong partisan

This did not, however, prevent his deportation to Malta, from which he returned in August 1921 to take up immediately the post of Minister of Interior at Angora, which he has since held in spite of a long absence in Europe during the summer of last year. The incident connected with his reception in London is well known to your Lordship. He has been one of the most steadfast of Mustafa Kemal's supporters and may be confidently expected to be a willing instrument for the furtherance of the Ghazi Pasha's schemes without any of the qualms of conscience which are reported lately to have disturbed Reouf Bey. I believe him to be unscrupulous, and, although I am ignorant of his attitude in regard to foreign politics, it is not unlikely that it may show a Francophil tendency, as he was much fêted by the French in the course of his mission to Europe last summer. The newspaper "Ileri," which I have for some time suspected of being French subventioned, three days ago devoted a long leading article to a warm eulogy of Fethi Bey, whom, as the new president designate of the council, it described as "the right man in the right place."

5. The opening of the Assembly on the 11th instant has confirmed the forecast which I ventured to make in my despatch No. 326 of the 28th May. Although the elections have not yet been finally concluded at Trebizond, approximately 200 of the new Deputies were at Angora on the appointed day and forthwith set about the completion of the necessary formalities attendant on the opening of the new Assembly. These afforded an opportunity for a Deputy to object to the assumption by Mustafa Kemal of the dual functions of Deputy for Smyrna as well as for Angora, and for a few minutes the debate is said to have been heated. The majority of the Deputies appeared to incline to the view that the Pasha was above the law, but this did not prove acceptable to the Assembly as a whole, and the objecting Deputy demanded either a modification of the Constitution or else the resignation by Mustapha Kemal of one of his mandates. The question was finally left in abeyance on the understanding that in a few days Kemal would make known his definite choice. The incident is, however, significant as showing, even at this early date, that Kemal will not receive blind obedience from the Assembly, even though it is composed entirely of his nominal partisans.

6. The "mazbatas" of the Deputies having been examined and found in order, the Assembly proceeded, on the 13th instant, with the election of its officials. Only one Deputy did not vote for Mustafa Kemal Pasha as President, and this one vote, which was given to Ismet Pasha, is stated to have been that of Kemal himself, while Ali Fouad Pasha was equally unanimously chosen as Vice-President

7. In accepting the Presidency, Kemal delivered a speech mainly devoted to a detailed review of events in Turkey since the armistice of Mudros. The Ottoman Government was disposed of in a few words as having been responsible for the *débâcle* of 1918. Much play was, however, made of the so-called treason of the Sultan-Caliph, who had been forced on the people by virtue of his right of succession, while particularly bitter references were made to him in connection with the despatch to Anatolia in 1920 of an Imperial force to subdue the Nationalists. The indignities and cruelties inflicted on the Turkish people by the Allied forces were dealt with at some length, and reference was made to the Greek occupation of Asia Minor. The recital of these events only served, however, as a peg on which to hang descriptions of the Nationalist achievements. The early struggles against what appeared hopeless odds, the Congress of Sivas, the securing of arms, the transformation of irregular bands into regular disciplined corps, the meeting of the first Assembly at Angora, the consciousness of growing strength, the initial and final successes over the Greeks and the crowning victory at Lausanne, all were in turn reviewed amid the cheers of the crowded Assembly.

8. Turning to the future, Mustafa Kemal remarked that, though the door towards civilisation and progress had now been opened, much still remained to be done if the fruits of sacrifice and victory were not to be frittered away. The first essential was to assure tranquillity to the people and authority to the Government. The independence of the country must be secured against all possibility of surprise, a task which could be entrusted to the army alone, and the perfection of the military machine must, therefore, be a cardinal point of future policy. Particular importance should he said, also be attached to the reform of the judicial system, as well as to such matters as public works, commerce and education.

9. After stating that the new Turkey desired to maintain, on a basis of reciprocal sincerity, friendly relations with all foreign States, Kemal Pasha called for the

maintenance of the unity which had already given the nation such glorious victories, and which alone could give real hope for the future. It was in this vein that he concluded. He paid a tribute to the dead, saluted the dawn of the era of national sovereignty in Turkey, and, in truly royal fashion, invoked the blessing of the Almighty on the labours of the new Assembly.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 177.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 20.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 766.) *Paris, August* 19, 1923.
(Telegraphic.)
THE President of the Council told me yesterday evening that he was not at all pleased with the behaviour of the Turks since the signing of the treaty. General Weygand had reported hostile movements of troops on the Syrian frontier. M. Poincaré admitted, however, that this was probably the result of local anarchy and not of orders from Angora.

No. 178.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Constantinople (*No.* 253) *and Moscow* (*No.* 169).

Foreign Office, August 20, 1923.

(Telegraphic.) R.
ACCORDING to press reports, Turkish authorities are expelling Armenians from vilayets of Van and Bitlis into territory of Armenian Republic Can you give any details.

No. 179.

Mr. Chilton to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 368.) *Washington, August* 22, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.
MY telegram No. 346.
In the course of conversation yesterday with Secretary of State, Mr. Brooks enquired whether he could give any further expression of views. Mr. Hughes replied that United States Government would be happy to act with the Allies in solution they thought best, whether for Embassy or Legation. He agreed with Chargé d'Affaires to begin with. As a practical point, he explained that, if post was to be Legation, it would involve new approbation by Congress, present approbation being for Embassy. As regards place of residence, he thought this must depend on Turkish Government.

No. 180.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 255.) *Foreign Office, August* 22, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.
ITALIAN Government state that, while British and Italian post offices are to be closed on evacuation, French is to remain, and they are anxious that we should urge on French Government uniform procedure. Matter hardly seems to us of sufficient importance to warrant action at Paris. What are your views?

No. 181.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 23.)

(No. 292.) *Athens, August* 23, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.
CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 96 to Athens.
Head of political bureau at Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whose attention I drew to the matter, informs me that at present moment Greek authorities are themselves encountering difficulties from Bulgarian and other bands, particularly near frontier line.
Strictest orders have been issued against anything in the nature complained of in paragraph 2.
Head of bureau is convinced that Turks are merely seeking pretext for persecuting Greeks left in Turkey. He begs to draw attention of His Majesty's Government to fact that, in spite of amnesty at Lausanne, Turks are detaining between 150 and 200 Ottoman Greeks in prison. Greek Government have twice protested to Spanish Government. He will send me nominal roll so far as it exists at present. He also complains that eighteen Christians from Beicos, and others on whose behalf Sir H. Rumbold and M. Veniselos had interceded with Ismet at Lausanne, although not executed, are still detained in prison.
I have telegraphed to British consul-general at Salonica for information regarding reports telegraphed by Mr. Henderson, and I will telegraph further information if it should reach me.
(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 155.)

No. 182.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 23.)

(No. 425.) *Constantinople, August* 22, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.
GENERAL HARINGTON has shown me War Office telegram to him respecting pardon for Turks guilty of offences in occupied territories (see my telegram No. 415).
In view of importance of securing immunity for his civilian employees, he is willing to agree to this extension of amnesty declaration, and neither of us anticipates difficulty in connection with Turkish offenders during evacuation period.
Reserve might be specifically made in respect of future offences entailing death or bodily harm as under article 4 of declaration.
It is important that Allied guarantee should be furnished [group undecypherable], as treaty will probably be ratified to-day or to-morrow.
If Allied Governments delay much longer, would it be possible for us to give and receive guarantee individually? We are chiefly concerned, as our employees number several thousand, whereas French and Italians have very few natives.

No. 183.

Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 294.) *Athens, August* 24, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.
GENERAL Headquarters at Salonica dissolved midnight, 20th August.

No. 184.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 427.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 24, 1923.

MY telegram No. 426.

Adnan Bey communicated to the three High Commissioners last night two communications addressed to them by Ismet Pasha, stating that Grand National Assembly had voted yesterday, 23rd August, draft laws ratifying Peace Treaty as well as other acts signed at Lausanne.

First note refers to article 1 of evacuation protocol, and recalls that evacuation is to begin from date of this communication.

Second note refers to article 1 of protocol relating to Karagatch, and asks that Greek Government be notified accordingly. It recalls that territory mentioned in that article is to be handed over to Turkish authorities on 18th September.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 98.)

No. 185.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 428.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 24, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Mixed Railway Commission at Karagatch will cease to function on 15th September.

It is important that League of Nations should, before that date, appoint commissioner in accordance with article 107 of treaty. My colleagues are making similar suggestion to their Governments.

General Harington suggests British representative on present Mixed Commission, Major Ross, would be a most suitable appointment. He enjoys full confidence of both parties, and I would strongly recommend his nomination if possible.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 99.)

No. 186.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 429.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 24, 1923.

MY telegram No. 426.

In handing me communication respecting ratification of treaty, Adnan Bey read to me telegram from Ismet expressing hope that Allies would now withdraw men-of-war from Smyrna. Telegram referred to joint notes to Adnan of February last mentioning that Allies intended to maintain right of keeping ships there until signature of peace, as well as to similar communication addressed to Vali by Admiral Nicolson.

Though Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, is prepared to withdraw ships as soon as possible, I had been unable to make communication to Adnan authorised in your telegram No. 242, as French Government, while in agreement in general principle, was opposed to any previous notification to Turks.

I accordingly informed Adnan that I had already been in communication with you on the subject, and that all three Governments were in favour of early withdrawal, but had not yet decided on actual date. I told him that one difficulty was question of telegraphic communication with our consul there, which since Turkish overland telegraph would not take cypher messages were at present transmitted by wireless to men-of-war. Withdrawal would be inconvenient until this restriction was removed. Adnan said that good effect of withdrawal would be spoilt if made conditional on this. He said, however, that he would at once telegraph urgently to Angora to get this restriction removed.

I do not think Turks will raise difficulties, but consider that this point should be settled first. I am therefore sending cyphered text of this telegram to Adnan with request that it be sent to Smyrna through Turkish telegraph office. If I receive in next two or three days cyphered reply from acting consul-general by same route, I shall endeavour to arrange with colleagues for withdrawal about middle of next week.

(Repeated to Smyrna, No. 65.)

No. 187.

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August* 24, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 212.

Instructions have been sent to Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople to take action similar to that adopted by his colleagues.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 188.

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August* 24, 1923.

MY telegram No. 152.

Italian Government consider that representatives in Turkey should have rank of Ambassador. They agree that relations should be opened by a Chargé d'Affaires for short period.

They also consider that Ambassador should reside at Constantinople, and that a local representative should be appointed to Angora, not, however, by His Majesty's Government, but by Ambassador, to whom all arrangements in this connection should be left.

No. 189.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 257.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 24, 1923.

MY telegram No. 246 of 9th August: Withdrawal of warship from Smyrna.

As Turkey has now ratified treaty, you may, without waiting for your colleagues to receive similar instructions, inform representative of Angora Government informally that British man-of-war will be withdrawn from Smyrna.

No. 190.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Kennard (*Rome*).

(No. 220.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 24, 1923.

MY telegram No. 212 of 8th August: Withdrawal of warship from Smyrna.

Please inform Italian Government that Mr. Henderson has now been instructed to inform representative of Angora Government informally that British man-of-war will be withdrawn from Smyrna.

No. 191.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 25.)

(No. 430.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 24, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 255.

My Allied colleagues and I are agreed that practical difficulties in the way of maintenance of post offices after evacuation will be great, and that uniform action in principle is desirable, but it seems too late, even if it were expedient, for us now to modify arrangements already made in accordance with schemes [? group omitted] verbal concurrence of French and Italian delegates at Lausanne (see Lausanne despatch No. 105 of 30th January).

I think, therefore, that I should merely inform my colleagues here that, so far as British post office is concerned, these arrangements will be carried out. I doubt if it will benefit French if they do not come into line. In my opinion no good purpose will be served by not carrying out spirit of treaty in this respect.

No. 192.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 25.)

(No. 433.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 25, 1923.

MY telegram No. 430.

Acting French High Commissioner informs me that French Government have now agreed to simultaneous closing of Allied post offices on termination of occupation.

[E 8191/1482/44] No 193.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Count de Saint-Aulaire.

Foreign Office, August 25, 1923.

Your Excellency,

YOUR note of the 25th May relative to the invitation addressed by Schroder's Bank to the Imperial Ottoman Bank with a view to a discussion of French and Italian participation in the future development of the Anatolian Railway, the Haidar Pasha Port and the Mersina-Adana Railway has been carefully considered by the Departments concerned.

2. I am informed that the proposal emanated from Messrs. Rothschild and Sons and Messrs. J. Henry Schroder and Co., who, with the National Provincial and Union Bank of England (Limited), the Westminster Bank (Limited) and Lloyd's Bank (Limited), form one group, and that the control of the enterprise, which is the subject of the proposal, is in the hands of this British group.

3. I have noted your Excellency's observations on the composition of the Orient Railway Bank of Zurich, but I would point out that even admitting for the sake of argument the German character of this bank, it is not yet definitely established, as you are aware, whether it could be brought under Allied control by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles. The question whether the Reparation Commission is enabled, under article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles, to acquire the German shares in this bank has been referred to arbitration, but the Reparation Commission has never claimed the right to acquire the whole or part of the bank's interest in Turkish railway companies, nor has it offered to submit to arbitration the question of whether it possesses such right. Consequently it would not appear that article 260 could have been relied upon as providing the means to secure the acquisition of the portfolio of the Orient Railway Bank of Zurich. This portfolio, which is in great part mortgaged to Swiss debenture holders, had already been offered to international, and even powerful non-Allied groups,

and it is at least satisfactory that control of it has been finally and definitely acquired by an Allied group.

4. You allege that the combination proposed by the British group, not being in conformity with the principle of equal partition of Allied interests in German-worked railways in Turkey, takes no account of articles 155 and 260 of the Treaty of Versailles, articles 293 and 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Tripartite Agreement and its addendum, the "Accord particulier" of the 25th March, 1922, nor of the guiding principles of the Treaty of Lausanne.

5. I have already discussed the question of the acquisition of the portfolio of the Orient Railway Bank of Zurich in the light of article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles. As regards the other instruments cited, you will, I venture to think, agree that the Treaty of Sèvres, the Tripartite Agreement and its addendum, the "Accord particulier," are not operative, and will never become so. In fact, an agreement, to take the place of the Tripartite Agreement, has already been concluded between the Government of the French Republic and the Italian Government

6. I cannot agree with you that it was ever the intention to secure in the peace treaty with Turkey that there should be equal participation of British, French and Italian interests in the railways formerly controlled by the Germans in Asia Minor. Article 95 of the original draft, to which you specifically refer, was indeed framed on the hypothesis that the Turkish Government would seek to nationalise the Anatolian railway, and that Allied interests would be involved—not in the ownership but in the exploitation of the line. There does not, however, appear to have been any implication that the three Allies should hold equal shares in the exploiting company Finally this article does not appear in the peace treaty as signed, and there is nothing to replace it which contains the slightest indication of any understanding as to the future participation of Allied capital in Turkish transport undertakings.

7. Passing to the general question of the elimination of the Germans from railway enterprise in Turkey, I have already stated that the British group inform me that this has been secured through the acquisition of the control of the portfolio of the Orient Railway Bank of Zurich. In this connection I would submit, for your consideration, that unless it can be shown that, under article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Reparation Commission were entitled to and had prior to January 1921 taken all necessary steps to acquire the Orient Railway Bank of Zurich—which is doubtful—or to acquire its portfolio—which is unlikely—it is difficult to see how German influence could have been more effectively eliminated than by the British group's action.

8. Finally you ask that His Majesty's Government should intervene to intimate to the British group that it should assure to the French and Italian groups an equal share in the capital and control of its recent acquisition. It is difficult for His Majesty's Government to comply with this request for, as I informed the Italian Ambassador in my note on the Franco-Italian Agreement of the 12th March, 1923, a copy of which was communicated to you on the 6th April, 1923, "it is the established practice of His "Majesty's Government to allow British financial and industrial firms and groups "complete freedom to make their own combinations and arrangements, and to choose "their own spheres of activity." It would not seem to be either feasible or proper, more especially in view of the lapsing of the Tripartite Agreement and the "Accord particulier," to influence the British group to enter into an engagement of any kind against its inclination or against what might appear to it to be its interest.

9. I have, however, intimated to the British group, that His Majesty's Government expect that it will give French and Italian groups an equitable participation in its enterprise. The group has informed me that it is quite willing to do so, but it wishes, in view of the capital involved and of the financial risk incurred, to assure for itself effective control.

10. I trust that the foregoing explanations will satisfy your Government, and that they will agree that it is now for the French and Italian groups to open negotiations with the British group with a view to the early attainment of a satisfactory arrangement.

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 194.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 26.)

(No. 297.) *Athens, August* 25, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 427.

Italian Minister considers that according to terms of article 1 of protocol of 24th July notification should be made by Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople through Spanish representative there, who is in charge of Greek interests, especially in view of rupture of diplomatic relations here.

French Chargé d'Affaires and I are accordingly telegraphing in this sense, and I do not propose to take any action unless instructed by you.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 8626/199/44]

No. 195.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 27.)

(No. 490.) *Constantinople, August* 18, 1923.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a textual translation of the speech delivered on the 13th instant by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the Grand National Assembly at Angora Owing to its length this translation could not be completed in time for inclusion with my despatch No. 477 of the 14th instant.

2. As your Lordship will observe, Kemal Pasha confined himself to a large extent to a recital of past achievements. The old Assembly and the army were duly eulogised, and underlying these praises it is not difficult to read the hint that the organisation of the new Turkey and her victory were due to the directing hand of Mustafa Kemal himself. In regard to the Sultan, his references were particularly bitter, and it is interesting to note that at every point he linked the name of the Sultan with the country's enemies, thereby seeking further to discredit the former by showing him to have been a willing tool in, if not the instigator of, all the repressive measures taken during the earlier days of the Nationalist movement. This idea is indeed further developed than at any previous time, as Mustafa Kemal accuses the regular forces employed in 1920 by the Sultan's Government, and not the irregular Kemalist bands, of being rebels, *i.e.*, against the nation.

3. In my opinion, however, the main features of the speech, which, as in the case of nearly all Mustafa Kemal's pronouncements, is well worthy of perusal, are the reference to the army and the absence of any allusion to the constitutional question, which for some time had been the universal subject of discussion. The same line was taken by Fethi Bey, the new President of the Council, in the speech delivered immediately after his election, and would seem to indicate that Mustafa Kemal, having for a time coquetted with the idea of a Government on democratic and constitutional lines, has decided to rest his fortunes on the army which he knows rather than to face the uncertainty as regards his personal position which might result from a revision of the Constitution. The latter may well wait awhile, since the Constitutional Reform party must of necessity take time to complete and perfect its organisation, whereas the growing opposition of the Military party was a more immediate danger. A born opportunist, Kemal doubtless hopes that, if and when this opposition develops, the occasion will provide the means of dealing with it. In the meantime the Ghazi Pasha observes in his speech that peace will not be everlasting, that experience shows that might is right, and that the army is the sole guarantee of the future security and independence of Turkey. The military machine must therefore, he says, be developed and organised. If his intention be to set up a military dictatorship, he would scarcely have expressed himself differently.

4. The abandonment of the scheme of constitutional reform would appear to have been decided upon at a meeting of the People's party held on the eve of the opening of the Assembly. The reforms had in fact been drafted and discussed and only awaited the final approval when, on the motion of Mustafa Kemal, the whole question was indefinitely postponed. It is not improbable that it was this issue which finally brought about the retirement of Reouf Bey, who was understood to be strongly in favour of reforms, but who may not have felt himself strong enough at present to brave the hostility of Mustafa Kemal. This theory is indeed advanced to-day in the "Tevhid," which states that Reouf's resignation was due to his inability to work with his former

colleagues, whose views he had sought for long to reconcile with his own and with those of other groups in the Assembly. In the meantime he has been granted three months' leave of absence from the Assembly, but shows no inclination to break his self-imposed silence. Incidentally he refused the presidency of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly, and it is also reported that he has likewise declined the post of Turkish Ambassador at London which was alleged to have been offered to him.

5. By glorifying and strengthening the army, by flattering the Assembly, and by securing the election of Fethi Bey as President of the Council, Mustafa Kemal appears to have succeeded in re-establishing his ascendancy and to aim for the time being at carrying on by the same means as before. At any rate the constitutional issue has been delayed until after the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne. The resulting evacuation of Constantinople will add to the laurels of Kemal and his associates, but the practice of dismissing powerful rivals is one which cannot be indulged in indefinitely. Sooner or later internal questions will have to be faced, and Mustafa Kemal's appeal for national unity is not without significance.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 195.

Text of Speech delivered in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey at Angora on August 13, 1923.

(Translation.)

Gentlemen,

WE find ourselves at the opening of the session of the second Grand National Assembly of Turkey. I salute with the utmost respect the members who compose our new Assembly. At the same time, the opening of the session coincides with a happy event in the history of the new Turkish State. I regard this fact as a happy augury for the happiness and well-being of our country and nation and for the success of your august Assembly. Actually, our four years' struggle for independence has been terminated by a peace worthy of the honour of our nation. When the treaty signed at Lausanne has been ratified by your august Assembly, we shall enter the sphere of happy labour, free and independent in the full significance of these terms. With all my heart I wish you complete success for the maintenance of the happy results obtained, for the solution of questions arising out of the Treaty of Lausanne, and for your efforts to give our country peace and prosperity.

Gentlemen, during the period of national activity which preceded the meeting of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, I have enjoyed the esteem and confidence of your nation. I have exercised the presidency of the first Assembly and the functions of commander-in-chief of our heroic army. In these two qualities I have been the object of the greatest national honours. My election to the presidency by your august Assembly has aroused in my heart feelings of the deepest gratitude. In your presence and in that of the nation I undertake that all my material and administrative energies will be devoted to assuring success in the field of labour which has been opened by the peace, and that, leaning on your support and on the confidence of the whole nation, I shall continue to work in a manner worthy of the high value of the nation's confidence.

Gentlemen, the honour of being your chosen president imposes on me the duty of making certain declarations I hope that a favourable reception will be accorded to my declarations which deal with my position and my actions in the past. You are fully aware of the phases of the struggle and of all the sufferings as well as the joys of success through which the nation has passed. I am going to summarise these events in three distinct parts: the period from the armistice of Mudros up to the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and its Government, the years of our first Assembly, and, finally, the present, in which our new Assembly has met. I think that these three periods contain all the important national events which have led us to this day, and which have created the situation of to-day as well as the grandeur and greatness of our new duties. Before your high Assembly, which is the first of the peace inaugurated by the New Turkey, I deem it unnecessary to speak of the Ottoman Empire which has disappeared and of the general war which was its last great landmark. I shall therefore commence my remarks from the armistice of Mudros.

Gentlemen, the period from the conclusion of the armistice of Mudros up to the opening of our first National Assembly is full of the most tragic episodes and of the

gravest insults which can be inflicted on the prestige and dignity of a nation. As you are aware, from the very morrow of the signature of that armistice between the Allies and the Turkish Government it was in word and deed violated by the victors. Invading British, French and Italian armies established themselves on the dearest portions of our fatherland. Constantinople and the Straits became exercising grounds for the land and sea forces of the enemy. The Greek armies stained the quays of Smyrna with blood. They commenced to devastate our most prosperous provinces. The honour of our women and children was violated, as was everything which bore the Turkish name, even including some of our monuments and religious institutions. Daily our finest susceptibilities were wounded by the threat to erect the cross on St. Sophia. With pressure which could not be resorted to even in the case of prisoners, our officers, who bore on their shoulders the weight of centuries of glory, were obliged to render honours to the officers of the enemy. Our flag, emblem of our honour, was insulted. Foreign officers, established in the most remote corners of Anatolia to superintend the application of this iniquitous armistice, founded centres of intrigue under the name of intelligence bureaux, while, at the instigation of our internal enemies, they exposed our people to unimaginable cruelties and insults. The influence of the Government and the dignity of the nation became as playthings in the hands of those officers of aggression. In a word, the conscience of Turkism was exposed to a terrible test. It was impossible not to foresee the result of these unending aggressions or the tragedy of that result.

The Ottoman Sultan and Caliph, who, thanks to history and tradition, had been placed on the glorious throne of the fatherland, as well as his Government, delivered themselves to the enemy only in order to secure their own contemptible private ends. They made themselves the accomplices of the enemy by betraying the fatherland. The situation appeared completely hopeless. The force of the enemy was overwhelming; the misfortune was great and unbearable. In fact, we were compelled to choose between slavery and death. We had to struggle for freedom and independence against difficulties such as no other country in the world has ever had to face. Intelligent men regarded the situation as being beyond the limits of the destiny appointed for a conquered people. There was no longer any difficulty in understanding that the victorious Powers had decided on the final destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, it was not felt necessary to respect the honour or dignity of the Turkish people. It was impossible to imagine any obstacle in the way of the enslavement of the Turkish people and the dismemberment of Turkey. The people began to awake. In certain parts of the country committees were formed under various names, and the foundations were laid by the nation itself of armed defence against the enemy. Congresses in the east and in the west gave a fresh impetus to the national awakening. Finally, the General Congress of Sivas perfectioned within previously determined limits the different national organisations under the name of "the Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Roumelia," and thus united the national forces

Gentlemen, these serious efforts drew the attention of the enemy, and particularly of the Sultan-Caliph, who resorted to reprisals. Orders were issued for the persecution of the authors of the national movement. Measures of extermination were entered upon. The Palace and its Government, which had humbled themselves before the enemy, wished at any price to stamp out the national vigilance; they wished to prevent the nation from struggling against those who were attacking its right and its honour, and they gave themselves as guides to the enemy for the dismemberment of the country.

But, gentlemen, the determination of those who had organised the Congress of Sivas was firm, and their support from the nation was strong. They continued their labour without flinching. First of all, the election of the Deputies and the meeting of the Assembly were assured. In this way the nation gave the first proof of its existence and gained its first important success against despotism.

Gentlemen, in spite of all these crimes committed by the Palace and its Government against the fatherland and the nation, the latter sought with all sincerity once more to save the Sultan-Caliph as well as the Ottoman Empire; it contented itself with assuring the meeting of the Deputies elected in accordance with the laws of the Ottoman Empire. Although it was evident that, under foreign bayonets, the Deputies could not discharge their duties with absolute freedom of opinion, the hesitation and superficial considerations of the majority unfortunately made it necessary to hold the meeting in Constantinople. Gentlemen, our enemies and the Sublime Porte could not regard as probable a courageous act on the part of an Assembly at Constantinople. In their opinion, the meeting of this Assembly would not permit the development of a national organisation in Anatolia, and, after the national effervescence had been satisfied

in this manner, the tragedy would be continued anew. Those who realised this truth continued their struggle in Anatolia. Thanks to these efforts the organisation in Anatolia grew stronger. In spite of the unfavourable position of the Assembly, which leant on Anatolia, it continued its labours. This situation did not appear favourable to the enemy. In despair at seeing their end unrealisable by fraudulent means, they took a decision, and the tragic occupation of Constantinople took place on the 16th March, 1920. An end was, in fact, made to the life of the Ottoman Empire.

To the workers in Anatolia this event was not unexpected. From thenceforth the possibility of saving the Ottoman Empire and of securing under its auspices the salvation of the fatherland and the independence of the nation had competely disappeared. An invitation for the convocation of a National Assembly became indispensable. Finally, on the 23rd April, 1920, your predecessor, the first Grand National Assembly of Turkey, assembled in the room in which we find ourselves to-day. Our first Assembly, which will for ever occupy a high and honourable place in Turkish history, and which will win the appreciation of our grandchildren, proclaimed the assumption in its own hands of the destinies of the nation. It adopted the principles of national sovereignty as the basis of its actions and laid the foundations of a strong popular Government.

Gentlemen, the creation in Anatolia of a new national Government was a deed of foresight which proved the sagacity of our nation. But our enemies, and the Sultan-Caliph with them, were not pleased at this. They took common action with a view to imposing on us by force the Treaty of Sèvres which had been signed in Paris. They had recourse to every kind of devilry in order to stifle the national enthusiasm in Anatolia. On the one hand, using religion as a political instrument, they condemned the Anatolian warriors to death, and by means of "fetvas" incited the population to revolt; and on the other hand, while the pockets of certain persons were being filled, they sent against us forces called "police forces," or "the army of the Caliph." They deceived the innocent population, and under pressure lit up and down the interior the fires of insurrection.

Gentlemen, on the day of the opening of our first Assembly the insurrection directed from Constantinople had come within eight hours' distance of Angora. In Samsoun and its environs a cruel political revolt had been prepared with a view to dominating the surrounding country. The east, the west and the south of the fatherland were burning under the fires of the enemy. That was the situation which faced us at the opening of our national movement. Honourable Sirs, it was not easy to arrive at the brilliant result of to-day. I wish to draw your attention alike to the greatness of the journey between the commencement of our movement and the point at which we have arrived and to its shortness. Engrave it for ever firmly on your memories, for it is from this source that we must draw strength and vigour for our struggles of to-morrow.

Gentlemen, before I pass to the second phase, let me say that your predecessor, the High Assembly, never allowed itself to flinch in face of the terrors of the first days. It pursued its task with the great ability and power which it received from the nation. The Government of the new State threw itself courageously into the struggle. Those who had allowed themselves to be incited to revolt were reduced to obedience. Without guns, without rifles, without ammunition and without means, the army which had become a wreck was resuscitated. The irregular forces which had been created with painful efforts towards the end of the first struggle were immediately transformed into regular forces. This transformation caused the destruction of certain treacherous detachments who considered it contrary to their interests. The destiny and the tranquillity of the country were confided to a regular army. Gentlemen, the nation will ever gratefully recall the brilliant services rendered by the army in the first days of its organisation. The victory over Armenia, the first and second victories at In Kunu, the phases of heroic resistance and sacrifice shown in the battles on the southern front, all these will be gloriously remembered as precious events in the honoured history of the national army.

Gentlemen, in proportion as the years of struggle passed, our young army was organised on solid foundations. It showed the power and greatness to accomplish heroically the greatest and most important tasks which the will of the nation might demand of it. At the battle of the Sakaria it vanquished the proud Greek army and obliged it to retreat. Finally, it crushed the whole Greek army of Asia Minor in the battles of Afion-Kara Hissar and Doumlou Pounar and completely annihilated it and all its accessories on the soil of Anatolia. I leave it to history to appreciate the details of the battles of Anatolia, every phase of which was worthy of the glory of our fatherland, of our national history and of our grandchildren. But, gentlemen, the art, the music,

the literature and all the fine arts of the nation must for ever unitedly glorify this sacred struggle and the love of fatherland.

Sirs, these military events with which I have dealt were accompanied by very important political activities. In particular, we concluded with the Russians a treaty of friendship, which is still in force. We concluded treaties of the same nature with Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. As a result of our victory in the eastern front we made peace with the Armenians. As regards our relations of that time with the Western Governments, we were only able to conclude with the French the Agreement of Angora, which contained limited conditions. However, although we have sincerely endeavoured to obtain peace before and after every victory, our applications were either met with refusal or rejected with disdain.

Gentlemen, what can we do when the eternal rule which condemns to sterility rights unsupported by material forces has not shown an exception in regard to us? So long as the will of the nation could not appear in the form of victory, the Goddess of Peace did not open her arms to us.

Gentlemen, while our first Assembly was endeavouring to rescue the country from the feet of the enemy, and while it progressed towards the goal of an honourable peace for the nation, it established the edifice of the new Turkey. With this object it elaborated laws and took decisions. It also solved several questions in accordance with the needs of the different sections of the Government. In spite of the existence of certain persons of limited view who did not cease to create difficulties in the way of peace and of our military movements, the late Assembly discharged its duty well, and in general it gave life and deliverance to the fatherland and the nation.

After four years of struggle, and following on our decisive victory, the Military Convention of Mudania was concluded, and we passed to the period of peace deliberations. The difficulties encountered in the course of these negotiations have also been numerous. But I regard this as very natural, because the questions regulated during these peace negotiations were not questions of four years, but they were the evil inheritance of a period of four centuries. For the Ottoman Empire, during its most glorious and most powerful moments, had sacrificed to the detriment of the independence of the nation and of its vital interests so much that the result was not only the destruction of the Empire but also the exposure thereafter of the nation, the real proprietor of the country, to the greatest difficulties in establishing its rights and its existence. The difficulties have been successfully surmounted. As a result, the signed treaty will be submitted and explained to your august Assembly. Here I wish only to summarise the efforts already made and their results.

Gentlemen, not a trace remains of the Great Armenia which was to embrace Trebizond in the east and Adana in the south. The Armenians have been left within their own natural frontiers. The three sanjaks forcibly detached from the fatherland in 1878 are again under our flag. In the north the Pontus Government and its supporters who wished to establish themselves on the fairest and richest shores of the Black Sea have been eliminated. It has been recognised that Turkey is entitled to the same rights as every other civilised country. Again, in the south, our beautiful cities, such as Adana and many others, in respect of which we nourished such bright hopes for the wealth and power of our fatherland, were delivered from the invasion which oppressed them. In the west, our most prosperous provinces, our cities like Smyrna and Broussa, Pasha Ali and historic Adrianople, and beautiful Constantinople which incites the envy of the world, were liberated from the yoke of slavery and occupation. Besides this, there were broken the judicial, political, economic and financial chains which kept us behind other civilised nations. They were rent in sunder.

Gentlemen, the successes already obtained have only opened for us a way towards progress and civilisation. We have not yet arrived there. It is incumbent on us and on our children's children to tread this path without hesitation. We must never forget that it should be our daily thought not to permit the escape of the fruits obtained at the price of such sacrifices, and to take steps to secure that a return to the calamities of the past shall henceforth be impossible. But let us be sure that simple attention and vigilance and ingenious jealousy will not suffice to enable us to reach these ends. Gentlemen, the tasks falling to this race because of the centuries of bad administration present innumerable difficulties. We must therefore regulate our numerous and important affairs in a sane and rational manner. Experience has shown that the sole method of performing great works with limited means is not to scatter our forces and to concentrate the most of the existing means on the most important objectives. Without doubt in the period of peace which we are now entering we shall above all

devote our budget, in so far as it allowed, to the maintenance of the new State and to rendering it powerful and eternal. But to attain this end we must always have before our eyes certain cardinal points. The first cardinal point which occurs to me is that of security.

Gentlemen, the existence of a wise Government depends on its assuring the security of the country and the peace and tranquillity of the nation. A stable security must reign throughout the country and the nation must enjoy its tranquillity in peace and security. Those who seek in any part of the country to disturb the confidence of the people or the unity and security of the Government must find arrayed against them the whole forces of the State. Then, gentlemen, the independence of the Turkish State is sacred. It must be for ever preserved and assured. The sole guarantee for the independence of the State and for the existence of the nation and the people is our heroic army. Particular attention must therefore be devoted to the reorganisation and development of our military machine. It would be foolishness to believe that the peace which we have obtained to-day will be an everlasting one. This is such an important truth that carelessness in regard to it even for one moment would endanger the whole existence of the nation. Naturally, so long as our rights, our honour and our dignity are respected we shall not fail to respond with the most absolute reciprocity. But, alas, we have learnt by bitter experience that violation of the rights of the weak is a law and that these rights are never respected. For that reason, gentlemen, we cannot in any circumstances postpone the preparations which every nature of eventuality may render necessary.

Gentlemen, while measures are being taken for ensuring the external and internal security of the country, very particular importance should be attached to the reform of our judicial system as soon as possible. From the point of view of assuring the success, well-being and happiness of the nation, you will realise the vital necessity and urgency of such questions as public works, commerce and public instruction.

Gentlemen I do not think it necessary to say anything more in regard to our foreign relations. Our objects are known to the whole world. It need not be doubted that we shall seek to live on friendly terms with our neighbours and with all foreign States and to follow a policy based on respect and reciprocal sincerity. I shall say this: we enter the era of peace with a very real sincerity and with a desire serious and calm. If your august Assembly will permit me, I would like to add a few words to all my observations to which you have so kindly listened.

Gentlemen, leaving details on one side for a minute, let us cast a glance over the existence of this sacred thing which we call the fatherland. We see it composed of a large stretch of black earth without life, without any work of art and without prosperity. Under this black earth are hidden treasures and on it there lives a nation noble and heroic. Now, we have undertaken these long painful struggles to prove that we are and ever shall be free and independent masters of this precious patrimony bequeathed to us by our ancestors. We have waged these struggles in the name of safeguarding the fatherland and the independence of the nation. The principal aim of our future activity will also be to assure and strengthen the tranquillity, the security and the protection of our fatherland. For this reason we are going to make the country prosperous and the people happy. Our hope, our strength and, more particularly, the unity which our nation and your august Assembly will show will be guarantees for the success of the efforts which we shall make along the path of progress and civilisation.

My honourable sirs, before concluding my remarks I would invite you all to perform one great duty. Let us together do honour to the heroes who distinguished themselves during the critical days through which we have passed. Among them are not only the heroes whose breasts have been pierced by the sword of the enemy on the field of battle, but also the unfortunate old men, women and children who have perished in the flames. Among them are the young girls whose honour has been violated and who are condemned to eternal weeping. Among them are families who have lost their homes and who have buried their children. And among them are the conquerors who having gloriously performed their tasks on the field of battle have to-day returned to their villages. Let us pray for the rest of the souls of the martyrs.

Gentlemen, the secret of all the successes of which we can all justly be proud is found in the edifice of the new Turkey itself. I pray that Almighty God may accord your august Assembly His support to assure the happy development of the country under these conditions.

[E 8627/199/44] No. 196.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 491.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 21, 1923.*

THE Grand National Assembly at Angora has been chiefly occupied during the past week with formal business and in clearing the way for the important questions which, commencing with the Treaty of Lausanne, must shortly engage its attention.

2. Until now the treaty has been under consideration by the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Assembly presided over by Yussuf Kemal Bey. The commission's report, which is understood unanimously to recommend integral acceptance, will to-day be laid on the table of the Assembly. It is announced that the debate on the treaty will be free, though part of it will be carried on behind closed doors, and that some thirty Deputies will participate in it. I much doubt, however, that anything like this number will eventually speak, since apart from the Deputies elected from the areas in the neighbourhood of the Turco-Syrian frontier who will demand the extension of Turkish sovereignty to their fellow-countrymen beyond the border, little or no opposition is anticipated. The motion for ratification will probably be carried by a very large majority and not later than the 25th instant.

3. The initial reception accorded by the local press to the new Government was on the whole unfriendly. The absence of Reouf Bey was almost universally deplored, and it was suggested that reasons of fatigue might better have accounted for the retirement of several other Ministers than for that of the former President of the Council. The speech of Fethi Bey was criticised as being altogether inadequate in present circumstances, and suspicion was excited by the references made by Kemal Pasha to the dominant position to be occupied by the army in the Turkish State. Subsequently, however, when it was stated that the whole programme of the Government was under consideration and that a definite pronouncement of policy will shortly be made by the President of the Council, criticism abated and during the last few days has given place to an attitude of reserve.

4. Meanwhile several important meetings of the Popular party have been devoted to the discussion, which at times appears to have been somewhat lively, of the party's programme which is shortly to be announced. To one of these meetings Mustafa Kemal submitted the question of his double mandate for Angora and Smyrna and, after stating that he himself was unable to make a choice, left the matter to the decision of the party. The latter, as had been anticipated, accorded the privilege by right of priority to Angora, and a fresh election will now have to take place at Smyrna. This decision is, however, of some interest as showing that the minority, who refused to accept the theory that Kemal was above the law, have carried their point, and as a reminder that he must walk warily, even though there is no properly constituted Opposition in the Assembly.

5. The brigandage, to which special reference was made in Fethi Bey's speech, is also by no means a negligible factor in the situation. In some circles brigandage is regarded as merely a pretext for the use of force, and in this connection one newspaper a few days ago suggested that justice and not force was necessary if the new Turkey is to maintain her position. As reported in my despatch No. 478 of the 15th instant, force is, however, being employed, and according to information now received from the acting consul-general at Smyrna, the position in the interior is serious, and casualties have been numerous, two wagon-loads of wounded having already arrived at Smyrna. Travellers from the interior have reported to Mr. Urquhart that the roads are becoming increasingly unsafe owing to the activities of deserters and unpaid demobised soldiers, while there is also an unconfirmed rumour that a certain Hedja Mustafa has established himself in the hills and is preaching the re-establishment of the Sultanate.

6. While the latter story must be accepted with reserve, information from various sources indicates that Konia, as in the past, is a centre of the Oppositionists. Little further has for the moment been heard of the officer's union to which reference was made in my despatch No. 464 of the 7th instant, but it is to be noted that Nureddin Pasha, the commander of the First Army at Ismid, who is one of its leading members, has left, nominally on two months' leave of absence, and in doing so has addressed a farewell order to his troops. It is likewise reported that similar leave of absence is to be given to Ali Ihsan and Yacoub Shevki Pashas.

7. Reouf Bey has so far given no definite sign of his intention to associate himself with any of the Opposition groups. It is, however, symptomatic that such organs of the

local press as have shown an inclination to espouse his cause to-day report that on his arrival at Konia two days ago he was received with general acclamation. The streets were gaily decorated and triumphal arches erected in his honour, while a procession of motor-cars and carriages met him at a distance of 8 miles from the town and escorted him to his hotel.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 8629/8629/44] No. 197.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 493.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August 22, 1923.*

SOMETHING akin to consternation has been caused in both Government and unofficial circles in Turkey by the recent depreciation of the Turkish lire, which, instead of rising after the signature of peace as many Turks fondly hoped, has fallen from the vicinity of 7 to nearly 9 to the pound sterling. The difficulties which the Government at Angora is at present experiencing in paying the salaries of its troops and functionaries and is likely in the future to meet in order to find money to finance its schemes for the reorganisation and development of the new Turkey, had caused a rumour to be widely spread that a new issue of paper money was contemplated. The rumour was sufficiently prevalent and credible to cause an official communiqué to be published to the effect that the Government, "which did not find it necessary to take this step even "during the war of independence, has, now that peace is signed, less need than ever to "have recourse to such a measure."

2. There has also been much discussion in the press and elsewhere regarding the necessity for putting a stop to speculation, which in many quarters is regarded as the main cause of the fall in the Turkish exchange. With this idea in view, it has been widely proposed that the Constantinople Bourse should be closed. The foreign banks have also been the object of considerable obloquy in this connection, the most violent attack being that directed against the Ionian Bank, with which I have dealt more fully in my despatch No. 486 of the 20th instant. The Public Debt Administration is also accused, by at least one paper, of being concerned in the manipulation of the exchange.

3. The Turks do not seem to realise, or at any rate refuse to acknowledge, that the present depreciation of the currency is merely a natural result of the entire lack of confidence in Turkey which prevails at the moment in local, commercial and financial circles, and which is likely to increase rather than diminish as the date of the final evacuation of the Allied troops approaches.

4. The British army alone spends probably from 35,000*l.* to 40,000*l.* a week here If the considerable sums spent by the other military and naval forces, including the American, are taken into consideration, it would scarcely be overestimating if the total amount spent per month in the town as the result of the occupation were reckoned at over 300,000*l.* Nor would it be surprising if the result on the small local market of the sudden cessation of this hitherto steady flow of foreign currency were to produce in the near future a further considerable fall in the value of Turkish currency.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 8630/199/44] No. 198.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 494.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report from the acting consul-general at Smyrna on the situation in Anatolia.

Constantinople, August 22, 1923.

Enclosure in No. 198.

Acting Consul-General Urquhart to Mr. Henderson.

(No. 112.)
Sir, *Smyrna, August* 17, 1923.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the rumours which are current to the effect that there is serious disorder in the Smyrna hinterland.

2. There is some difficulty in estimating exactly how much truth there is in these rumours, but the following are established facts :—

(*a.*) Insecurity has increased during the past few months at a rate alarming to the Government;

(*b.*) Besides small detachments of troops from various points, a large number of infantry and cavalry is being moved from Soma to the region between Tourbali and Egerdir. These troops arrive by the Cassaba Railway, and are immediately transferred to the Aidin line, one train of about thirteen wagons running nightly. Such trains have been running nightly since the 12th instant, and are expected to continue until ten or eleven trains have run altogether. The troops are fully equipped.

3. Before his departure from Smyrna the late vali, referring to the situation in the interior, stated that the Government was resolved to restore security, and would employ the military, and not the police, to do so. I am informed that the Minister of the Interior made similar statements in his opening speech in the new Assembly.

4. Popular rumour has it that the measures taken are of extraordinary severity, and that martial law is in force in the region referred to above. Villages are said to have been destroyed during the fighting.

5. There would appear to be some slight cause for discussion as to whether the law-breakers are mere brigands, deserters and unpaid demobilised soldiers banded together for robbery, or whether they are under leaders holding to some political principle which leads them into opposition to the present rulers. I consider, however, that it would be altogether rash, on the basis of present information, to imagine that any organised revolt has been attempted against the Government, despite reports of the existence of an organising rebel leader named Hodja Mustafa. Discontent there certainly is, but I do not believe that it has reached the stage of organised rebellion, and the unrest in the interior would therefore be but a strong outbreak of brigandage due to poverty and administrative disorganisation. The Government has thousands of troops in the area, and may be expected to crush the brigands; but, with a shrinking national production and unfavourable European markets for raisins and tobacco, it will require extraordinary wisdom on the part of the Government and patience on the part of the people to avoid further similar, if not more serious, troubles during the coming winter.

I have, &c.
R. W. URQUHART.

No. 199.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 27.)

(No. 298.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August* 26, 1923.

MY despatch No. 624.

Decree law, dated 25th August, ratifies Treaty of Lausanne and all the conventions annexed to it.

Second decree of same date puts an end to state of war.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 157.)

No. 200.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 27.)

(No. 434.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, August* 27, 1923.

UNDER Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, Annex 7, by which Turkey is bound by article 25 of Lausanne Treaty, Germany renounced in favour of principal Allied Powers all her rights over certain cables, including Constantinople–Constantza cable, German share in which should therefore be transferred to Reparation Commission.

On the other hand, article 110 of Lausanne Treaty, by which Roumania and Turkey are to come to an agreement about this cable, makes no mention of Allies' rights under Treaty of Versailles.

French military authorities have exploited cable since armistice for benefit of Allies, and enquire to what authority they should hand it over.

In view of divergence indicated above, I would be glad of instructions.

My Allied colleagues are addressing similar telegram to their Governments.

No. 201.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (*No.* 311 (*by bag*)) *and Rome* (*No.* 221 (*R*)).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 27, 1923.

PLEASE act on my telegram No. 305 (No. 217) of 17th August: Extension of Turkish armistice.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 259.)

No. 202.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August* 28, 1923.

HEAD of Political Bureau at Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me that last June Greek authorities succeeded in discovering complete anti-Greek organisation in Western Thrace directed by Fuad Bey from Bulgaria. Many Mussulman Greek subjects are implicated and are being tried. Should any be condemned to death, sentence would be commuted, in spite of fact that, as crimes were committed within last few months, persons do not come under Lausanne amnesty for acts committed before November 1922.

Greek Government have to-day received through Netherlands Minister strong note from Turkey threatening reprisals unless all these people are released. Head of bureau points out that it is impossible to govern in Western Thrace if every plot or crime is to be tolerated. As Turks have not ceased to persecute Ottoman Greeks, he fears they are merely seeking pretext for further trouble in the future, and wishes British authorities to be informed (see my telegram No. 292). He will send me copy of Greek reply.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 160.)

No. 203.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 301.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August* 28, 1923.

MY immediately preceding telegram and my telegram No. 292.

According to press 800 Greek hostages are detained in prisons at Oushak and undergoing great privations. Head of Political Bureau confirms this. These hostages, and military men still in Turkish hands, should be released according to terms of agreement of 30th January, 1923. Representative of International Red Cross is going to Constantinople in a few days to look into matter.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 204.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 437.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 28, 1923.

ATHENS telegram No. 297.

Spanish Chargé d'Affaires here, though in charge of Greek interests, does not represent Greek Government, with which he corresponds only through Spanish Legation at Athens.

Best manner of overcoming difficulty caused by rupture of British and Italian diplomatic relations at Athens is for French representative there to make necessary notification to Greeks on our behalf.

My colleagues are also recommending this solution.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 102.)

No. 205.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 438.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 28, 1923.

MY telegram No. 429.

Turkish Ministers and Mustafa Kemal are to visit Smyrna on 9th September to celebrate anniversary of its recapture. I think it would be fitting that Allied warships should withdraw before that date.

I am anxious to arrange for early withdrawal, at any rate, of British man-of-war, as this would facilitate return there of British subjects, and especially Maltese from Malta, for permission for which Governor is constantly pressing me. This could be used as argument to convince French Government, who might be informed that, in any case, we propose to withdraw by, say, 7th September.

Cypher telegram referred to in last paragraph of my telegraph above mentioned duly reached Smyrna and I have received reply. I am repeating this by same route.

(Repeated to Smyrna, No. 69.)

[E 8570/8570/44] No. 206.

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 29, 1923.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to request that the attention of the League of Nations may be drawn to article 107 of the Treaty of Peace signed with Turkey at Lausanne on the 24th ultimo. This article provides for the freedom of traffic over the sections of the railway lying between the Græco-Bulgarian frontier near Adrianople and the Græco-Turkish frontier near Kuleli-Burgas, and that such freedom shall be ensured by a commissioner selected by the Council of the League of Nations.

2. The article further provides that a Greek and a Turkish representative shall be attached to the commissioner, and that the commissioner shall refer to the Council of the League of Nations any question which he may have been unable to settle, the Greek and Turkish Governments undertaking to carry out any decision given by the majority vote of the council.

3. The salary of the commissioner, as well as the expenses connected with his work, are to be borne in equal parts by Greece and Turkey.

4. The Mixed Railway Commission at Karagatch, which, under article 4 of the armistice of Mudania, is at present controlling these sections of the railway, will come to an end on the 15th September next, and in the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is important that the commissioner appointed by the League of Nations should take up his duties before that date. It is, moreover, to be observed that the Treaty of Peace and other instruments signed with Turkey at Lausanne have already been ratified by Greece and Turkey, and that upon ratification by Bulgaria the Thracian Frontier Convention will come into force.

5. In these circumstances, the Secretary of State hopes that the Council of the League of Nations will be so good as to select a commissioner in accordance with article 107 of the Lausanne Treaty, and I am to state that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, Major Ross, the British delegate on the present Mixed Commission, who enjoys the full confidence of the Greek and Turkish Governments, would be a suitable person for this appointment.

I am, &c.
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

No. 207.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 262.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1923.

YOUR despatch No. 488 of 20th August.

I think it would be better to postpone changing title of dragoman, &c., of which in principle I approve, until it can be done simultaneously with conversion of High Commission into Embassy or Legation on British ratification of treaty, by which time status of mission will have been decided.

No. 208.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, August* 31, 1923.

MY telegram No. 292, paragraph 2.

Press report that nineteen Greeks of Beicos have been hanged despite promise given by Ismet to M. Veniselos at Lausanne.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 163.)

No. 209.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 297 of 25th August: Turkish ratification.

Please inform Greek Government officially, if possible in conjunction with your French and Italian colleagues, of ratification of Lausanne Treaty by Turkey.

There is no objection to Mr. Henderson joining his French and Italian colleagues in making a similar notification to the Spanish representative at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 265.)

No. 210.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 1.)

(No. 443.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 31, 1923.

I HAVE received communication from Turkish Government enquiring whether His Majesty's Government regard Greek ratification of treaty by decree law as valid in spite of fact that it is, strictly speaking, unconstitutional. Similar enquiry has been addressed to my Allied colleagues.

Turkish Government has not yet received official communication of Greek ratification, which Greek Government will presumably make through Dutch Legation at Athens.

As Greek ratification should be deposited in Paris, its acceptance there would seem to constitute recognition of validity by three Governments.

(Sent to Athens, No. 104.)

No. 211.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 444.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 31, 1923.

MY telegram No. 438.

French High Commissioner having received necessary instructions, three Allied admirals met this morning and decided that Allied men-of-war at Smyrna be withdrawn simultaneously at 9 A.M. 3rd September. Naval commanders at Smyrna will notify Governor-General to-morrow of their intention.

(Repeated to Smyrna, No. 72.)

[E 8815/21/44] No. 212.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 501.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 27, 1923.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 650 of the 15th August on the subject of the access to Turkish ports of foreign merchant-ships in distress, to transmit herewith copy of the note on this subject which Adnan Bey addressed to the Allied High Commissioners on the 30th June, together with copy of the joint note which was sent to him in reply.

2. Adnan Bey has since communicated to us on the 5th August a further note (copy of which is also enclosed) on which no action has been taken, inasmuch as the Allied joint note of the 14th had already pointed out that any restriction of the nature indicated was contrary both to international law and established usage.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 212.

Adnan Bey to Allied High Commissioners.

IL résulte d'une communication du Ministère des Affaires étrangères que les bateaux de commerce qui, par suite d'une avarie, à l'exclusion de tout autre but, se verront obligés de s'approcher des côtes turques, seront autorisés à avoir accès aux ports de Behram, Edremid, Burhanié, Khouda, île de Ali Bey, Aïvalik, Dikili, Tchandarli, Fotcha (ancien et nouveau), Ourla, Tchechmé, Alatchata, Sigadjik, Escala Nova, Kullik, Bodroum, Chuk-Abad, Marmaris et Keuidjéghiz.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance du Haut-Commissariat de Sa Majesté britannique, la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de la prier de bien vouloir en faire part aux intéressés.

Constantinople, le 30 juin 1923.

Enclosure 2 in No. 212.

Allied High Commissioners to Adnan Bey.

LES Hauts-Commissaires par intérim de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note que la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères a bien voulu leur adresser au sujet des ports auxquels les bateaux de commerce pourront avoir accès en cas d'avarie.

Toutefois, en prenant acte de ces dispositions, ils croient utile de faire observer que toute restriction ayant pour objet de faire interdire l'accès de certains ports aux bateaux avariés serait contraire au droit des gens et à l'usage établi.

Les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés seraient reconnaissants à la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères d'apprendre si, d'après les termes de cette note, ils doivent comprendre que le libre accès aux ports nommés ne serait autorisé qu'aux seuls bateaux avariés.

Constantinople, le 14 juillet 1923.

Enclosure 3 in No. 212.

Adnan Bey to Allied High Commissioners.

LA délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note collective que leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires par intérim de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie avaient bien voulu lui adresser en date du 14 juillet dernier, contenant leurs observations au sujet de la décision concernant l'accès aux ports turcs des bateaux de commerce en cas d'avarie.

Par une note circulaire en date du 24 mai dernier, la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères avait eu l'honneur d'informer leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires, qu'afin d'empêcher l'entrée en territoire turc des bandes grecques formées et équipées dans les îles helléniques, il a été interdit à toute embarcation de s'approcher nuitamment des côtes turques.

En vue de ne pas exposer au danger de perte les bateaux de commerce qui, par suite d'une avarie se verraient obligés de s'approcher de nuit des côtes turques, il a été décidé ultérieurement de leur permettre d'avoir accès aux ports mentionnés dans la note du 30 juin.

La délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères estime que cette mesure n'est pas contraire au droit des gens, étant donné qu'elle a dû être adoptée en vue d'assurer la sécurité du pays. Ladite mesure concerne exclusivement l'accès pendant la nuit à certains ports turcs des bateaux de commerce en cas d'avarie.

Constantinople, le 5 août 1923.

[E 8825/199/44] No. 213.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 514.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 28, 1923.

THE discussion of the Treaty of Lausanne in the Turkish National Assembly commenced on the 21st instant. In the report of the Foreign Affairs Commission, which was first read, the various points of the treaty were reviewed in turn, attention was drawn to the importance of the abolition of the Capitulations, and to the absence of any reference to the currency in which Turkish debt coupons would be paid, an omission which was held to be tantamount to Allied recognition of the justice of the Turkish point of view, and the hope was expressed that, with the definite settlement of the Irak frontier question, the national aspirations would be completely realised. In view of the advantages thus secured, the commission recommended the adoption of the treaty by the Assembly.

2. Yussuf Kemal Bey, the president of the commission, opened the debate, which followed with a short speech in which he advised the examination of the treaty as a whole, when it would be found that it conferred on Turkey rights equal to those already enjoyed by the European Powers. He complimented the negotiators on the successful conclusion of their labours, and, turning towards Mustafa Kemal Pasha, said, amid loud cheers, "Pasha, this is thy work."

3. The Deputies who had announced their intention of criticising the treaty then spoke, and, as anticipated in my despatch No. 491 of the 21st instant, devoted themselves principally to the question of the southern frontier. The provisions of the Angora Agreement were criticised as being incompatible with Turkish national independence, and the Government was pressed to obtain their modification in agreement with the French Government. The parallel of an unredeemed Alsace Lorraine was quoted, and appeals were addressed to the sympathies of the French nation. In this connection a particularly violent speech was delivered by Hamdullah Soubhi Bey, a

former member of the Angora Cabinet and ex-Vice-President of the Assembly, who stated that the situation on the Syrian frontier was a menace to the peace which everyone so ardently desired, and that the Turks over the frontier were living in a hell owing to oppression and persecution. He concluded by asserting that independent Turkey would not rest until they also were happy and free. Colonel Mougin was present during this part of the debate, and, according to press reports, expressed to correspondents his regret at the language used by some of the speakers.

4. Some of the Thracian Deputies then deplored the separation of Adrianople from the adjoining provinces on which it was economically dependent. Western Thrace had, they said, been given first to the Bulgars and then to the Greeks, a fact which proved that it belonged to neither, but to the Turks. The latter were the sons of conquerors of five centuries ago who were Turks of Anatolia. It was their historic right therefore to remain in the homes of their ancestors and not to be arbitrarily separated from Turkey.

5. When the debate was continued on the 22nd instant other points of the treaty were raised, but the speeches were, on the whole, moderate in tone. Such matters as the exchange of populations, the distribution of the public debt, the judicial and economic clauses, and also the Straits Convention, were discussed. As regards questions primarily affecting His Majesty's Government, real hostility was shown by only one Deputy. This was Nejati Bey, Member for Broussa, who criticised the treaty article by article. "The whole world," he said, "must know that in taking the Mosul question out of the treaty, the Allies will gain nothing more. We cannot abandon our precious territory." In referring to the Turkish warships requisitioned at the beginning of the war, he complained that Great Britain had confiscated the sums subscribed by the children of the country for the naval defence of its coasts. After reading the text of article 129, Nejati Bey continued: "There is no nation which respects tombs and monuments so much as ourselves. We had had to abandon our dead on foreign soil, and the foreigners should have done the same. It is impossible not to feel that in keeping a corner of territory at the Dardanelles Britain is harbouring some secret design."

6. The Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission, Tewfik Ruchdi Bey, replied to the points raised by the various speakers. He dealt first with the southern frontier, and said that as the Agreement of Angora was in full force it was the elementary duty of the Government integrally to apply its clauses as well as those of its annexes. In regard to the Irak frontier the speaker was non-committal, and contented himself with expressing the hope that the national claims would be satisfied in this as they had been in other directions.

7. The debate was thereupon adjourned until the 23rd instant, when Ismet Pasha delivered a lengthy speech, a summary of which I have the honour to enclose herein.* Praise of the members of his delegation was followed by a particularly warm tribute to Mustafa Kemal. No effort was, however, made to direct attention to his own achievements, a fact which is illustrative of the well-known modesty of the speaker. He nevertheless warmly and forcefully defended his handiwork. His replies to his critics regarding the frontier settlement were such as effectively to silence them, and he did not permit himself to waste much sympathy on the co-religionists beyond the border who in the past had not, he said, been averse to raising difficulties when Turkey was passing through troublous days. On almost every point he was at pains to reconcile the terms of the treaty with those of the National Pact, though it will be observed that, in dealing with the question of the Straits, his arguments appear to have been somewhat involved.

8. The speech of Ismet Pasha was conclusive, and at 6 P.M. the adoption was moved of each of the four Bills embracing the treaty and its attached protocols and conventions and carried by votes varying between 206 and 213 in a House of 227 Members. As I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 505 of yesterday's date, the ratification of the treaty by the Assembly was officially notified to me by Adnan Bey the same evening.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

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* Not printed

[E 8826/199/44] No. 214

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 3.)

(No. 515.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 29, 1923.

I WAS received yesterday by the Caliph. I considered the ratification of the treaty by the Turkish Government as a suitable moment to request an audience. I was the more inclined to do this as Ismet Pasha, on his way through Constantinople from Lausanne, had not, for reasons of which I am unaware but which have given rise to some comment, gone to visit His Majesty. My Persian colleague regarded his failure to do so as a grave mistake. Moreover, my French colleague had, without consulting the Italian High Commissioner or myself, asked for an audience on the occasion of the signature of the treaty. I did not, however, fail to notify my intention both to M. Maissa and M. Jessé Curely, and the former agreed to follow my example. M. Curely gave his audience of a month ago as a reason for not repeating it after such a short period.

2. I found the Caliph looking remarkably well, and Dr. Adnan Bey present. I was struck by the evident pleasure with which His Majesty received me. I explained that I had wished to take this opportunity of expressing to him the satisfaction with which His Majesty's Government and the British public had learnt of the Turkish ratification. The Caliph replied that, while he shared his people's joy at the attainment of peace after so much suffering, he viewed the Treaty of Lausanne with considerable misgiving. Turkey thereunder had, he said, assumed very heavy engagements, and he referred to an article which he had written some two or three years ago for the "Morning Post" on the subject of the Treaty of Sèvres. While I remembered that he had written it, I could not recollect what he had said, and I accordingly found it difficult to follow the comparison which he proceeded to make between the two treaties, apparently to the disadvantage of that of Lausanne.

3. His Majesty devoted the remainder of the interview to constant repetitions of Turkey's need in the future of Great Britain's support and guidance. Whenever I led the conversation away from this subject he returned to it, repeating himself over and over again. He spoke in enthusiastic terms of the British Constitution, of British political and economic institutions and of British statesmen, the product, as he said, of centuries of tradition. I could not fail to think that he was comparing them in his own mind and for Adnan Bey's edification with the present-day Turkish statesmen, institutions and Constitution. The interests of Turkey and Great Britain, he said, did not clash and should not be allowed to clash. The Turkish people—he could vouch for them—respected and admired England, and he hoped and believed the Turkish Government did so likewise. He appealed to Adnan for confirmation. He more than once spoke confidently as regards the feelings of the nation as distinct from the Government, whose sentiments, though not fully acquainted with them, he trusted were not different from those of the people, whom he described as loyal and honest and sincerely anxious for British friendship.

4. The Caliph then remarked that the signature of the treaty was merely a stage, Turkey's real task was now beginning, and he prayed to his God that the issue would be a favourable one for Turkey. He prayed too that peace would bring our two countries together. Turkey had been led astray by misguided individuals for their own personal ends. He hoped that there would now be an end to personal ambitions. Turkey had been ill, but the moment of convalescence had arrived, and he observed that people, when convalescing, required more delicate treatment even than when they were ill. He hoped that Great Britain during this period would handle Turkey gently.

5. I reminded His Majesty of your Lordship's statement at one of the last full sessions at the end of the first conference in Lausanne, and your assurance of British friendship and assistance for a Turkey re-established and secure. I added that His Majesty's Government had already given evidence of goodwill by the manner in which no time had been lost in effectively carrying out their obligations under the evacuation protocol. Their promptness in this respect had been an object lesson for those who mistrusted us, and who had not hesitated to hint that Great Britain, once in occupation of Constantinople, never intended to quit it. The Caliph declaimed against these misguided persons, though regretfully admitting that in times of stress such miserable creatures found an opportunity to exist. He said that an occupation required the use of force and consequently a material effort. Great Britain would find it less costly if a loyal people held Constantinople for her. He thereupon recalled, as he had done on

the occasion of my first audience with him last November, his impressions as a boy of some 10 years of age during the Russian invasion in the seventies. He spoke with great and unassumed bitterness of Russian insolence and of Russia's fixed determination to crush Turkey. Great Britain, under Disraeli, had saved Turkey then, and was the great and powerful friend on whom Turkey counted in the future. I observed that history had repeatedly proved that England was always willing to assist small nations that sought to develop pacifically. I did not think that she would withhold that support and guidance which His Majesty asked for if Turkey was earnest in her desire for and gave proof that she merited them.

6. The Caliph made no mention by name of any of the present Turkish Government except Ismet Pasha, whom he commended for having succeeded in winning your Lordship's esteem, and to whose great labours at Lausanne he made allusion. He added that he felt sorry for him at having to continue those labours by making speeches at Angora, no light task in the Grand National Assembly. His reference to that assembly was, I thought, somewhat contemptuous. His reference to Ismet Pasha was of a somewhat mixed quality, as if, on the one hand, he really approved of the general's undoubted pro-British tendencies, but, on the other, did not attach much weight to the excuse of fatigue which Ismet had probably given for not visiting him.

7. The Caliph spoke very warmly of Sir Horace Rumbold, who, he said, had deservedly earned a great reputation as a statesman, and who had done so much to bring Great Britain and Turkey together again. I took this opportunity to withdraw after a conversation which had lasted over three-quarters of an hour, and much of which was clearly intended for Adnan Bey's benefit more than for mine. His Majesty convinced me, however, that he personally at any rate regarded good relations with Great Britain as essential for Turkey, and that whatever the policy of the Turkish Government might be, he himself looked upon Great Britain as the only country from which Turkey could hope to get that effective assistance which was indispensable if she was not to sink altogether under the weight of the difficulties of her present condition.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 215.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 4.)

(No. 449.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 4, 1923.

TURKISH Government have removed former restrictions on entry of foreigners into Turkey. Definite instructions have not yet reached local authorities, but this would mean that previous consent of Angora is no longer indispensable. Turkish visa will be required, but foreigners from places such as Malta, where no visa is obtainable, will apparently be allowed to land on payment of visa fee at port of arrival.

I am asking consul-general, Smyrna, to confirm by enquiry of Governor-General that no objection will be raised to landing there of British subjects, and particularly Maltese.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 107; Smyrna, No. 77; and Malta, No. 14.)

No. 216.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (*Athens*).

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 443 of 31st August: Greece and Turkish Treaty.

Please telegraph your observations.

No. 217.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 268.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1923.

MY despatch No. 488 of 18th June: Ex-Sultan.

Ex-Sultan has addressed personal letters to the King and to me appealing to be allowed to reside with his family and private suite in Cyprus, and saying that he will be obliged otherwise to come to London. He also asks His Majesty's Government's help for recovery of his property, &c., under sequestration at Constantinople.

Colonial Office are opposed to Cyprus as place of residence, on general grounds of policy. What is your view?

What is present view of Angora authorities regarding departure of Sultan's family from Constantinople, and question of his properties?

No. 218.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 5.)

(No. 450.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 5, 1923.

MY telegram No. 443.

Turkish Government, in view of sufferings of Moslem population in Greece, are anxious that commission provided for under article 11 of Exchange of Populations Convention should be constituted immediately. They have already nominated Turkish members, whose names will be communicated as soon as they are officially notified of Greek ratification of the treaty. Turkish Government enquire whether Allied Governments have yet received Greek official notification.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 109.)

No. 219.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 269.
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 5, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 435 of 27th August: Sequestered rolling-stock.

Reparation Commission has neither discussed nor taken any decision on this question.

No. 220.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 6.)

(No. 358.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 5, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 144.

Revolutionary Government, as I have already pointed out, are unconstitutional. As such, their representative at Lausanne represented an unconstitutional Government. So far as I know, however, his right to sign was never questioned at Lausanne, and it seems to me somewhat late in the day now to question the validity of the decree-law of the present Government of Greece. If we declare this decree invalid, it seems to me that we shall have to raise further question of right to tax British subjects by decree of unconstitutional Government, but this His Majesty's Government have declined to do.

There is no reason to suppose that any Parliament which might come into power after the elections would denounce law ratifying the treaty, though it would probably be considered necessary to confirm ratification in constitutional manner. In spite of its unsatisfactory nature, only a few hot-heads, such as General Pangalos, might wish to denounce the treaty (see my despatch No. 624).

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 8984/8814/44] No. 221.

Note on Articles of Lausanne Treaty and other Conventions, &c., involving Action by His Majesty's Government as regards their Execution.

POLITICAL.

I.—*Boundaries.*

(a.) *Articles 2 and 5 of Thracian Frontiers Convention.*

THE boundaries of demilitarised zones in Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey have to be delimited within fifteen days of the coming into force of the convention, which takes place as soon as Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey have ratified the convention. The two latter have done so. His Majesty's Government have to appoint one representative on the commission.

Action.—The department are in touch with the Treasury and War Office regarding an appointment and salary, and are communicating with Rome, Paris and Constantinople as to the diplomatic representatives of the signatories at Constantinople co-ordinating and supervising these and other similar appointments and work. Sofia is being asked to telegraph when Bulgaria is likely to ratify.

(b.) *Articles 4 (i), 5 and 20 of the Straits Convention.*

Within fifteen days of the coming into force of this convention (at the same time and in the same manner as the main treaty) a commission is to meet for the delimitation of the boundaries of the demilitarised zones round the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Great Britain has to appoint one representative.

Action.—The department are in touch with the War Office on the question of similar appointments generally.

(c.) *Article 3 of the Main Treaty and the Evacuation Protocol.*

The frontier between Turkey and Irak is to be settled by friendly arrangement between Great Britain and Turkey within nine months of the end of the period of six weeks from the ratification of the treaty by Turkey, fixed for the completion of the Allied evacuation of Constantinople. The nine months thus run from the 4th October. Failing such settlement the question goes to the League.

Action.—The department have submitted a memorandum on the question of London or Constantinople as the seat of these negotiations.

N.B.—The question of both the temporary and permanent delimitation of the Græco-Turkish frontier in Thrace is left, under article II of the "Karagatch" evacuation protocol and articles 2 (2) and 5 of the main treaty respectively, to Greece and Turkey, but it is possible that, in accordance with the latter articles, Greece and Turkey might agree to ask Great Britain to appoint the president of their boundary commission. This will not be constituted, however, until the entry into force of the main treaty, and no time limit is laid down for such constitution in the treaty.

II.—*Straits Commission.*

Under Article 10 of the Straits Convention this commission is to be constituted at Constantinople, apparently on the coming into force of the Straits Convention, which takes place at the same time and in the same manner as the main treaty. No time limit is laid down in the convention for such constitution.

Action.—Great Britain has to appoint one representative; presumably he will be our Ambassador at Constantinople, but he will certainly require the help of the naval attaché, as the main duty of the commission is to see that the somewhat complicated provisions in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the annex to article 2 of the convention governing the passage of warships and military aircraft are carried out. It may therefore be

better to appoint the naval attaché instead of the Ambassador as British representative, but this will obviously require some preliminary settlement at any rate between France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey (who appoints the president of the commission). It might be well to discuss this with the French and Italians at once.

III.—*League of Nations Thracian Railway Commissioner.*

Under article 107 of the treaty the League of Nations will have to appoint a commissioner on the coming into force of the treaty.

Action.—The Department are in communication with the War Office and the secretariat of the League on the possible application of this article as from the 15th September, when the Mixed Allied Railway Commission under the Mudania Convention evacuates, and as to the possible appointment by the League to the permanent post of the British representative on this mixed commission.

IV.—*Egypt*

Under article 19 of the treaty, any questions arising from the recognition of the State of Egypt are to be settled by subsequent negotiation between the parties, and under article 34 of the treaty and the Franco-British agreement of the 24th July, 1923 (Egyptian nationality) negotiations will have to take place before or as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty regarding the rights of option, &c., of Turkish subjects from Syria and the Lebanon resident in Egypt

Action.—The department are in communication with Cairo on this point.

V.—*Sanitary.*

(*a.*) Under article 116 of the treaty and on its entry into force Great Britain will have to appoint a representative to the *ad hoc* commission at Constantinople to be established for the liquidation of the old superior council of health, pensioning and rights of its employees, &c. No time limit is set by the treaty for the appointment of this commission.

Action.—It may be well to consult Constantinople by despatch now as to the future appointment of Dr. Clemow or Major Hobson for this purpose.

(*b.*) On the coming into force of the treaty and under article 117 Great Britain, as mandatory for Palestine, Transjordan and Irak and possibly as regards India, Somaliland and the Malay States, will have to appoint a representative or representatives to the Sanitary Co-ordination Commission for pilgrimages to Jerusalem and the Hedjaz. No time limit is set by the treaty for the establishment of the commission.

Action.—In due course the Colonial Office (as regards the above territories and possibly the Malay States and Somaliland), the Ministry of Health and the India Office will have to be consulted.

VI.—*Graves.*

On the coming into force of the treaty, and under articles 130, 133 and 134, Great Britain has to appoint with regard to the graves on the Gallipoli Peninsula (1) a permanent commission whose duties are defined in article 130, and especially in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of that article; (2) a permanent organisation for the maintenance, &c., of the graves, &c.; and (3) especial custodians to work under this organisation. No time limit is set by the treaty for such appointments.

Action.—The Department have discussed this question exhaustively with representatives of the Imperial Graves Commission who are communicating with the Foreign Office further regarding these appointments and General Fabian Ware is probably visiting Constantinople in October or November to discuss all these arrangements informally with the interested parties on the spot.

VII.—*General.*

1. *Sanitary and Judicial Declarations and Amnesty Declaration*

While no specific action is required by Great Britain in the following matters, it is important for the British representative at Constantinople to watch carefully and report on Turkey fulfilling the specific unilateral pledges undertaken by her under the declaration relating to sanitary matters (document X in the Lausanne Blue Book, "Treaty Series" No. 16 (1923)) and, under the declaration relating to the administration

of justice (document X), especially as regards the appointment of European medical and judicial advisers; also as regards the provisions of the amnesty declaration and protocol, particularly paragraph 6 of the declaration (document VIII of the Blue Book).

Action.—The Department might draw Mr. Henderson's attention to this.

2. *The Exchange of Population Convention.*

Under article 11 of this convention, mixed commissions have to be appointed on the coming into force of this convention (*i.e.*, the ratification of the main treaty by Turkey and Greece, which has already taken place). But the members are to be appointed by Greece and Turkey and by the League of Nations from neutrals. No British appointment or interest is therefore involved.

Action.—The League of Nations are already cognisant of their duties under this convention and no action by His Majesty's Government is necessary.

Financial.

1. *Calculation of Amount of Annuities to be paid by Detached States.*

Under article 47, within three months of the coming into force of the treaty, the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt will proceed to this work. Interested detached States are given the opportunity of sending delegates to Constantinople to check the council's calculations.

Action.—It will be necessary to remind the Colonial Office of this, in order that Irak, Palestine and Transjordan may depute and send representatives.

2. Under article 49, within one month from the final determination of the annuities under article 47 (it is impossible to foresee exactly within what dates this month will fall) a commission is to meet in Paris to determine the distribution of the nominal capital of the Ottoman Public Debt.

His Majesty's Government, as mandatory for Irak, Palestine and Transjordan, is entitled to appoint a representative or representatives to this commission.

Action.—In due course the Treasury and Colonial Office will have to be asked to concert together regarding this appointment.

3. Presumably before the entry into force of the peace treaty, the inter-Allied agreement for the distribution of the sum of five millions, &c., for the payment of Allied reparation claims in Turkey will be signed. It will come into force with the rest of the peace treaty, and according to the present draft it will then be necessary to depute a British representative to sit on the commission in Constantinople.

Action.—It will be well to draw the attention of the Treasury to this in order that they may propose a suitable appointment.

Economic.

I.—*Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.*

Under article 92 and the following articles, a mixed arbitral tribunal is to be established at Constantinople between each of the Allied Powers on the one hand and Turkey on the other, within three months of the coming into force of the treaty. Each of these tribunals will be composed of three members, two appointed respectively by each of the Governments concerned who shall be entitled to designate several persons, from whom according to the case in question, they will choose one to sit as a member of the tribunal. The presidents will be chosen by agreement between the two Governments concerned. If the number and character of the cases justify it, the Governments concerned shall be entitled to create in each tribunal one or more additional sections, the seat of which shall be in whatever place may be convenient. Each of these sections shall be composed of a vice-president and two members, the appointments to be on the same lines as the main Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Each Government shall appoint one or more agents to represent it before the tribunal.

Action.—It will be necessary for His Majesty's Government to appoint a member for the main Mixed Anglo-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal, and such members for the additional sections and agents as experience may prove necessary. It is understood that the Foreign Office, according to the precedent of the other treaties, will appoint the member to the main Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, but presumably this will be in consultation with the Board of Trade who will probably suggest names. The Board of Trade will nominate additional members and agents. In due course it will be necessary to consult the Board of Trade regarding these appointments.

II.—*Convention respecting the Conditions of Residence, Business and Jurisdiction.*

(*a.*) Under article 4 a separate convention is to be concluded between Turkey and each or any of the signatories within twelve months from the coming into force of the convention (*i.e.*, from the coming into force of the main treaty), in order to settle the admission in Turkey of nationals of the other contracting Powers to the different forms of commerce, professions and industry, and reciprocally the admission in the territories of the said Powers of Turkish nationals for the same purposes.

Action.—Presumably as this question is mainly economic, the Board of Trade will have to be consulted in due course with a view to the opening of the necessary negotiations and the appointment of the British representative or representatives.

(*b.*) Under article 19 of the same convention, each of the Contracting Powers reserves the right of declaring at the time of the coming into force of the convention that its provisions do not apply to all or any of their dominions enjoying responsible government, or their colonies, protectorates, possessions or territories beyond the sea subject to their sovereignty or authority.

Action.—The Colonial Office are already making arrangements to obtain a list of the dominions, colonies, &c., whose names will have to be notified to the Turkish Government by such declaration after the convention enters into force. No further action is necessary at present.

III.—*Commercial Convention.*

(*a.*) Under article 9 of the Commercial Convention and the letters exchanged between Ismet Pasha and Sir H. Rumbold on the 24th July, 1923, respecting cabotage (see pages 233 to 235 of the Lausanne Blue Book), it will be necessary for the Kdedivial Mail Steamship and Graving Dock Company (Limited), M. and J. Constant, and the Ellerman Line (Limited) to open negotiations, as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty, regarding the conditions under which they may eventually be authorised to continue in this cabotage trade in Turkey for such period as may be provided for in any contract which they may conclude with the Turkish Government. If no agreement is reached by the companies with the Turkish Government within a period of six months from the 1st January, 1924, these companies will only be entitled to carry on their activities under present conditions for a further period of two years.

Action.—It may be desirable to suggest to the Board of Trade that in due course they draw the attention of the companies concerned to these stipulations.

(*b.*) Under article 15 special conventions between the interested countries are to determine all questions relating to records, registers and designs in connection with the services relating to industrial, literary and artistic property, and their eventual transmission or communication by the Turkish authorities to the offices of the State in favour of which territory is detached from Turkey. No time limit is laid down for the drawing up of the special conventions.

Action.—No action will be necessary on this article until after the treaty and convention enters into force. It will then be necessary to draw the attention of the Colonial Office and Board of Trade, and ask their views regarding the necessity of an Anglo-Turkish convention on these lines.

(c.) Under article 16 of the commercial convention the contracting Powers reserve the same right of making a declaration regarding their dominions, &c., as under article 19 of the convention relating to residence, &c. (see above).

Action.—The Colonial Office are already taking steps regarding this declaration, and no further action is necessary at present.

IV.—*Concessions Protocol.*

(*a.*) Under article 2 (i) it will be necessary for Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. and Vickers to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Government as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty, with a view to the modification of the provisions of their pre-war concession in Turkey, or the grant of a new concession for an undertaking of equal importance.

Action.—It may be well for the department to draw the attention of the company to this article officially, before the entry into force of the treaty.

(*b.*) Under articles 1, 4 and 5 and the unilateral Turkish declaration attached to the concessions protocol it will be necessary for British concessionnaires and Ottoman companies in which, before the 1st August, 1914, British capital was preponderant to take up with the Turkish Government, as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty, the question of putting into conformity with the new economic conditions the provisions of their pre-war contracts and agreements, &c.

Action.—As the treaty has been published, and the interested concessionnaires must presumably be regarded as cognisant of these stipulations, it does not seem necessary for the department to send any official communication to them drawing their attention to these provisions.

V.—*Anatolian Railway.*

By the terms of the letter addressed on the 24th July, 1923, by Ismet Pasha to the president of the Third Committee of the Lausanne Conference in regard to certain railway and port concessions in Turkey, the contracts and agreements of the Anatolian Railway, the Bagdad Railway, the Mersina-Adana Railway, the Oriental Railways and the Haidar Pasha Harbour will, within a period of one year from the coming into force of the treaty, be brought into conformity with the new economic conditions.

Action.—As the Anatolian Railway is now British controlled, it may be well for the department to draw the attention of the British group officially to this letter in order that they may take such steps as they consider necessary to negotiate with the Turkish Government on these points.

E. G. FORBES-ADAM.

Foreign Office, September 6, 1923.

No. 222.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 7.)

(No. 370.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 6, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 450.

Ratification of treaty was reported in my telegram No. 298, and I presume there is no questioning its validity (my telegram No. 358).

Spanish Legation were officially notified of fact a few days ago, and to-day informed Greek Government that notification had been transmitted telegraphically to Constantinople.

No. 223.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 7.)

(No. 371.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 6, 1923.

MY telegram No. 304.

I received note from Greek Government last night dated 1st September acknowledging my note stating that orders have been given for cession of Karagatch in accordance with article 215 of treaty.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 224.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 7.)

(No. 451.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 7, 1923.

ATHENS telegram No. 358 and my telegram No. 450.

Turkish Government are much too anxious to get on with Exchange of Populations Convention to question validity of Greek ratification, provided Powers accept it. Turkish Government do, however, expect to be notified officially of Greek ratification. This is first step. It could be done through Dutch Legation in Athens or through Spanish Legation or Allied High Commissioners here. Through the latter would probably satisfy Turks most as implying acceptance by Allies of Greek ratification. In some form or another, however, notification should be conveyed officially and as soon as possible to Turkish Government.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 110.)

No. 225.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 7.)

(No. 452.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 7, 1923.

MY telegram No. 428.

French Government have informed High Commission that since article No. 143 does not become operative till treaty enters into force, League of Nations cannot appoint temporary commissioner, and therefore local Allied authorities should come to an agreement with Turkish Government on the subject.

As I saw no objection to this proposal, I proposed to Adnan Bey to-day that present commission should continue to function until League of Nations was in a position to make the necessary appointment. I said that my colleagues were in agreement in principle subject to possible modification of personnel of their commissions, which would necessarily be civilian after termination of evacuation. General Officer Commanding-in-chief is prepared, subject to War Office concurrence, to allow Major Ross to continue to act in present capacity. I asked Adnan whether Angora would agree to this. He said that latter had just enquired by telegraph views of Allies as regards administration of this section of railway during period prior to entry into force of treaty, and that he anticipated their acceptance.

I should be glad to be informed whether this arrangement, if it can be concluded, is approved. Please repeat reply to Athens, as Greek Government's approval should also be obtained.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 111.)

No. 226.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 7.)

(No. 453.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 7, 1923.

I HAVE received note from Ismet Pasha stating that in conformity with article 143 of treaty Turkish Government propose to deposit shortly, in Paris, instrument of ratification in respect of six following acts, namely, Peace Treaty, conventions respecting Straits, Thracian frontier, residence and jurisdiction, and commerce, and protocol respecting accession of Belgium and Portugal.

As regards remaining acts, which have also been ratified by Turkish Government, latter considers it unnecessary to include them in ratification instrument to be deposited in Paris. Ismet enquired views of His Majesty's Government on this point, and particularly whether instrument of ratification of His Majesty's Government will solely include six acts above mentioned.

Similar enquiry has been made to French and Italian High Commissioners.

No. 227.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 7.)

(No. 454.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 7, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 269.

Is sequestrated rolling-stock to be sold or not?

French High Commission, which has received instructions that it is to be sold, is pressing for reply from British and Italian Governments, since, if it is to be sold, no time is to be lost.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 228.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 8.)

(No. 455.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 7, 1923.

MY despatch No. 364.

I would be grateful for early reply. I learn from secret source that Shereef Ali Haidar has informed Caliph that he has decided to go to Egypt, and has asked latter to give him letter recognising him as Shereef of Mecca.

Caliph, who was told by Adnan that he could not do this, then suggested Turkish Government should help shereef, and latter's son, Abdul Mejid, will probably go to Angora and appeal there for assistance.

No. 229.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 7.)

(No. 456.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 7, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 268.

I think that it would be better that ex-Sultan should not reside in Cyprus. Close proximity of Turkey would encourage intrigues which might be no less awkward for us than they would be resented by the Turks. His presence in Cyprus might even lead to unfortunate incidents. On general grounds also I regard proposal as undesirable.

Turkish authorities would place no obstacle in the way of departure of Sultan's family from Constantinople. I am not aware that he has any private property here except possibly one kiosk. Palaces and domains are State property since 1910. In any case if there be any, Angora would do nothing to facilitate release from sequester, though they might allow it eventually to be liquidated under protocol attached to amnesty declaration. I do not know whether Angora would be prepared to do anything for him, even if he were to offer formally to abdicate.

No. 230.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 272.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1923.

THRACIAN Frontier Convention enters into force under article 5 as soon as Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey have ratified it, and under article 2 of the Boundary Commission, for the delimitation of the boundaries of the demilitarised zones under article 1 has to be set up within fifteen days from such entry into force. Greece and Turkey have ratified the treaty, and presumably Bulgarian ratification may follow at any time. It is therefore urgently necessary to prepare for the appointment of this commission.

This raises important general question what Diplomatic Body is to co-ordinate salaries, &c., and work of such commissions under the Lausanne settlement. While question of Thracian Boundary Commission is the only imminent one, the precedent in this case must affect the question of boundaries of demilitarised zones under articles 4 and 5 of Straits Convention, as well as any co-ordination of appointments, &c., which may prove necessary under the treaty settlement. Only other Boundary Commission, *i.e.*, that for Græco-Turkish frontier under article 2 of main treaty, is primarily a matter for Greece and Turkey, who are alone represented on it, and jointly appoint its president.

In the case of other treaties this kind of work has been done by Ambassadors' Conference in Paris, but the Treaty of Lausanne differs from other treaties with ex-enemy Powers in that France, Great Britain and Italy were placed in a special position with regard to the execution of the latter, and the Ambassadors' Conference was set up and organised in virtue of that special position. In the case of the Lausanne Treaty all the signatories are, generally speaking, on a footing of equality as regards the execution of the treaty, and no special body is established for this purpose. France, Great Britain and Italy would certainly not be entitled therefore to set up any co-ordinating or supervising body on which they could hold a

predominant position. I therefore incline to the view that meetings of the diplomatic representatives of the interested Powers at Constantinople should be held from time to time to do this work. This body would be notified by each Government of the appointments to any commission to be set up under the treaty, and would discuss and fix by joint agreement the salaries and expenses of the commissioners, &c. It would also see that the time limits laid down in the treaty for the appointments of commissions, &c., and the completion of their work were adhered to.

Please discuss this informally with your French and Italian colleagues and Adnan Bey, and telegraph your views as soon as possible. You should, of course, make it quite clear, especially to the latter, that I am not suggesting the establishment, on Turkish territory, of any international body to control the execution of the treaty as a whole, but simply machinery for the convenience of the signatories as regards the co-ordination of appointments, salaries and the setting to work of commissions under the treaty. In the case of the Thracian Frontier Convention, the Greek and Bulgarian diplomatic representatives would be represented on the diplomatic body as well as France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey. As regards the Boundary Commission for the delimitarised zones under the Straits Convention, only France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey will be concerned under the terms of the convention.

This telegram is being repeated to Rome and Paris for the views of the French and Italian Governments.

This proposal may entail extra work on your staff, but except as regards the Thracian Frontier Convention this should not be the case until towards the end of the year, before which date the treaty as a whole is unlikely to enter into force.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 272; repeated to Paris, No. 327 (by bag); Rome, No. 230; Sofia, No. 39; and Athens, No. 147.)

No. 231.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Erskine (*Sofia*).

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 7, 1923.

MY telegram No. 272 to Constantinople.

Please ascertain when Bulgaria is likely to ratify Thracian Frontier Convention, repeating your reply to Athens and Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 273.)

No. 232.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 8.)

(No. 459.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 8, 1923.

MY telegram No. 451.

Delegate of Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been officially notified by Spanish Legation of Greek ratification.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 113.)

No. 233.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 276.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 450 of 5th September: Exchange of Populations Convention.

Please see my telegram No. 329 to Paris. British member of Council of the League of Nations is being asked to expedite appointment of League members of mixed commissions under article 11.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 149.)

No. 234.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)

(No. 329.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 443 of 31st August: Turkey and Greek ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.

Please inform the French Government as soon as possible of the Turkish Government's enquiry, and state that His Majesty's Government propose to reply that they see no reason to question the validity of the Greek Government's ratification of the treaty any more than the right of the Greek represenatives to sign it.

You should add that His Majesty's Government assume that the French Government share this view, and you should ask for a very early reply.

No. 235.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 461.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 9, 1923.

GREEK officer and fifty men occupied on 4th September Gumruk Island in Maritza Delta. Island is opposite Enos, and, according to Turks, east of main course of Maritza. Customs station at Enos is on it, and it has remained neutral since Mudania. It also remained Turkish after 1913 treaty with Bulgaria.

I have received written protest from Turkish Government requesting Allied intervention with a view to restoration of *status quo* pending decision of Thracian Boundary Commission.

Can His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Athens be instructed to request Greek Government to withdraw detachment, which has probably been sent there by local authorities without orders from Athens, and to await settlement by Boundary Commission?

Any modification of *status quo* prior to decision of latter is undesirable, and might, particularly if extended, easily lead to serious incident.

As Allied contingents in neighbourhood are to be withdrawn almost immediately, action by them is neither possible nor expedient.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 114.)

No. 236.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 462.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, September* 9, 1923.

MY telegram No. 449, last paragraph.

Governor-General has not yet received instructions. At present he is authorised to admit well-known persons arriving on business without reference to Angora, but will not so admit British subjects generally.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 115, and Malta, No. 15.)

[E 9073/199/44] No. 237.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 533.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 5, 1923.

SINCE the close of the debate on the Treaty of Lausanne the sittings of the Grand National Assembly have been reduced to a minimum, and the time of the Deputies has been almost entirely occupied with attendance at meetings of the Popular party and of the various commissions.

2. For the moment the tendency seems to be to make the Assembly's debates purely formal, all important questions being discussed and settled at secret sessions of

the party, the decisions of which are then merely submitted to the Assembly for approval. In this way the general public is apparently to be left in ignorance of the views expressed by dissentient Deputies, while the treason law makes it impossible for open and energetic criticism to be made in public speeches and in the press. The procedure is in fact government by a caucus, which, however unpracticable in a more civilised country, may not for some time be realised by the uneducated public of this country.

3. Meanwhile it is evident that the secret party discussions have not shown the general unanimity within the Government itself which might have been expected. The resignation of Reouf Bey has now been followed by that of Moussa Kiazim Effendi, Minister for Religious Affairs, who accepted that post only five months ago. The official reason given for this resignation is, as usual, that of ill-health, but even the Constantinople press has refused to accept this explanation, and has generally ascribed it to the Minister's refusal to accept the Government's proposals for the modification or repeal of the prohibition law. I am inclined, however, to attribute the real reason to the Government's policy towards the Caliphate. I understand that no little dissatisfaction has been caused in Anatolia by the negligent official attitude in connection with religious matters. This is being exploited by the Conservative groups, and may well have dissatisfied Moussa Kiazim Effendi, who is himself an orthodox Moslem and was, furthermore, the nominee of Reouf Bey himself. His successor is a certain Mustafa Fevzi Effendi, one of the Deputies for Saroukhan, but it may be noted that in an Assembly of 176 Deputies he only received 121 votes, the smallest majority by which a Minister has been elected for some considerable time.

4. Some importance may proved to be attached to the departure from Angora a few days ago of Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, who has throughout been one of Mustafa Kemal's right-hand men. As in the case of Reouf Bey, it is stated that he will make a tour of inspection, to last some four months, in the eastern provinces. Such a tour need not require explanation, but it is worthy of note that the present moment has also been chosen for the nomination to a similar military inspectorship of another distinguished general, Ali Fouad Pasha, who has been Vice-President of the Assembly since the beginning of the present year. These two events have synchronised with the definite adoption of a secret party meeting of the propcsal, referred to in my despatch No. 464 of the 7th ultimo, that army officers on the active list cannot be Deputies. Nor is any appointment or decision affecting the army, on which Mustafa Kemal's personal ascendency rests, without significance.

5. The uncertainty of the situation at Angora has been shown in the contradictory reports which have been published regarding the Government's policy. This, it was announced, would be read by the President of the Council of Ministers soon after the meeting of the Assembly. Obstacles were then apparently encountered, and the declaration of policy was withheld on the ground that the issue of a Government programme savoured of Cabinet responsibility, which was at variance with the Turkish Constitution, inasmuch as, with the Ministers individually responsible to the Assembly, it would fall to the latter to prepare the programme which would be passed to the Government for execution. This objection has, however, now apparently been surmounted, as it is reported that the programme, having been approved by the Popular party, has been printed, and will be read in the Assembly in the course of the next few days by Fethi Bey.

6. For some weeks little has been heard of the constitutional question, but it cannot be long ignored. That the matter is receiving the consideration of the Government is shown by the fact that a few days ago Fethi Bey gave a press interview on the subject. A project would, he said, shortly be submitted to the Assembly recommending the modification of the fundamental law in such a way as to establish Government responsibility whereby the Cabinet would acquire more power and authority. The nature of the modifications would have, however, he said, to be decided by the Assembly. It is quite likely that the occasion of settling the question of Cabinet responsibility will be taken to define more clearly the personal position of Mustafa Kemal.

7. The undetermined policy of the Government continues to be the subject of increasing criticism here, as the position of inferiority to which the former capital has been relegated is more fully realised. While the transfer of the seat of the Government to Anatolia seems to have been philosophically accepted, this city will not submit without a struggle to permanent maladministration and economic extinction. There is an insistent demand in the Constantinople press for local autonomy, and it is somewhat remarkable, in spite of the chauvinism of Angora, to read therein constant appeals for

the collaboration of foreign experts. On the 31st ultimo the newspaper "Ikdam," in its leading article, even deplored the fact that the only Turk who would be likely efficiently to discharge the duties of prefect was Dr. Djemil Pasha, a former prefect and Minister of Public Works under Damad Ferid Pasha. As, however, this able official has in his absence been condemned to some years of imprisonment owing to his association with Ferid Pasha, the "Ikdam," like some other organs which subsequently referred to the article of their contemporary, has had perforce to resign itself to regarding its choice as unrealisable.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 9074/313/34] No. 238.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 534. Confidential.)
Constantinople, September 5, 1923.

My Lord,

THE Persian Ambassador called upon me to-day to tell the tale of his recent misadventures in Angora.

2. On his arrival there he had communicated to Ismet Pasha an advance copy of his letters of credence and of the speech he proposed to make on presenting them. He had subsequently seen Ismet Pasha himself, who had at first demurred to the use therein of the word "Ottoman" as reported in my telegram No. 446 of the 1st instant. Subsequently other objections had been raised to the wording, and especially to the fact that the letters were addressed to Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Government ("Hukumet") of the Grand National Assembly. The Turks had chosen to regard the word "Hukumet" as referring to the Cabinet, and had consequently maintained that in effect the president thereof was the Bashvekil Fethi Bey. Prince Isaak Khan had in vain explained that, used in this connection, "Hukumet" did not mean Cabinet but Government in the general sense, as was proved by the French translation which accompanied the Persian version, which ran as follows: "A son "Excellence Ghazi Moustafa Kémal Pasha, Président de la grande Assemblée nationale "de Turquie."

3. Isaak Khan told me that he had in view of these various objections asked the Turks to draft themselves the wording which they desired so that he might submit it to his Government. It then transpired that a further difficulty was the fact that in the body of the letters of credence he was, after the usual compliments, described as being accredited to the Grand National Assembly. It was made clear to Isaak Khan that what the Turks really wanted was that the Ambassador should be accredited personally to Mustafa Kemal, and that the exact words used in the letters of credence to the former Sultan should be employed, with the sole omission of the words Majesty and the substitution of "Turkish" for "Ottoman." Isaak Khan had been compelled by this pretension to point out that by their own decrees the sovereignty of Turkey was vested in the Grand National Assembly and that he could, therefore, not recommend his Government to give to Mustafa Kemal a position which he was not recoguised in Turkey as possessing.

4. Having thus reached a deadlock, Isaak Khan had preferred not to await in Angora any answer from the Persian Government but to return at once to Constantinople. He told me confidentially that he had recommended three courses to his Government: either that he should be appointed immediately to a new and higher post, such as to Rome or even London or as Persian delegate to the League of Nations, or that new letters of credence should be made out in Tehran after an adequate apology had been made by the Turkish Ambassador there for what had occurred, or that he should be instructed to return on leave to Tehran in order to give a personal explanation of the facts of the case, his counsellor being left indefinitely as Chargé d'Affaires in Constantinople.

5. Isaak Khan expressed a marked preference for the first solution on the ground that, while admittedly most satisfactory to himself, his wife being in Europe, it was calculated more than the other alternatives to impress on the Turks the dissatisfaction of the Persian Government at the indignity to which their Ambassador had been

exposed. He was obviously and naturally feeling hurt and resentful and was at pains to inform me of the various expressions of respect for his own person which he had received. He gave me a lurid picture of the discomforts of life at Angora and the hundreds of bugs ("les centaines de punaises") which infested the residence which had been placed at his disposal.

6. He told me that he had conversed with both the Soviet Ambassador and the Afghan representative. They were, he said, both profoundly discontented with the present Turkish Government and he anticipated trouble between Russia and Turkey the Caucasus within the next two years. The Persian counsellor, whom I had met at a party on the day of his return from Angora, had told me that he had found there a strong and active party of opposition to Mustafa Kemal. I gathered from Isaak Khan, on the other hand, that both the great majority of the Assembly and the army were devoted to the Ghazi Pasha and ready tools in his hand. Ismet was apparently living in the same house with the marshal. He did mention, however, that Bekir Samy Bey had said to him that the Cabinet would be compelled to resign if it were generally known that Mustafa Kemal had insisted on foreign Ambassadors being accredited to him personally rather than to the Grand National Assembly.

7. The whole story of the failure of Isaak Khan's mission is of considerable interest. The objection to the use of the word "Ottoman" in the letters of credence was undoubtedly secondary. The real motive of the rejection was that which was last brought forward, namely, the omission of the personal reference to Mustafa Kemal in the body of the document. Such a reference would have constituted another rung on the ladder designed by Mustafa Kemal to elevate himself to the supreme dignity. His present powers are too ill-defined, nor would it be strange if a man of the ambitions always attributed to Kemal were dissatisfied, while effectively ruling the country, with the somewhat ambiguous title of President of an Assembly. At the same time, whatever be the title that he has in mind, the fact that the secondary objection was alone published shows that Mustafa Kemal, who has never yet been too precipitate, feels that it is still too early to show his hand. He can scarcely, however, delay much longer, if not in changing his title, at any rate in more clearly defining his attributes. It would certainly have helped him if a foreign Power of its own volition had recognised him as head of the State. In this respect he is probably disappointed. Nevertheless, he must be fully aware that recoguition by the Turkish nation itself is the first essential, and I should not be surprised if the course of the next few months were to witness a further development of Mustafa Kemal's career.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 9076/199/44] No. 239.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 10.)

(No. 536.)
Constantinople, September 5, 1923.

My Lord,

THE general insecurity in Anatolia, and more particularly in the hinterland of Smyrna, to which I referred in my despatch No. 491 of the 21st ultimo, is continuing to engage the serious attention of the Turkish Government, which has been compelled to recognise that this question is the most urgent of the problems confronting the new Assembly.

2. Although a draft law defining the measures to be taken for the repression of brigandage has already been prepared, the Government has decided to take active measures without waiting for its approval, and has proclaimed a state of siege in the regions of Aidin and Eudemish. The military commandant in these areas has issued a proclamation to the effect that all brigands must unconditionally surrender within a period of seven days, while a reward of 100 liras is offered to persons furnishing information regarding them and their whereabouts. After the expiration of the time-limit, all brigands will, it is announced, be summarily dealt with. The wearing and possession of arms are of course strictly forbidden.

3. As I am informed by the acting consul-general at Smyrna that the troop movements there have ceased, it would appear that the authorities have the situation in

hand. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the "Tanin" to-day describes the outbreak of brigandage in Anatolia as largely political, and quotes as a case in point a certain Opposition candidate who, after his failure in the recent elections, became the leader of a band.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 240.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva).

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1923.

FOLLOWING for Mr. Tufton:—

"Your letters of 1st and 7th September to Mr. Oliphant: Appointment by "League of Nations of Commissioner for Græco-Turk railway through Karagatch "under article 107 of Lausanne Treaty.

"Please arrange that no action be taken on our letter to the League of Nations "of 29th August regarding appointment of commissioner under article 107 of the "Lausanne Treaty. French Government take technically correct view that no such "action can be taken by League until treaty enters into force. Allied High "Commissioners at Constantinople have therefore suggested to the Turkish "Government continuance in office during interim period of present Allied Railway "Commission under the Mudania armistice, and they anticipate Turks will agree. "Greek Government are being sounded, but are also unlikely to object.

"Letter follows."

No. 241.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 330) and Rome (No. 231).

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1923.

MY telegram No. 272 to Constantinople.

Please inform French and Italian Governments and ascertain their views.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 330, and Rome, No. 231.)

No. 242.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 331 (by bag)) and Rome (No. 234 (R)).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 452 of 7th September: Article 107 of Lausanne Treaty regarding supervision of traffic over railway between Græco-Bulgarian frontier and Turco-Greek frontier.

Please inform French (Italian) Government that His Majesty's Government had suggested to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on 29th August that the League of Nations should at once appoint the commissioner under article 107 of the Treaty of Lausanne, and were prepared to submit the name of a British officer for the post who, in their opinion, had special qualifications for the work. They realised, however, that such a premature application of the treaty could only be effected with the assent of the Greek and Turkish Governments.

2. As the Allied High Commissioners have now suggested the continuance in office of the present Inter-Allied Railway Commission during the interim period before the entry into force of the treaty, His Majesty's Government will take no further action on their above-mentioned request to the League.

3. You should therefore invite the French (Italian) Government, if they agree, to send immediate instructions to the French (Italian) representative at Athens to request the Greek Government, jointly with his British colleague, to agree to the proposal of the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 331, and Rome, No. 234; repeated to Athens, No. 153, and Constantinople, No. 277 (in "R").)

No. 243.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1923.

MY telegram No. 331 to Paris.

You should act accordingly as soon as your French and Italian colleagues receive instructions.

[**E 9974/1/44**] No. 244.

Synopsis of, and Memorandum on, the Main Events in Turkey since June 1921.

THE following is a summary of the main events in the Near Eastern situation from the end of June 1921:—

End of June 1921.

The Greek Government refused the offer of mediation made by the Allies as a result of the Paris Conference of the 18th–20th June, mainly on the ground that the military situation would not permit of any further delays.

July.

On the 11th July the Greeks again started operations. By the 20th July they had captured Afium Karahissar, Kutaya and Eskishehr.

September.

On the 1st September the Greek army reached the Sakaria River, the furthest point of its advance. By the 11th September the Greeks had lost the decisive battle, and by the 23rd September they had taken up a position, apparently for the winter, on lines running just east of Eskishehr and Afium Karahissar.

October.

Shortly after their victory the Angora Government concluded with the Russian Soviet Government a formal treaty of alliance at Kars on the 13th October, and they followed this up with the conclusion of the notorious agreement of the 20th October with M. Franklin-Bouillon, acting on behalf of the French Government. This agreement terminated hostilities in Cilicia, changed in favour of Turkey the northern frontier of Syria as laid down by the Treaty of Sèvres, in principle accepted Angora's pretensions regarding the treatment of minorities in Turkey only on the same lines as the minority treaties made by the European States, and, generally speaking, prejudiced in certain other economic respects the settlement of questions which were an Allied and not purely a French concern. Lord Curzon at once protested against the conclusion of this agreement, and correspondence was exchanged with the French Government resulting, in effect, in their assuring His Majesty's Government that the agreement was only intended to be of local scope, and that its provisions would be merged in any general settlement to be concluded between the Allies and Turkey.

November.

Towards the end of October the Greek Prime Minister, M. Gounaris, came to London and had a series of meetings with Lord Curzon, the last of which took place on the 19th November. In these meetings he endeavoured unsuccessfully to throw his

case into the sole hands of Great Britain, but Lord Curzon eventually succeeded in extracting a somewhat qualified assurance from him and his Government that he would accept Allied mediation.

Having obtained this assurance, Lord Curzon endeavoured, towards the end of 1921, to bring the French and Italians into a conference to discuss the terms of such mediation.

January 1922.

Unfortunately, the fall of M. Briand and M. Bonomi, soon after the Cannes Conference early in January, followed by a considerable interregnum as regards the formation of the Government in Rome, prevented any such conference being called until March 1922.

February.

Meanwhile, M. Gounaris returned to London and wrote to Lord Curzon on the 15th February, reminding His Majesty's Government of Greece's acceptance of the offer of joint Allied mediation, but asking for financial and material assistance from Great Britain in order that the Greek army might sustain the military *status quo* in Asia Minor, which M. Gounaris regarded as essential if Turkey were to be persuaded to accept the terms of the mediation. Lord Curzon replied on the 6th March explaining that since M. Gounaris had last been in London he had done his best to take the next essential step towards Allied mediation, namely, the summoning of an Allied conference, but that political events in Italy and France, over which he had no control, had prevented this. Lord Curzon pointed out that so far as was consonant with Great Britain's publicly declared neutrality in the Græco-Turkish conflict, she had put no obstacles in the way of Greece's attempt to raise a loan on London market, but that this attempt had failed for commercial, rather than political, reasons.

March.

Representatives of the Constantinople and Angora Governments were invited to London in March 1922 as a preliminary to the meeting of another Allied conference. The representatives of both Governments had several interviews with Lord Curzon, in which the grounds for a possible mediation were explored. The Allied Conference eventually met in Paris on the 22nd–26th March, and agreed upon certain proposals for mediation, involving an armistice on the basis of the military *status quo*, together with peace terms, which would have entailed the Greek evacuation of Asia Minor. Greece accepted the armistice and made no reply regarding the other terms proposed. Angora refused even the armistice unless Greek evacuation preceded it. Unfortunately the French Government, who had, in spirit, if not in letter, pledged themselves by the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement to support Turkey in the conflict, did not join with His Majesty's Government in strictly adhering to the Paris Conference proposals, and through the spring and summer of 1922 views were exchanged between the French, British, Italian and Turkish Governments in an attempt to find some common basis, as far as possible on the lines of the Paris proposals, on which Greeks, Turks and Allies could be brought into a conference.

May.

Meanwhile, the issues became somewhat clouded by the renewal in Anatolia of the persecution of Christians. Reports of massacres appeared daily in the press, and there was clamour for a sterner policy against Turkey. To some extent massacres had occurred intermittently since the armistice, and it was really the details of such atrocities as those committed by the Turks in the Caucasus in the winter of 1920–21, when 50,000 Armenians perished, and the appalling deportations of Greeks inland from the Trebizond and Samsoun districts in the autumn of 1921 which were now reaching Europe. An attempt to force the Turks to accept some kind of international enquiry into the deportations and massacres in Anatolia was, however, frustrated by the French attitude, who endeavoured to exploit the atrocities committed in the Greek occupied area. As the Guemlek and Yalova commissions of enquiry proved, the Greeks were not, indeed, innocent, but there appears to be no doubt that the scale on which the Turks massacred and maltreated Christians was far greater than that on which the Greeks misbehaved.

July.

In July the Greek Government, with the idea of forcing a decision in its exhausting struggle with Turkey, and finding that the chances of Allied agreement and Allied mediation were receding into the background, transferred Greek divisions from Anatolia to Thrace in the hope of being allowed by the Allies to enter Constantinople. This move was frustrated by a united Allied front in the occupied areas round Constantinople.

August.

The Turks, however, taking advantage of the Greek move, captured Afium Karahissar by a surprise attack on the 28th August. The utter and unexpected collapse of the Greek army followed, and early in September the Turkish forces entered Smyrna and began to move in a threatening manner towards the Straits.

September.

On the 13th September all Smyrna, except the Moslem and Jewish quarters, was burnt and Smyrna became filled with 200,000 homeless and starving Greeks and Armenians from the ravished countryside and the burnt quarters of the city. After some negotiation, the Turkish authorities allowed British, American and Greek ships to remove the refugees to Greece. Under fear of the Turks, other refugees from Eastern Thrace and the interior of Anatolia made their way to Greece, until over 500,000 refugees had flocked into that unfortunate and impoverished country.

The Greek *débâcle* was followed by a revolution in Greece under the militarist (Veniselist) leaders and the abdication of King Constantine.

The march of the Turkish troops towards the Straits as a result of the Greek *débâcle* emphasised what has been apparent since the conclusion of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of October 1921, and the events following the Paris Conference of 1922, namely, the disunity of the Allied front caused by the French policy of always yielding to the Angora Turks and currying their favour. On the one hand, His Majesty's Government rushed reinforcements to the Straits with a view to their defence. On the other hand, M. Poincaré withdrew the small French forces which the local French commander had spontaneously sent (for the first time since the armistice) to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, namely to Ismid and Chanak. The Italian Government, as usual, was sitting carefully on the fence. In pursuance of His Majesty's Governments consistent policy of endeavouring to solve the Turkish situation by united Allied mediation, Lord Curzon conferred again in Paris with M. Poincaré and Count Sforza on the 20th September, and as a result of that conference and a further similar conference in the early days of October the Allies induced Turkey to negotiate and sign with their military authorities at Mudania an armistice convention, and to agree to meet the three Allied Powers, together with Japan, Roumania, Greece and Jugoslavia, in conference at Lausanne.

October.

The Mudania armistice was signed on the 11th October. Under its terms the Allies remained in effective occupation of a zone on each side of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and round Constantinople, while the Greek forces withdrew behind the Maritza, a Turkish administration being readmitted to Eastern Thrace with a strictly limited force of gendarmerie.

November

On the 4th November the Constantinople Government resigned and Refet Pasha took over the control of the city on behalf of Angora. From this moment the Allied High Commissioners and General Harington, as Allied commander-in-chief, began gradually to drop the administrative duties which had devolved on them as a result of the military occupation of Constantinople of 1920. On the 18th November the Sultan fled to Malta. His place was taken by Abdul Medjid, who was, however, allowed by the fiat of the Grand National Assembly to be merely a religious authority with the title of caliph.

On the 20th November the full Lausanne Conference opened with representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Greece. At the invitation of the Allies, the United States Government sent observers. Russian representatives were also admitted for the discussions on the future status of the Straits, and for the same purpose and for the discussion on the Thracian Frontiers

Convention. Bulgarian delegates also participated. Representatives of Belgium and Portugal took part in the discussions on the economic, financial and capitulatory questions, and the discussions on the latter question were also attended by the representatives of various neutral countries.

February 1923.

The first phase of the Lausanne Conference lasted from the 20th November, 1922, to the 4th February, 1923. It concluded by the formal presentation on the 31st January and the 1st February to the Turks of a draft treaty settlement with which, in the main, they were already familiar, owing to the long discussions in commissions and sub-commissions on which all the invited Powers had seats. Private negotiations between the heads of the three Allied delegations and Ismet Pasha continued during the next few days, and on the 4th February Ismet Pasha in a long written statement to the three delegations accepted the bulk of the political and territorial clauses, but made certain difficulties regarding the financial, economic and capitulatory parts of the draft settlement. Further concessions were made by the Allies in order to overcome these difficulties, but Ismet Pasha remained obstinate up to the end of the last meeting on Sunday evening the 4th February, and the conference was in consequence suspended, all the delegations returning home. Minutes of all the sittings of the three main commissions of the conference, the Allied draft treaty as presented on the 31st January and the 1st February, together with an explanation of the concessions subsequently offered before the break-up of the conference, were published in full in a Blue Book by His Majesty's Government.

March.

On the 8th March, after long debates in the Grand National Assembly, Ismet Pasha addressed to the three inviting Powers a long communication stating exactly what parts of the proposals made by the Allied Governments during the Lausanne Conference the Turkish Government were prepared to accept and what amendments on those proposals they desired.

These proposals were discussed by a meeting of French, British and Italian experts in London at the end of March 1923, and as a result the Turkish Government and the other participating Powers were invited to resume, on certain conditions, the suspended negotiations again at Lausanne on the 20th April.

Meanwhile, with a view doubtless to obtain American support at the forthcoming conference, and to stiffen the attitude of their own delegates on all economic questions, the Grand National Assembly hurried through, in March, the grant of a concession amounting to a monopoly for the construction of new railways and the exploitation of minerals in Turkey to American interests connected with the notorious Admiral Chester. This act was destined to make the task of the Allied negotiators during the second phrase of the conference considerably more complicated.

April.

The conference, attended this time by General Pellé, French High Commissioner at Constantinople, on behalf of France, and by the second delegates only in the case of all other Powers, except Turkey, who was represented by the same delegation as at the first conference, resumed the discussion on the outstanding points at Lausanne. The conference lasted more than three months, and after long delays and various crises, eventually signed peace on the 24th July, 1923. Early in its proceedings it was threatened with rupture, owing to the refusal of the Greeks to accept the Turkish demand for the payment of reparations, one of the main questions which had been left outstanding at the end of the first phase of the conference. Greek troops threatened to cross the Maritza and reopen hostilities, but the matter was finally settled by the strong and united action of the three Allied Governments and the astute diplomacy of M. Veniselos, who induced Ismet Pasha to waive Turkey's claim against the concession of Karagatch by Greece to Turkey and the return of Turkish ships seized by Greece since the armistice. The last six weeks of the conference were spent in endeavouring to settle the three outstanding questions of the currency in which the interest on Turkey's pre-war debt was to be paid, the terms on which Turkey was to satisfy the Allied holders of pre-war concessions in Turkey, and the provisions for the evacuation by the Allied troops of Turkish territory. The last-named question was not in itself a difficulty, as the Allied Powers had all along been prepared to offer Turkey more or less the terms which she desired, but they rightly refused to discuss the question until the other two disputed points

were on the way to settlement. The other two questions, the one financial, and the other economic, mainly concerned France, although there was a substantial British interest in the matter of concessions. Largely by British mediation, the French were forced to accept a settlement of the pre-war debt question which left the question of the currency outside the treaty for future discussion between the Turkish Government and the bondholders. The concessions question was settled by a compromise, Turkey, in the main, agreeing to give a substantial measure of satisfaction to the Allied economic interests concerned. The issue was, however, clouded and the terms obtained were less favourable than they might have been to the Allies owing to the conclusion, in the interim period between the two phases of the conference, of an agreement between the Grand National Assembly and what is generally known as the Chester interests, who received what practically amounted to a monopoly for the construction of new railways in Turkey and the exploitation of minerals on either side of the new lines to be built. The American observer, who, throughout the conference, afforded little concrete assistance to the Allies in the negotiations, unfortunately stiffened Turkish resistance in the final stages of the conference on the question of concessions.

The Turkish and Greek Governments have both already ratified the Treaty of Lausanne and other instruments signed there. The former ratification brought into force the protocol for the evacuation of Turkish territory by the Allied troops, which is to be completed within six weeks, namely by the 4th October. Under article 3 of the treaty, and by the provisions of the Evacuation Protocol, the period of nine months during which Turkey and Great Britain will endeavour to settle by amicable negotiation the frontier between Irak and Turkey will run from that date. The ratifications by Greece and Turkey, taken together, bring into force the Exchange of Populations Convention, and the protocol for the evacuation of territory and islands to be restored to Turkey under the treaty and now occupied by Greece. The two ratifications also re-establish peace between Greece and Turkey. As soon as Bulgaria also has ratified, the Thracian Frontiers Convention will enter into force.

The entry into force of the main treaty, the Straits Convention and the other conventions, &c., signed at Lausanne, depends upon not only Turkey's ratification, but upon ratification by three of the four Powers, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. In the interests of all parties concerned and with a view to the early execution of the provisions of the treaty, it is desirable that the latter ratification should be expedited as much as possible. It is, therefore, hoped that the Dominions and Indian Governments, who have already been consulted by the Colonial Office and the India Office, will be able, at an early date, and, at any rate, before Parliament meets in November, to signify their assent to ratification of the treaty by Great Britain.

General Observations on the Lausanne Settlement.

The Lausanne settlement has been seriously criticised in some quarters in this country and abroad, who take as their standpoint the crushing victory of the Allies in 1918 and the final terms on which peace has been made five years later. These critics are apt to compare, of course, unfavourably, the present settlement with that signed at Sèvres with the representatives of the Constantinople Government on the 10th August, 1920 It is quite true that the Treaty of Sèvres not only detached from Turkey territories of enormous extent; it also imposed upon the territory left to the Turks strict Allied tutelage, in order that Turkey might be forced to make amends for the damage which she had caused to the Allies by her wanton entry into the war in 1914. This tutelage consisted of virtually Allied control over the Straits, the Turkish budget, Turkish economic reconstruction and the grant of concessions, and over the Turkish military, naval and air forces.

The Lausanne Treaty leaves Smyrna and Eastern Thrace to Turkey. It leaves the islands of Imbros and Tenedos to Turkish government. It not only drops all question of an independent Armenia—carved partly out of Turkish eastern vilayets—but it tacitly leaves Turkey's frontier with Russia where it was fixed in Turkey's post-armistice treaties with the Russian Soviet Government. Thus Kars, Ardahan, and a large strip of territory which was Russian in 1914, are included in Turkey, and the territory of Russian Armenia, still nominally a semi-independent State federated with the Russian Soviet, is much circumscribed. For the rest, while the treaty recognises the cession of all the other territories, and, in

particular, the Arab countries, detached by the Treaty of Sèvres, with, however, a frontier with Syria more favourable to Turkey, and with a possibility for Turkey of negotiating with Great Britain a frontier with Irak more advantageous to Turkey than that laid down in the Sèvres Treaty, it leaves the Turks masters in their own house. The Allied controls contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres and the old privileges of foreigners under the capitulatory treaties, and of the Ottoman Greek and Armenian communities in Turkey, are no longer recognised.

The critics of the Lausanne Treaty omit, however, to take full account of the circumstances under which the Treaty of Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne were respectively negotiated, and the sequence of events since the armistice, which had forced the Allied Powers to give Turkey the more favourable terms embodied in the latter instrument.

The Treaty of Sèvres was drawn up on the model of all the previous treaties which had then been made with enemy Powers since the 1918 armistice. Drastic articles on the model of those in the other treaties were introduced into the Sèvres Treaty regarding reparations, war criminals, economic penalties, &c., and the measure of foreign interference in Turkey's administration which existed before the war was largely increased and systematised, partly in order to enable Turkey to pay reparations and make amends to the Allies and partly with the idea that by such foreign control alone could Turkey be re-established and rehabilitated. No article of the Sèvres Treaty was, however, discussed or negotiated with the Turkish Government; the only discussions and disputes were those between the Allies; the underlying idea was that the terms, when agreed upon, should be forcibly imposed on the enemy. Signature of the Sèvres Treaty was, in fact, imposed upon Turkey, but not, unfortunately, ratification, partly owing to the change in the Greek internal political situation, partly owing to the continued growth in cohesion and strength of the Government of the Grand National Assembly at Angora under Mustafa Kemal, which was mainly the outcome of the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the fluctuating fortunes of that occupation, partly owing to the divergence of views between the Allies manifested in the abortive direct agreements between France and Italy and Angora in the spring of 1921, in the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 1921, in the weak policy of M. Poincaré throughout 1922, culminating in his desertion of Great Britain at Chanak in September.

The Lausanne Conference had, therefore, to be called together after the Turks had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Greeks and had begun to forget the Allied victory of four years before. The Turks were invited to it on a footing of equality with all the other Powers, and every article of the treaty had to be discussed with, and explained to, them. Agreement had necessarily to be achieved chiefly by debate, persuasion and compromise. The divergence of the views of Great Britain, on the one hand, and of France and Italy, on the other, which had been clearly shown to the Turks through the post-armistice period, persisted throughout the Lausanne Conference. This divergence of views was perhaps not so much as to the terms to be obtained from the Turks as in the best manner of obtaining them, but it sufficiently weakened the Allied front to prevent a strong line being taken, and it certainly prevented the acceptance by Turkey of the original draft treaty of the 31st January, 1923.

It must be remembered, however, that during the first phase of the Lausanne Conference Great Britain achieved successfully what must be regarded as the main objects of British Imperial policy with regard to Turkey—the freedom of the Straits, the complete liberation of the Arab countries from the Turkish rule, and, perhaps of less, but still of great, importance to British Imperial interests, the handing over, maintenance and safeguarding of British cemeteries in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The Straits.

In the teeth of Russian opposition, the international status of the Straits is now to be definitely interpreted as enabling foreign warships and aircraft, though in limited numbers, to pass from the Ægean to the Black Sea. The latter has definitely ceased to be a Russian preserve. A zone on both sides of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus is to remain unfortified and demilitarised except for the right of the Turks to pass troops across it and to maintain a garrison at Constantinople An international commission at Constantinople, on which Great Britain is represented, is to be established to supervise the execution of the Straits Convention. As a necessary corollary of this measure of freedom for the Straits, Turkey has been given an international guarantee for the safety of Constantinople and the territories round

the Straits under which Great Britain, among other Powers, undertakes to carry out any measure decided upon for this purpose by the Council of the League of Nations. But this conditional and joint obligation is not too large a price to pay for a change in the status of the Straits so manifestly favourable to British Imperial interests.

Arab Countries.

Under articles in the treaty, Turkey has definitely renounced all administrative or political rights over the territories detached from her, including all the Arab countries. It is quite true that Great Britain did not succeed in the Lausanne Conference in obtaining Turkish signature to the frontier between Irak and Turkey which Great Britain desired to lay down, but it must be remembered that the recovery of Mosul was a cardinal article in the national pact, on the basis of which the Turkish delegation at Lausanne were forced by their own Government to conduct their negotiations. It must also be remembered that while the Lausanne Treaty was being negotiated there was a considerable party at home clamouring not only for the surrender of Mosul by Great Britain, but for the total withdrawal of British forces and interests in Irak. With only lukewarm support from our Allies, Great Britain stood firm against the cession of Mosul, and obtained Turkish assent to an article in the treaty whereby the frontier between Irak and Turkey shall be fixed by amicable agreement during a period of nine months running from the evacuation of Turkish territory by Allied forces. Failing such agreement, the issue will be decided by the Council of the League of Nations. In view of the fact that the Arab character of Mosul is not seriously challenged in any quarter, it is almost inconceivable that the negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey, or the decision of the council, can result in the surrender of that town and the adjacent territory by Irak to Turkey.

Graves.

Great Britain, by her insistence during the first phase of the Lausanne Conference, obtained from Turkey the handing over of the land in Gallipoli on which the graves of British soldiers are concentrated, and permanent British control, supervision and maintenance of these graves—terms as good as those laid down by the Allies in the Treaty of Sèvres.

Finance and Economics.

It is quite true that the financial and economic terms accorded to Turkey in the Lausanne Treaty are far less favourable to the Allies than those which would have been imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres, but both as regards finance and economics France had a greater interest in Turkey before the war than Great Britain. British policy and tactics in these matters throughout the Lausanne Conference had, therefore, to some extent to be subordinated to our Ally France, and the policy of the French Government, both before and during the Lausanne Conference, was one, which by its weakness, could only logically have ended, as it did end, in the considerable concessions on these subjects which the Allies were forced to give to Turkey. At the same time the impoverishment of Turkey, cut off as a result of the war and as a result of her virtual isolation from the rest of the world for five years since the armistice, coupled with the ravaging of a rich part of Anatolia by the Greeks, rendered the payment of any substantial reparation sum out of the question. By the Lausanne Treaty, however, the sum of five millions has been left in the hands of the Allies for the payment of the reparation claims of their nationals, and probably much more than a third of this sum will go to British claimants. The treaty also forces Turkey to maintain established pre-war concessions in that country, and to give a measure of reparation in kind, if not in money, and apart from the above five million fund, to British pre-war economic enterprises in Turkey.

It is generally agreed that British policy, since the firm stand taken by Great Britain at Chanak in September 1922 and during the Lausanne Conference, has gained her a greater measure of prestige in Turkey to-day than that of any other foreign Power. This prestige, coupled with the stronger financial position held by Great Britain relatively to any other European Power, should enable her to play a large part during the coming years in any financial and economic reconstruction of Turkey which the stability of future Turkish Governments may permit.

The final restoration of peace in the Near East, in so far as finality and stability are possible in this troubled quarter of the world, the definite enhancement of British prestige in Turkey, the freedom of the Straits, and the liberation of the Arab

countries, together with the appeasement in all Moslem countries which appears likely to follow the reconciliation between Great Britain and Turkey, seem sufficiently important achievements to silence most critics of the Lausanne settlement.

Future of Turkey.

It is impossible to forecast to what extent Turkey has now before her a period of external and internal peace, but the facts that there has been no indication of any desire on the part of Turkey to fish in the neighbouring waters troubled by the Italo-Greek crisis, and that Turkish intrigue in other Moslem countries, such as the Arab countries, Persia and Afghanistan, appears to have abated, point to the possible sincerity of statements by Turkish statesmen that they really wish to concentrate now upon Turkey's internal reconstruction and development. Such a policy can also be read into the recent statement made by the new Turkish Prime Minister, Fethi Bey, to the Grand National Assembly at Angora after its ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. Turkey is, however, faced by those post-peace problems by which other countries in Europe were seriously troubled after the conclusion of the post-armistice peace treaties, and in particular she has to reorganise her civil service, cut down her armed forces and provide employment for ex-officers and soldiers. The expulsion or deportation of Greeks and Armenians, and the consequent dearth of skilled clerical and other labour which this entails, are likely to increase her difficulties. The task of disbanding her army has already given rise to increased brigandage and almost open rebellion in the Aidin Vilayet. It remains to be seen whether Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues will retain sufficient prestige and strength to continue the task they have begun and to prevent the elements of opposition, which appear now to be concentrated round the remains of the old Committee of Union and Progress, weakening their hold on their country and possibly leading to another revolution in Turkey. On the whole, however, their position at present seems secure, and if so, it is possible to foresee some short period at any rate of stability and reconstruction in the new independent Turkey.

Foreign Office, September 10, 1923

E. G. FORBES ADAM.

No. 245.

Mr. Barber to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 56.) *Sofia, September* 10, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 40.

Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me that ratification of Thracian Frontier Convention will be first act of new Sobranje for which elections are to be held about the middle of November.

He added that he expected new Sobranje would assemble during the first week in December.

(Sent to Athens and Constantinople.)

No. 246.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 464.) *Constantinople, September* 11, 1923.
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 272.

My French and Italian colleagues concur in regarding your proposal as most practical method of co-ordinating action in respect of various commissions to be set up by Lausanne Treaty. They are telegraphing to their Governments in that sense.

Adnan Bey is of the same opinion, but must first ascertain views of Angora Government. He asked whether body so instituted would have authority to take decisions in respect of differences which might arise on more important matters between members of various commissions. I said this appeared to me extension of your proposal, which merely referred to minor matters such as salaries and dates.

I think it would be as well to contemplate eventual extension in practice of powers of this body, in which case heads of missions would be principal members. Question of presidency, which Turks would probably claim on the ground that Frenchman presides at Ambassadors' Conference in Paris, would then have to be considered.

No. 247.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens).

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 375 of 8th September: Attitude to be adopted by Mr. Bentinck towards Greek Minister of War.

In exceptional circumstances of the case you should of course receive Minister of War Action reported in your telegram No. 384 approved.

No. 248.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 334 (by bag)) and Rome (No. 236 (R)).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 453 of 7th September: Ratification of Treaty of Lausanne.

Please inform French (Italian) Government and explain that, while ratification either by Allied Governments or Turkey is not provided for as necessary in the case of the concessions protocol, we think it desirable that such ratification should be included in the general instrument of ratification to be deposited at Paris, as well as the ratification of the six acts specified by Ismet Pasha; and that it would be desirable that it should therefore also be included in the Turkish instrument of ratification to be deposited at Paris. Please enquire if the French (Italian) Government agree, and, if so, ask them to send instructions to Constantinople for necessary Allied communication to Ismet Pasha.

Please also ascertain if French (Italian) Government are including in their instrument of ratification the amnesty declaration, the protocol regarding the Western Thrace and Greek minorities treaties and the convention regarding compensation by Greece. It seems necessary to us that the last named should be included in Allied instruments of ratification and desirable that the other two should be included. It is important, however, that the three Allies should follow the same procedure in this matter. Turkey is not a signatory of the last two, and the Allies have held, as regards the amnesty declaration *vis-à-vis* of Turkey, that only her signature was necessary to bring it into force. She should not therefore be asked to include it in her general instrument of ratification.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 334 (by bag), and Rome, No. 236; repeated to Constantinople, No. 278.)

No. 249.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 279.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 461 of 9th September: Temporary occupation by Greeks of Gumruk Island in Maritza River.

Before this question is taken up at Athens it will be useful to have impartial opinion as to present actual position of this island with reference to the median line of the waterway of the Maritza or of its principal branch, or, if this part of the river is navigable, of the median line of the principal channel of navigation. We can hardly take action on a partial Turkish statement without checking it. Presumably General Harington still has officers near the spot who could report. Please consult him.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 158.)

No. 250.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 391.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 12, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 158

As a Græco-Turkish incident on Maritza has been reported in the press this morning I asked Political Director when he called on another matter what had really happened. He said that island had all along been in Greek occupation. Last Sunday Greeks were attacked by Turks, and there had been a few casualties on both sides. Greeks were still in occupation, and as Boundary Commission would start operations in a few weeks things could remain as they were until then. He had to-day been instructed by Minister for Foreign Affairs to draw up note of protest against Turkish attack.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 173.)

No. 251.

Mr. Kennard to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 223.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September* 13, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 217.

Italian Government agree, and are instructing their High Commissioner at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 252.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 15.)

(No. 231.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September* 15, 1923.

YOUR despatch No. 1070.

Italian Government agree that captured rolling-stock be sold and proceeds divided amongst Allies. They make suggestion that proceeds may be allotted to compensation for damages of Allied subjects in Turkey.

As regards sequestrated rolling-stock, Italian Government consider that while article 72 of Treaty of Lausanne should be applied, *i.e.*, that material to ex-enemy Governments be sold and proceeds delivered to Reparation Commission and remaining material restored to ex-owners [? groups omitted]. In above connection attention is drawn to paragraph 3 of clause 3 of protocol relative to evacuation of occupied Turkish territory.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 253.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 15.)

(No. 232.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September* 15, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 272 to Constantinople, and your telegram No. 231 to Rome.

Italian Government agree to work being done by Allied representatives at Constantinople in conjunction with [? Turkish] [? representative], and if occasion arises, with representatives of other signatory Governments.

Instructions have been sent to Italian High Commissioner by telegraph.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 254.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 15.)

(No. 233.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September* 15, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 234.

Italian Government learn that Council of League of Nations examined question of nomination of commissioner for railways, and decide that each delegate should telegraph to his own Government to urge continuance of present Railway Commission.

Italian Government have agreed, and have instructed their representative at Athens accordingly.

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

No. 255.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henaerson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 286.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 15, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 464 of 11th September: Diplomatic Body at Constantinople to supervise execution of certain clauses of Lausanne Treaty.

It is, in most cases, provided in treaty that boundary commissions should decide by a majority vote, while special provision is also made in treaty for settlement of disputes in such cases as mixed arbitral tribunals, financial commissions and *ad hoc* sanitary commission. I therefore consider scope of work of proposed Diplomatic Body should be confined to minor matters, as suggested by me. Powers can decide later, and on the merits of any other dispute as it arises under treaty, whether it can suitably be dealt with by same body. Under this arrangement it seems a matter of minor importance whether presidency is at times held by a Turk, since, as in case of Ambassadors' Conference at Paris, decisions will have to be taken unanimously. I am therefore enquiring views of French and Italian Governments as to desirability of presidency being held in rotation by British, French, Italian, Japanese representatives and Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs himself.

You should be guided accordingly, if Adnan reverts to the matter.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 286; repeated to Athens, No. 171; Sofia, No. 42; and Rome, No. 247.)

No. 256.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (*No.* 339) *and Rome* (*No* 248)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 15, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 464 and my telegram No. 286 to Constantinople of 11th and 12th September: Lausanne Treaty execution.

Please inform French (Italian) Government of substance of both telegrams, and enquire whether they share my views.

[E 9249/199/44] No. 257.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 17.)

(No. 543.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, September* 11, 1923.

THE long expected declaration of policy by the new Government of Turkey was at length read on the 5th instant by Fethi Bey, President of the Council of Ministers, and was unanimously approved by the Assembly on the same date. I have the honour to enclose herewith the full text of Fethi Bey's statement as published by the "Journal d'Orient."*

2. A general perusal of the Government's programme chiefly serves to demonstrate the magnitude of the task confronting the new Turkey. In every branch of the

* Not printed.

administration the need for reforms is admitted, as is also, however, the inadequacy of the means available for their execution.

3. The balancing of the national budget is regarded as the cardinal point of future internal policy. No external loans are, however, to be contracted as these are considered to have been the cause of many of Turkey's past misfortunes. The gradual liquidation of internal war debts and the regular payment of the interest on the foreign debt are promised, and will, it is hoped, assist the re-establishment of Turkish credit. Agricultural development is to be encouraged by State aid to the Agricultural Bank, and by reductions in the tithe rates and general economic progress, by the despatch of students to Europe and by the more equitable levy of the temettu or income tax The necessity for the employment of foreign experts is likewise recognised, and it is interesting to note that, though foreign loans are not to be countenanced, in his reference to public works Fethi Bey expressed the readiness of the Government to afford all facilities for the employment of foreign capital in this connection.

4. Such matters as public instruction, the judicial régime, organisation of the gendarmerie, improvement of prison conditions and civil service questions were also touched upon. Although the necessity for reforms under each of these heads was admitted the importance of balancing receipts and expenditure was repeatedly emphasised, and it was made abundantly clear that these reforms would only be effected within the limits of that condition.

5. It will be remarked that Fethi Bey's references to the relations of Turkey with foreign States were as brief as possible. Turkey would, he said, work honestly for the fulfilment of the recently concluded treaties. The expression of the desire for the cultivation of good relations with Persia is not without interest in view of the strain to which these have recently been subjected.

6. Owing to a printers' strike, which commenced on the 6th instant and still continues, it was not at first possible to learn the views of the Turkish press on the Government's declaration. The proprietors of the eight Turkish newspapers have now, however, succeeded in producing a somewhat attenuated common newspaper in which some fragmentary comments have been published. These have, on the whole, been unfavourable. They point out that while, on the one hand, the much and long required reforms are promised, on the other, the Government has bound itself to a financial policy which makes their realisation impossible. They also show curiosity as to the manner in which, even with the smallest and most economical reforms, the budget is to be balanced in present conditions. In brief, the general opinion seems to be that the declaration is a collection of fair words with nothing behind them, and that the Government would be well advised to replace words by deeds.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

No. 258.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 17.)

(No. 416.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 17, 1923.

NEWSPAPERS report that on 15th September Karagatch was formally handed over to Turks.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[**E 9092/7862/44**] No. 259.

Mr. Oliphant to M. Preziosi.

My dear Preziosi, *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1923.

WITH reference to your official note of the 29th August, I enclose herewith a copy of a letter which Sir William Tyrrell has sent to M. de Montille regarding the Inter-Allied Turkish Reparation Convention *

You will see that His Majesty's Government accept the changes in the convention agreed upon by the British and Italian experts.

* Printed separately.

We assume that you will now communicate with the Quai d'Orsay directly through your Embassy in Paris as to the few outstanding drafting points, and arrange for your Ambassador in Paris to sign the convention.

Lord Crewe will receive the necessary authorisation from here.

Yours very sincerely,
LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[**E 9092/7862/44**] No. 260.

Sir W. Tyrrell to M. de Montille.

My dear M. de Montille, *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1923.

IN reply to your letter of the 4th September and the enclosed note by your expert at the Quai d'Orsay regarding the Inter-Allied Turkish Reparation Convention, I send you herewith, for communication to the Quai d'Orsay, a memorandum by our experts on the changes in the draft convention agreed to by the British and Italian experts and their respective Governments, subject always to the concurrence of your experts and Government.

We are sending a copy of this letter and the enclosures to the Italian Embassy.

Will you please let us know in due course if the Quai d'Orsay agree to the draft and the verbal alterations suggested in the memorandum, and will make the necessary arrangements for obtaining the consent of the Roumanian and Japanese representatives in Paris and for the signature of the convention there?

Yours sincerely,
W. TYRRELL.

Enclosure in No. 260.

Memorandum on the Allied Turkish Reparation Convention.

THE British and Italian experts met on the 20th August and agreed upon the enclosed text, subject to the approval of the Italian Government, which has now been communicated officially through the Italian Ambassador here to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

2. It was agreed that the text should at once be communicated to the French Government, and that, if the French Government concurred, the French experts should be asked to draw up the final text of the convention (since it is in the French language) and to obtain the concurrence of the Japanese and Roumanian Governments. It was thought that the Japanese Government could perhaps be most easily approached through the Japanese financial expert, Mr. Sato, who is understood to be Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in Paris.

It was proposed to suggest that the British and Italian Governments should ask the French Government to be good enough to arrange for the convention to be signed in Paris as soon as the concurrence of the Japanese and Roumanian Governments has been obtained.

3. The only three changes proposed in the text by the British and Italian experts on the 20th August are the following:—

(a.) *Article* 4.—The words "La présidence sera tenue successivement par les "représentants de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie" were added at the suggestion of the Italian expert.

(b.) *Article* 6 (1) (*d*), *paragraph* 1.—The words "sur les territoires restés turcs à "la date de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne" were inserted. The Italian Government strongly desired to exclude claims by Ottoman concessionary companies for damage suffered in detached States, the chief claims on this account being those of the Damascus–Hamah Extension Railway and the Jaffa–Jerusalem Railway. It was understood that the French expert had already acquiesced in this provision.

(c.) *Article* 6 (1) (*d*), *end of paragraph* 2.—The words "En aucun cas la totalité "des indemnités à payer à ces sociétés ne pourra pas excéder la valeur "nominale des bons du Trésor visés au paragraphe 2 de l'article 1er" were inserted.

The Italian Government were most anxious that some limit should be placed on the amount to be received by the concessionary companies, and had suggested that the amount to be received by these companies should be limited to the proceeds of the 5 per cent. Turkish Treasury bills, 1911, referred to in article 1 (2).

The British expert considered that such a limit was of too uncertain and arbitrary a character to be acceptable, but agreed to the Italian Government's proposal in a modified form—namely, that the limit should be the nominal value of these Treasury bills, or the sum of 846,100*l.* (It is expected that the amount to be received by the companies in question will fall far short of this sum.)

4. The British and Italian experts did not discuss drafting amendments on the 20th August, since the time available was limited, and, moreover, it was felt that the final French text would best be prepared by the French experts. The following drafting amendments may be pointed out:—

(*a.*) The Treaty of Lausanne should presumably be referred to as "le Traité de Paix "avec la Turquie signé à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923" in paragraph 2 of the preamble, and as "le Traité de Lausanne" in article 1 (1), article 5 and article 8 (where the words "en date de ce jour" should be omitted).

(*b.*) *Article* 1 (1).—"L'article 58" should be substituted for "l'article 57" in accordance with the final numbering of the articles in the treaty.

(*c.*) *Article* 6 (1) (*d*), *paragraph* 2, *line* 2.—As damage in detached States is excluded, the word "turc" should be substituted for the words "du pays "intéressé."

(*d.*) *Article* 6 (2) (*b*).—The date "24 juillet" should be inserted.

(*e.*) *Article* 6 (2) (*c*).—The correct title and date of the concessions protocol should be given, viz., "en vertu du protocole relatif à certaines concessions "accordées dans l'Empire ottoman du 24 juillet 1923." At the end of the paragraph "les sociétés visées audit protocol et à ladite déclaration" should presumably be substituted for "lesdites sociétés."

Convention relative à l'Évaluation et à la Réparation des Dommages subis en Turquie par les Ressortissants des Gouvernements alliés autres que la Grèce.

L'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon et la Roumanie,

Désireux d'affecter à la réparation des dommages subis par leurs ressortissants les sommes rendues disponibles en vertu du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie,

Ont résolu de conclure une convention à cette fin et ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Les Puissances contractantes conviennent d'affecter en commun à la réparation des dommages subis par leurs ressortissants :

1. Les sommes en or visées à l'article 57 du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie en date de ce jour ;
2. Les bons du Trésor 5 pour cent 1911, du montant nominal de 846,100*l.* sterling, que le Gouvernement britannique consent à affecter à la réparation desdits dommages

Ce fonds sera administré par la commission prévue à l'article 2 de la présente convention.

ARTICLE 2.

Une commission dénommée "Commission d'Évaluation" sera instituée dans un délai d'un mois après la mise en vigueur du traité avec la Turquie pour évaluer les dommages subis par les ressortissants des Gouvernements alliés (autres que la Grèce) tels qu'ils sont définis ci-dessous.

ARTICLE 3.

Cette commission se composera de trois membres nommés respectivement par les Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie. Dans le cas où le dommage

intéresserait un ressortissant d'un autre Gouvernement signataire, il serait adjoint à la commission pour l'évaluation de ce dommage un membre additionnel nommé par ce Gouvernement. En cas d'égalité des voix, celle du président sera prépondérante.

ARTICLE 4.

La commission établira sa procédure, dans les termes assurant le prompt règlement des dommages.

La présidence sera tenue successivement par les représentants de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie.

Les décisions seront prises à la majorité des voix.

Les décisions de la commission seront sans appel.

Le budget de la commission et de son personnel sera soumis à l'approbation des Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie.

Les dépenses de la commission seront prélevées sur le fonds de réparation.

ARTICLE 5.

Les demandes des intéressés devront être introduites dans le délai d'une année à dater de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

ARTICLE 6.

1. La commission devra évaluer et indemniser dans les conditions prévues à la présente convention les dommages ci-après définis :

(*a.*) Les dommages directs (autres que ceux visés au paragraphe 2 de cet article) subis sur les territoires qui étaient ottomans au 1er août 1914 ou sur mer par les ressortissants des Gouvernements signataires de cette convention, dans leurs personnes ou dans leurs biens, pendant la période comprise entre le 1er août 1914 et la mise en vigueur du traité avec la Turquie, par suite de tout acte ou négligence du Gouvernement turc, y compris les dommages résultant de mesures de réquisition, de séquestre, ou de confiscation, ainsi que les dommages directs subis sur les mêmes territoires par lesdits ressortissants pendant la même période par suite de tous faits de guerre, quel qu'en soit l'auteur.

(*b.*) Les dommages directs causés par l'incendie de Smyrne aux biens et propriétés des ressortissants des Gouvernements signataires.

La commission aura pouvoir de déduire de l'indemnité attribuée à ce titre les sommes que le réclamant aurait obtenues par ailleurs ; elle aura également pouvoir d'écarter les réclamations au cas où elle estime que le réclamant n'a pas fait toute diligence utile pour obtenir une indemnité à laquelle il aurait eu droit par d'autres voies.

(*c.*) Les dommages visés aux alinéas (*a*) et (*b*) qui ont été subis par les protégés des Gouvernements signataires dont la patente de protection ressort à une date antérieure au 1er août 1914.

(*d.*) Les dommages visés aux alinéas (*a*) et (*b*) qui ont été subis sur les territoires restés turcs à la date de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Lausanne par les sociétés ottomanes dans lesquelles les ressortissants des Puissances signataires avaient un intérêt prépondérant au 1er août 1914.

La commission tiendra compte des avantages d'ordre économique accordés à ces sociétés par le Gouvernement du pays intéressé en raison des dommages subis par elles. La valeur desdits avantages devra être évaluée en espèces et sera déduite du montant revenant aux sociétés en vertu de la présente convention. En aucun cas la totalité des indemnités à payer à ces sociétés ne pourra pas excéder la valeur nominale des bons du Trésor visés au paragraphe 2 de l'article 1er.

2. Seront hors de la compétence de la commission et non indemnisés par elle :

(*a.*) Les dommages indirects, y compris la privation de jouissance et le manque à gagner ;

(*b.*) Les réclamations relatives aux sommes à payer par le Gouvernement hellénique en vertu de la convention en date du 1923, réglant le remboursement des dettes résultant des actes par des autorités helléniques en Turquie ;

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(c.) Les réclamations des sociétés concessionnaires à raison de l'utilisation par le Gouvernement turc de leur propriété ou de leurs services qui devront être réglées par ledit Gouvernement en vertu du protocole relatif aux sociétés concessionnaires du 1923 et de la déclaration y annexée ou en vertu des arrangements intervenus entre le Gouvernement turc et lesdites sociétés.

ARTICLE 7.

La commission distribuera le fonds de réparation aux intéressés proportionnellement à la valeur des dommages subis par eux. Les indemnités accordées par la commission seront versées aux intéressés par l'entremise de celui des Gouvernements alliés dont ils sont les ressortissants.

ARTICLE 8.

La présente convention sera ratifiée.

Les ratifications en seront déposées à Paris en même temps que les ratifications du Traité de Paix en date de ce jour.

Elle entrera en vigueur pour chaque Puissance contractante en même temps que ledit Traité de Paix.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente convention.

Fait à Paris en un seul exemplaire, qui sera déposé dans les archives de la République française, qui en délivrera des expéditions authentiques à chacune des Puissances signataires.

Le 20 août 1923.

No. 261.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 18.)

(No. 472.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Constantinople, September* 18, 1923.

MY telegram No. 449.

Local authorities here have now received necessary instructions respecting freedom of travelling for foreigners in Turkey.

No. 262.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 18.)

(No. 473.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September* 18, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 331 to Paris.

Agreement was reached a few days ago between respective local authorities in Thrace for formation of Græco-Turkish Commission to replace former Allied Railway Commission.

Adnan Bey confirmed to me yesterday that Angora had accepted this local arrangement in spite of his recommendation for Allied Commission as better calculated to prevent disputes than if commission consisted of Greek and Turkish members only. He assured me that Turks for their part would respect spirit of article 107 of treaty.

In these circumstances I am inclined to recommend that proposal of League of Nations reported in Rome telegram No. 233 be dropped. Retention of present British member is at any rate somewhat inconvenient, as he has now offer of other permanent employment, and General Harington is anxious in his own interests to withdraw him by 21st September.

I suggest therefore that Allied Governments notify the two Governments concerned that they do not wish to raise objection to purely Græco-Turkish Commission, provided it prove satisfactory, reserving in contrary event right to insist on other arrangements.

No. 263.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 18.)

(No. 474.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 18, 1923.

MY despatch No. 544.

Osmanieh wireless station will be handed over to Turks on 25th September on conditions, unless modified before that date, laid down in War Office telegram No. 92020 of 13th September to General Harington.

I see no objection to getting undertaking respecting possible German claims, but no advantage either, in view of article 155 of Treaty of Versailles and of definite Turkish claim to ownership.

I regard second condition as likely to defeat what little chance there ever was of Turks employing Allied engineers and staff or of re-equipping station with Allied material. Nominal control in future will certainly be Turkish, so that second condition will in any event be little more than dead letter. Nor are we on sufficiently strong ground in the matter of our claim respecting German ownership to insist on conditions, which Turks might decline to accept.

For economy's sake, if for no other reason, Turks will probably get German material and assistance in working station in future, but, much as I regret this possibility, I see no procedure whereby we can ensure against it.

No. 264.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 19.)

(No. 241.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, September* 19, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 334 to Paris.

Italian Government agree as regards proposal contained in first paragraph and their representative at Constantinople has been instructed accordingly by telegraph.

Italian Government concur that amnesty declaration and protocol relative to Greek Minorities and Thrace Treaties should be included in Allied instrument of ratification. As regards convention relative to compensation by Greece, although its ratification need not be included in Allied instruments of ratification of acts signed the same day at Lausanne, it should be deposited in Paris simultaneously with latter as specified in last paragraph of convention in question.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 265.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 289.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 19, 1923.

SIR R. GRAHAM'S telegram No. 231 of 15th September: Disposal of rolling-stock at Constantinople.

You should now settle the matter with your Allied colleagues as instructed in my telegram No. 282 of 13th September.

Disposal of captured rolling-stock should present no difficulty. It will not be necessary to adopt Italian suggestion that proceeds of sale should be used for compensation of Allied nationals in Turkey. It will suffice to agree to divide proceeds amongst Allies.

As regards sequestered rolling-stock, it is not clear how clause 3 of Evacuation Protocol applies. Clause only refers to property of Turkish Government or Government Departments, but railways in Turkey belong to Ottoman limited companies, *i.e.*, private concessionary companies. If any rolling-stock belonging to such companies is included in sequestered material, neither above clause nor article 72 of treaty applies. Such material should presumably be returned to concessionary company.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 266.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 20.)

(No. 430.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 20, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram of 18th September, with reference to your telegram No. 331 to Paris.

It is not clear to me whether recommendations are made by all three High Commissioners or by British only. My colleagues have not received similar information, but it seems to my Italian colleague and to me that, according to terms of article 107, League of Nations are bound to select a commissioner.

In view of Constantinople suggestion and of Rome telegram No. 233, substance of which was merely sent to Italian Minister from Geneva without any instructions, and of fact reported in my telegram No. 414, I propose to await further instructions before acting on your telegram No. 154. Italian Minister is telegraphing to Rome in similar sense.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Rome.)

[E 9407/1019/65] No. 267.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 21.)

(Secret.)
Sir, *Downing Street, September* 20, 1923.

I AM directed by the Duke of Devonshire to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 10th September, raising the question of the venue of the proposed negotiations with the Turkish Government regarding the frontier of Irak. His Grace had already consulted the Acting High Commissioner for Irak on this subject, as requested in your letter of the 13th August, and had received from Sir H. Dobbs in reply the telegram (No. 485 of the 4th September) of which a copy was communicated to you in the letter from this Office of the 7th instant.

2. It will be seen that Sir H. Dobbs is in agreement with the King and Prime Minister of Irak in favouring the view—contrary to that expressed in your letter under reply—that the negotiations should be conducted in London. The Duke of Devonshire is disposed to take the same view. It appears to him that negotiations of such importance should take place at the capital of one or other of the States concerned. It is inevitable that one plenipotentiary should be at a distance from his Government and under the necessity of consulting it by telegraph, but there seems much to be said against an arrangement that would place both plenipotentiaries in that situation. It is likely that constant reference will have to be made to Bagdad during the course of the discussions, and if these were held at Constantinople the British plenipotentiary would have to adopt the complicated procedure of referring through the Foreign Office and Colonial Office to the High Commissioner. If, on the other hand, the conversations were held in London, one link in this chain of communication would disappear. His Grace fully appreciates the arguments advanced in your letter as to the undesirability of the presence of Turkish delegates in London, but he considers that arguments of no less force can be adduced against the proposal that the conversations should take place at Constantinople. It appears to him that the same reasons which prompted the Allied Powers to resist the suggestion that the main peace conference should be held in Turkish territory apply equally to the question now under discussion. It would, in his Grace's opinion, be more difficult to resist any claim by the Irak Government to direct representation at the conference if it took place at Constantinople than if it were held in London under the immediate supervision of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the contingency cannot be disregarded that considerable concessions may have to be made to Turkey in the course of the negotiations. It appears to his Grace that difficulties would be less likely to arise in this connection if any representative of the Irak Government were attached as adviser to the Secretary of State for the Colonies than if he were attached to a British mission at Constantinople. The Irak representative in London is at present in Bagdad on leave, but is expected to return at the beginning of October, and it should not be difficult to arrange for him to be authorised by the Irak Government to express their views to the Colonial Office as and when necessity arises. Works of reference, official papers, maps, statistics and expert military

advice are all more readily available in London than elsewhere. Turkish propaganda is less likely to be effective in this country during the autumn, when, as is pointed out in your letter under reply, the Imperial Conference, the session of Parliament and other matters are likely to monopolise public interest. At Constantinople, on the other hand, the progress of discussions on a subject which the Turkish Government have hitherto affected to regard as vital to the future of Turkey would appear to afford a great opportunity for local intrigue and press agitation.

3. But it is the personal aspect of the question to which his Grace attaches the greatest importance. It had always been his hope that the conference would be held under conditions which would enable the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to exercise his personal superintendence, if not over the details, at least over the general conduct of its proceedings. The Duke is well aware how heavy are the calls upon his Lordship's time, and is most reluctant to suggest any procedure that would increase the burden. Nevertheless, Lord Curzon's personal association with the discussions would, in his Grace's opinion, so immensely enhance the prospect of a successful issue that he feels bound to press this aspect of the question upon his Lordship's consideration. He would venture in this connection to refer to the personal messages transmitted to Lord Curzon by King Feisal and his Prime Minister on the occasion of the ratification by the Turkish Government of the Treaty of Lausanne. It is clear from the tenor of these documents that the King and his advisers fully realise that it was due to Lord Curzon's personal intervention alone that the Turkish claim to the Mosul vilayet was successfully resisted at Lausanne. Nothing could be better calculated to maintain public confidence in Irak during the further stages through which this difficult question has to pass than the knowledge that Lord Curzon was personally participating in the discussions on the subject.

4. The Duke would be grateful if the whole question of the venue of the conference could be reconsidered in the light of the above arguments.

I am, &c.
J. E. SHUCKBURGH

No. 268.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 21.)

(No. —.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 21, 1923.

FOLLOWING is repetition of my telegram No. 414:—

Your telegram No. 154.

My Italian colleague is still without instructions to act in the sense of your telegram No. 331 to Paris.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 178; repeated to Rome, No. 78.)

No. 269.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (*No.* 341 (*by bag*)), *and Rome* (*No.* 254 (*R*)).

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1923.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 473 of 18th September: Karagatch Railway Commission.

Please inform Government to which you are accredited, and suggest that instructions be sent to their representatives at Athens and Constantinople that the three Allied Governments concur, subject to proviso in last paragraph of Mr. Henderson's telegram and on the strict understanding that it is without prejudice to due execution of article 107, when the treaty enters into force. This is, of course, on the assumption that Greek Government are also prepared to accept local arrangement.

(Addressed to Paris, No. 341, and Rome, No. 254; repeated to Constantinople, No. 291; Athens, No. 177; and Geneva, No. 88.)

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No. 270.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 292.) *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1923.
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 443 of 31st August: Turkey and Greek ratification of the treaty.

In view of formal transfer of Karagatch, and action taken by Turkey at Geneva to secure immediate establishment of Mixed Commission under Exchange of Populations Convention, I am not clear whether Turkish Government are still in doubt about validity of Greek ratification.

But if so, you may inform Adnan that His Majesty's Government regard method of Greek ratification of the treaty as a purely internal question, which does not concern the other signatories.

French Government have agreed with us on this reply. We did not approach Italian Government as Græco-Italian crisis was then at its height. You should, however, act in concert with your colleagues if they have instructions, or can obtain them quickly, otherwise alone.

In speaking to Adnan you may point out as additional argument for not questioning validity of Greek action that representatives of present Greek Government were permitted to sign treaty without question.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 292; repeated to Rome, No. 255, and Athens, No. 178.)

[E 9479/199/44]

No. 271.

Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 24).

(No. 566.) *Constantinople, September* 18, 1923.

My Lord,

THE Turkish Government and Assembly have been principally concerned during the past fortnight with financial matters and the difficulties arising out of the Exchange of Populations Convention.

2. Finance was dealt with in Fethi Bey's declaration of policy enclosed in my despatch No. 543 of the 11th instant, and since then the various commissions of the Assembly have been occupied in preparing the estimates for the current year. Small supplementary votes for different Departments have been passed from time to time, but pending the production by Angora of its first national budget the available information is too fragmentary for reliable comment.

3. The execution of the Exchange of Populations Convention is causing the Turkish authorities considerable anxiety, and Adnan Bey has more than once expressed to me the desire of his Government that no time should be lost in setting up the Mixed Commission provided for in article 11 of the convention. Adnan Bey explained that the hand of the Turkish Government in this respect had been forced by the sufferings to which the Moslem population in Crete and Macedonia were being at present exposed.

4. As your Lordship is aware from my despatch No. 556 of the 12th instant, the Turkish Government has already notified the names of its delegates on the commission to be established for this purpose. But the financing of the undertaking and the settlement of the Hellenic Moslems are difficult problems, and have been the subject of much discussion in the party meetings. The former will, it is expected, be surmounted by the raising of an internal loan, which may be guaranteed on the receipts obtained from the application of the Abandoned Property Law. The question of the settlement of the refugees is to be solved by the grouping together in separate areas of the refugees coming from the different localities in Greece. The Moslems of Anatolia are, however, giving indications that the arrival of the newcomers will not be welcomed, and are raising the cry of "Anatolia for the Anatolians."

5. In this connection interest attaches to a report which appeared in the local Armenian papers of the 16th instant to the effect that the Armenians of the interior, who have for some time been assembled at the Black Sea ports with a view to emigration from Turkey, are now being encouraged by the Turkish authorities to return to their homes, in which the Government undertakes that they will be reinstated. A number

of such refugees have, the report adds, already returned to Amassia and other towns, and have had their properties restored to them. This is one of several indications that the Turks themselves are already beginning to regret their suicidal policy of expelling their "helot" population.

6. Meanwhile there is much evidence of generally unsettled conditions. In the Turkish labour world this has taken the form of strikes, of which three commenced in a single week. That of the employees on the Smyrna–Aidin Railway, which lasted some eight days, has been reported to your Lordship. On the 5th instant the butchers of Constantinople engineered a lightning strike with a view to dealing a blow at the control recently instituted by the municipality over the slaughtering of all animals. Thanks to the energetic measures taken by the Vali, this strike was, however, of very short duration, and resulted in the complete discomfiture of the strikers.

7. The printers' strike, to which I referred in my despatch No. 543, is of more importance and still continues, all efforts to bring the two parties together having so far ended in complete failure. The chief demands of the compositors relate to hours of work and rates of pay, and are such as the newspaper proprietors cannot accept. Nevertheless, the strikers, having been assured of the support of their fellow-workers in other towns of Turkey, daily produce a morning and an evening newspaper in support of their cause, and the position has become one of stalemate. The proprietors likewise produce a common newspaper voicing their standpoint, and have suggested that the strikers are drawing their main support from Communist sources. The organ of the strikers has of course indignantly denied the implication, and in fact has commenced the publication of articles showing anti-Communistic tendencies. I think it, nevertheless, quite probable that the paper is indeed subsidised by the Bolshevik delegation here.

8. Reports are increasingly positive regarding troubled conditions and general insecurity in the interior. In spite of the energetic measures taken by the Government to suppress it, brigandage is increasing. Some of the bands are even stated to have been reinforced by the accession to their strength of the Government contingents sent to deal with them. They are particularly active in the vicinity of Trebizond and Erzeroum, which, as your Lordship is aware, have for long been centres of anti-Kemalist agitation.

9. In the eastern provinces also the situation would appear to be far from satisfactory, and it now seems certain that Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha's departure from Angora was connected therewith. A more serious revolt is reported to have broken out at Dersim and to have spread to Mush, Bitlis and Diarbekir, while unrest is general in other Kurdish areas. No account of the measures taken to deal with the outbreak has yet reached me, but it appears that no reliance can be placed on the troops in these areas, who are themselves dissatisfied at the manner in which their position has been prejudiced in favour of the western armies, who have been in a better position to make their power felt in the capital.

10. Although too much importance should not, in my opinion, be attached to these reports of disorder, yet they do, I think, represent to some extent the present position in the interior of Asia Minor. The brigandage question is the greatest of the problems immediately confronting the Government, and unless these bands are ruthlessly stamped out anarchy and chaos will become general. The Nationalist army was created out of brigandage, and it is conceivable that the activities of bands will in the end undermine the Kemalist organisation. This fact is, however, fully realised by Mustafa Kemal and his advisers, and all the energies of the Government are doubtless being concentrated to meet the danger.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 9465/1482/44]

No. 272.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(*Received September* 24.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de France n'a pas manqué de communiquer à son Gouvernement la note que son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères a bien voulu lui adresser au sujet du projet de participation d'un groupe anglais au Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie.

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Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères à Paris estime qu'il y a lieu de se demander si l'élimination de l'influence allemande est suffisamment assurée par la combinaison du groupe de banque anglaise telle qu'elle a été exposée le 21 août à Londres aux représentants du groupe français.

Le groupe anglais obtient de la Banque des Chemins de Fer orientaux les droits de vote correspondant aux intérêts de cette banque dans les chemins de fer d'Anatolie. C'est par un simple arrangement avec le Conseil d'Administration de la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer orientaux que le groupe anglais s'assure le contrôle précédemment détenu par le groupe suisse-allemand. Le texte de cet accord n'a été communiqué ni au groupe français, ni au Gouvernement de la République, mais il y a lieu de noter que le Conseil d'Administration de la Banque des Chemins de Fer orientaux avec lequel l'arrangement est conclu comprenait jusqu'à l'année dernière neuf membres allemands sur dix-sept. S'il est maintenant en majorité suisse, à une voix de majorité seulement, ce changement ne résulte pas des modifications dans la répartition du capital ni de l'élimination de l'influence allemande ; il répond seulement à la nécessité de se conformer dans la forme aux nouvelles prescriptions de la législation fédérale. On peut, dans ces conditions, se demander si, le groupe anglais pourra exercer effectivement le contrôle de l'affaire.

Enfin, les intérêts à proprement parler financiers du groupe suisse-allemand des Chemins de Fer orientaux, loin d'être éliminés, acquièrent plus de valeur par le nouveau projet ; il doit recevoir en effet en titres de la nouvelle société 100 pour cent de la valeur nominale de ses actions et obligations des anciennes compagnies, tandis que les autres actionnaires et obligataires, en majorité turcs, ne se voient accorder que 20 et 30 pour cent des leurs. C'est, en réalité, aux dépens des capitaux nouveaux attendus des autres groupes alliés que doit se réaliser la consolidation des intérêts financiers de l'ancien groupe. Pour toutes ces raisons, il est impossible de ne pas se demander si l'éviction des intérêts allemands est aussi complète et efficace que l'exigent les accords alliés. La communication du Gouvernement britannique du 25 août indique bien que le groupe anglais lui a fait savoir au paragraphe 7 que " l'élimination des Allemands des " entreprises des chemins de fer en Turquie était assurée par l'acquisition du contrôle " du porte-feuille de la Banque des Chemins de Fer orientaux " ; mais il serait important aux yeux du Gouvernement de la République que le Gouvernement britannique voulût bien, après examen des conventions conclues par les banques anglaises, donner lui-même au Gouvernement français cette assurance.

D'autre part, en ce qui concerne la répartition du contrôle des chemins de fer en Turquie, son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères indique que le Traité de Sèvres, l'accord tripartite et l'accord particulier du 25 mars 1922 sont inopérants. Il ajoute qu'en fait l'accord qui a été conclu entre les Gouvernements français et italien, le 3 février 1923, a remplacé l'accord tripartite.

Le Gouvernement français, comme il a cru déjà devoir le rappeler à l'occasion de cette affaire, estime que la politique des trois Gouvernements alliés en Orient a toujours eu le même objet : évincer l'Allemagne de ses chemins de fer en Turquie et assurer aux trois Puissances alliées une part égale dans le produit de cette éviction.

L'article 294 du Traité de Sèvres, l'article 95 du projet de traité du 31 janvier 1923, l'article 91 du projet de traité du 4 février 1923, qui obligeaient la Turquie à la reprise des réseaux allemands, avaient tous comme complément nécessaire l'article 4 de l'accord tripartite signé par l'Angleterre, la France et l'Italie, le 10 août 1920, qui obligeait les Alliés à se partager également les chemins de fer.

Le Gouvernement français ne saurait donc accepter la thèse d'après laquelle l'accord tripartite serait devenu caduc en raison de la non-ratification du Traité de Sèvres. L'accord tripartite a toujours été considéré en effet comme un accord entre alliés, dont l'esprit subsistait en dépit du sort de ce traité. Il a été confirmé par l'accord particulier du 25 mars 1923, à une époque où personne ne croyait plus que le Traité de Sèvres serait accepté par les Turcs. A la séance du 22 mars 1922 de la Conférence de Paris, son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté répondant à M. Schanzer a, d'après les termes du procès-verbal, déclaré : " La position " de la Grande-Bretagne est claire ; l'accord tripartite est un accord entre alliés auquel " les Turcs ne sont pas partie. Le Gouvernement britannique ne réclame aucune " sphère d'influence ; il reste fidèle loyalement à l'accord qu'il a signé."

D'autre part, il n'apparaît pas non plus que l'accord franco-italien du 3 février 1923 fasse tomber et remplace, comme l'indique la lettre du 25 août adressée à cette Ambassade, l'accord tripartite et l'accord particulier du 25 mars 1922 qui le complète.

L'accord franco-italien, en effet, résulte des lettres échangées le 3 février 1923 entre les Cabinets de Paris et de Rome. Elles comprennent : Une lettre détaillée sur l'accord

intervenu et deux lettres se bornant à constater cet accord. Le premier de ces documents précise expressément *in fine :*

" Cette entente sera portée à la connaissance du Gouvernement britannique. Il est " d'ores et déjà entendu que le syndicat réservera explicitement aux groupes britanniques " le droit de participer au syndicat, aux mêmes conditions que les groupes français et " italien."

Les deux autres documents déclarent que l'objet de l'accord, c'est-à-dire la constitution d'un syndicat franco-italien, " sera considérée par nos deux Gouvernements " comme la réalisation au point de vue économique de l'accord particulier du 25 mars " 1922. Dans le cas où leurs efforts dans ce sens resteraient sans résultat, les deux " Gouvernements se concerteraient à nouveau pour assurer par d'autres moyens le " respect des engagements réciproques qui découlent de l'accord du 10 août 1920, dit " Accord tripartite."

Dans le fond et dans la forme, l'accord franco-italien, loin de faire disparaître l'accord tripartite, demeure fidèle à son esprit, puisqu'il réserve expressément aux intérêts anglais une part égale aux intérêts français et italiens.

Du reste, à la Conférence de Londres qui s'est tenue entre le 21 et le 26 mars 1923, c'est-à-dire postérieurement à la communication faite au Gouvernement britannique de l'accord franco-italien, il a été convenu, d'après le procès-verbal de la sous-Commission économique qui discutait l'article 95, " que l'article qui traite de la future propriété et exploitation des chemins de fer d'Anatolie et de Bagdad devait être laissé pour une discussion ultérieure avec les Turcs, en vue, si possible, d'arriver à quelques arrangements avec eux, en dehors du traité."

Il est hors de doute que, si cet arrangement avait eu lieu, le contrôle des Alliés dans la réorganisation de ces réseaux eût été exercé sur la base de l'égalité, c'est-à-dire conformément à l'esprit de l'accord tripartite, complément de l'article 294 du Traité de Sèvres, comme de l'article 195 du projet de Traité de Lausanne.

Au surplus, des accords comme l'accord tripartite et l'accord particulier du 25 mars 1922 ne sauraient disparaître sans être dénoncés formellement.

D'autre part, au paragraphe 9 de sa lettre du 25 août, le Gouvernement britannique indique qu'il a fait savoir au groupe anglais qu'il comptait qu'une équitable participation serait accordée aux groupes français et italien ; il ajoute que le groupe anglais lui avait annoncé qu'il était disposé à le faire, mais qu'il désirait, en raison du capital qu'il avait investi dans l'affaire et des risques financiers courus, assurer le contrôle effectif de cette entreprise.

Il semble impossible de considérer comme une équitable participation la combinaison qui a été offerte le 21 août au groupe français. Si elle était acceptée, elle obligerait le groupe français à payer 12½ pour cent du capital de la nouvelle affaire sans avoir aucun contrôle, tandis que le groupe anglais, en ne payant que 5 pour cent du capital se réserverait 51 pour cent du contrôle avec des avantages qui en découlent. Une telle inégalité se justifierait d'autant moins que le groupe anglais investit moins de capitaux que le groupe français et court par conséquent moins de risques financiers. Il serait donc indispensable que, non seulement les conditions de cette participation fussent revisées, mais également que les bases mêmes de la combinaison puissent être discutées par le groupe français appelé à investir des capitaux au même titre que le groupe anglais.

Sa Seigneurie le Marquis Curzon de Kedleston invoque en dernier lieu le principe d'après lequel le Gouvernement britannique s'interdirait, d'une manière constante, d'intervenir auprès des entreprises financières ou industrielles anglaises au sujet de leur champ d'action ou de leurs opérations. Le Gouvernement britannique a signé, il y a trois ans, un accord qui prévoyait d'une manière détaillée la collaboration des groupes alliés dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer allemands en Turquie ; il a notifié au Gouvernement français la constitution du groupe anglais appelé à assurer cette collaboration ; en se constituant avec un groupe français et un groupe italien en syndicat d'étude, ce groupe a accepté d'agir dans le cadre de cet accord. Comment le Gouvernement de Londres peut-il considérer maintenant qu'il ne lui appartient pas d'intervenir auprès de ce même groupe pour la mise en pratique de ces mêmes engagements ? Il y a là une question indépendante des modalités d'ordre technique que comporte la réalisation de ces engagements et sur l'importance et le caractère de laquelle l'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

En conséquence, le Comte de Saint-Aulaire a été chargé de demander à son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté pour les Affaires étrangères s'il

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est en mesure de lui donner l'assurance que les conventions conclues entre le groupe anglais et la Banque des Chemins de Fer orientaux garantissent l'éviction des Allemands du Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie.

Les considérations qui précèdent montrent que l'accord franco-italien du 3 février 1923 n'a nullement fait disparaître et remplacé l'accord tripartite, qu'il est fidèle à l'esprit de cet accord et que les Gouvernements français et italien ont, au contraire, renouvelé, dans leur échange des lettres du 3 février, l'engagement forme de le respecter. A la Conférence de Londres du 25 mars 1923, postérieure à l'accord franco-italien, la décision prise au sujet d'un accord éventuel avec les Turcs, qui devait remplacer l'article 95 du Traité de Lausanne, indiquait que le Gouvernement britannique désirait rester fidèle au partage égal d'influence dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer ex-allemands. Le Gouvernement britannique n'entend sans doute pas se libérer aujourd'hui de cet engagement. Enfin, l'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant à son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères de bien vouloir le mettre en mesure de fournir à son Gouvernement des précisions sur la manière dont il conçoit l'équitable participation qu'il a invité le groupe anglais à offrir au groupe français

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 21 septembre 1923.

[**E 10449/1019/65**] No. 273.

Notes on the Mosul Frontier Question by Colonel F. R. Maunsell, C.M.G., C.B.E.— (Communicated by War Office, September 22; Received in Foreign Office, September 24.)

UNDER the Treaty of Lausanne the next question for consideration is that of Mosul, or rather the northern frontier of our Mesopotamian mandate. After the Mudros armistice it was finally decided to accept as the provisional frontier the boundary of the Mosul Vilayet as it existed in Turkish times. For most of the line this meant taking the boundary of the Vilayets of Van and Mosul as far as could be determined from the maps then available. As a former consul at Van, I can, perhaps, claim some knowledge of the situation as it was regarded in Van before the war.

The Turkish Government, like other Oriental States, never seem to care to have their frontiers laid down too definitely on accurate maps; probably they like to have some deviations they may manage to include in subsequent quarrels or negotiations. Even the vilayet boundaries of the interior were in many cases not too clearly laid down, but were generally recognised by the gendarmerie of vilayets, by local custom following some well-marked geographical feature in many cases.

In the Kurdish vilayets the Turkish Government purposely drew the vilayet boundaries to suit political considerations, to divide up some unruly Kurdish tribal confederation so that it fell under two separate vilayet Governments, thus frustrating possible combination and rendering the tribes easier to manage as a whole.

This was specially noticeable among the large Kurdish confederations on the plateau north of Lake Van, Erzerum and Bitlis. Now, for reasons that will be shown later, the boundary of the Vilayets of Van and Mosul remained the most indeterminate of, perhaps, all the other Turkish provinces.

Other boundaries of the Van Vilayet, such as that with Erzerum on the north and Bitlis on the west, were comparatively clearly defined by geographical features, and because these districts round Lake Van were under fairly good administrative control the boundaries were generally recognised. It was otherwise with the boundaries of the Mosul and Bitlis Vilayets south of the lake. The Turkish Government published no map showing the official divisions of their country, and the best semi-official map was, and I believe still remains, Huber's "Carte administrative de l'Empire ottoman," which gave the vilayets, sanjaks and nahies* with considerable

* These frequently altered in Eastern Turkey.

accuracy in Eastern Turkey, and although the scale was very small, and the map difficult sometimes to reconcile with the ground, yet a good general idea of the administrative divisions was produced.

There were also vilayet administrative maps in the various volumes of Cuinet's "Gazetteer," but these were also of small scale, roughly drawn, and still more difficult to reconcile with the ground.

Until the production just before the war of the Turkish staff map of North-Eastern Turkey in Asia, the country remained officially unsurveyed, but I found that the Valis generally had manuscript maps of their vilayets on a small scale hanging up in their offices, marking roughly the boundaries of their vilayets. I never obtained access to that of the Van Vilayet, and those of the Sivas and Trebizond Vilayets, which I saw, were very rough productions.

The Turkish staff map of Eastern Turkey seemed to have been made for military purposes, and I have never seen any vilayet boundaries marked on it. In the discussion of the Mosul frontier question it is, however, quite possible that the Angora Government will produce maps with frontiers and boundaries drawn to suit their political claims, utilising their staff map as far as it applies; and probably copies of my 1:250,000 War Office map, which they managed to capture during the war, and of which they subsequently made identical copies in Turkish character for the use of their staff.

When compiling the 1:250,000 map it was suggested to me that the Turkish administrative divisions might be put on it, but with only Huber's small scale map and Cuinet to guide me, and moreover, from my own experience of Turkish boundaries on the spot, I found it impossible to carry this out with any tolerable accuracy, so I left them out. Similarly, when the 1:2,000,000 R.G.S. map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria and West Persia was published, the same suggestion was made by the R.G.S., but I concluded that it would be better to omit the administrative boundaries for the reasons given above.

Then as regards the 1:1,000,000 world map, with special reference to the sheets representing Eastern Turkey in Asia, it may be noticed that these give the vilayet boundaries there. I had nothing to do with the production of this map; doubtless Sir Charles Close evolved this information from some sources open to his somewhat bureaucratic mind, but as one who had seen things on the spot I could not subscribe to them.

The southern and south-western boundaries of the Vilayet of Van, with those of Mosul and Bitlis respectively, have always remained particularly indefinite because the Governments of these vilayets found great difficulty in controlling the Kurdish tribes (many of them nomad) of Hakkiari and the Bohtan districts, and had, after several unsuccessful attempts at control, left them semi-independent, mulcting them of taxes or tribute whenever a favourable opportunity offered.

This represented the state of things before the war, when the situation was fairly normal and the Armenian and Assyrian questions more or less quiescent, but I scarcely think it has altered much at the present day when the Armenians and Assyrians have been obliterated or driven from their proper homes, and the control of the Angora Government over the Hakkiari and Bohtan has certainly become much weaker than that of the former Imperial Government.

At a previous period I believe the Vilayet of Van had included in it the Amadia Kaza, as happens at present, but it was subsequently given up to Mosul as it was found practically impossible to maintain communication between Van and Amadia in winter, the tracks down the Great Zab Valley being mostly closed then and found difficult even in summer; while the routes between Amadia and Mosul through Dohul and the Bahdinan are always open at all seasons.

It seems to me an anachronism that Amadia should be in any way under Van. Before the war it might possibly have been useful to Van as a centre from which Tiari and the lower Assyrian districts on the Great Zab might have been controlled, but as these latter are now largely derelict I cannot see how Amadia can be any use at all to the Government of Van, except as a centre from which to disseminate propaganda hostile to our interests in the Mosul Vilayet, an advantage which is no doubt fully appreciated and taken advantage of.

Bashkala is the headquarters of the Sanjak of Hakkiari in the Vilayet of Van, and from this point was before the war, and probably is now, directed as far as possible the government of the very intricate mountain districts to the south along the Persian frontier and south-west along the gorges of the Great Zab. Bashkala itself stands in the upland plain of Albak, some 8,000 feet above sea level, with a severe winter climate,

and is then difficult of access, the only route then being the lofty Chukh pass, which, however, remained passable except in actual blizzards.

In summer, however, Bashkala is comparatively easy of access and commands also an easy route across the Persian frontier to Urumia.

The northern boundary of the Hakkiari Sanjak was clearly marked by the Chukh Dagh and its continuations south-west to the Kokobulend Peak, after which definition became very vague. As the Albak plain terminates a few miles below Bashkala, the Great Zab abruptly plunged into a series of deep rocky gorges from which it does not emerge for many miles, sweeping round by the Amadia Kaza and passing through the Assyrian districts.

In these mountains the Turks maintained only one kaïmakam at Julamerk, who did his best from the old castle of the Kurdish "mirs" of Hakkiari to administer the wild mountains around him.

He contented himself with collecting an annual tribute from each of the Assyrian valleys which lay south of him, along tributaries of the Great Zab, such as Diz, Lizan, Walto, Tiari, Salebekkan, and so on as shown on the 1:250,000 map, there being a fixed sum paid by the "malik," or headman of each tributary valley. He also tried to prevent encroachments and quarrels by neighbouring Kurds, but as he had only a few gendarmes and no military garrison with him in Julamerk, he could accomplish little in this direction.

He was helped a good deal by the fact that the Assyrian Patriarch, Mar Shimun, then lived at Kochannes, a village situated on the way between Bashkala and Julamerk, and therefore comparatively easy of access from both places.

Communication between Bashkala and Julamerk was fairly easy by hill paths in summer under the slopes of Kokobulend, and in winter by tracks along the Great Zab.

I could always manage to communicate, winter and summer, with the British missionaries, who then lived with the Patriarch in Kochannes, before they moved to Amadia.

But south of Julamerk, down the Great Zab, communication was always regarded as practically impossible in winter, and extremely difficult even in summer, so that it is obvious there was no defined frontier in this direction with the Mosul Government, under which Amadia then was.

In that direction the kaïmakam simply collected a tribute from the Assyrian tribes or "valleys," and the frontier remained nebulous.

As it appears that these Assyrian valleys are now largely derelict and uninhabited, it is difficult to see what the kaïmakam at Julamerk can now accomplish, if he is there at all, except to use the place as a supporting link in propaganda among the Kurds against the British when opportunity offers, working in connection with Amadia as best he can.

Towards the south, along the Persian frontier, the authority of Bashkala was rather better supported.

A kaïmakam was installed at Diza, the chief place on the Gavvar Plain, with a military garrison of about one infantry battalion supplying small outposts in the vicinity, a customs post on the route to Urumia in Persia, by the Delasi Pass, a well-frequented track, and maintaining also some gendarmes under the kaïmakam's personal orders. The Gavvar Plain, the bed of ancient lake among the mountains, was easy to traverse, and also communication with Bashkala was easy. Diza was therefore a useful centre from which to control the districts along the Persian frontier on one side, and the intricate mountain districts of the Jelu Dagh and Sat Dagh, which lay west of the plain.

Repeated efforts in the latter direction failed to achieve success.

"Nahies" were formed, with mudirs under the kaïmakam of Diza, in such places as Oramar Heriki and Sat, on the far slope of the Sat Dagh, the mudir being sometimes a local Kurd, but these did not remain in office long, if they did not meet a violent end; so the attempts were soon abandoned.

The Assyrian districts of the Jelu and Baz on the other side of the Jelu Dagh, paid tribute in the usual manner, through Kochannes, to Julamerk or Bashkala direct.

Here again it is obvious that there could be no defined frontier with the Mosul Vilayet at all.

In fact in this direction the Mosul Government had special difficulties of their own; they were periodically obliged to send small military expeditions, sometimes with varying success, to subdue the Kurdish Agha of Barzan, who was nominally dependent on a kaïmakam installed by them in Zebar or Akra.

Usually this chieftain lived in complete independence, defying Mosul generally,

and certainly so distant a Vali as that of Van. The present agha in Barzan is, I think, not unknown to our authorities in Akra, and appears still to be continuing his career of independence, although here again we find the Turks utilising these chiefs and those in Zebar as agents for propaganda against ourselves in the Akra region.

Taking a direct line from Gavvar to Akra, or from Gavvar to Amadia, the country is exceptionally difficult, even for this mountainous region, principally owing to the deep limestone gorges which the streams traverse, and the absence of the high upland downs which make the country farther north easier to traverse.

When I passed through, the Turks contented themselves with placing a military post of a corporal and a few men from Diza at the mouth of a narrow defile which led out of Gavvar Plain towards Oramar, to control traffic, leaving the districts beyond to look after themselves under their own aghas. Nervi, Reikan, Sati, Herki and such mountain districts with their patches of fertile ground in the deep valleys and villages perched high up on the limestone crags overlooking the gorges were left to their own devices so long as they did not trouble the outer world too much.

During the war the celebrated church of Jelu, what might be called the Westminster Abbey of the Assyrians, was destroyed, and this district, with those of Baz and Des adjoining it, are now derelict. I remember well that to enter the Jelu Valley from Gavvar I had to traverse a gorge only a few feet wide, with limestone crags towering two or three hundred feet on either side, and at a sharp turn of the stream bed we were confronted by a stone loop-holed erection, by which we had to pass. This could have been occupied and held by a few men if the Jelu people had wished to dispute our passage.

This gives an idea of the difficulties of controlling these wild districts without using a large military force, which the Turks declined to do.

Looking farther south along the Persian frontier, the Bashkala Government generally maintained kaïmakam in Neri, which before the war contained the fine house in which resided the Sheikh of Neri, the father of the present Sheikh Sayyid Taha, whom we have recently installed as District Governor of Rowanduz. The old sheikh was a remarkable man of considerable wealth derived from tobacco growing in the district and from smuggling it over the Persian border at Katunan, where he had another large house, a mansion for these parts. A man of great reputed sanctity, he was a special protégé of the late Sultan Abdul Hamid, and consequently the kaïmakam, if at all assertive, found himself in a most difficult position, as his royal master would hear nothing against so holy a personage as the sheikh, and, moreover, one who sent him such costly presents.

I encountered once a kaïmakam in the far north of the Van Vilayet, where he had just got a post, who told me of recent experiences of his post at Neri, where he had fallen foul of the sheikh in some way, and suddenly one evening found himself engaged in a desperate struggle with three Kurds, who leapt in through the window with the intention of strangling him. He told me he just managed to escape, but thought it best to ask for transfer to another post.

At present the houses of the old sheikh at Neri and Katunan are in ruins after the war, and the place is occupied by a Turkish garrison, a detachment of the 9th Army Corps, and is an important centre of action, political and military, against our position in Rowanduz and also in Akra.

In previous memos I have set out the importance of this line of Van–Bashkala–Diza–Neri–Rowanduz to the Turks as being the only easy route through this mountainous country, and thus the best for military action and propaganda against our position in Southern Kurdistan.

For not only is there an easy mountain track from Neri through Kaniresh to Rowanduz, but there is also a track, much used, through Barzan, the Great Zab Ferry at Rezan to Zebar and Akra, centres of hostile activity against us.

South of Neri, where the authority of Van was none too secure under the old sheikh, its authority scarcely penetrated; the Kurdish district Haschea, close to the Persian frontier, was regarded as practically independent, as was Baradost. Rowanduz was then in the Vilayet of Mosul, and there was no settled boundary between it and the district under the Sheikh of Neri, although such might have been roughly indicated by the line of the Rudbar-i-Barasgir, about Kaniresh, near which our frontier has temporarily been drawn, and behind which the Turkish invaders of Rowanduz have recently been driven by our troops.

This concludes the survey of the shadowy boundaries between the Sanjak of Hakkiari and the Mosul Vilayet, and we may turn further north to the limits of the Sanjak of Van itself to the south-west of that town. South of Van itself a kaïmakam

was installed in Shattakh, a small place, once half Armenian, on the upper waters of the Bohtan River, and connected with Van by a good road over a low easy pass.

From here the Nurduz district immediately to the south, consisting of high uplands or downs easy to traverse, was controlled. Sometimes a mudir, under the kaïmakam, was installed in Merwanen, or a local agha was employed to look after the several villages of sedentary Kurds in Nurduz. These, with the district of Khoshab (Makmudie) to the east, also the seat of a kaïmakam, rarely gave any trouble, and these districts were well under control.

But it was to the south-west of Merwanen where difficulties began, as in that direction habitations ceased, and the great upland pasturages or "yailas" of the nomad Kurds commenced.

One of the largest of these "yailas" was that of Farashin, under the northern slope of Kokobulend Peak, usually occupied by the Hartoshi confederation of Kurds.

I have travelled along the line of migration of these nomads without seeing a single habitation after leaving Shernakh, near Jezire-ibn-Omar, until I reached Merwanen a fortnight later.

These nomads, principally of the Hartoshi and Miran confederations, were a constant source of trouble to the Vali of Van; after having wintered on the west bank of the Tigris, and crossed that river in spring by the boat bridge at Jezire, the sheep tax being collected as they traversed the bridge. His difficulty was to prevent petty raids and looting by these invaders, who might properly be said to belong to the Vilayet of Diarbekr, in which Jezire was situated, on villages of sedentary Kurds and Armenians in the Shattakh and Merwanen districts, and also to prevent inter-tribal fighting between the two great factions, the Hartoshi and the Muran, of the nomads.

For this latter purpose a half squadron of regular cavalry from the Van garrison was usually posted with the chief of the Hartoshi in the Farashin Yaila to watch his movements; and it may be noted that these troops were under the military Pasha of the Van garrison, and not directly under the Vali or Civil Governor, while these two officials did not always work together, thereby causing further trouble.

Generally, no military operations were undertaken against these two great confederations from Van, they being left to fight it out on their own in the autumn towards Jezire, which they usually did; the region between Merwanen and Shernakh being regarded as a sort of no man's land, at any rate outside the jurisdiction of the Governor of Van. As I have mentioned, the authority of the Sanjak of Hakkiari terminated about the Kokobulend Peak, and thus there was a wide area of country south-west of Nurduz before the authority of the Mosul Vilayet could be said to be reached, and consequently there was no idea at all of a settled frontier between the Vilayets of Van and Mosul in this direction.

It is true that at one time an attempt was made to instal a kaïmakam under Van at Elk, a small village on the head waters of the Khabur, but shortly after I passed the charred remains of the kaïmakam's house in that place, he having just escaped with his life from the surrounding Kurds, who burnt it over his head. As a result, the attempt was abandoned and not tried again, and, except when a small military expedition was sent to chastise some outlaws of the Zshiriki Kurds who attacked my caravan passing above Elk at Haidan-i-Ziril, the district was left alone, and no touch was preserved with the Mosul Government.

Looked at from the south, from the point of view of Mosul, a kaïmakam was maintained at Amadia, who established a very shadowy authority over the powerful Kurdish Sheikh Berwari, who dominated the middle Khabur Valley, and was generally left alone by him.

Since our occupation, Mr. Jardine, one of our district officers, has travelled over and surveyed this middle Khabur district, and it would seem that any effective control by the Government of Van remains as far off as ever, namely, that it is still confined to Nurduz and Shattakh, a very long way off.

It may be mentioned that Shattakh was completely devastated and destroyed during the war, and that the uplands of Nurduz also suffered, so that the control of Van in this direction is probably more shadowy than ever, and miles out of touch with our present Mesopotamian border.

Thus again, taking the intricate mountain districts which lie north of Zakho traversed by the middle course of the Hazil River, we find that before the war the Mosul Government maintained a kaïmakam in Zakho, but that he had little or no control over the Kurdish aghas who held various natural fastnesses in the gorges of the middle Hazil; they were left severely alone, except when their conduct became

outrageous, and then a small military expedition was organised in Mosul, and after much trouble managed to storm through their narrow gorges into their strongholds and extract some reparation for their continual looting.

Our own troops during the later stages of the war sent a small expedition into this district, and had some difficulty in penetrating the difficult fastnesses of these Kurds. The course of this river Hazil is a very curious one.

The upper waters consist of a large number of streams rising in Harakol Dagh and the other ranges which surround a wooded basin called Bestenjik, and then converging like the sticks of a fan to one enormous gorge in the hills to the south, where they unite to form the course of the middle Hazil, which, after traversing some very remarkable gorges and receiving tributaries through narrow limestone gateways on either hand, finally emerges into the Zakho plain and joins the Khabur below that town.

Now, the wide basin of the Bestenjik, although some 30 miles across, remained entirely uninhabited, except for a few parties of Kurds whom I saw gathering oak galls.

There were no villages at all, for the simple reason that it was on the track of the annual migrations of the nomad Kurds, the Hartoshi and Muran, to whom I have referred above, and to them a village was usually a place to loot.

Taking this with the semi-independent district along the middle Hazil, it will be seen that the Turkish kaïmakam when in Zakho had to look far before he could find the frontier of any vilayet to the north of him.

As we have seen, that of Van was far away to the north-east in Nurduz. Directly north he would discern no settled government until he reached the other side of the great Harakol range, where the Vilayet of Bitlis maintained kaïmakams in Khoskheir and Deh in the Bohtan. These depended on the mutaserif of the Sanjak of Sairt, who actually had an imperfect control over his kazas. Khoskheir was noted for its street fighting, when the adherents of the various local aghas were wont to exchange shots and conduct their local affrays up and down the main street in front of the konak. Such a kaza could scarcely be termed settled, and its frontiers to the south were quite indefinite.

Deh was a large village containing many Armenians, and is now probably derelict, while its boundaries have doubtless entirely lapsed.

Thus, with the wide independent space intervening, the frontiers of the Mosul Vilayet can scarcely be said to have marched with those of Bitlis at all.

Then, to the north-west of Zakho, the territory of an entirely separate vilayet was introduced, as at Jezire a kaïmakam was posted under the Vilayet of Diarbekr.

The frontier between the two kazas, on the Zakho–Jezire road, were fairly well defined across the Nahrwan Plain, following our present line with the Turks there.

But the authority of the Jezire kaïmakam did not extend far from the banks of the Tigris into the wild mountains which approach the bank east of that place.

Among these hills is Shernakh, the stronghold of the sedentary section of the powerful tribe of Hartoshi Kurds, under an agha who still exercises a very powerful influence, and claims to be a descendant or relation of Bedr Khan Bey, the Kurdish hero of 1837.

Beyond Shernakh to the east comes the uninhabited area of Bestenjik, which I have already described, while Derigule, in the Rohsur Valley below Shernakh to the north, and a place on the nomad migration route, is under the Hartoshi chief also.

Shakh, in the hills a few miles east of Jezire, is the gateway leading to Shernakh, standing as it does at the mouth of the Tang-i-Ghelli, a fine limestone gorge, up which the track to Shernakh leads, the passage being once defended by two fine castles overlooking the gorge, which are now in ruins.

Shakh itself has walls and defences of the Roman period in good preservation, similar to those of Jezire, while the remains of a remarkable irrigation canal cut by the Romans in solid rock for a long distance, and meant to utilise the water of the stream in the gorge, can still be traced. The Kurds of Shakh regard themselves as under the Hartoshi chief of Shernakh, and the guardians of this gateway for him.

It was usual for the kaïmakam of Jezire to fall in with this arrangement, while he exercised little authority over the Hartoshi, and probably the present Turkish Government find it convenient to do the same, unless they seek by underground propaganda to utilise the Hartoshi aghas for some action against our position in Zakho. It is to be hoped that our officers have taken measures to counter this, as these Hartoshi struck me as a fine stamp of Kurd, who would readily be loyal to us.

In article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of Angora, 1921, the frontier regarding Jezire is referred to as follows: "Thence it will follow the old road between

" Nisibin and Jezire-bin-Omar, where it will join the Tigris. The localities of Nisibin " and Jezire-bin-Omar, as well as the road, will remain Turkish, but the two countries " shall have the same rights to the use of the road."

A commission comprising delegates of the two parties was to have been constituted within a period of one month from the signature of the agreement to determine the above-mentioned line, and it is to be hoped that the subtle mind of the Angora delegate did not put too wide a meaning on the word " locality " of Jezire-bin-Omar, a rather vague expression, I think, and extend the territory occupied rather too widely.

Now, taking the districts referred to as a whole, we find the Turks had only two general lines of control over this wide area of Kurdish mountains, one on the extreme east, that of Van–Bashkala–Diza and Neri, towards Rowanduz, and another on the extreme west from Bitlis, through Sairt and Jezire, towards Zakho, and they seem still to be utilising the same lines in the method of governing the country.

And I should imagine that at present the Turkish, or, rather Angora, Government has a rather weaker hold over these regions than the Government of the Ottoman Empire before the war.

The growth of the Kurdish national spirit, due largely to the presence of our forces and the evidence of our administration in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan, is, in my opinion, largely answerable for this, and should be encouraged further by us as far as possible.

The discussion of the Mosul frontier took place in January 1923 at the Lausanne Conference, the arguments put forward by Ismet Pasha for a Turkish occupation of the former Mosul Vilayet down to Jebel Hamrin being completely refuted in a speech by Lord Curzon at that time.

Among other details,* Lord Curzon remarked, on the point of strategy, that Ismet Pasha had said very little, and perhaps wisely. His Lordship added that Mosul would be an excellent place for an army corps to be stationed. The southern frontier was only 60 miles from Bagdad. Was it not obvious that a Turkish army placed at Mosul would have Bagdad at its mercy, and could make an Arab kingdom well-nigh impossible.

Such an argument holds with probably greater force to-day, as the Irak army is still insufficiently strong to withstand any Turkish advance without strong backing from us, especially as now in the minds of the Irak people the Lausanne Treaty was a moral victory for the Turks in the sense that in their eyes they have been able to flout the Western Powers, especially England, whom they thought so powerful, and to gain the right to expel foreigners and infidels from their country at will.

I might even add that, in my opinion, the Irak army will never be able to stand against the Turks without our support.

Or if I may put it more clearly, King Feisal's Irak army with its British advisers could not be trusted to stand for a moment against the Turks if the British garrison were withdrawn. The advisers would be quickly swept aside and might suffer an unfortunate fate.

Babylonia and Chaldaea were never able to stand against Assyria and invaders from the north, and their descendants could not do it to-day. But the Irak levies, composed of Kurds and Assyrians under the control of British officers, supported by British military and especially air force, may be expected to show a determined front to the Turks, and drive them out of their country and beyond, if called upon. The Turkish arguments regarding Mosul were completely refuted in January at Lausanne. but I scarcely think that sufficient attention was then directed to the very important strategic importance of Rowanduz looked at in conjunction with Mosul.

Assuming that the adjoining district with the various Kurdish tribes are under control, as they are at present under Sayyid Taha, Rowanduz stands as the key point on a very important trade route into North-West Persia and Tabriz by Rayat and the easy pass of the Garwa Sheikh on the frontier, up to which point the Russians constructed a metalled road during the war.

It would be an easy feat for modern engineering to construct a motor road through the Rowanduz gorge to join this road at the summit of the pass. Then there is the possibility of constructing a railway from Bagdad through Kirkuk, Rania and the Wazna Pass up the Lesser Zab Valley into Lahjan Plain, and thus entering North-West Persia from the south-west. With Rowanduz in hostile hands such a line would be impossible, and there is no other pass by which to cross the frontier ranges except near the Tak-i-Girra, a long way to the south and heading away from North-West Persia.

* "Times" report of January 23, 1923.

With Rowanduz in our hands the Wazna Pass line would be securely protected on the north. As I have shown above, Rowanduz is the terminal of an important line of Turkish advance, both for military action and propaganda from Van through Bashkala, Diza and Neri.

By this threatening attitude in recently massing troops at Neri an indication is given that they appreciate the value of this line, and intend to utilise it as a lever in their negotiations.

Then again, Rowanduz in hostile hands would always constitute a threat on the right flank of our position at Mosul.

The Turks felt this acutely when the Russians advanced and captured the place during the war, although they were prevented from moving far west of the town by the Turks holding some trenches on the crests above the gorge.

Moreover, when Rowanduz was in Turkish hands during the early part of this present year we found to our cost that they used it as a centre for their intrigues and propaganda, which penetrated as far south as Rania and Suleimanieh, and jeopardised our whole position in Southern Kurdistan. Is it wise that we should then gratuitously give them the opportunity of repeating these manœuvres, which would become intensified if permanent occupation were guaranteed? Even if we decided to hold on to Mosul such action would mean a constant menace on the right flank of our whole position in Mesopotamia and in Bagdad itself.

Then again, there is always the possibility in the future of a reorganised army and an aggressive attitude on the part of Persia, which quite lately during the Khalizi incident has shown an unwelcome desire to interfere in Irak affairs.

They seem not to have entirely forgotten that it was only some 300 years ago when the Sultan wrested Bagdad from the Shah, and certainly, if the British left Irak, these ambitions might revive, and it has even been rumoured that they might trade off their province of Azerbaijan with the Turks in exchange for permission from them to reoccupy Bagdad.

In such eventualities, or rather, to prevent their occurring, the strategic position of Rowanduz is invaluable, as it provides a direct gateway from Mesopotamia into North-West Persia, through which such actions might be controlled and a too restless Persia brought to reason. A watch could also be kept on such as that on the frontier at Bulakbashi further north.

Turning now to the part of the proposed frontier directly north of Mosul, we find that in the correspondence stating the British objections of the conclusion of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921, Lord Curzon, in a letter to M. de Montille dated the 21st November, 1921, said; "His Majesty's Government " cannot remain indifferent to the manifest strategic importance to their position in " Irak of the return of the track of the Bagdad Railway to Turkey or of the transfer to " that Power of the localities of Jezire-bin-Omar and Nizibin."

This warning has since been fully justified as the Turks have utilised Jezire as a military station of importance directly threatening our outpost of Zakho.

Jezire in Roman times was Bezabde, and as the ancient walls still standing testify, it was a frontier post of considerable importance against Parthia. This is due to its geographical position at a point of crossing of the Tigris just after the river emerges from a long series of difficult gorges upstream.

The Turks now seem to wish to emulate the Romans by constituting the place as a frontier post threatening our position in Mosul, where we may be taken to represent similar influence to that of Parthia.

The present Turkish garrison in Jezire is stated to be four battalions whose military headquarters are in Diarbekr with which they are connected by a good road through Nisibin and Mardin, a route, it may be mentioned, very vulnerable to air attack. From Jezire northward along the Tigris left bank, is a rough track, but one which the Turks have utilised for moving troops and even light artillery, up to Sairt and thence to Bitlis.

By this route connection can be established with troops of the IXth Army Corps and if necessary reinforcements brought from that force.

This it may be remarked is the same corps which supplies the detachments in the Baskala direction.

Also, the narrow defiles on the Tigris and the Bitlis Pass are not entirely immune from air attack.

As regards the locality of Nisibin, this is clearly an important strategic concentration point for an advance directed against Mosul, owing to its being the railhead of the Bagdad Railway and also connected with Diarbekr through Mardin by

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a good military road. From Nisibin to Mosul the route lies over open country, open to air action.

In this connection it may be as well to note the recent attack on the French post at Armida, between Nisibin and Ras-ul-Ain, when a Kurdish force of 2,000 men, stated to be led by Turkish regular officers, barbarously murdered the garrison after surrender. This incident indicates that the Angora Government are not above utilising disaffected bands of Kurds for their own purposes, and rousing the latent sense of cruelty which these semi-civilised races possess to serve their own ends.

The fact that machine-guns were supplied to the Kurds and Turkish regular officers led them, makes the matter rather more serious than ordinary propaganda efforts among the tribes.

Facing Jezire, at the northernmost corner of our mandate, we are fortunate in possessing the strong defensive position of Zakho–Feishkhabur, to which I have alluded in a former memorandum.

This definitely bars an advance from Jezire across the open plain of Nahrwan in front of it, while the passage of the Khabur at Zakho, and the forcing of the defile of the main road from Mosul leading to that place would be a difficult task for the enemy were it adequately held.

But it may be well to consider the general point of view from which the Angora Government may be expected to approach the whole question of the Mosul frontier, now that they have ratified the Lausanne Treaty, and must enter into further discussion with a view to settling it.

I should like to be permitted to give what I imagine to be the view of the Angora Turks and those of the interior rather than of those who tell plausible tales at Constantinople to officials who have never penetrated into the interior during their service.

First of all, we have the violent speeches on the subject delivered in the National Assembly at Angora just previous to the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, both on the Mosul frontier question and also as regards the French and Syrian frontier.

These may appear as foolishly bombastic to Western people, but I think they should be considered as really serious expressions of opinion of what the Deputies of the interior think, and, moreover, in such a subservient body as the Assembly they would not have been permitted to be delivered unless by the express sanction of Mustafa Kemal himself, who remained somewhat discreetly in the background on this occasion.

Then there are the recent concentrations of Turkish troops at Neri threatening Rowanduz, and the retention of a needlessly strong garrison of some four battalions at Jezire, which may certainly be taken to contravene Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which enjoins the Turkish and British Governments reciprocally to undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier (that of Mosul), no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.

Then there is the sudden incident which has just cropped up at Bulahbashi (near Katur), on the Turko-Persian frontier, not far north of the Rowanduz sector of the Mosul frontier under discussion.

Mustafa Kemal seems to have modelled his action on that of Mussolini at Corfu, and, moreover, his action is directly aimed at us as one of the four signatories of the Turko-Persian Frontier Commission.

The incident may be looked on as a slight one, but I do not think this should be the case, in view of the opening of the Mosul frontier question, which is imminent.

It is quite clear that the Frontier Commission completed its labours up to Mount Ararat from the Persian Gulf a short time before the outbreak of the great war in 1914; the map-sheets showing the boundary pillars of the new frontier and the accompanying text were signed by the delegates of all four Powers—Great Britain, Turkey, Russia and Persia—and accepted and ratified in due form just before war broke out.

It will be found that the new frontier as then accepted has been inserted on the various sheets of my War Office 1:250,000 map dealing with this frontier, this being done from the larger scale sheets signed by the delegates of the Frontier Commission. The new frontier has also been inserted on the 1:2,000,000 R.G.S. map.

There was certainly then no question that this frontier, which had been under dispute for some seventy years, was then finally decided, and I think will be found to be so.

I think this arbitrary and sudden action of the Angora Government in much the same area renders the general aspect of the Mosul question more serious than if it had been taken under ordinary circumstances, and it will have the effect of impressing the local Kurds along this section of the frontier, most of whom are adherents of Simko Agha, with a sense of the power which the Angora Government can now arrogate to itself after its victories in the field and at the council table further west. This is no doubt one effect which they certainly intended to produce. Strange as it may appear to Western thought, I submit that the following may be taken as the view that the Angora Government and the ignorant fanatics whom Mustafa Kemal leads or, rather, drives.

At Angora they imagine they have esconced themselves in a stronghold so far in the interior that they feel themselves quite secure from any Western interference, and certainly it is true that no Western Power is now inclined for adventures in the interior of Asia Minor, while the Greeks are out of the picture for the present.

The triumphant return of Ismet Pasha from Lausanne brought to mind the victories of the council table, but the withdrawal of our great fleet and our troops even from the hardly-contested field of the Gallipoli Peninsula must have conveyed an inordinate sense of their own might against the Western Powers to the mind of the meanest Turkish peasant of the highlands of Anatolia.

To the devout Moslem it must have been ecstatic to see Greek and Armenian Christians driven from homes they had occupied for centuries before the Turks ever arrived in the land, driven forth with scarce a protest from the great Christian Powers, while the corresponding return of Turks from Thessaly and Macedonia seems delayed in deference to specious arguments from Angora.

Then, again, the position of foreigners has been deprived of the safeguards they so hardly won from great Sultans and enjoyed for centuries.

That a Turkish policeman should be able to hale an Englishman before a Turkish magistrate in Constantinople may seem only right and proper to some Western minds, but think of the same being done in Sivas or Kaisarie and its effect on the local population. Again at the trial of Mme. Fahmy at the Old Bailey the judge did not object to a Moslem witness taking the usual oath on the Bible.

Would the local Kadi of Erzingan or Konia have permitted such a thing or even have allowed a Bible to be brought into his court at all?

All these things, which seem trivial to us, must have given an undue sense of elation to the Turkish people, and moreover seemed to have raised the prestige of the Turks among the peoples of Syria and Mesopotamia so recently under their yoke as well.

But in contrast to this feeling of elation it may be as well to consider if there is any solid foundation for all this arrogance. Mustafa Kemal, with the National Assembly packed with his friends, has gone some way to becoming a military dictator, but he is still far from being secure. Discontent is growing among the large body of officers whom he has displaced, the usual violent repressive measures are being taken, executions are being planned and the Aidin district is in a state of siege, where two divisions are employed.

It may be that Mustafa Kemal, as the best way of solving a difficult problem, may elect to precipitate an attack on the French or ourselves in Syria or Mesopotamia. He may win some initial success in either field which would have the effect of increasing tenfold the arrogance and elation of the Angora Turks and their dictator, and, moreover, it might create such a stir throughout Islam that the Moslem world might come forward to acclaim Ghazi Mustafa Kemal as the only sovereign leader fit to wield the sword of Islam; in fact, to assume the title of Caliph itself.

But the Turkish army, numbering now some 200,000 in place of a peace strength of 600,000 in 1913, seems none too large for such excursions when the many vulnerable frontiers situated all round the present area of Turkey come to be considered. In Eastern Thrace the Turk has been placed face to face again with the Balkans and all its troubles, Mussolini has been faced in Smyrna and Adalia, the situation on the Transcaucasus frontier, though quiescent, has to be faced, without counting the Syrian and Mosul frontiers; munitions cannot be produced in Turkey itself, but must be purchased from some outside Power who will require payment, and, above all, the British fleet, which may have dipped beyond the horizon for the moment, can return with surprising and disconcerting speed, convoying transports, and supported by winged clouds of aeroplanes.

Still, a military dictator in the position of Mustafa Kemal is a desperate man, and may imagine that a bold stroke in some direction is the only way left to him out of

his internal dissensions, or that some such action is necessary to ensure the concessions he may demand during the negotiations about to commence on the Mosul frontier question.

Then, there is a further passage in Lord Curzon's speech at the Lausanne Conference last January in reply to Ismet Pasha's claims regarding Mosul which runs as follows:—

> "There had been constant manifestations of Kurdish discontent under Turkish
> "rule, and during the last four years the British Government has been bombarded
> "with representations from disappointed Kurds asking them to take up the matter
> "of Kurdish autonomy or Kurdish independence. As to the Assyrian and
> "Nestorian Christians on the frontier of Mosul, do they want to be handed over
> "to Angora? Not a day passes that I do not get letters from them appealing to
> "be saved from that fate."

Since that date in the mountain districts, over which the Turks have so little real control, which I have referred to above in the Hakkiari, the Bohtan and the Bitlis districts, the Kurdish desire for autonomy or independence continues to express itself, and still looks to British justice to further its aims.

The recent installation of Sayyid Taha as district Governor of Rowanduz must have done much to further hopes on that side of the frontier, while the cruel treatment of Simko Agha and his son by the authorities at Van must have done much to demonstrate the treatment which they may expect from Turkish masters, and to cause secret resentment among the Kurdish tribes of that area.

Bitlis and Sairt are also important centres of the Kurdish national movement as well as Jezire, as I have already shown, and places at which the national spirit could be fostered.

As for the Assyrian and Nestorian Christians, their once fertile valleys in the basis of the Great Zab still remain places of desolation, and the little mountain churches, so sacred to the faith, are heaps of ruins.

When the frontier of our area in Mesopotamia was being discussed after the armistice, I put forward to the War Office, as drawn on sheets of my 1 : 250,000 map, a suggested frontier, which ran along the Chukh Dagh, north of Bashkala, by Bashit Dagh, to the south of Lake Van, by Vestan, thence to the crest of Bitlis Pass, with an outlet on the lake at Tadvan, the Sanjak of Bitlis south of that point, the boundaries of the Sanjak of Sairt, and the "locality" of Jezire, with the kaza at present depending on that place.

This frontier, given only in outline, would provide for the inclusion in the area of the two general lines which have been shown to control all the intervening area, namely, Bashkala–Diza–Neri and Rowanduz on one side and Bitlis–Sairt–Jezire on the other. The area is predominantly Kurdish, almost entirely so, since the Armenians have been removed. The Assyrian (Nestorian) districts along the Great Zab are included in it.

This area might be arranged in one general State, with the present Kurdish districts under our mandate and under the same system of government. It is, I submit, a mistake to place the Kurds too much under the control of the Irak Government, the Arab and Kurdish races being so different in character, but in Southern Kurdistan the influence of Bagdad must continue to be felt to a certain degree for economic and geographical reasons. Yet the wider area proposed would give them a more considerable degree of autonomy and an area sufficiently large in which they might at least commence to foster ideas of national independence.

In their present frame of mind it is not easy to think of the Turks agreeing to such a scheme as they seem inclined to put forward, and assert again their far-reaching claims of last January, this time backed by threats.

But events may tend to alter this during the discussion, and the above suggestion might, I think, in any case be taken into consideration. On the other hand, if the Turks maintain their obdurate and threatening attitude it would be unwise to concede them anything of the area at present within our frontiers, either at Rowanduz or at Zakho especially, both of them important strategic points.

In their present attitude any concession would so weaken our entire position in Irak that we should ultimately have to abandon the country altogether, and King Feisal's position be rendered impossible.

His Majesty's Government surely wishes that King Feisal should be assisted along "the golden road to Samarkand" rather than that he should fall again into the hands of a tyrant worse than Harun-el-Rashid, namely, the Angora Turk.

This can only be done by retaining our military and air forces, as at present organised for his assistance, as well as giving political help to his Government, until the moods and ambitions of the tyrant entirely change and become more reasonable.

September 22, 1923.

F. R. MAUNSELL, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

No. 274.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 297.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1923.

YOUR telegram No. 457 of 7th September: Extension of amnesty.

You may give individual guarantee desired regarding extension of clause 2 of amnesty as regards Irak and Palestine provided that Turks agree that extension of clause 1 includes Turkish subjects, such as Assyrians who have entered and fought for Great Britain in the Irak levies, and were originally domiciled in parts of Turkey other than Constantinople. Guarantee must also be worded to exclude offences against agreement for maintenance of *status quo* in the Mosul area embodied in last paragraph of article 3 of Treaty of Lausanne and clause 7 of Evacuation Protocol.

Please inform your French and Italian colleagues of your action.

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